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Abstract 
It is well known that Liverpool surpassed Bristol as Britain's premier slave 
trading port in the mid-eighteenth century, but the reasons for Liverpool's 
dominance remain debated. In this comparative research, the theoretical framework 
of entrepreneurship and various notions of capital, including financial, human and 
social, accessed through merchants' associational networks is employed to determine 
whether or not Liverpool merchants were more entrepreneurial in the trade which in 
turn made them more successful. An interdisciplinary methodology that embraces 
concepts from both economic and business history as well as social network and 
socio-cultural analysis is used to ascertain how slave merchant networks in both 
ports operated and managed their trade. 
Entrepreneurship has quickly become a popular field of study in economics, 
sociology and business, and provides a new avenue to explore the organisation of 
the slave trade in both merchant communities. Additionally, by applying the notion 
of entrepreneurship within Liverpool slave merchant networks, a more convincing 
and satisfying explanation for their relative success besides their often-argued but 
little-explained "business acumen" is offered. An examination of nominal data 
sources, including the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database and club membership as 
well as qualitative sources such as merchant correspondence and parliamentary 
papers are used to map trends in business organisation between the two cities and 
over time, and to draw conclusions on the relative strength and nature of business 
partnerships. It is argued that Liverpool merchants managed slaving voyages within 
comparatively larger investment groups; thus, the business network a Liverpool 
merchant was part of was also larger. From these larger networks, Liverpool 
merchants had greater access to knowledge, skills and resources, collectively known 
as capital, and this larger pool of expertise offered more competitive advantages to 
ii 
their trade. Because of this, Liverpool merchants, as entrepreneurs, were able to 
surpass their counterparts in Bristol to become the leaders in the slave trade. 
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Acknowledgements 
I owe my deepest thanks and appreciation to a number of people in the 
completion of this project. This PhD has been made possible by funding from a 
number of institutions. Firstly, I am grateful to the School of History and the 
International Office at the University of Nottingham for funding my PhD and 
providing small research grants. Secondly, research grants from the Economic 
History Society, Royal Historical Society and the Historic Society of Lancashire and 
Cheshire funded numerous trips to the archives in Bristol, Liverpool and London, and 
without them, the research for this project could not have been completed. I should 
also like to thank my grandfather, Norbert White, whose financial, but more 
importantly, moral support eased many burdens these past four years. I hope I 
have made him proud. 
I would like to thank the very helpful staff at the Bristol Public Records Office, 
Bristol Reference Library, Liverpool Record Office and Merseyside Maritime Museum 
for their patience, assistance and in their genuine interest in my research. I should 
also like to thank the Bristol Public Records Office and the Liverpool Record Office for 
allowing me to print the maps used in Chapter Five. 
I am extremely grateful for the guidance provided by my supervisor, Dr. 
Sheryllynne Haggerty. I could not have been matched with a better mentor, whose 
research interests so closely align with my own and whose enthusiasm kept me 
inspired. She has been firm but fair, has kept me focused and has always looked out 
for my best interest. She truly went beyond the nominal duties of "supervisor", 
allowing me to stay in her home in Liverpool on numerous occasions. For all this, and 
her friendship, I am indebted. 
Much appreciation and thanks are also due to my very dear friend, Dr. Adam 
Brown. His creation of the computer code which facilitated the analysis of the slave 
iv 
trade communities of Bristol and Liverpool, as well as his work on the Pajek diagrams 
were invaluable to this project. Additionally, he proofread several drafts of chapters, 
listened to my concerns and frustrations and always provided a kind word. 
My love and thanks go to my parents and sister whose encouragement from 
three thousand miles away was absolutely essential. 
Lastly, I need to thank my very good friends whom I've met during my time 
at Nottingham. Warren Dockter deserves special mention, while the friendship and 
almost daily company of Emily Buchnea, Neil Howe, Alan Kissane and Matthew 
Phillips will not be forgotten. 
V 
Contents 
Abstract 
............................................................................................................. 
ii 
Acknowledgements 
........................................................................................................... 
iv 
Chapter One: Introduction 
........................................................................................ 
1 
Chapter Two: Bristol and Liverpool in Comparison 
........................................... 
50 
Chapter Three: Trends in the Organisation of the Bristol and 
Liverpool Slave Trade 
................................................................... 
91 
Chapter Four: An Analysis of the Trends in the Bristol and 
Liverpool Slave Trade 
.................................................................. 
148 
Chapter Five: The Bristol and Liverpool Slave Trade Merchants 
In their Urban Setting 
.................................................................. 
184 
Chapter Six: Mobilisation of Slave Trade Merchant Networks and their 
Relationship to the State and London 
.................................... 
233 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
...................................................................................... 
278 
Technical Appendix: The Trans Atlantic Slave Trade 
Database 
........................................................................................ 
287 
References 
........................................................................................................ 
291 
vi 
List of Maps, Figures and Tables 
Maps 
5.1 Map of Bristol Slave investor residences, 1775 
.................................................... 
205 
5.2 Map of Bristol Slave investor residences, 1794 
.................................................... 
207 
5.3 Map of Liverpool Slave investor residences, 1766 
............................................... 
211 
5.4 Map of Liverpool Slave investor residences, 1805 
............................................... 
213 
Figures 
3.1 Breakdown of ownership of Bristol slaving voyages, 1725-1807 
..................... 
103 
3.2 Breakdown of ownership of Liverpool slaving voyages, 1725-1807 
............... 
103 
3.3 Mean number of owners per voyage in Bristol and Liverpool, 1725-1897... 106 
3.4 Bristol solo versus non-solo managed voyages 
................................................... 
107 
3.5 Liverpool solo versus non-solo managed voyages 
.............................................. 
108 
3.6 Association of merchants, investors and relationships in 
Bristol and Liverpool 
............................................................................................................ 
110 
3.7 Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities, 1730-1739 
........................ 
116 
3.8 Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities, 1750-1759 
...................... .. 
118 
3.9 Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities, 1770-1779 
...................... .. 
120 
3.10 Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities, 1790-1799 
..................... 
122 
Tables 
Table 2.1 Clearances of Slave Ships by national carrier 
.............................................. 
75 
Table 2.2 Clearances of Slave Ships from Bristol and Liverpool 
................................. 
80 
Table 3.1 Major embarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool slavers, 
1725-1807 
................................................................................................................................. 
94 
Table 3.2 Major disembarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool slavers, 
1725-1807 
................................................................................................................................. 
98 
Table 3.3 Major embarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool case 
study merchants, 1725-1807 
............................................................................................... 
127 
VI' 
Table 3.4 Major disembarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool case 
study merchants, 1725-1807 
.............................................................................................. 
128 
Table 3.5 Ownership characteristics of Bristol case study merchants 
..................... 
131 
Table 3.6 Ownership characteristics of Liverpool case study merchants 
................ 
131 
Table 5.1 Percentage of membership of slave trade 
investors in organisations in Bristol, 1775 and 1794 
.................................................... 
225 
Table 5.2 Percentage of membership of slave trade 
investors in organisations in Liverpool, 1766 and 1805 
................................................ 
226 
vii' 
Chapter One: Introduction 
On his tour through England and Wales in 1720, Daniel Defoe described the 
city of Bristol as: 
The greatest, richest and best port of trade in Great Britain, London only 
excepted. The merchants of this city not only have the greatest trade, but 
they trade with a more entire independency upon London, than any other 
town in Britain. And 'tis evident in this particular, that whatsoever 
exportations they make to any part of the world, they are able to bring the 
full return back to their own port and dispose of it there. ' 
More than seventy years later, and describing a city about two hundred miles to the 
north, Dr. William Moss depicted the port city of Liverpool in his 1797 edition of The 
Liverpool Guide as follows: 
The advantages the town possesses in its near connexion and ready 
communication, by internal rivers and canals, with the extensive 
manufacturing town and neighbourhoods of Manchester; the coal country of 
Wigan: the unrivalled potteries of Staffordshire; the exclusive export of Salt; 
its central situation on the western coast of the kingdom, thereby 
communicating readily with Dublin and the northern parts of Ireland; and finally, the goodness of the Harbour and the very superior accommodation for Shipping; have all conspired to form it into a vortex that has nearly swallowed 
up foreign trade of Bristol, Lancaster, and Whitehaven. 2 
The above quotations demonstrate the passing of the torch from one commercial 
centre to the next, each being able to call themselves England's second city at 
different points in their history. While these two bustling ports of the eighteenth 
century enjoyed several advantages which contributed to their overall commercial 
prosperity, they also shared leading roles in a trade that contradicts twenty-first 
century sensibilities: the Atlantic slave trade. This dissertation seeks to explore 
those at the heart of the slave trade in England, the men of the merchant 
1 Daniel Defoe, A Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain Vol. 2 (1778) (reprinted London: Dent, 
1962), p. 36. 
2 William Moss, Georgian Liverpool: A Guide to the City in 1794 (reprinted Lancaster: Palatine Books, 
2007), p. 7. 
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communities in Bristol and Liverpool who entered into and organised slave trading 
ventures. It is well known that Liverpool surpassed Bristol as Britain's premier slave 
trading port in the mid-eighteenth century, but the reasons for Liverpool's 
dominance remain debated. While factors have been put forth including Liverpool 
having a more industrialised and better connected hinterland, as well as a more 
modernised port, this dissertation employs the theoretical framework of 
entrepreneurship and various notions of capital accessed through associational 
networks to determine whether or not Liverpool merchants had a "particular spirit of 
enterprise" which enabled their success. 3 To achieve this end, a methodology that 
embraces concepts from economic and business history, as well as social network 
and socio-cultural analysis is utilised. For both port cities, qualitative and 
quantitative data have been analysed to ascertain the associational networks that 
comprised the interwoven business and social relationships of these merchants. 
Through an examination of how the slave trade was organised in each city, and the 
social and political roles the prominent slave merchants held in each, a more 
comprehensive and, importantly, a comparative picture of the successes and failures 
of the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade emerges. 
The methodology and structure of the project are discussed in a later section. 
The eighteenth-century Atlantic world will first be reviewed including a discussion of 
the slave trade, followed by a review of the business history and mercantile culture 
literature that informs this project's understanding of the eighteenth-century trans- 
Atlantic merchant. Special attention will be given to the scholarship on 
entrepreneurship and networks as they factor greatly in this interdisciplinary 
methodology. 
3 Liverpool merchant James Penny informed the Privy Council investigating the slave trade in 1788 that Liverpool slave merchants owed their success in the trade to a "spirit of enterprise which is peculiar to the British merchant". Examination of James Penny, 27 Feb 1788, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), 
Board of Trade (hereafter BoT) 6/9. 
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The Atlantic Context 
The Atlantic Ocean is more than thirty million square miles, and explorers, 
adventurers and merchants have mapped out its geography and complex system of 
trade winds and currents since the fifteenth century. 4 Influenced by the North East 
trade winds, the slave trade was part of the wider movements of people, goods and 
ideas that comprise the larger theoretical perspective known as the "Atlantic World"; 
one which is claimed to be one of the most important historiographical developments 
in recent scholarship. 5 This perspective identifies the Atlantic world as a conceptual 
historical unit whereby the political, economic and cultural interactions among the 
peoples of Europe, Africa and the Americas are studied comprehensively and not as 
separate or isolated interactions. 6 While ships engaged in Atlantic trade utilised 
various shipping patterns, including bilateral, multilateral, shuttle and direct voyages, 
it is easy to see how the slave trade fits within this framework because its traditional 
tool of analysis, that of "triangular trade", easily conforms to Atlantic world 
methodology. ' Although not without its criticism for its simplicity, this now well- 
known triangular framework describes how ships loaded with goods left the British 
Isles for Africa, where the goods were then exchanged for slaves. Slaves were 
transported across the Atlantic to the West Indies and the North American mainland 
4 Thomas Benjamin, The Atlantic World: Europeans, Africans, Indians and their Shared History, 1400- 
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 67-68. 5 David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (eds. ), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 11. Miles Ogborn also places the Atlantic world in a larger context of 
comparative global history. Global Lives: Britain and the World, 1550-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). The Atlantic perspective is richly debated in the historiography. For a good discussion of the evolution of this perspective see William 0' Reilly, "Genealogies of Atlantic History", 
Atlantic History, 1 (2004), pp. 66-84. For a discussion of the challenges from other theoretical perspectives, 
see Paul W. Mapp, "Atlantic History from Imperial, Continental and Pacific Perspectives", William and 
Mary Quarterly, 63 (2006), pp. 713-724. 
6 Robin Law and Kristen Mann, "West Africa in the Atlantic Community: The Case of the Slave Coast", 
William and Mary Quarterly, 56 (1999), pp. 307-334. 
See Kenneth Morgan, "Shipping Patterns and the Atlantic Trade of Bristol, 1749-1770", William and 
Mary Quarterly, 46 (1989), pp. 506-538. Only about two thirds of ships made the complete triangular journey, indicating the variety of shipping patterns vessels utilised. Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. 328. 
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colonies, where they laboured to produce goods which were then shipped back to 
Britain, thus completing and maintaining this triangular pattern of trade. This 
"triangular trade" framework is representative of one of three concepts David 
Armitage identifies of Atlantic history at large, that of circum-Atlantic history, which 
focuses on the Atlantic as a zone of exchange. 8 All three concepts, including trans- 
and cis-Atlantic however, are interrelated and draw on the common themes of 
connection and identity that arise out of these movements created by exchange. 
Most useful for this study, though, is the approach known as "cis-Atlantic" history. 
According to Armitage, this concept "studies particular places as unique locations 
within the Atlantic world and seeks to define that uniqueness as the result of the 
interaction between local particularity and a wider web of connections (and 
comparisons)". 9 He notes that obvious locations for a cis-Atlantic study include port 
cities and mentions Bristol as an example. 1° In addition, Pierre Gervais claims that 
trading links should be the primary unit of analysis when studying the eighteenth- 
century merchant, as merchant activity, and the wealth derived from such, was 
central to these networks of exchange that created the Atlantic world. " Because the 
cis-Atlantic approach emphasises the comprehensive analysis of particular places, 
comparisons can thus be made between different places studied within this 
framework. Moreover, combined with the idea that merchant networks are the key 
concept from which to study and ascertain merchant behaviour, it becomes clear that 
this framework can inform a comparative and comprehensive study of Bristol and 
Liverpool slave merchants and of how their behaviour contributed to their overall 
success in the eighteenth-century commercial world. 
8 Armitage and Braddick, British Atlantic World, p. 16. 9 Ibid., p. 21. 
1o Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
11 Pierre Gervais, "Neither Imperial nor Atlantic: A Merchant Perspective on International Trade in the Eighteenth Century", History of European Ideas, 34 (2008), pp. 465- 473; Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. 66. 
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Formed on the basis of merchant capitalism, the Atlantic system spawned the 
"development of overseas productive enterprises, ports, cities and entire colonies". 12 
This Atlantic perspective as it relates to the slave trade underscores the commercial 
connections that linked Britain with both Africa and the Americas, and thus the way 
in which enslaved persons played a significant role both as commodities of the trade 
and as producers of commodities in the trade. Kenneth Morgan has noted that the 
slave trade was an integral part in the growth of the British Empire in that it 
stimulated shipbuilding, helped to develop ports, shaped attitudes towards capital 
accumulation and sparked the growth of long-distance oceanic communications and 
trade. 13 Furthermore, the slave trade facilitated innovations in commercial 
organisation and finance, as seen in extensive credit arrangements and remittance 
procedures, further discussed in Chapter Two as it relates to the trades of Bristol and 
Liverpool specifically. 14 All of this was made possible by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, when a strong commercial sector in the English economy 
facilitated a dramatic growth in commerce and overseas expansion. 's A link thus 
developed at this time between commerce and political power, and British 
merchants, as agents of commerce, can be seen as key factors in further developing 
the nation's power and prestige. 16 It is in this context of increased trade through 
state sponsorship that "modern" ideas of entrepreneurship and of the entrepreneur 
12 Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. 349. 
13 Kenneth Morgan (ed. ), The British Transatlantic Slave Trade Vol. 1(London: Pickering and Chatto, 2003), p. xi. 
14 Paul Butel, The Atlantic World (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 138; R. C. Nash, "The Organization of 
Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy", in Peter A. Coclanis (ed. ), The Atlantic Economy 
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice and Personnel (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), pp. 95-152; Kenneth Morgan, "Remittance 
Procedures in the Eighteenth Century British Slave Trade", Business History Review, 79 (2005), pp. 714- 749; K. G. Davies, "The Origins of the Commission System in the West India Trade: The Alexander Prize 
Essay", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 2 (1952), pp. 89-107. 15 See Ralph Davis, A Commercial Revolution: English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century (London: Historical Association, 1967), p. 3. 16 H. V. Bowen, Elites, Enterprise and the Making of British Overseas Empire, 1688-1775 (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 82. See Chapter Six for the relationship of Bristol and Liverpool merchants to 
the state. 
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emerge in the eighteenth century, which is discussed further below. '7 Additionally, 
growth and expansion facilitated the "urban renaissance" of the eighteenth century, 
impacting upon the commercial and social life of merchants, discussed further below 
and in Chapter Five in particular. 
This growth in commerce and expansion in turn was accompanied by the 
emergence and growth of plantation slave labour in North America and the 
Caribbean, as staple commodities such as tobacco and sugar required cultivation on 
large-scale plantation complexes. 18 These economic changes further stimulated 
great social change. Imports and exports were traded on an unprecedented scale, 
and Britain experienced an increased standard of living while at the same time 
producing a net outflow of population. 19 Thus, new political and economic 
relationships among countries and colonies were forged and connected in a vast web 
of trading networks. Ralph Davis attributes the development of this boom in the 
availability of new consumer goods to the growth in trading activity. He notes that in 
1570, England's only major export was woollen cloth, which accounted for around 
four-fifths of the trade, and was concentrated on the Atlantic coasts of Europe and 
places around the North Sea. However, by 1770, Britain not only had a more 
diversified range of goods for export, but re-exported large quantities of colonial and 
Asiatic goods and had extended its trade to much of the globe. 20 Indeed, throughout 
the century, customs records reveal that British exports increased almost sixfold 
17 Martin Ricketts, "Theories of Entrepreneurship: Historical Development and Critical 
Assessment", in Mark Casson, Bernard Yeung and Anuradha Basu (eds. ), The Oxford Handbook of 
Entrepreneurship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 33-59. 18 Kenneth Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, 1660-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 1; Benjamin, Atlantic World, pp. 373-419. 19 Stanley Engerman, "Mercantilism and Overseas Trade, 1700-1800", in R. Floud (ed. ), Economic History 
o(Britain since 1700: 1700-1860 Vol. 1(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 182-205. 2 Davis, Commercial Revolution, p. 3. 
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while imports rose over fivefold. 21 The bulk of these exports were in the form of 
manufactured goods, particularly textiles, which is reflective of Britain's technological 
advantage in production. Meanwhile, throughout the 1700s, imports were primarily 
in foodstuffs such as sugar and tea, which highlights the importance of Britain's 
overseas colonies and foreign trade in the development of the economy. 22 
Furthermore, Britain's previous position as a net importer of capital shifted to that of 
a net exporter of capital, primarily to the Americas. 23 This again emphasises the 
increased economic importance of the colonies and the increasingly significant role 
played by merchants, as much of this capital and investment came from them. The 
details of Bristol and Liverpool's trade, as well as their merchants' participation in it, 
are discussed at length in Chapter Two. 
This transition from primarily importing to exporting capital was indicative of 
mercantilist policies that were protected by the Navigation Acts, a series of 
legislation first enacted in 1651 and then codified in 1660, that were passed in an 
attempt to regulate colonial commerce for the benefit of the Crown. 24 At this time 
European powers fiercely competed with one another in trade and as the Spanish, 
French, Dutch and British all had similar commercial aims, the protection of trade 
was largely pursued by war. 25 Indeed, between 1660 and 1800, Britain was at war 
for fifty-five of those years, with most of them having a colonial component. 26 War 
often had damaging effects on Britain's trans-Atlantic trade and consequently, 
Britain's slave trade. Queen Anne's War (1702-1713), the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739- 
1748), War of Austrian Succession (1744-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756- 
'' David Richardson, "The Slave Trade, Sugar and British Economic Growth, 1748-1776", in B. Solow and 
S. Engerman (eds. ), British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 103-133. 22 Ibid., p. 195. 
1.3 Ibid., p. 194. 
--4 Ibid., p. 198. 
25 Benjamin, Atlantic World; Susan Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of 
English Society, 1640-1700 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 39. 26 Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, p. 16. 
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1763) were four conflicts that were fought among these colonial powers to protect 
and expand trading interests. 27 Fought during the formative period in the British 
slave trade, these wars certainly impacted upon the trade of the Bristol and Liverpool 
slave traders, as analysed in Chapters Three and Four. Because trade and warfare 
were the "unholy twins of commerce" the connection was made between financial 
gain and maritime defence as the cornerstone for the burgeoning empire's success. 28 
The Navigation Acts were thus intended to siphon revenue from colonial trade, but 
more importantly to protect it as well; not only were they designed to increase 
British shipping activity, but the number of skilled seamen was supposedly increased 
to give strength to the British Navy in time of war. 29 As will be seen in Chapter Six, 
one argument in support of the slave trade was that it served as a training ground 
for seamen, indicating the link between trade and maritime defence. Although these 
laws were notoriously and widely circumvented, they placed restrictions on both the 
export and import of goods to and from countries other than England, as well as 
restricted the carriage of goods to and from the colonies to British vessels. 
Moreover, they insisted on the enumeration of some colonial exports, particularly 
tobacco and sugar, to be sent to Britain before their re-sale to the Continent. 30 
Britain thus became the primary benefactor of its trade. 
Britain's control of the Atlantic was strengthened after the Dutch War of 
1664-1667; however, Britain's absolute supremacy in the Atlantic region was 
arguably not achieved until 1759, during the Seven Years' War, after decisive 
27 Ogborn, Global Lives, p. 68. 
28 Malcolm Balen, Secret History of the South Sea Bubble (New York: Harper Collins, 2005), p. 30. 
''9 Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, p. 13. 30 Engerman, "Mercantilism and Overseas Trade", p. 198. For an examination of excise in England, see 
William J. Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade, Production and Consumption in England, 1640-1845 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
8 
victories against the French in the Caribbean and in present-day Canada. 31 With the 
Dutch losing their stronghold on a variety of trades, including the very profitable trio 
of tobacco, sugar and furs by the latter half of the seventeenth century, Britain 
increased its trading activity in these staple commodities. The "Americanisation" of 
Britain's trade thus was a large source of its wealth later in the eighteenth century. 
Tobacco, first grown commercially in Virginia's tidewater region in the 1620s, and 
sugar, grown on West Indian plantations from the 1650s, initiated the development 
of monocrop cultivation in the Americas, in which large-scale plantations were used 
to raise these cash crops for export. In turn, the development of plantation 
agriculture also Africanised the labour force of the western hemisphere, as millions of 
Africans were forcibly brought to the colonies to labour under European plantation 
owners. 32 
The Seven Years' War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. 
The resulting "complex series of territorial exchanges" established British North 
America's territorial and commercial dominance as the empire effectively stretched 
from Nova Scotia to Florida. 33 British territory now encompassed both 
topographically and ethnically diverse colonies from New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts in New England, to Pennsylvania and Delaware in the Middle Atlantic, 
and South Carolina and Georgia in the South. Virginia, however, was Britain's 
largest, richest and most populous mainland colony because of the cultivation of its 
staple crop, tobacco. In the 1620s, Britain imported 65,000 pounds of Virginia 
tobacco; by the 1670s this figure had jumped to 220 million pounds. 34 While Virginia 
31 See J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006); Frank McLynn, 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004); Butel, Atlantic World, p. 156. 32 Benjamin, Atlantic World, pp. 381-382; D. A. Fannie, "The Commercial Empire of the Atlantic, 1607- 1783", Economic History Review, 15 (1962), pp. 205-218. 33 Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, p. 295; Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America (London: Tauris, 1986), p. 75. 34 James Walvin, Britain's Slave Empire (Stroud: Tempus, 2000), p. 22. 
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was certainly an important colony, the whole Chesapeake region, consisting of the 
present-day states of Virginia and Maryland, was significant for tobacco cultivation 
and thus the slave trade. Between 1698 and 1774, when Virginia and Maryland 
ended their transatlantic slave trade, London, Bristol and Liverpool merchants 
delivered 82,500 slaves to the region, with Bristol delivering almost half of this 
number. 35 Bristol and Liverpool's presence in this region is further explored in 
Chapter Three. 
Although the Chesapeake may have been an important region early in 
Britain's commercial empire, it was the sugar plantations of the West Indies that 
were to become the most profitable, and the West India interest had the most 
influence back in Britain out of all the colonies. Indeed, the sugar plantations 
produced three times more wealth than all other plantations and the majority of the 
slaves sent on British ships were delivered to the Caribbean islands. 36 The islands of 
St. Kitts, Barbados, Nevis, Montserrat and Antigua were settled in 1624,1627,1628 
and the 1630s respectively, while Jamaica was taken from the Spanish by 1655.37 
Sugar was the West Indies' staple crop for two centuries and as early as the 1660s, 
it surpassed tobacco as the most valuable single source of imports into England. 38 
West Indian sugar planters not only accrued a significant amount of wealth, they also 
garnered political influence, particularly between the 1730s and 1760s. Certainly in 
Bristol, the most economically and politically powerful men in the city were linked to 
35 Lorena S. Walsh. "Liverpool's Slave Trade to the Colonial Chesapeake: Slaving on the Periphery", in 
David Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz and Anthony Tibbles, (eds. ), Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), pp. 98-111. 36 Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. 373. See also Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
37 Richard S. Dunn, Sugar & Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 
(London: Cape, 1973), pp. 9,10. Britain's early ventures in Atlantic trade included "clandestine" voyages 
to Spanish and Portuguese America, circumventing the Iberian monopoly. In particular, supplying slaves to Spanish America later in the eighteenth century became a profitable avenue of trade, particularly for 
Liverpool slave traders. This is discussed in Chapters Three and Four. Nash, "Organization of Trade", p. 
95; James Wallace, General and Descriptive History of Liverpool (Liverpool: Printed for R. Phillips, 1795), 
Available at: Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale, University of Nottingham, pp. 216-217. 38 Fannie, "Commercial Empire of the Atlantic", p. 210. 
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the West India interest which shaped the commercial profile of the port, as discussed 
in Chapter Two. 39 The West Indian political lobby is further analysed in Chapter Six 
when its influence on the defence of the slave trade is discussed. English sugar 
consumption increased dramatically at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning 
of the eighteenth centuries, from 6.5 pounds per head in 1710 to 23.2 pounds in the 
early 1770s. 4° Viewed in another way, in 1700 Britain imported 23,000 tons of sugar 
from the West Indies and 245,000 tons by 1800.41 This increase was in conjunction 
with an increase in the consumption of other beverages including beer, spirits, and 
particularly tea. As the imports of sugar increased over the eighteenth century, so 
did those of tea. In the 1720s, nine million pounds of tea were imported to Britain 
and just twenty years later, this figure rose to twenty million pounds. 42 This is 
reflective of a striking development in consumer purchasing during the early-modern 
period, in that certain non-European grocery items were bought and consumed in 
mass quantities by the English and their colonial counterparts. 43 These groceries 
included tobacco, tea, coffee, chocolate and sugar, all of which were exotic to 
Western Europeans at this time. 44 
Sugar was thus "probably the most valuable commodity in all the world's 
trade of the eighteenth century" and because of this, the West Indian islands were 
39 See Kenneth Morgan, "Bristol West India Merchants in the Eighteenth Century", Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 3 (1993), pp. 185-208; Madge Dresser, Slavery Obscured: The Social History of 
the Slave Trade in a Provincial Port (London: Continuum, 2001). Historians have debated the extent of 
political influence the West India interest had in Parliament. Taking different arguments into consideration, 
Andrew O'Shaughnessy estimates that any one session would have forty or fifty members linked to the 
West Indies in "The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy 
and the American Revolution", Historical Journal, 40 (1997), pp. 71-95. David Beck Ryden cautions 
against the "myth" of their political power given that there were 558 seats in the Commons in West Indian 
Slavery and British Abolition, 1783-1807 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 193. 
40 Richardson, "The Slave Trade, Sugar and British Economic Growth", p. 113. 
41 Walvin, Britain's Slave Empire, p. 23. 
42 Ibid., p. 23. 
43 Carole Shammas, The Pre-industrial Consumer in England and America (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), p. 77. 
44Carole Shammas, "The Revolutionary Impact of European Demand for Tropical Goods", in John J. 
McCusker and Kenneth Morgan (eds. ), The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 163-186. 
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Britain's most valuable colonies. 45 Indeed, Robert Fogel asserts that between 1600- 
1800, sugar was the "single most important" commodity internationally traded, 
"dwarfing" in value the trade of other products including grain, fish, tobacco, spices 
and cloth. 46 Shortly before the War of American Independence, sugar accounted for 
about a fifth of British imports; additionally, Jamaica was the wealthiest British 
American colony, while the British West Indies as a whole constituted 32.2 per cent 
of the wealth of British America. This large proportion of wealth was in spite of 
having a significantly lower population than the mainland colonies. 47 Additionally, 
British slavers disembarked the vast majority of their slaves in Jamaica, and, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade conformed to this 
national trend. 48 Unlike the mainland southern colonies whose slave population 
increased from natural increase, the demand for slaves in Jamaica was particularly 
high as planters typically lost two and three per cent per year on account of deaths 
outstripping births. As Trevor Burnard has noted, wealth and slavery were thus 
"inextricably linked" in British America as the areas where slavery thrived were the 
most prosperous. 49 
The importance of the sugar islands because of their prodigious wealth is 
further underscored by the numerous conflicts fought by foreign powers for their 
control. Britain's long-standing rivalry with the French during the eighteenth century 
is particularly noted among Bristol and Liverpool slave traders, who periodically 
45 Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623-1777 (Barbados: University of the West Indies, 1974), p. 11. 
46 Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), p. 21. 
47 Fogel, Without Consent or Contract, p. 21; Trevor Burnard, "`Prodigious Riches': The Wealth of 
Jamaica before the American Revolution", Economic History Review, 54 (2001), pp. 506-524. 48 David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, Manolo Florentino (eds. ), Trans Atlantic Slave 
Trade, available at: www. slavevoyages. org. 
49 Burnard, "`Prodigious Riches"', p. 521. 
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spoke against French competition, and the perceived threat of it, in the trade. 
5o 
Sugar required substantial capital investments as well as a large labour force due to 
the intensive nature of its cultivation; planters thus turned to cheaper sources of 
labour and imported African slaves in larger and larger numbers as the eighteenth 
century progressed, instead of relying on white indentured servants or Indian 
labour. 5' Europeans utilised two approaches in the organisation of the slave trade: 
monopoly joint-stock companies and free, independent traders. 52 The joint-stock 
companies established trading forts at various points along the Western coast of 
Africa from which they carried out their trade initially in gold. From 1672, the British 
slave trade was run by the Royal African Company with its headquarters at Cape 
Coast Castle along the Gold Coast. It lost its monopoly on the trade in 1698, 
however, and the trade was thus opened to free traders. The Company then 
experienced managerial difficulties until it was formally dissolved in 1752 and 
replaced by The Company of Merchants Trading to Africa. 53 Independent traders, 
especially those from Bristol and Liverpool, however, enjoyed the most success in 
the British slave trade. Between 1624 and 1807, an estimated 2,292,269 slaves 
were delivered to the Caribbean on British vessels. 54 Jamaica received the most 
slaves with over 997,879 delivered in this period; Barbados was second in terms of 
disembarkation, with around 328,879 slaves delivered. For comparison, the 
Chesapeake region received only around 115,024 slaves, while South Carolina had 
around 125,538 slaves delivered in the period. 55 More slaves were traded in the 
Caribbean to both meet the labour requirements of large sugar plantations but also 
so These conflicts are discussed in Chapter Four as to their implications for the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
trade. Competition and the perceived threat by the French thereof are also examined in Chapter Six. 
51 Farnie, "Commercial Empire of the Atlantic", p. 209. 
52 Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. 343. 
53 See Kenneth Morgan (ed. ), The British Transatlantic Slave Trade Vol. 2: The Royal African Company 
(London: Pickering and Chatto, 2003), p. xxi; K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London: 
Routledge, 1960). 
sa Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
55 Ibid. 
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to sustain the slave population itself, creating a disproportionately higher population 
of blacks than whites in the British Caribbean. For instance, in 1660, the white 
population of Barbados and Jamaica was 22,000 and 3,000 respectively, with the 
black population around 20,000 and 500; by 1713, however, the white population in 
Barbados and Jamaica was 16,000 and 7,000 respectively while the black population 
had soared to 45,000 and 55,000.56 Thus, by mid-century, masters were 
outnumbered by their slaves four to one in Barbados, ten to one in Jamaica and 
seven to one in the Leeward Islands. 57 Britain also supplied slaves to Spanish 
America when they held the Asiento contract. 58 As discussed further below, much in 
the historiography of the slave trade relates to this "numbers" aspect of the trade, 
including its volume and distribution and debates on its profitability. Its particular 
organisation in terms of business and entrepreneurship are not as richly debated, a 
point which this project seeks to address. 59 
Merchant Culture: History and Theory 
This study assesses how entrepreneurship, or a particular spirit of enterprise, 
impacted on the developments within the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant 
communities. In so doing, the concepts of entrepreneurship, networks and the 
theoretical notions of capital must be understood and applied to current 
understanding of eighteenth-century business practice. The urban and commercial 
context of the eighteenth-century transatlantic merchant is considered first and is 
informed by the literature on merchant culture. This will be followed by an analysis 
56 Dunn, Sugar & Slaves, p. 312. 
57 Ibid., p. 313. 
58 See Davies, Royal African Company, pp. 327-335. The Asiento contract is further discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
59 This line of inquiry was initiated by Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1969). 
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of entrepreneurship and capital, which is applied to this understanding of the 
eighteenth-century merchant and establishes the theoretical foundations of this 
dissertation. 
It was mentioned above that the commercial growth and expansion of the 
eighteenth century established the merchant as a key agent of political power and 
prestige. Additionally, this growth facilitated the "urban renaissance". Chapter Five 
discusses more specifically how features of the "urban renaissance" were exhibited in 
the Bristol and Liverpool communities; however, the predominant features are 
outlined here. Eighteenth-century towns, and particularly provincial ports such as 
Bristol and Liverpool, significantly grew in population and this growth was 
accompanied by corresponding developments in commerce, industry and services. 
With an emphasis on transformation and renewal, these changes in the urban 
landscape also ushered in notions of improvement and the development of a civic 
identity. 60 Thus, while a sense of "civic pride" has long been associated with the 
nineteenth century, its origins are in the eighteenth century and arguably can and 
should be considered in this context of growth and change. 61 Neil McKendrick et al. 
argue for the "democratisation of consumption" during this period in which the 
broadening of the market altered the relationships among producers, distributors and 
consumers while simultaneously transforming economic and social values. 62 Social 
mobility and status could be achieved through purchasing power and not necessarily 
by birth alone. 63 Successful merchants enjoyed the elevated status attributed to 
their economic situation, and with this change in status came political involvement. 
60 Peter Borsay, The English Urban Renaissance: Culture and Society in a Provincial Town, 1660-1770 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 43,22. 61 Jane Longmore, "Civic Liverpool: 1680-1800", in John Belchem (ed. ), Liverpool 800 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2006), pp. 113-171. Chapter Five further discusses notions of civic pride, 
reputation and status as it relates to Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchants. 62 Neil McKendrick, "The Consumer Revolution of Eighteenth Century England", in Neil McKendrick, 
John Brewer and J. H. Plumb (eds. ), The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of 
Eighteenth Century England (London: Europa, 1982), pp. 9-34. 63 McKendrick, "Consumer Revolution", p. 16. 
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As already mentioned, merchants played a key role in the development of the early- 
modern state, particularly because commercial expansion required merchants to look 
to the state for protection and encouragement of its interests. 64 Thus, with more 
economic power, merchants also increasingly took part in politics. This in turn 
fostered a relationship between business success and civic reputation and impacted 
upon merchants' self-perceptions and status in the eighteenth-century urban world. 
Because of this democratisation, certain ideas regarding taste, decorum and 
standards were also propagated along with these notions of improvement to ensure 
these developments served to "refine rather than corrupt"; indeed, the eighteenth 
century is also sometimes characterised as "a century of taste" on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 65 Reformation societies, charities and almshouses consequently arose to 
"prove" that this new wealth was honourably spent and to justify these new 
commercial developments. 66 
While social changes reflected commercial expansion, physical changes in the 
landscape did the same. Some of the most notable improvements made during this 
period include developments in communications infrastructure connected with inland 
trade. Bridges, turnpike roads and wider, more uniform streets were built to both 
facilitate trade and cater to the increase in traffic. 67 Specific transportation 
improvement schemes, particularly in regards to river transport in Bristol and 
Liverpool, are noted in Chapter Two and port improvements are discussed further in 
Chapter Six. In addition to transport, improvements also took place in the form of 
64 Perry Gauci, The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 2,10. 65 John Styles and Amanda Vickery (eds. ), Gender, Taste and Material Culture in Britain and North America, 1700-1830 (New Haven: The Yale Centre for British Art, 2006), pp. 14,19. 66 See Natasha Glaisyer, The Culture of Commerce in England, 1660-1720 (London: Royal Historical 
Society, 2006); Jonathan Barry, "Bristol Pride: Civic Identity in Bristol c. 1640-1775", in Madge Dresser 
and Philip Ollerenshaw (eds. ), The Making of Modern Bristol (Tiverton: Radcliffe Press, 1996), pp. 25-48. 67 E. L. Jones and M. E. Falkus, "Urban Improvement and the English Economy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", in Peter Borsay (ed. ), The Eighteenth Century Town: A Reader in English Urban 
History (New York: Longman Group, 1990), pp. 116-159. 
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public building programs, in which these new buildings were more uniformly 
constructed in the classical style. The most impressive of these new public buildings 
were commercial structures such as the merchants' Exchanges based on the model 
of the Royal Exchange in London, completed in 1671.68 The Exchanges in Bristol 
(1741-1743) and Liverpool (1749-1754) were built by the distinguished Bath 
architect, John Wood the Elder and both were arranged around a central courtyard 
and fronted by monumental Palladian facades. These commercial structures were 
vitally important for conducting business in the city. Merchants arguably received 
their most valuable pieces of information from informal and formal interactions with 
colleagues, and thus merchants spent ample amounts of time in the merchant 
Exchanges and patronising local coffeehouses and taverns. 69 Coffeehouses in 
particular were new and important commercial and social spaces. Because certain 
coffeehouses catered to specific trades, business became socialised and merchants 
would often conduct business in coffeehouses as well as at the Exchange or counting 
house. 70 Coffeehouses also hosted informal drinking clubs and societies, further 
discussed in Chapter Five as it relates specifically to Bristol and Liverpool. These 
social groups were important, as they worked to promote solidarity and maintain 
commercial networks. 71 Like coffeehouses, counting houses were situated in areas 
that "facilitated shopping around, bargaining and acquiring information" as well as 
being close to the water where goods were being loaded and unloaded on and off 
ships. 72 Both formal and informal meeting places were areas where merchants could 
68 Borsay, English Urban Renaissance, p. 104. 69 David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Economy, 1735-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 88. Madge Dresser shows many 
prominent members of the Bristol merchant community were also neighbours in Slavery Obscured, p. 106. 
° Brian Cowan, The Social Life of Coffee: the Emergence of the British Coffeehouse (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 169. 71 Longmore, "Civic Liverpool", p. 141. 72 Hancock, Citizens of the World, p. 88. 
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not only conduct business, but access various forms of capital as well, as further 
discussed below. 
While the urban environment of the eighteenth-century English merchant is 
well understood, the historiography is still rich with discussions of what is meant by 
"business community" and those that participated in one. 73 For example, the term 
"businessman" was not used in the late colonial period due to the general nature of 
trade; however, "going into business" and "'going into merchandizing" were used by 
merchants to mean commercial participation. 74 Additionally, Sheryllynne Haggerty's 
study of the British-Atlantic trading community examines contemporary notions of 
"merchant", "trader" and "dealer" among others, placed in the context of the 
commercial community at large. She remarks that merchants enjoyed the position of 
being at the "top of the trader status tree" and by 1755, the term "often, but not 
always, implied someone 'who trafficks to remote countries"' and thus was "implicitly 
concerned with mercantilist concerns". 75 In observing such difference among these 
contemporary definitions, Perry Gauci cautions that it is "unwise to use terms as 
'business community' without paying tribute to the diversity of experience within the 
urban elite". 76 Differences and implications in defining what is meant by merchant or 
a business community impact upon historical studies and scholarship appreciates the 
nuance involved in historical conceptions of business and business practice. 
While much of the scholarship on eighteenth-century business appreciates 
nuance in the concepts of "merchant" and "business community", historians are less 
cognisant of that of entrepreneurship and how this impacted upon the eighteenth- 
73 See Sheryllynne Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading Community, 1760-1810: Men, Women, and the 
Distribution of Goods (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Gauci, Politics of Trade; Richard Grassby, The Business 
Community of Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Hancock, 
Citizens of the World. 
74 Robert. A. East, "The Business Entrepreneur in a Changing Colonial Economy", Journal of Economic History, 6 Supplement (1946), pp. 16-27. 75 Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community, p. 41. 
76 Gauci, Politics of Trade, p. 7. 
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century commercial world. This is in part due to the fact that the term 
"entrepreneur" was not used by merchants themselves at this time. The French 
economic theorist, Cantillon, coined the term in the mid-eighteenth century and it 
was not introduced into English economics until the latter part of the nineteenth 
century by John Stuart Mill. " Although not specifically in use in England however, a 
more modern conception of entrepreneurship had in fact developed by the 
eighteenth century, in conjunction with the aforementioned link between an increase 
in trade and the power of the state. Merchants were at the crux of this relationship, 
and as Martin Ricketts explains, terms such as "buccaneer" and "privateer" were 
instead used to connote those engaged in what may now be considered 
entrepreneurial activity. 78 Historical studies that fail to define what is considered 
entrepreneurial are problematic, especially because contention still remains in 
modern studies of what constitutes an entrepreneur. Economists rarely try to define 
what is meant by an entrepreneur and instead often rely on the stereotype of a 
"swashbuckling adventurer". 79 With regard to the Bristol and Liverpool merchant 
communities, historians have also used the terms "entrepreneurship" and 
"entrepreneur" to describe relative commercial success and failure, but have not 
adequately explained what is meant by these terms. For example, Steve Poole 
labels part of the commercial community in Bristol as the "entrepreneurial 
bourgeoisie", but he does not establish his criteria for determining what makes these 
men entrepreneurial. 80 Morgan also suggests "entrepreneurial failure" on the part of 
Bristol merchants, but again, the criteria are not clarified. 81 Likewise, David 
Richardson notes that the "major entrepreneurs" in the Liverpool trade were 
77 Ricketts, "Theories of Entrepreneurship", pp. 41,40. 
78 Ibid., p. 37. 
79 Mark Casson, The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), p. 1. 80 Steve Poole, "To be a Bristolian: Civic Identity and the Social Order, 1750-1850", in Dresser and 
Ollerenshaw, Making of Modern Bristol, pp. 76-96. 
81 Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, p. 221. 
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instrumental in exploiting new sources of slave supply on the Western coast of 
Africa; while one can interpret that the exploitation of new resources can be 
entrepreneurial, there is still a degree of assumption regarding its meaning. 82 Thus, 
although entrepreneurship is discussed in historical works, it is rarely grounded in a 
meaningful and contextualised definition. Moreover, by relying on assumptions that 
readers understand what is meant by entrepreneur and entrepreneurship, such 
historical studies have not achieved the more nuanced analysis of eighteenth-century 
business communities that studies with such a contextualised definition and 
discussion would accomplish. 83 
While entrepreneurship is not adequately treated in current literature on the 
eighteenth-century commercial world, the concept of networks is well known and 
widely studied. It was mentioned above that networks of exchange created the 
Atlantic world. Accordingly, the transatlantic commercial world of the eighteenth 
century was a connected set of markets and merchant networks. This highlights the 
issue of the importance of communication with, and the cultivation of, business 
contacts. Indeed, merchant networks in a slaving voyage included not only the 
merchants who invested in the voyage, but also the suppliers of goods for barter, 
captains used, factors and agents in the Americas, and the traders on the African 
coast. Networks, seen as intermediaries between markets and firms, were 
particularly important to ensure "efficient economic activity" especially in the relative 
absence of formal institutions and communication systems at this time. 84 It is 
accepted that successful merchants became so by developing solid commercial 
82 David Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade: The Accounts of William Davenport, 1757- 
1784", in Roger Anstey and P. Hair (eds. ), Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition: Essays to 
illustrate Current Knowledge and Research (Widnes: Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 1976), 
pp. 60-91. 
3 Such a definition is discussed further below. 
84 Jon Stobart, "Personal and Commercial Networks in an English Port: Chester in the Early Eighteenth 
Century", Journal of Historical Geography, 30 (2004), pp. 277-293; see also Mark Casson, 
"Entrepreneurial Networks in International Business", Business and Economic History, 26 (1997), pp. 811- 
823. 
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relationships with the merchants and traders with whom they dealt. Thus, trust and 
reputation were requisite factors in building and maintaining these commercial 
contacts. Trust and reputation were developed and maintained through reciprocal 
and repeated interactions and exchanges among the members in merchant 
networks. Thus, networks formed from "'something that may not improperly be 
called a commercial friendship 
... 
which takes its rise from a long correspondence 
and is established by a punctual and steady integrity on both sides". 85 This notion of 
commercial friendship echoes Adam Smith's observation that "colleagues in office, 
partners in trade, call one another brothers; and frequently feel towards one another 
as if they really were so". 86 Additionally, Sir Alexander Grant, a London merchant, 
noted that an "`Association in Trade was the very next thing to Matrimony"which 
required "'similar or well adapted tempers & dispositions & even personal friendship 
and affection"'. 87 
Often, these associations were familial. Richard Grassby notes that an 
organisational chart of any firm "reads like a genealogy" and client lists and 
correspondents were passed down through the generations. 88 The importance of 
family connections in international trade is often noted. Peter Mathias argues that 
businesses often operated within a "family matrix", which called for extended kinship 
networks because the accumulation of significant wealth rarely occurred in one 
generation by the actions of one merchant, and capital and connections were 
required at the outset of a business venture to overcome its initial risks. 89 Personal 
connections could be created through marriage, which often cemented alliances 
85 Quoted in Peter Mathias, "Risk, Credit and Kinship in Early Modem Enterprise", in McCusker and 
Morgan, Early Modern Atlantic Economy, pp. 15-36. See also Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, 
"Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of the Old Calabar Slave Trade", 
American Historical Review, 104 (1999), pp. 333-355. 
86 Quoted in Alan Silver, "Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth Century Social Theory and 
Modern Sociology", American Journal of Sociology, 68: 3 (1990), pp. 1474-1504. 
87 Quoted in Hancock, Citizens of the World, pp. 25,26. 
88 Grassby, Business Community, p. 19. 
89 Mathias, "Risk, Credit and Kinship", p. 17. 
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between families with similar business interests, or through family wealth and 
influence, which initiated potential businessmen into "the insider's world of personal 
contacts, confidential relationships, personal trust and status in the trade". 90 The 
"family matrix" and issues of trust also extended to apprentices. Gauci notes "the 
apprentice could not fail to recognise the potential importance of the master for his 
future career in trade". 91 Through the master, the apprentice would learn the 
intricacies and nuances of the trade, but also make the same contacts as the master. 
Moreover, many apprentices married into their masters' families, thereby 
representing not only "personal attachment, but also enduring commercial 
priorities". 92 
Some historians, however, caution against over-emphasising the importance 
of kinship for the commercial success of merchants. Haggerty argues that in "an 
increasingly impersonal world, in which trade was already global, there was no way 
that traders could know everyone that they dealt with" and that in some cases, 
"familial networks could often be a burden rather than a help". 93 The eighteenth 
century witnessed the evolution of the business firm, so many partnerships were 
open-ended and informal; a merchant could be a partner with another merchant for 
one or two ventures and then partner up with other individuals or groups at the 
same time for different ventures. 94 Merchants often worked in partnership to spread 
both knowledge and costs, as well as to combat risk, but formal contracts or articles 
binding these partnerships were few. This is indicative of the importance of trust and 
personal integrity for the success of individual merchants. Perhaps besides family 
connections, then, the most important factor in creating partnerships is what David 
90 Mathias, "Risk, Credit and Kinship", pp. 19,18. 91 Gauci, Politics of Trade, p. 73. 9'` Ibid. 
93 Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community, p. 109. David Hancock's study of Scottish networks in the Madeira wine trade also addresses this issue. David Hancock, "The Trouble with Networks: Managing 
the Scots Early Madeira Wine Trade", Business History Review, 79 (2005), pp. 467-491. 94 Hancock, Citizens of the World, p. 11. 
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Hancock describes as the "complementarity of business strengths", which could be 
geographical or operational in nature. 95 Whatever reason merchants chose to align 
with their partners, from an entrepreneurial standpoint, it must be considered how 
certain partnerships led to commercial success or failure in the Bristol and Liverpool 
slave merchant communities. 
As mentioned above, network relationships were maintained through repeated 
interactions which in turn built loyalty and trust, and helped to combat risk. 
Networks also played a crucial role in information transfer and commercial 
knowledge was spread through merchant correspondence. Letters of introduction 
and likewise letters of recommendation were particularly important in eighteenth- 
century business practice because they "included the bearer in the merchant's 
established business network and opened up the benefits that came with it". 96 These 
letters often expressed that merchants, agents and captains possessed the desired 
qualities for good business practice, which are outlined below. Letters were not only 
vital for information transfer, but important for the propagation of reputation due to 
their public nature as well. It has been argued that letters had a "critical place in the 
system of oral and written communication in port cities" precisely because of the 
disclosed information. 97 Merchants shared and discussed information provided by 
newspapers, personal experience and indeed, letters, and so the implications on an 
individual's reputation are made particularly clear. Stories of both good and bad 
business practice, as well as tales of praise and criticism were shared through 
merchant networks. Toby Ditz's study of mercantile representations of failure in 
eighteenth-century Philadelphia demonstrates that merchant correspondence, shared 
in the public sphere, used certain stock phrases to comment on the merchants' 
95 Ibid., p. 107. 
96 Stobart, "Personal and Commercial Networks", p. 278. 97 Toby L. Ditz, "Shipwrecked; or Masculinity Imperiled: Mercantile Representations of Failure and the Gendered Self in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia", Journal of American History, 81: 1 (1994), pp. 51-80. 
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reputation, honour and masculinity. 98 The use of stock phrases as it relates to 
entrepreneurship is worth mentioning here, as it is illustrative of how "story-telling" 
operates as a key ingredient in social network theory as way to foster solidarity and 
identity. In the modern context Robert Putnam, as well as Don Cohen and Laurence 
Prusak, espouse the notion that dense social ties facilitate gossip and other means of 
developing reputations. Cohen and Prusak argue that "verbal codes" are created 
throughout networks that help develop a sense of shared identity; in this way, if one 
were to ask several investment bankers about their worst plane trip, "the stories 
seem to merge into one common tale of woe". 99 No doubt Philadelphia merchants' 
representations of failure through their correspondence operated in the same way. 
In one respect, using stock phrases, or "verbal codes" was simply part of the 
business practice, in that letters of instruction, for instance, followed a particular 
template. However, such as in the case of the Philadelphia merchants, their usage is 
also indicative of ways in which trust and solidarity are promoted and maintained 
through networks and thus had a deeper social and cultural meaning. 
There were, however, other important ways in which merchants received the 
required information. Commercial publications, such as bills of entry, exchange rates 
and marine lists gave valuable day-to-day information. John McCusker notes these 
types of tracts developed when merchants decided it was to their best advantage to 
share information that was "previously thought more valuable for being kept 
secret". loo By publishing these "secrets", efficiency was increased and businesses 
could be more productive because merchants had more regular, comprehensive 
98 Ibid., p. 54. 
99 Don Cohen and Laurence Prusak, In Good Company: How Social Capital Makes Organizations Work 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001), p. 61. 100 John J. McCusker "The Demise of Distance: The Business Press and the Origins of the Information 
Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World", Reprinted from American Historical Review, 110 (2005), 
pp. 295-321. 
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knowledge of the different markets. 101 This is further indicative of the importance of 
knowledge in the commercial world. Other print sources include manuals. Haggerty 
asserts, "some elite merchants often had a whole library consisting of items such as 
'how-to' guides, reference works, town histories and literary works". 102 These 
commercial tracts taught merchants how to apply techniques such as double entry 
bookkeeping, but perhaps more importantly, discussed the personal attributes 
merchants should possess. Craig Muldrew discusses these important soclo-cultural 
aspects of merchant and commercial life when he notes that with the nature of risk 
in trade, "the stress on trust as a necessary social bond meant that increasingly a 
good reputation for honesty and reliability in obligations was of great social 
importance". 1113 Reputation, trust and credit were thus synonymous and commercial 
manuals taught merchants what was expected of them. 
The eighteenth-century merchants' particular urban and commercial context 
thus shaped their business practices. Merchant communities, as the "social base of 
the merchant universe" arguably retained their own culture and ties of solidarity, 
which were propagated through correspondence, commercial manuals and, as will be 
seen later, formal and informal interactions. 104 As will now be discussed, this context 
allowed for entrepreneurship and the application of various types of capital to 
influence their commercial success. While the "urban renaissance" is discussed 
above as it relates to the Bristol and Liverpool experience, economic and sociological 
studies explore other theoretical constructs that shape the socio-economic context. 
Mark Granovetter facilitates a discussion of both general business history and 
economics with a social dimension. While specifically targeting "modern industrial 
101 McCusker, "Demise of Distance", p. 305. 102 Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community, p. 114. 103 Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: the Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early 
Modern England (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 148. f04 Frederic Mauro, "Merchant Communities, 1350-1750", in James D. Tracy (ed. ), The 
Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350-1750 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 255-287. 
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society", he raises the issue of the extent to which "economic action is embedded in 
structures of social relations" and addresses the question of how institutions and 
human behaviour are influenced by social relations and interactions. 105 This issue, 
however, is also applicable to the eighteenth-century Atlantic world. Trading 
networks grew in both breadth and sophistication during this period and merchant 
behaviour within these networks should be analysed to ascertain to what degree this 
behaviour was indeed informed by embedded social structures. Granovetter also 
uses the concept of oversocialisation in his discussion of economic behaviour. An 
oversocialised person is one who is "overwhelmingly sensitive to the opinions of 
others and hence obedient to the dictates of consensually developed systems of 
norms and values, internalised through socialisation so obedience is not perceived as 
a burden". 106 Economically speaking, oversocialisation works to internalise 
"normative standards of behaviour as to guarantee orderly transactions". 107 Again, 
Granovetter uses this term for modern applications, but it could equally be used for 
early modern and eighteenth-century merchants as well. As mentioned above, 
business and economic historians note that reputation and trust were crucial in 
forging and maintaining business contacts in merchants' networks. Like Muldrew, 
Joel M. Podolny and Karen C. Page note that in a network, actors pursue repeated 
and enduring exchanges in a context with no legitimate authority to regulate any 
disputes that arise from these exchanges. 108 The guiding principle behind this form 
of organisation is a "spirit of goodwill". This "spirit" gives members a sense of 
obligation to each other rather than a desire to take advantage, much like 
105 Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness", American 
Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985), pp. 481-510. 
106 Ibid., p. 488. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Joel M. Podolny and Karen C. Page, "Network Forms of Organization", in Richard Swedberg (ed. ), New 
Developments in Economic Sociology Vol. 1 (Cheltenham: Edward Elger, 2005), pp. 481-500. 
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Granovetter's argument of a context of embeddedness. 109 Eighteenth-century 
business ethics were thus embedded in market activities "wherein relations of 
obligation and dependence forged commercial bonds tempered by sociability" and 
these moral factors "provided strong reasons for stressing cooperation within 
marketing structures of the period". "0 
As mentioned above, historians' more ably deal with what businessmen and 
merchants were, than they do in regards to their entrepreneurship. However, 
definitions by business historians are in agreement with those concepts elaborated 
upon in the literature of eighteenth-century enterprise, which can be used to 
comment on entrepreneurship. Stanley Chapman asserts that merchants included 
general traders rather than specialists, while Robert A. East describes a colonial 
merchant as one having a broad interest in imports and exports in a "quasi- 
international" economy-or, specific to this study, the Atlantic economy. "' Some 
studies define entrepreneurs as economic opportunists and "'jacks of all trades" who 
are sufficiently good at many skills, which although applied to current understanding, 
are closely aligned with the idea of eighteenth-century traders operating in a general 
commercial context. 112 The London Tradesman, first published in 1747, described 
commerce as the Sphere of the Merchant" that "extends itself to all the known 
World and gives Life and Vigour to the whole Machine". 113 Due to the worldly nature 
of the profession then, a merchant "ought to be a Man of an extensive Genius" with 
an understanding not only of "Goods and Merchandize in general 
... 
but he must 
know Mankind and be acquainted with the different Manners and Customs of all the 
109 Ibid., p. 403. 1 10 Beverly Lemire, The Business of Everyday Life: Gender, Practice and Social Politics in England, 1600-1900 (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 24. 111 Stanley Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 35; East "Business Entrepreneur", p. 16. 112 George Herberton Evans Jr., "A Theory of Entrepreneurship", Journal of Economic History, 12 (1942), 
pp. 142-146. 
13 Robert Campbell, The London Tradesman originally published by T. Gardner (1747) (Newton Abbot: 
David and Charles, 1969), p. 284. 
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Trading Nations"; therefore, he must be "as well acquainted with the Manners and 
Customs of all the Nations he trades with as his own". 114 These descriptions imply 
what the merchant did (his role) and what kind of person the merchant was (his 
personality), which are two considerations tackled by entrepreneurial theory. 
Indeed, these considerations of eighteenth-century business practice are 
supported by current notions of entrepreneurship. Contention exists in current 
studies of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs, particularly because entrepreneurial 
theory is analysed from two different approaches, each with their own limitations. 115 
The first approach is functional, in that the specific role of the entrepreneur is 
defined. The second is indicative, whereby the entrepreneur is described in terms of 
his or her personality. 116 Economists have typically utilised the functional approach 
while economic historians have adopted the indicative; thus most entrepreneurial 
studies have not integrated these approaches into a single, cohesive framework. 
Mark Casson's recent work has achieved such integration, as his definition of an 
entrepreneur as "someone who specialises in taking judgmental decisions about the 
coordination of scarce resources" encompasses both the entrepreneur's role and 
requisite personal characteristics. 117 This dissertation also seeks an integrated 
approach. An analysis of the entrepreneur that encompasses both his role and his 
personality falls under the umbrella term of "management", and slaving voyages 
required particular managerial skill. "" When applied to the context of eighteenth- 
century slave trade merchants, Casson's definition embodies the notion of slave 
11a Ibid., pp. 292-293. 115 For a discussion of the limitations see Howard E. Aldrich and Catherine Zimmer. "Entrepreneurship 
through Social Networks", in Donald Sexton and Richard Smiler (eds. ), The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 3-23; Casson, The Entrepreneur. 
116 Casson, The Entrepreneur, p. 19. These two approaches are also know as demand and supply, further 
explored in Patricia H. Thornton, "The Sociology of Entrepreneurship", Annual Review of Sociology, 25 (1999), pp. 19-46. 117 Casson, The Entrepreneur, p. 20. 118 Joseph Schumpeter, "Entrepreneur", in Swedberg, New Developments in Economic Sociology, pp. 267- 298. 
28 
merchants as decision makers, for example, in terms of assessing market 
opportunities, and as coordinators of resources, by for instance gathering the 
necessary capital, knowledge and experience from a group of investors in order to 
conduct a voyage. Entrepreneurial studies define the role of the entrepreneur as one 
who assumes risk, supplies financial capital, is an innovator, decision maker, 
coordinator of resources, and engages in arbitrage, which fall in line with the slave 
trader's role. Studies additionally note such personal characteristics as initiative, 
foresight, courage, imagination, optimism and low risk aversion, which also 
encompass the traits of successful slave merchants. 119 
Eighteenth-century sources also note similar traits. Baron Hawkesbury 
asserted that "spirit" and "diligence" combined with "vigour" and "industry" 
contributed to the success of Liverpool merchants. 120 "Spirit" in particular was often 
cited as a requisite quality for good commercial practice. Liverpool merchant James 
Penny informed the Privy Council in 1788 that Liverpool slave merchants owed their 
success in the trade to a "spirit of enterprise which is peculiar to the British 
merchant". 121 John Tarleton of Liverpool also attributed success to the "enterprising 
spirit of the people" that enabled Liverpool "to carry on the African slave trade with 
vigour". 122 Certain qualities were also seen as necessary in building trust and 
reputation for commercial success. Upon establishing a new partnership in Jamaica, 
Francis Bright emphasised the importance of "transacting all our affairs with 
119 See Robert F. Hebert and Albert N. Link, "Historical Perspectives on the Entrepreneur", Foundations 
and Trends in Entrepreneurship, Vol. 2 (2006), pp. 261-408; Robert Baron, "The Cognitive Perspective: A 
Valuable Tool for Answering Entrepreneurship's Basic `Why' Questions", Journal of Business Venturing, 19 (2004), pp. 221-239; Mark Casson, Entrepreneurship and Business Culture (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995); Nigel Wadeson, "Cognitive Aspects of Entrepreneurship: Decision Making and Attitudes to Risk", in Casson, Yeung and Basu, The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship, pp. 91-114. 120 Examination of Baron Hawkesbury 27 Feb 1788, BoT 6/9. 121 Examination of James Penny, 27 Feb 1788, BoT 6/9. 
122 Gomer Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque with an Account of the Liverpool Slave Trade, 1744-1812 (Reprinted by McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 
p. 610. 
29 
prudence and punctuality" to become a "more established name". 123 Not having 
these qualities, on the other hand, resulted in poor business practice, as described in 
a letter from Jeremiah Meyler in Kingston to his cousin Richard back in Bristol: "in 
regard to our partner Mr. Hall he is not the industrious man he was some time past" 
as he spent much of his time "in bed & visiting the fair sex". 124 Fortunately for the 
partnership, two years later, Charles Hall began "to apply himself to business" so 
Jeremiah Meyler was able to relinquish more responsibilities in the firm. 125 Such 
characteristics as industry, prudence, spirit and vigour thus reinforce the idea that 
eighteenth-century merchants, although not necessarily using the term 
"entrepreneur" recognised similar attributes that were essential for commercial 
prosperity. Therefore, there is no danger of anachronism in using modern notions of 
entrepreneurship as an analytical tool. This interwoven relationship between a 
merchant's entrepreneurial role and the desired character traits for business is 
perhaps best encapsulated by Bristol merchant Isaac Hobhouse's agents in 
Montserrat when they attributed a successful voyage in 1722 to his "good 
management and to [the] conduct of Captain Holland who proved to be a very 
honest man and no ways short of the character you gave him". 126 These ideas are 
further explored in Chapter Four. 
Casson's definition emphasises that an entrepreneur is an individual, but 
teams or firms can be comprised of "coalitions of entrepreneurs". 127 Recent themes 
in entrepreneurship, particularly from a sociological standpoint also highlight the 
nature of the group. It has been argued that organisations are "culturally embedded 
and historically specific" and are thus reflective of social conditions at a particular 
123 Francis Bright to Bright, Whatley & Co., 15 Dec 1752 in Kenneth Morgan, (ed. ), The Bright-Meyler 
Papers: A Bristol- West India Connection, 1732-1783 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 273. 124 Jeremiah Meyler to Richard Meyler, 26 Nov 1752 in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 271. 125 Richard Meyler to Jeremiah Meyler, 27 Mar 1754 in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 296. 126 Agents in Montserrat to Isaac Hobhouse, 5 Jan 1722, Jefferies Collection, Vol. 13, Bristol Reference 
Library (hereafter BRL). 
127 Casson, Entrepreneurship, p. 79. 
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historical point; entrepreneurs can both reproduce or challenge the existing social 
order depending on the diversity of skills or points of view they may bring to the 
organisation. 128 Therefore, entrepreneurs act or react in a particular cultural context, 
singularly and as a group. The impact of organisations which acted as a focus for 
entrepreneurial activity will also be seen in the examination of Bristol and Liverpool 
slave merchants. Moreover, in a given context, entrepreneurship is not static. It is 
instead a "continuing function" rather than a "once-for-all, or possibly intermittent 
activity". 129 Entrepreneurship as a continuing function gives rise to the notion of a 
life-cycle in that an entrepreneur's career path is marked by various stages. 
Typically it would start with an entry-level but specialised position, then rising 
through the ranks increasing responsibility and broadening networks, achieving a 
leadership position, and retiring at which point his position becomes largely 
symbolic. 130 Likewise, the idea of a life-cycle or particular career path was noted by 
contemporaries. James Wallace asserted that the "usual gradation" for Liverpool 
merchants was "to take poor boys apprentice for long terms 
... 
became good 
seamen, were then made second mates, then first mates, then captains, and 
afterwards factors on the islands". 131 While this process did not necessarily occur for 
all slave trade merchants, successful business practice was developed through 
experience, which Wallace certainly intimated. Because entrepreneurship was 
developed through experience, the idea that the entrepreneur is "the ruggedly 
independent self-employed individual" is largely "of popular myth". 132 This notion of 
a life-cycle of entrepreneurship, particularly in regards to networks, is considered in 
this dissertation. 
128 Howard E. Aldrich, "Entrepreneurship", in Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds. ), Handbook of 
Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 451-488. 129 Casson, The Entrepreneur, p. 22. 130 Casson, Entrepreneurship, p. 100. 131 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 216. 132 Casson, Entrepreneurship, p. 100. 
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As entrepreneurship is embedded in a social context, and organisations are 
thought to be a vehicle for entrepreneurial activity, merchants' associational 
networks are integral to the discussion of entrepreneurship in the Bristol and 
Liverpool slave trade. Current business literature comments on different levels of 
organisation, which must be mentioned here. As noted above, the entrepreneur acts 
singularly or as part of a group. Likewise, individuals in a business enterprise can be 
further organised into networks, firms and clusters. This dissertation, however, 
emphasises the network organisation of the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant 
community, particularly because firms and clusters are more prominent in the 
literature after the advent of industrialisation; as such, firms and clusters are more 
difficult to contextualise in the eighteenth-century business context. There are, 
however some useful links in the theoretical presuppositions of each type of 
organisation. Casson identifies firms as an extension of the personality of the 
entrepreneur, whereby its competitive advantage lies in its expert decision- 
making. 133 Additionally, Edith Penrose defines a firm in its most basic sense as a 
"collection of resources". 134 As will be defined more specifically below, and 
emphasised throughout the dissertation, the particular resources (collectively known 
here as "capital") Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant networks had access to 
shaped their performance in the slave trade. Additionally, it took the entrepreneur, 
or the merchant with a particular spirit of enterprise to use these resources to his 
trading advantage. Lastly, a cluster is defined as a "wider agglomeration of 
industries that may be connected by common products, technologies, markets or 
institutional frameworks". 135 What is most useful about this concept is the life-cycle 
model of clusters in which clusters experience four stages, culminating in saturation. 
133 Mark Casson, "The Nature of the Firm Reconsidered: Information Synthesis and Entrepreneurial Organization", Management International Review, 36 (1996), pp. 55-94. 134 Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 77. 135 John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp, Industrial Clusters and Regional Business Networks in England, 
1750-1970 (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 3,7. 
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It is argued here that the business networks of Bristol and Liverpool slave trade 
merchants also exhibited a life-cycle pattern relative to access to capital. Indeed, 
Chapter Five demonstrates that the Liverpool slave merchant networks became 
saturated by the end of the period. All of these types of organisations can thus be 
used to comment on entrepreneurship, however, for the case of Bristol and Liverpool 
slave trade merchants, discussing how entrepreneurship is accessed is best 
conducted through an analysis of their networks. 
Entrepreneurship and capital are interconnected concepts. Entrepreneurship 
is embedded in a particular social context in which various forms of capital also exist 
and can thus be accessed. Capital exists in various forms, three of which are 
pertinent to this study, economic, human, and social. Economic capital includes 
financial resources. In the slave trade, economic capital financed the full scope of 
slaving voyages, including the cost of outfitting ships, purchasing goods for barter 
and hiring crew members. Human capital equates to knowledge and skills. Stephen 
Behrendt's recent work on Liverpool slave ships' captains as human capital 
demonstrates that knowledgeable and experienced captains in the Liverpool trade 
comprised a significant advantage for Liverpool slave traders. 136 Social capital, 
however, is more nuanced, with facets of the theory debated in business and socio- 
economic literature. Indeed, Putnam asserts that the term "social capital" has been 
"independently invented at least six times over the twentieth century", highlighting 
the nature of the debate. 137 Pierre Bordieu, however, defines social capital as "the 
aggregate of the actual or potential resources that are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
136 Stephen D. Behrendt, "Human Capital in the British Slave Trade", in Richardson, Schwarz and Tibbles, Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, pp. 66-98. 137 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of the American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), p. 19. 
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acquaintance and recognition". 138 Put simply, social capital includes the resources, 
"real or potential, gained from relationships". 139 At the core of this theory is the idea 
that social networks have value; access to social capital exists in networks and is 
inclusive of the "norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them". '4° 
Whereas economic capital refers to a tangible resource and human capital refers to 
properties of individuals, social capital rests in the connections among people. Thus, 
the sources of social capital are varied, leading some sociologists to define social 
capital by its function and outcome rather than its sources. 141 Indeed, merchants in 
the eighteenth century built relationships with each other not only through their 
business practice, but through political involvement, membership in both cultural and 
social clubs and by patronising the same taverns and coffeehouses. It is this access 
that is what is important, and not necessarily the resources themselves; as Alejandro 
Portes warns, equating social capital with resources is ''tantamount to saying the 
successful succeed". '42 
Much like the building of trust and reputation in the eighteenth-century 
commercial context, social capital is built through what Putnam, Lewis Feldstein and 
Donald Cohen refer to as "multistrandedness". 143 This relates to the notion that 
people have numerous opportunities to network, for instance, through membership 
in political, social or religious clubs and associations. These different opportunities 
can be seen as foci around which individuals organise their social lives and create 
their social context, reinforcing the diversity in the sources through which social 
138 Pierre Bourdieu, "Forms of Capital", in John Richardson (ed. ), Handbook of Theory and Research in the 
Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 241-258. 139 Lin, Nan, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action (Port Chester. Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), p. 23. 
140 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p. 19. 
141 James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital", American Journal of Sociology, 
94 (1988), pp. 95-120. 
142 Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modem Sociology", Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24 (1998), pp. 1-24. 143 Robert Putnam, Lewis Feldstein and Donald J. Cohen, Better Together: Restoring the American 
Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 291. 
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capital can be accessed. 144 Furthermore, multiple opportunities for interaction create 
a "redundancy" in interaction, reinforcing social ties by strengthening feelings of 
loyalty, trust and obligation. '45 
Access to social capital can be either bonding (exclusive) or bridging 
(inclusive). Bonding capital often refers to the relationships among family members, 
close friends, or those connected through religious and ethnic ties. In contrast, 
bridging capital refers to acquaintances or colleagues. 146 Granovetter and Ronald S. 
Burt have theorised similar and useful concepts related to bonding and bridging 
capital. Granovetter discusses the idea of strong and weak ties. This argument 
asserts that the more acquaintances, or weak ties, one has in his social (or 
merchant, in this case) network, the more access to information he will receive. This 
is because weak ties serve as bridges among different networks and knowledge can 
be spread among groups more readily. Conversely, if one's network was comprised 
simply of close friends, or strong ties, this information would most likely stay within 
the group. 147 Burt expanded on this notion by espousing the idea of "structural 
holes"; a person at the "hole" of a social structure can effectively broker across 
different groups, thus spreading alternative ways of thinking and behaving. 148 In this 
way, social capital has both positive and negative outcomes. 
For the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchant, then, social capital was 
accessed from the other people in his network besides himself. Besides commercial 
interactions, redundancy in contact was achieved for merchants through membership 
144 Scott L. Feld, "The Focused Organization of Social Ties", American Journal of Sociology, 86 (1981), 
pp. 1015-1035; Michael Woolcock, "The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic 
Outcomes", available at http: //www. oecd. org-dataoecd/5/13/1824913. pdf 
, 
pp. 1-36, accessed 1/1/2010- 145 Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen, Better Together, p. 291. Redundancy in interaction would occur for two 
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in associations and clubs and the access of various types of social capital were 
simultaneous processes in the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, feelings of loyalty and trust were also perpetuated 
through frequent correspondence in addition to face-to-face contact. It has been 
argued that the associational world of merchants became more complex and 
impersonal as the eighteenth century progressed, particularly with the advent of 
more formal payment institutions such as the bill system; as a consequence, these 
relationships formalised and the importance of social capital declined. 149 However, it 
is argued here that the importance of social capital was not lessened in this period, 
rather formal institutions and arrangements only altered network dynamics. The 
access to social capital and its importance in the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade 
merchant networks is further explored in Chapter Five. 
All three types of capital relate to resources and relationships and the theory 
of entrepreneurship can be seen as an umbrella framework that binds them all. 
Current business literature discusses the various types of capital and indeed the 
access to it as sources of competitive advantage; competitive advantage can be 
further defined by a firm's "core competencies", or particular bundles of skills and 
technology that are unique and add value. '50 The comparative advantages Bristol 
and Liverpool slave trade merchants had in terms of accessing various resources can 
be used to discuss their relative success and failure in the trade. 
149 David Richardson and Robin Pearson, "Social Capital, Institutional Innovation and Atlantic Trade 
before 1800", Business History, 50 (2008), pp. 765-780. 
150 See Jay B. Barney and Patrick M. Wright, "On Becoming a Strategic Partner: The Role of Human 
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The Project 
Gaps in Literature 
This dissertation is a comparative project that examines the slave trade 
merchants of Bristol and Liverpool in their economic and socio-cultural contexts. The 
theoretical framework of entrepreneurship and various notions of capital applied 
within associational networks lies at the crux of this analysis in determining whether 
a "particular spirit of enterprise" led to Liverpool's ultimate success in the slave 
trade. An interdisciplinary approach is therefore utilised and draws on previous work 
from different methodological frameworks in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
analysis. Thus, not only does this work aim to address certain gaps in the 
historiography, it also seeks to serve as a bridge between these different frameworks 
in the attempt to achieve such comprehension through an interdisciplinary approach. 
Eric Williams' perhaps controversial study instigated intense debate on the 
profits of the slave trade and the implications of the capital invested in the trade. 
However, as mentioned above, the bulk of the scholarly attention on the Atlantic 
slave trade over the last fifty years has primarily focused on the economics of the 
trade, such as the volume and distribution of slave sales. Scholarly debates have 
thus arisen out of this attention. Philip Curtin's seminal study initiated discussions 
and debates on the volume of the trade, which has subsequently sparked inquiry into 
such issues as the distributions of the age and sex of slave cargoes, mortality rates, 
and pricing strategies. 151 Historians have also considered the commercial aspect of 
151 See Klein, Atlantic Slave Trade; Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade; David Richardson, "Slave Exports from 
West and West-Central Africa, 1700-1810: New Estimates of Volume and Distribution", Journal of African 
History, 30 (1989), pp. 1-22; David Eltis, "Mortality and Voyage Length in the Middle Passage: New 
Evidence from the Nineteenth Century", Journal of Economic History, 44 (1984), pp. 301-308; Herbert 
Klein and Stanley Engerman, "Slave Mortality on British Ships, 1791-1797", in Anstey and Hair, 
Liverpool, the African Slave Trade and Abolition, pp. 113-126; D. P. Lamb, "Volume and Tonnage of the 
Liverpool Slave Trade, 1772-1807", in Anstey and Hair, Liverpool, the African Slave Trade and Abolition, 
pp. 91-113. 
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the trade, both in how appropriate cargoes were assorted for trade on different parts 
of the African coast and how trade was conducted between the English merchants 
and African traders. 152 Thus, there is much in the literature which focuses on the 
"numbers aspect" of the trade. These considerations are further explored in the 
following chapters. 
There is also extensive historiography on eighteenth-century commerce in 
general, the Atlantic slave trade specifically, and English merchant communities that 
this project draws on, and the gaps in current knowledge influenced the research 
questions and focus for this current study. As demonstrated in the business history 
and mercantile culture section, an important piece of the commercial discussion is in 
regards to the themes of trust, personal reputation (especially with reference to 
securing credit) and kinship, and these themes are well documented in business 
literature and are common themes in merchant correspondence of the time. 153 There 
is still, however, relatively little research which places the economics of the trade in 
the context of a broader business culture. This project weaves together commercial 
and socio-cultural material to form the much needed comprehensive and 
comparative analysis of Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities. 
As noted above, there is something of a void in the socio-cultural analyses of 
the Bristol and Liverpool slave traders. Recent strides have been made, however, to 
address the void in this type of analysis. The recent work by Madge Dresser and 
Sheryllynne Haggerty has informed this study. 154 Dresser has conducted important 
work on the Bristol slave traders in terms of their involvement in the civic culture of 
152 See Lovejoy and Richardson, "Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History"; Henry A. Gemery and Jan S. 
Hogendorn, "The Economic Costs of West African Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade", in Henry A. 
Gemery and Jan S. Hogendorn (eds. ), The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 143-163; Richardson, "Profits in the 
Liverpool Slave Trade" ; Francis E. Hyde, Bradbury B. Parkinson and Sheila Marriner, "The Nature and 
Profitability of the Liverpool Slave Trade", Economic History Review, 5 (1953), pp. 368-377; Williams, 
Capitalism and Slavery. 
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Bristol, yet her focus is on the link between urban development and the wealth 
accumulated by those involved in the slave trade; similarly, while Haggerty has 
defined and described the Liverpool merchant community, an emphasis on the social 
involvement in the city of the prominent slave traders and how this contributed to 
business performance is lacking. Additionally, in-depth studies by Kenneth Morgan, 
David Richardson, Patrick McGrath, Walter Minchinton, Francis Hyde, Paul Clemens 
and Diana Ascott on the ports of Bristol and Liverpool have provided context for their 
commercial development and raised questions regarding the reasons for Liverpool's 
dominance in the slave trade. '55 These studies of the Bristol and Liverpool merchant 
communities on a macro-scale have provided guidance for this comparative project. 
On a micro-scale, exemplary case studies have also been conducted that have 
helped lay the groundwork for this project. David Richardson and Kenneth Morgan 
have conducted the most comprehensive work on the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
trades and possibly eighteenth-century British-Atlantic trade in general. 
Richardson's study on the Liverpudlian slave trader, William Davenport, and 
Morgan's work on the Bristolian slave trader, James Rogers, demonstrate the insight 
that can be gained from a detailed analysis of an individual merchant who has left 
more complete records behind. 156 From these more in-depth studies on a micro- 
scale, questions emerge regarding the larger patterns that existed in the respective 
merchant communities. Richardson's study of Davenport, a relative specialist in the 
155 See for example Kenneth Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); David Richardson, The Bristol Slave Traders: A Collective Portrait 
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Eighteenth Century (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1972); Diana Ascott, Fiona Lewis and Michael 
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trade, led Richardson to question the organisation of slaving ventures and how 
merchants organised themselves among ships' husbands and sleeping partners. 
Morgan's study on Rogers also invites questions of the organisation of the slave 
trade at large, particularly because James Rogers went bankrupt, and so his 
experience is not typical of the slave merchant's experience. Whilst these studies 
lack the comparative aspect, they have established precedents for this study, not 
only because they highlight important research questions, but because they 
influenced the objective to analyse several merchants in depth to develop this much 
needed comprehensive picture. Influenced by these aforementioned studies, this 
project's approach is one that analyses the slave trade in Bristol and Liverpool on the 
macro- and micro-scale, adding further comprehension to this comparative 
examination. 
Research Questions 
It is well known that Liverpool surpassed Bristol as Britain's premier slave 
trading port in the mid-eighteenth century, but the reasons for Liverpool's 
dominance are still a cause for great debate. The limitations of the historiography in 
answering why Liverpool became Britain's leading slave trade port influenced the 
primary question of this dissertation; did Liverpool slave merchants have a more 
"enterprising spirit" than the slave merchants of Bristol which caused than to be 
more successful in the trade? 
The answers to subsidiary questions will contribute to the discussion of this 
main question. Some of these questions refer to the organisation of the trade while 
others address socio-cultural patterns in the two ports. First, it is important to 
ascertain the size and structure of both slave trade merchant communities. Once this 
is distinguished, it is then key to determine how the slave trade was organised in 
both ports. Thus other questions addressed include what was the size and 
40 
composition of investment groups in both ports? Did these change over time? Were 
these patterns similar for the case study merchants in each port? 
Secondly, in determining the organisation of the slave trade in both cities, it is 
also important to address to what degree these networks were integrated and how 
this integration was established, particularly in light of demographic changes in both 
ports over the course of the eighteenth century; was there an importance placed on 
"fresh blood" being initiated into these communities? Did these demographic 
implications affect Bristol and Liverpool merchants' enterprising spirit? 
These first questions relate to the organisation of the slave trade, and how an 
enterprising spirit contributed to and affected the organisation of the trade in both 
ports as well as their success in the trade. The following questions look at the socio- 
cultural aspects of the slave merchants' enterprise and how this contributed to the 
creation and maintenance of merchant networks: in what types of cultural and 
political organisations were Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchants involved? 
Where did merchants reside in the community? Did this change over time? Lastly, 
how did this impact upon their business practice? Did a merchant's life outside the 
commercial world contribute to an entrepreneurial character? 
These questions fall into two general categories, encompassing the business 
side of the trade and the socio-cultural side of the merchant communities. They work 
together to create a comprehensive profile of the communities. These categories 
inform the structure of the dissertation which is discussed below. 
Methodology and Sources 
This project analyses the men involved in slave trading ventures from Bristol 
and Liverpool in the eighteenth century, specifically from 1725-1807. The start date 
was chosen because Bristol entered the slave trade well before Liverpool and had its 
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highest points of investment in the period between 1728-1732 and 1737-1738.157 
This is before Liverpool's participation in the trade really accelerated in the mid- 
century. Therefore it is important to recognise that the major participants in the 
Bristol and Liverpool trades were not necessarily contemporaries trading at the same 
time, and trading practices and circumstances would have developed over time. 
Moreover, 1807 is the logical choice to mark the end of the period of study as it 
coincides with the abolition of the British slave trade. Importantly, the established 
timeline also covers the height of Britain's involvement in the Atlantic slave trade. 
One of the most important sources used for this project is the Trans Atlantic 
Slave Trade database, which has been updated from the CD-ROM version and is now 
accessible online. '58 Extensive queries were made of this database to ascertain the 
trends in organisation of slaving ventures, as well as the specific information on the 
trading networks of the case study merchants. Specifically, an important category 
for research queried from this database was that of ownership for slave ventures. It 
is important for this study to see who the prolific slave merchants were in terms of 
primary ownership, but also who these merchants entered into partnerships with as 
secondary owners. From this, business relationships can be understood as it can be 
shown who merchants worked with most often and over what periods of time, 
signifying the trends in the organisation of the trade. Relationships were further 
analysed and graphically represented using social network analysis and a program 
called Pajek. The details of how this was achieved, including a discussion of 
particular considerations when using the database, is found in the Technical 
Appendix. 
These investigations helped to identify the main individuals who form the case 
studies for the project. Twelve merchants, six from Bristol and six from Liverpool, 
157 David Richardson, Bristol, Africa and the Eighteenth Century Slave Trade to America Vol. 21 730-1 745 (Gloucester. Alan Sutton Publishing Limited, 1987), p. xv. 1 58 Eltis, et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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were selected to demonstrate how they fit in with the general patterns discussed. 
Michael Becher, Henry Bright, Isaac Hobhouse, John Fowler, James Laroche and 
James Rogers represent the merchants from Bristol while Foster Cunliffe, William 
Davenport, Thomas Earle, Benjamin Heywood, William James and John Tarleton are 
those from Liverpool. These merchants were selected as they represented the trade 
in both cities at different points in time and each participated in a significant number 
of voyages. The points in time were selected from Richardson's four-volume Bristol, 
Africa, and the Eighteenth Century Atlantic Slave Trade, which established four 
significant time periods as well as commented on the core groups of merchants in 
each period. These time periods include 1698-1729,1730-1745,1746-1769, and 
1770-1807; he labels these periods for Bristol as the years of expansion, 
ascendancy, decline and lastly, the final years. These volumes identified core groups 
of slave traders that were responsible for managing the most voyages in the given 
period. The first volume lists nineteen traders who organised about sixty per cent of 
Bristol's voyages; the second volume asserted that about twenty merchants 
dominated the trade throughout the period, although the Importance of different 
individuals fluctuated over time; the third volume noted that about half of the slaving 
voyages were managed by thirteen agents, and in the final volume, about seventy- 
five per cent of the voyages were managed by a group of just ten. 159 Merchants were 
selected from Bristol who engaged in roughly the same amount of voyages as 
primary owners during these established time frames. An analysis of Liverpool's core 
merchants, however, particularly in different time periods, has not been as thorough 
as Richardson's work on Bristol. Wallace commented in 1795 that in the latter period 
between 1783 and 1793, the trade was supported on "average by ten houses"; 
likewise, J. E. Inikori has tried to establish the core merchants Wallace was referring 
159 David Richardson, Bristol, Africa and the Eighteenth Century Slave Trade Vols. 1- 4 (Gloucester. Alan 
Sutton Publishing Limited, 1986,1987,1991,1996). 
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to, however, his source material makes it difficult to corroborate. 160 David Pope's 
recent work lists the top 201 Liverpool merchants in the period between 1750-1799. 
His criteria of ownership or part ownership on at least eighteen voyages coupled with 
residence in Liverpool for part or all of the period, however, leaves this merchant 
pool fairly open; arguably, a merchant who only invested in eighteen voyages in his 
career cannot be in the same "top" category as a merchant who both led and 
invested in significantly more voyages. 161 This project does not intend to establish, or 
re-establish these core groups; however, the chosen case study merchants here are 
useful in a further analysis of the organisational patterns of the slave trade in both 
ports because qualitative data on them is also extant. Furthermore, as the slave 
trade was dominated by a relatively select few, having six key merchants from both 
ports represents a statistically acceptable sample size. Substantiating the data of 
these case study merchants from the database with the available manuscript sources 
also facilitates a more in-depth discussion of trends in the trade that is not conducive 
in larger samples. The case studies also allow for commentary on the merchant 
networks, network behaviour, and their operation within the trade, which previous 
studies do not. 
Additionally, a large amount of nominal data has been collected from trade 
directories, as well as political and club membership lists. Slave trade investors 
listed in trade directories, as well as the case study merchants in particular, were 
cross-referenced with membership lists of social clubs and political organisations to 
create a more complete picture of merchants' overall civic involvement, and whether 
or not this social involvement influenced commercial or entrepreneurial action. This 
160 Wallace, General and Descriptive History, p. 231; J. E. Inikori, "Market Structure and the Profits of the 
British African Trade in the late Eighteenth Century", Journal of Economic History, 41 (1981), pp. 745- 
776. 
16' David Pope, "The Wealth and Social Aspirations of Liverpool's Slave Merchants of the Second Half of 
the Eighteenth Century", in Richardson, Schwarz and Tibbles, Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, pp. 
164-227. 
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also lends itself to comment on the level of integration merchants had in their 
respective communities, how it might have affected their commercial success, and 
facilitates their associational networks to be ascertained. 
Other sources, particularly merchant correspondence and business papers, 
meeting minutes, parliamentary papers and other contemporary sources including 
town guide books, histories and newspapers are used to infer the merchants' socio- 
cultural context and how this contributed to an entrepreneurial spirit in both Bristol 
and Liverpool. For instance, merchant correspondence is particularly vital in 
gathering information on merchant attitudes towards commerce, including how they 
dealt with and responded to the major commercial issues such as risk and trust, and 
how they developed and maintained their reputations. Meeting minutes revealed 
what commercial concerns merchants felt were important and how they defended 
these concerns; additionally, town guide books and histories promoted images of the 
port cities that helped shape their larger reputation. The answers to the research 
questions were thus based on the combination of quantitative and qualitative data; 
the quantitative data provided the "bones" of the Bristol and Liverpool merchant 
communities while the qualitative data fleshed out the study by providing the socio- 
cultural foundations of these communities. 
Like many historical studies, the limitations of this project lie in the sources. 
The Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database is an incredible resource, which significantly 
helped the research of this work. It, however, has its own set of limitations and a 
particular methodology which must be taken into consideration when using it. This is 
discussed further in the Technical Appendix. Additionally, an equal number of 
manuscript sources from both slave trade merchant communities covering a similar 
time period simply do not exist. As the height of Bristol's participation in the trade 
was much earlier in the period, manuscript sources are not as available as they are 
for Liverpool, which became much more active in the trade later in the eighteenth 
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century. There are notable exceptions. The Jefferies collection holds much of Bristol 
merchant Isaac Hobhouse's correspondence from early in the period, however much 
of it includes copies of letters sent from his agents in the Americas. While this is still 
valuable, the collection is not as reflective of the "voice" of one of Bristol's more 
prominent early slave traders and extrapolation of Hobhouse's actions and words 
from these letters thus had to be conducted. Likewise, the papers of James Rogers 
from Bristol are wide in scope, however, because he was most active when Bristol's 
participation in the trade was in decline, as well as that he ultimately became 
bankrupt is demonstrative of the fact that it may not be a fair representation of the 
Bristol slave trade at large. Lastly, the recent publication of the Bright-Meyler papers 
offers further insight, but as this was not a specialised slaving partnership a large 
portion of the correspondence does not specifically address the slave trade. In 
contrast, the collections from Liverpool merchants are far more representative: the 
collections of William Davenport, David Tuohy, Robert Bostock, Thomas Leyland and 
the Earle and Tarleton collections cover much of the period and offer a far more 
representative picture of the trade. Of course, as more than four thousand 
individuals participated in the Liverpool slave trade, six collections are not as 
representative as would be ideal. Thus, collecting information from trade directories 
and various club membership lists of the merchant community at large helped to 
strengthen representativeness. 
Structure 
This dissertation is divided into two major sections, the first labelled "Inside 
the Counting House" and the second, "Outside the Counting House". 162 The first 
section addresses the formal business side of the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
162 These titles are influenced by Frederick B. Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House: The Quaker Merchants of Colonial Philadelphia 1682-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948). 
46 
merchant communities and answers the questions regarding the patterns and trends 
in the organisation of the slave trade and the structure of the merchant 
communities, both in the context of entrepreneurship and social networks. The 
second section addresses the social, or informal, side of the merchant communities 
by analysing merchant involvement in associational networks including social and 
political clubs, as well as how merchant networks operated and responded to political 
issues. Both sections include the merchant case studies. Because of the nature of a 
merchant's network, life inside and outside the counting house often merged in a 
merchant's career and cannot be seen as discrete entities. Thus, these two sections 
are integrated and work together to create a more comprehensive picture of the 
merchants in the Bristol and Liverpool slave trades, by analysing their professional 
and social lives as an integral discussion of how they contributed to a spirit of 
enterprise. 
Chapter Two discusses the port cities of Bristol and Liverpool specifically, 
giving an account both of their rise as prominent commercial centres and their 
involvement in the slave trade. Thus, a discussion of Bristol's relative decline is 
included in comparison to Liverpool's dominant position as a slave trading port. It 
also introduces their wider merchant communities; therefore discussions of the 
primary trading issues and how the Bristol and Liverpool merchants dealt with them 
are highlighted. This discussion of the rise and decline of the two ports' trades posits 
historiographical debates for the reasons behind their commercial success and 
failure. The rest of the project, however, will argue that these reasons outlined 
correspond with the larger and proposed argument that entrepreneurship and their 
ability to access key resources really determined Liverpool merchant's success in the 
slave trade. 
Chapter Three presents trends in the organisation of the slave trade 
specifically in Bristol and Liverpool and is based predominately on extensive queries 
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conducted of the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database. Additionally, the structure of 
both merchant communities is explored through social network analysis. Moreover, 
the twelve merchant case studies and their own business networks as they relate to 
the overall patterns are analysed. Change over time is also considered. 
Chapter Four analyses the trends presented in Chapter Three through the 
prism of entrepreneurship and the various notions of capital. While the trends were 
presented using quantitative data in the previous chapter, qualitative sources such 
as merchant correspondence are used to explain the trends, specifically addressing 
how merchant partnerships within their larger networks managed and conducted 
slaving voyages. This chapter thus exemplifies the integrated theory of 
entrepreneurship in that both the slave trade merchants' characteristics and their 
roles are examined to assess how this contributed to success and failure. These two 
chapters comprise the "Inside the Counting House" section. 
Chapter Five considers the merchants' social lives outside of their profession 
in the characteristic environment of the eighteenth-century "urban renaissance". The 
locations of the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchants' homes, businesses, and the 
social organisations in which they were involved are mapped to demonstrate how 
physical and social proximity can be used to comment on the creation and 
maintenance of their networks. How their social lives contributed to this question of 
entrepreneurial spirit and success in the commercial world is thus demonstrated. 
Chapter Six explores the notion of merchant representation to the state and 
the response of Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchant networks to port 
improvement schemes and their defence of the slave trade throughout the period. 
These case studies thus analyse the operation of these merchant networks in 
contexts other than the slave trade, but ones that nonetheless impacted upon their 
trading performance. The cohesiveness of these two communities is further 
examined in this analysis and it is demonstrated that Liverpool networks exhibited 
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more entrepreneurship in these regards. These final chapters encompass the 
"Outside the Counting House" section. 
Chapter Seven will conclude the study, summarising the answers to the 
primary questions of the study. This study argues that Liverpool merchants managed 
slaving voyages within comparatively larger investment groups; thus, the business 
network a typical Liverpool merchant was part of was also larger. Liverpool 
merchants had greater access to knowledge, skills and resources, collectively known 
as capital, and this larger pool of expertise offered more competitive advantages to 
their trade. In contrast, Bristol slave trade merchants managed voyages in smaller, 
more atomised networks with consequently less access to necessary human and 
social capital. Because of this, Liverpool merchants exhibited a greater spirit of 
enterprise and as entrepreneurs, were able to surpass their counterparts in Bristol to 
become the leaders in the slave trade. 
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Chapter Two: Bristol and Liverpool in Comparison 
To study the eighteenth-century merchant, one must arguably study the 
merchant's trading links and the wider networks in which he was involved. 163 As 
discussed in the Introduction, the transatlantic merchant's network at this time 
became increasingly global, and for the slave trade merchant, members in his 
network included not only other merchants investing in voyages, but the suppliers of 
goods for barter, captains used, merchants on the African coast, and factors and 
agents stationed in the Americas among others. 164 These networks were also 
embedded in complex localised networks that linked both the regional and national 
economies. 165 The Atlantic trade encouraged the development of ports and thus a 
specific type of economy; therefore, analysing merchants in port cities such as 
Bristol and Liverpool adds a further dimension in the comprehension of business 
networks during this period. Branches of history that address port cities in particular 
consider how physical geography, occupational structure and commercial factors 
such as the volume of trade contributed to the growth and development of this 
specific type of urban environment. 166 In this sense, studies of port cities can be 
extremely useful, because, by their very commercial nature, they cannot be studied 
in isolation from their interactions with the outside world. This supports the adoption 
of a cis-Atlantic approach, outlined in the Introduction, because of its focus on a 
location's interaction with other places in addition to its own uniqueness. 167 All ports 
exist as a "two-way exchange of traffic between land and water"; however, there is 
much differentiation among port cities, particularly in terms of the variety of 
163 See Introduction, p. 4. 164 See Introduction, p. 20. 165 Stobart, "Personal and Commercial Networks", pp. 277-293; Casson, "Entrepreneurial Networks", pp. 
811-823. 
166 David Harris Sacks, The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 4. 167 See Introduction, p. 4. 
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functions they fulfil. 168 F. W. Morgan notes that a classification of ports by their 
function is essential when studying them, yet a strict classification is difficult as ports 
rarely perform just one. 169 In his study of colonial American port towns, Jacob M. 
Price distinguishes between ports' functions as shipping points, processing centres, 
limited and general marts as well as communications and financial centres. He is 
careful to assert that no certain feature may be considered a given. Instead they 
were "'reflections of the character and trade of the port and of the institutional 
arrangements produced by the marketing requirements of the goods traded". 170 
While ports certainly differed, general criteria may be assumed. These characteristics 
include maintaining a safe haven for ships, allowing easy access by having both a 
time and space advantage on a variety of sea routes, providing a convenient centre 
for both the collection and distribution of goods as well as supplying the needs of the 
port's hinterland. 171 
These features were certainly present early on in the ports of Bristol and 
Liverpool, and both ports further developed in the eighteenth century to have their 
own distinct character as well as to grow into prominent and prosperous commercial 
centres. By the seventeenth century Bristol was the second largest port in England, 
and by 1700, it was also the second largest town with 21,000 inhabitants. 172 By the 
end of the century, the New Bristol Directory was able to hail the city as the "largest, 
richest and best port of trade, London only accepted". 173 Moreover, as the hub of the 
economic, social and cultural life of the southwest of England and southern Wales, 
168 James Bird, The Major Seaports of the United Kingdom (London: Hutchinson of London, 1963), p. 24. 
169 F. W. Morgan, Ports and Harbours (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1958), p. 70. 
170 Jacob M. Price, "Economic Function and the Growth of American Port Towns in the Eighteenth 
Century", Perspectives in American History, 8 (1974), pp. 123-186. 
171 Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey, p. 10. Bird also provides a description of the common developmental 
features of a typical British seaport labelled, "Anyport". Bird, Major Seaports, pp. 21-37. 172 Minchinton, Port of Bristol, p. 1; Kenneth Morgan, "The Economic Development of Bristol, 1700- 
1850", in Dresser and Ollerenshaw, Making of Modern Bristol, pp. 48-76; E. Anthony Wrigley, "Urban 
Growth and Agricultural Change: England and the Continent in the Early Modern Period", in Borsay, 
Eighteenth Century Town, pp. 39-83. 173 John Reed (ed. ), The New Bristol Directory for 1792 (Bristol, 1792). 
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Bristol's status as "'metropolis of the West" was easily cemented. 174 While the 
eighteenth century has been lauded as Bristol's "Golden Age", as an outport, and 
particularly when compared to Liverpool, it suffered from a relative decline in 
commercial importance. 175 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, its 
population of around 60,000 made Bristol only the sixth most populous British city, 
while it ranked eighth as an outport in terms of vessels, tonnage and men. 176 In 
contrast, although Liverpool emerged later than competing port cities, by 1800 it was 
"as large or larger than most provincial ports in Britain and Europe" and was even 
compared to "another Venice upon the water" for its great commercial prosperity. i" 
With only seven medieval streets comprising the town in the 1660s, Liverpool's 
population in the century between 1650 and 1750 grew more quickly than other 
major provincial cities including Hull, Glasgow and Bristol. 178 Liverpool had only 
around 5,500 inhabitants in 1700, but by 1800, the port had over 80,000, and 
surpassed Bristol in terms of population and commercial importance, and was only 
behind London and Manchester in terms of population. 179 The rapid growth in 
population can be mostly attributed to in-migration, which in turn, impacted upon 
the economic development of the port by bringing in human capital and shaping the 
town's commercial profile and development. 180 The implications of such demographic 
changes on the slave merchant networks for both Bristol and Liverpool are further 
discussed in Chapter Five. The seemingly unprecedented rapidity in the rise of 
Liverpool's population and its link with commercial development was not lost on 
174 Minchinton, Port of Bristol, p. 3; Walter E. Minchinton, "Bristol: Metropolis of the West in the Eighteenth Century", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4 (1954), pp. 69-89. 175 Minchinton, "Bristol: Metropolis of the West", p. 88. 176 Morgan, "Economic Development", p. 49. 177 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 9; John Gore (ed. ), Liverpool Trade Directory for 1796 (Liverpool, 1796). 
178 Ibid., p. 9. 
179 J. Langton and P. Laxton, "Parish Registers and Urban Structure: The Example of Late-Eighteenth Century Liverpool", Urban History Yearbook, 5 (1978), pp. 78-84; Wrigley, "Urban Growth", p. 43. Bristol and Liverpool's population is further discussed in Chapter Five. 180 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 15. 
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contemporaries. Richard Brooke commented on the city's transformation, noting it 
grew from "a place comparatively unimportant" to "one of the most populous and 
prosperous commercial towns in Europe". 181 The 1794 Liverpool Directory asserted 
that the town has so much increased in trade since the commencement of the 
present century, that it is now the greatest seaport in England except London, 
having exceeding Bristol considerably of late years". 182 With the noted increase in 
both population and commercial expansion in the two ports, this chapter discusses 
the development of Bristol and Liverpool as important eighteenth-century 
commercial centres. Their geographical locations, manufactures and industry are 
analysed to ascertain how they contributed to their trade. Bristol's relative decline in 
commercial importance compared to Liverpool's rise is also explored. Specific 
attention will be given to their Atlantic trade and the importance of the slave trade in 
each city. How entrepreneurship impacted upon their particular commercial 
development within the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities is also 
addressed. 
Geography, Industry and Manufacture 
Bristol and Liverpool were well placed geographically to become successful 
commercial centres. They were both located at the hub of land and water 
communication systems, facilitating access to industrious hinterlands, which in turn 
fostered trade. Specifically, being situated on the west coast of the country allowed 
the outports to participate in, and benefit from, the "Americanisation" of British 
foreign trade that had developed and increased during the eighteenth century. 183 
'g' Richard Brooke, Liverpool as it was 1775 to 1800 (1853) (Reprint: Bristol: Cedric Chivers, 2003), p. 3. 182 John Gore (ed. ), Liverpool Trade Directory for 1794 (Liverpool, 1794). 
183 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 2. 
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Bristol's eighteenth-century "Golden Age" has therefore been attributed to a 
combination in an import trade of plantation products such as rum, tobacco and 
sugar as well as in an export trade based on local industries and the products of its 
hinterland. 184 Likewise, it is argued that Liverpool's successful linkage of a well- 
connected hinterland, particularly with the coal and salt industries, to a developing 
Atlantic entrepot made Liverpool even more successful than Bristolians in capitalising 
on commercial opportunities. '85 
Merchants' utilising the advantages from the geographical situation of both 
ports is strongly linked to their development and their commercial success. 
However, their harnessing of seemingly "natural" advantages to form commercially 
competitive advantages is reflective of an entrepreneurial outlook. Bristol stood at 
the meeting point of five main roads. To the north, roads led to Wales and 
Gloucester, to the south, Wells and Bath, while London lay to the east, thus linking 
Bristol with the rest of the kingdom. 186 The rivers Avon and Frome form the city's 
harbour, and as Richard Bright described in his 1788 Draft of the Particulars of the 
Trade of Bristol, "meet each other at right angles" and "form three sides of a square 
upon the inward shores of which the quays are formed". 187 Much of the River Avon, 
although nearly ten miles in length, was not navigable without manual 
improvements, one of which allowed for small barge traffic in 1727.188 The Frome 
"was itself the handiwork of man", as the channel was re-made in the thirteenth 
184 Minchinton, Port of Bristol, p. 3. 
185 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 107; Jon Stobart, "In Search of Causality: A Regional 
Approach to Urban Growth in Eighteenth Century England", Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human 
Geography, 82 (2000), pp. 149-163; J. Langton, "Liverpool and its Hinterland in the Late Eighteenth 
Century", in B. L. Anderson and P. J. M. Stoney (eds. ), Commerce, Industry and Transport: Studies in 
Economic Change on Merseyside (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press: 1983), pp. 1-26. 186 Sacks, Widening Gate, p. 1. 
187 Richard Bright, "Draft of the Particulars of the Trade of Bristol", in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 663. 188 Ibid; Alan F. Williams, "Bristol Port Plans and Improvement Schemes of the 18`h Century", Bristol and 
Gloucestershire Archaeological Society, 81 (1962), pp. 138-188. 
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century to expand the number of docking places near the city centre. 189 Although 
the port required improvements to accommodate the increase in trade throughout 
the period, these improvements were not swiftly made. The inconvenience to 
merchants and shipping, as well as particular problems associated with a lack of 
improvements were noted throughout the period. Bright observed that "all vessels 
lie aground supported only by the mud in the bed of the river for fourteen hours out 
of each twenty four & large ships are not completely water born except at high water 
for about six days in every fortnight". 190 Complaints were made with more urgency 
in the latter half of the century when the lack of improvements, coupled with the 
hindrance in river navigation caused by mud, dirt and stones were linked to a decline 
in trade. In 1786, haven master John Shaw complained to the Society of Merchant 
Venturers that "there still remains a number of large stones on the bank 
... 
which is 
really dangerous to the navigation" and, speaking of a particular incident regarding 
the Amelia, indicated that if the ship's captain would have run ashore further down 
the river "he must have ruin'd the ship". 191 Three years later a Mr. Claxton further 
described the "shameful state" of the floating dock in a letter to Richard Bright, 
mentioning that "the Hercules was forced out, owing to the place being either full of 
mud or not having enough water in it" [emphasis in original]. 192 Additionally, 
Claxton reported in 1792 that "a large Jamaica vessel 
... 
deeply loaden with sugars 
nearly upsetting 
... 
between the mud docks" in which some little damage have been 
received by the ship and cargo"; incidents such as these made merchants hopeful, 
but also increasingly adamant that "the spirit of improvement would prevail" and 
`operate in favor of floating the harbour" as well as make other needed 
189 Sacks, Widening Gate, p. 2. 190 Bright, "Draft of Particulars", p. 664. 19' John Shaw to Society of Merchant Venturers, 14 Jun 1786, SMV 7/1/2/1, Bristol Records Office (hereafter BRO). 
192 Mr. Claxton to Richard Bright, 7 Nov 1789, SMV 7/1/3/11, BRO. 
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improvements. 193 This "Spirit of the Inhabitants" in Bristol, believed to have "been 
too long dormant" needed to be "roused into a generous emulation of the fellow- 
subjects of London [and] Liverpool" so that the port would recover and trade could 
continue to increase. 194 Various schemes for port improvements had been proposed 
and considered, yet little had been done. This is reflective of the fact that Bristol did 
not use their environment to be commercially competitive and consequently, Bristol's 
indecision and delays throughout the eighteenth century regarding port improvement 
ultimately hindered expansion in trade. Conversely, Liverpool's more active role in 
improvement schemes, aided by better organisation and finance of the dock system 
stimulated the development of the Merseyside. 195 In contrast with Bristol, Liverpool 
thus recognised their particular environment needed to be shaped and re-shaped to 
form a competitive advantage and made the necessary steps to ensure this was 
done. Bristol's relative indecision and caution towards making necessary port 
improvements compared to Liverpool's initiative is further discussed in Chapter Six. 
In turn, the ports' industries and manufactures were also shaped by their 
geographic position and demonstrate the importance of Bristol and Liverpool's 
hinterlands to their development. Defoe observed that Bristol had "so great an 
inland trade among all the western counties, that they maintain carriers just as the 
London tradesmen do, to all the principal countries and towns from Southampton in 
the south, even to the banks of the Trent north". 196 As the centre of the southwest, 
Bristol carried out an extensive coasting trade, sending goods to the five large 
counties that surrounded the port, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Wiltshire, Devon and 
193 Thomas Southey to Richard Bright, 8 Sept 1792,11168/ai, BRO; Bright, "Draft of Particulars", p. 664. 194 Printed Letter for Reduction of Town Dues and Dock Improvements, 20 Aug 1800,28048/p4, BRO. 195 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 32. Sacks maintains that inquiries into the history of an early 
modern English city must take into account a "reciprocal relationship between its political and economic life". Widening Gate, p. 4. Clearly, this is the case in terms of port developments in both cities, examined in Chapter Six. 
196 Defoe, Tour through the Whole Island, p. 36. 
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Cornwall. 197 Linked to 117 towns by ninety-six separate carriers by the mid- 
eighteenth century, Bristol was also the primary market for agricultural produce 
brought in from the surrounding areas. Improvements to turnpike roads in and 
around the port allowed for grain from the Midlands, dairy and meat products from 
southern Wales and vegetables from Evesham and Glamorgan to be brought in and 
sold. 198 Bristol was also the leading market in the region for raw industrial materials. 
It served as a distribution point, supplying the shipbuilding industry with timber from 
the Forest of Dean, the textile trades with teazles from Somerset, the woollen 
industry with wool from Milford and Cardiff, as well as the tinplate works with tin 
from Cornwall. 199 In addition, Bristol's trade provided raw materials for local 
industries, including unrefined sugar from the West Indies for the sugar refineries as 
well as Chesapeake tobacco for the snuff mills. 200 In this sense, it can be said that 
Bristol was "not more a commercial than a manufacturing town it 
. 
201 
Richard Bright echoed this statement when he commented that it is "difficult 
to say whether the internal manufacture or external commerce of Bristol is to be 
considered as the most valuable". 202 Bright mentioned the sugar refineries as one of 
the "most extensive" local industries, with "fifteen or sixteen sugar houses generaly 
at work"; by the end of the century, this figure numbered twenty. 203 With the West 
India trade being a profitable branch of Bristol's commerce, it is no surprise that 
sugar refining was also an important subsidiary industry. The sugar refineries 
themselves were also very lucrative, as Bright remarked, "the value of this raw 
197 Morgan, "Economic Development", p. 63. 198 Ibid; Minchinton, Port of Bristol, p. 6. 199 Minchinton, Port of Bristol, p. 6. Teazles are bristled flowerheads used to produce a napped, or `fuzzy' 
surface on wool and other fabrics. 200 Morgan, "Economic Development", p. 64. 201 Minchinton, Port of Bristol, p. 6. 202 Bright, "Draft of Particulars", p. 656. 203 ThId; Minchinton, "Bristol: Metropolis of the West", p. 77. 
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material amounts to from four hundred & fifty to five hundred thousand pounds". 204 
Bright also mentioned the glass trade as an important industry for Bristol's 
commerce, employing eleven large houses in the city. 205 Indeed, on his tour of the 
country in 1720, Daniel Defoe counted no less than fifteen, "which is more than 
there are in the city of London". 206 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
Bristol had five glasshouses that made a variety of bottles, window glass, flint glass 
and ordinary glass. 207 Again, Bristol's trade with the West Indies impacted upon the 
success of the glass industry, as Bristol's "great expence" of glass bottles were sent 
"fill'd with beer, cyder and wine to the West Indies". 208 Bristol was a centre for this 
industry as the raw materials, including sand, limestone and red lead were easily 
accessible in the area, and the trade, particularly in decorative glass, flourished for 
much of the century 
. 
209 The sugar and glass industries were dependent on the coal 
industry, thus the existence of the local coalfield at Kingswood was crucial for the 
industrial development of Bristol. 210 Besides sugar and glass, Bristol was also host to 
a number of other industries, including the copper and brass trades, brandy 
distillation, soap, gunpowder, bricks and tiles, lead, iron and cheese. 211 Many of 
these products, such as brandy and gunpowder in particular, were bartered for 
slaves in the African trade. Moreover, because sugar, produced from slave labour in 
the West Indies, was a principal industry for the city, the significance of the slave 
trade to Bristol's development and commercial success becomes more apparent. 
This can also be said for Liverpool. 
204 Bright, "Draft of Particulars", p. 656. 205 Ibid., p. 656. 206 Defoe, Tour through the Whole Island, p. 115. 207 Morgan, "Economic Development", p. 60. 208 Defoe, Tour through the Whole Island, p. 115. 209 Morgan, "Economic Development", p. 60. 210 Peter Aughton, Bristol: A People's History (Lancaster. Carnegie Publishing Ltd., 2001), p. 85. 211 Bright, "Draft of Particulars", pp. 657-660. 
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Like Bristol, Liverpool was well connected to an industrial hinterland that was 
bolstered by a series of improvements of river navigation systems and roads. 
Liverpool's links with the Lancashire coal industry and the Cheshire salt mines were 
especially significant in both its rapid growth and commercial prosperity, supporting 
the argument that the "coal-canal nexus" was instrumental in the development of 
towns in the north and midlands. 212 The timing of these developments was 
important. Indeed, as J. R. Harris asserts, Liverpool was profiting from its canal 
facilities before canals had even appeared in most regions, indicating an early 
advantage for the port. 213 Liverpool's connection with the Manchester textile 
industry was also pivotal, particularly with regards to obtaining goods, and credit for 
those goods, to be used in the slave trade. 214 In terms of the textile trade, Alfred 
Wadsworth and Julia de Lacy Mann state that the "situation and opportunities" of 
Bristol were similar to those in Liverpool yet cotton piece goods did not spread in 
Gloucestershire. Thus, in line with arguments regarding a sense of "spirit", 
Wadsworth and de Lacy Mann attribute the energetic man [in Lancashire] who could 
obtain credit" could make a career as a merchant "more easily than in the more 
static conditions which were usual in the south". 215 
Liverpool's relationship with Manchester was particularly important, and the 
development of the two was closely intertwined. 216 Wallace emphasised the 
important relationship Liverpool forged with Manchester when he commented that 
the 
212 Stobart, "In Search of Causality", p. 154. 213 J. R. Harris, "Early Liverpool Canal Controversies", in J. R. Harris (ed. ), Liverpool and Merseyside: Essays in the Economic and Social History of the Port and its Hinterland (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1969), pp. 78-97. 214 See Alfred P. Wadsworth and Julia de Lacy Mann, The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire, 1600- 1780 (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1931); Kenneth Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance in the 
British Slave Trade, 1740-1807", in Richardson, Schwarz and Tibbles, Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, pp. 14-43. 215 Wadsworth and de Lacy Mann, Cotton Trade, p. 172. My emphasis. 216 Stobart, "In Search of Causality", p. 157. 
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manufactures of Manchester advanced the exports of Liverpool to so great a 
degree as to have annually for many succeeding years paved the streets of both 
towns with SILVER, strengthened the abilities of both Liverpool and Manchester to 
enlarge their undertakings and to explore the lucrative path which ultimately led 
them to their present flourishing state of trade, respectability and credit. 217 
Put more succinctly, C. N. Parkinson notes that "while Manchester created Liverpool 
by giving it goods to export, Liverpool created Manchester by finding markets for all 
it made". 218 Highlighting the important relationship between Liverpool and 
Manchester, Liverpool merchants were allowed two year's credit from Manchester 
textile merchants while Bristol was only allowed nine months. 219 This was one 
competitive advantage Liverpool had over Bristol in the slave trade. 
In order for Liverpool to emerge as a successful port, however, it also had to 
overcome natural disadvantages. While Brooke praised the pool as a "convenient 
and comparatively secure harbour for vessels", in actuality, lifrig pol, meaning 
"clotted pool" was "a turbulent river estuary with high tides, treacherous sandbanks 
and shifting channels" and "a flat windswept shore". 220 A high sandstone ridge two 
miles from the shore also made communication with the hinterland difficult and 
hazardous in the winter. 221 To combat these difficulties, between 1719 and 1721, 
"there was something of a boom in acts for river improvement schemes", with 
improvements made on the rivers Mersey, Irwell, Weaver and Douglas. 222 In this 
sense, a "virtuous circle" was created in which the development of industries and 
transport led to the creation of corresponding industries and better transport. 223 in 
addition, the construction of the pioneering "Old Dock" on the Liver Pool first 
217 Wallace, General Descriptive History, pp. 205-206. 218 C. Northcote Parkinson, The Rise of the Port of Liverpool (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1952), 
57. 
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authorised in 1709 and in use by 1715, was the first commercial wet dock in Great 
Britain, elevating Liverpool's commercial capabilities and providing the port with 
particular advantages over other ports. 224 By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, Liverpool had twenty-eight acres of docks, greatly facilitating its trade and, 
as argued by Langton, making it "the best connected port in England". 225 
Contemporaries also noted Liverpool's advantages associated with its docks and 
hinterland communication. William Moss's 1797 Liverpool Guide boasted that 
Liverpool's docks "possess magnitude, convenience and a harmony of parts 
unrivalled throughout the world". 226 Noting that they were created by necessity, the 
"spirit of the town" had "brought them to their present state of perfection, and 
induced a desire in the metropolis to copy after them". 227 Thus, unlike in Bristol, 
where the "spirit of the town" was dormant and apathetic, the spirit in Liverpool 
inspired the necessary improvements to bolster and enrich the growing port's trade 
and is reflective of an entrepreneurial outlook. Richard Bright also described the 
comparative efficiency of Liverpool's canal networks. He commented on the 
reliability of goods reaching Liverpool via the canals from Staffordshire, Shropshire 
and Warwickshire, and lamented the delays on the River Severn caused by inclement 
weather and variable tides that hindered the delivery of goods from those counties to 
Bristol. 228 Liverpool's superior communications system also led the sundry 
merchants of Bristol to note that "Liverpoole is become so formidable a rival, and 
now meet us at markets that were formerly wholly supplied from Bristol", indicative 
of Bristol's relative commercial decline. These observations by Bristolians 229 
224 Michael Power, "Creating a Port: Liverpool, 1695-1715", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society for Lancashire and Cheshire, 149 (2000), pp. 51-7 1. 
'125 Marriner, Economic and Social Development, p. 30; Langton, "Liverpool and its Hinterland", p. 7. 226 Moss, Georgian Liverpool, p. 78. 
"7 Ibid., p. 78. 
228 Bright, "Draft of Particulars", p. 663. 229 Memorial respecting inconveniences of attending landing and floating dock from sundry merchants and 
traders, 28 Feb 1788, SMV 7/1/3/11, BRO. 
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demonstrate that not only did the lack of improvements hamper Bristol's commercial 
development, but it actually benefitted Liverpool's trade by diverting traffic through 
to Liverpool's superior communication systems. 
It has been noted above how both Bristol and Liverpool's hinterlands 
contributed significantly to their developments as successful commercial ports. 
However, by the mid-nineteenth century, Bristol's hinterland failed to grow 
sufficiently in order for Bristol to continue to assume national economic 
importance. 230 Additionally, Liverpool invested directly into its hinterland, whereas 
Bristol looked farther afield to Shropshire and South Wales. 231 Liverpool's hinterland 
rapidly industrialised in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with 
better transport services being developed, "enabling home demand and foreign 
demand to be harnessed together more effectively". 232 Liverpool was better adapted 
to industrial change, and as Langton and Laxton note, a shift occurred in the port's 
ever-changing economy towards being a major manufacturing centre in the "canal 
age". 233 As noted above, better communication between Liverpool and the adjacent 
counties of Lancashire and Cheshire was also fundamental to Liverpool's commercial 
development. Coal from west Lancashire fields and salt from Cheshire saltmines 
were Liverpool's primary exports. By 1791, Liverpool exported 79,000 tons of coal, of 
which 57,000 tons went to foreign ports while the rest was used in coastal shipping; 
additionally, 100,000 tons of salt were unloaded in Liverpool by 1796.234 These 
trades grew hand in hand, in turn leading to improved communications and fostering 
local industries and trade. A contemporary noted that the salt trade in particular 
"contributed more to the first rise, gradual increase, and present flourishing state of 
30 Morgan, "Economic Development", p. 64. 
'31 ]bid, p. 18. 
'3' Ibid., p. 64. 
233 Langton and Laxton, "Parish Registers", p. 82. 234 Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey, p. 30. 
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the Town of Liverpool than any other article of commerce". 235 Salt was an important 
commodity exchanged in Liverpool's coasting trade, while local metal works, iron 
foundries, salt refiners and glassmakers increased their demand for coal. 236 By the 
1780s, Liverpool counted among its industries three cotton mills, eight sugar 
refineries, two distilleries and fifteen roperies. 237 
Like Bristol, these trades supported and benefitted from the town's 
transatlantic trade. Additionally, craft industries were important in eighteenth- 
century Liverpool, particularly pottery and china manufacture and clock and 
watchmaking. 238 Liverpool's proximity to copper and brass manufactures in 
Lancashire and Ireland made it possible for local companies that manufactured 
African trade goods such as manillas to carry on a prosperous export trade, which it 
has been argued, gave Liverpool a competitive edge in the trade. 239 Moreover, 
shipbuilding was a significant part of Liverpool's commercial profile and was closely 
linked with Liverpool's involvement in the slave trade. Around 1750, when Liverpool 
began to dominate the slave trade, the port started to construct custom-built slave 
ships. In 1792, there were nine yards for ship construction, and between 1787-1807, 
Liverpool shipwrights built 469 vessels, averaging to about twenty-one a year. 240 
Thus, it appears Liverpool merchants had "natural" advantages in terms of their 
location in relation to key industries; however, it was their "spirit" which induced 
necessary improvements in transport and communications and really placed 
Liverpool in a superior position to conduct trade more readily and with greater 
efficiency. 
235 Quoted in Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey, p. 27. 
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Trade 
The above section highlights the link between geography and local 
manufacture, and these aspects were also strongly linked to the ports' trading 
capabilities. As mentioned above, the location of the ports on the west coast of 
Britain facilitated access and involvement in the "Americanisation" of British trade 
that developed in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it was the 
goods that both ports received from their hinterlands that made up the bulk of their 
exports in this trade. The Americanisation of the trade arguably led to commercial 
distinction among the trading communities in both ports, with arguments made of 
the increasing specialistion of merchants in the eighteenth century. As R. C. Nash 
asserts, transatlantic merchants tended to specialise in trades in which they had the 
greatest expertise. This human capital was usually acquired by being stationed 
overseas as agents or factors. 241 Additionally, trades increasingly became dominated 
by fewer merchants throughout the period. 242 This is argued primarily for the major 
commodity trades, including tobacco and sugar, further discussed in Chapter Four. 
The implications for merchant networks of human capital residing in the hands of 
fewer merchants, is also discussed specifically for the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
trade in Chapters Four and Five. Historians have observed specialisation and 
classification in the Bristol and Liverpool merchant communities in specific points of 
time. For instance, Morgan notes four categories of exporters in the shipping data for 
1773 in which the various categories exhibited a degree of specialisation in terms of 
the goods they exported and the markets to which they were sent; likewise, 
Elizabeth Baigent has analysed Bristol's trade directory in 1775 and identified 10.9 
241 See Introduction, p. 31. 242 Nash, "Organization of Trade", pp. 114,113. 
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per cent of the listings as involved in the shipping trade. 243 Additionally, Haggerty's 
study of the Liverpool and Philadelphia trading communities in the period between 
1760-1810 identifies the major categories of traders in both ports, while Langton and 
Laxton's analysis of Liverpool in the late eighteenth century provides a breakdown of 
occupational structure based on analysis of parish registers. 244 This speaks to the 
notion of particular concepts of a "business community" noted in the Introduction. 
Further analysis of trade directories in terms of slave investor representation is 
conducted in Chapter Five. 
Trade in this period was fostered by significant developments in merchant 
organisation and other services ancillary to trade. Services such as banking were 
significant developments in Bristol and Liverpool, in which, again, their geographic 
and commercial prominence played a role. Indeed, the Atlantic trade fostered a 
"miniature banking revolution" in the outports, with many colonial merchants 
becoming prominent partners in the first established banks. 245 In Liverpool, of the 
fourteen banks listed after 1750, ten were founded by merchants, highlighting this 
important link between banking and trade. 246 Merchant organisation, in terms of the 
size and structure of business firms, as well as financial mechanisms that developed 
such as the commission system, bills of exchange and the nature of credit is 
discussed below as it relates to Bristol and Liverpool's organisation of the slave 
trade, as well as entrepreneurship. It is important to comment here, however, on 
243 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, pp. 95-96. The first group specialised in sending specific 
products to different colonial destinations; the second group sent specific products to just one destination; 
the third group was relatively unspecialised in both the goods they sent and the markets in which they were 
traded while the fourth group sent varied cargoes to one or two colonial destinations; Elizabeth Baigent, 
"Economy and Society in Eighteenth Century English Towns: Bristol in the 1770s", in Dietrich Denecke 
and Gareth Shaw (eds. ), Urban Historical Geography: Recent Progress in Britain and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 109-124. 244 Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community; Langton and Laxton, "Parish Registers". 245 Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, p. 77. See also John Hughes, Liverpool Banks 
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the significance of the commission system and the use of bills of exchange in the 
operation of the Atlantic trades. The commission system arose out of the growth of 
large-scale sugar cultivation and the consequent rise of the wealthy planters in the 
West Indies. Under this system of organisation, planters were given full 
responsibility for the marketing of their own products, who consigned them to an 
agent back in London. 247 As argued by K. G. Davies, the commission system became 
the means whereby credit, "the very life-blood of the West Indies in the eighteenth 
century" was supplied by Britain and bills of exchange were the mechanisms in which 
these accumulated funds were drawn upon. 248 Slave merchants in particular were 
drawn to banking as slaves were also purchased by planters in the West Indies by 
bills of exchange, with the number of bills increasing in the latter half of the century. 
By 1750, a system arose known as the "guarantee system" in which bills of exchange 
were issued by factors (rather than planters) in sets of varying maturity, with terms 
of payment comprising three, six, nine or twelve months, or four, eight, twelve and 
sixteen months. 249 The system was named as such because factors had to name a 
surety, or "guarantee" to deal with their letters of credit in England. 250 By connecting 
a variety of people, including merchants, factors, planters and guarantors, these 
changes in remittance procedures allowed for greater economic integration in the 
Atlantic economy and helped to protect the credit extended by merchants in 
Britain. 251 In this way, British slave traders had an advantage over the French and 
Dutch traders. Indeed when asked as to what Britain owed its success in 
commanding a majority of the share in the African slave trade, not only did Liverpool 
merchant James Penny cite a "spirit of enterprise" but "credit which the British 
247 Davies, "Origins of the Commission System", p. 94. 248 Ibid., pp. 92,95. 
249 Morgan, "Remittance Procedures", p. 731. 250 Ibid., p. 731. See also Jacob M. Price, "Credit in the Slave Trade and Plantation Economies", in Barbara 
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66 
merchant has with manufactures which no other merchant in Europe enjoys". 252 This 
section will review Bristol and Liverpool's trade, with attention given to their Atlantic 
trade. A specific discussion of the slave trade will be in the following section. 
Bristol and Liverpool ships engaged in similar trades. Both Bristol and 
Liverpool exports were exchanged in Spain, Portugal and other destinations in the 
Mediterranean for oil, fruit and wine, as well as Newfoundland for fish. 253 Ships also 
engaged in the north-western European and the Baltic trades. For Liverpool 
especially, its salt exports were important in several trades, including the Baltic, 
Denmark, Norway and Hamburg trades, with the return product being mostly 
timber. 254 For both ports however, the most constant overseas trade throughout the 
eighteenth century was that with Ireland. As Defoe noted, Bristol traded "chiefly to 
the south and west parts of Ireland; from Dublin in the east, to Galloway west" while 
Liverpool had "all trade of the east shore and the north from the harbour of Dublin to 
London Derry". 255 In the beginning of the century, about seventy Bristol vessels 
travelled to the southern ports of Cork, Limerick, Waterford and Youghall to trade 
manufactured goods and colonial products for dairy produce, salted beef and pork, 
linen and yarn, leather hides and timber. By the end of the century, however, 120 
vessels were engaged in this trade. 256 Liverpool's proximity to Ireland also made the 
Irish Sea the focus of its shipping as far back as the Middle Ages, and made it the 
backbone of its commerce. Both Dublin and Drogheda were popular trading ports in 
which the Irish traded agricultural produce, herrings, linen and flax in exchange for 
Liverpool's staple commodities of salt and coal, as well as copper, soap and re- 
exported foreign luxury goods. 257 Southern Irish ports also served as victualling 
252 Examination of James Penny, 27 Feb 1788, BoT 6/9. 
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stations in the oceanic trades, with ships heading for Africa, the West Indies and the 
Americas calling on these ports for provisions. 
Proximity to Ireland, however, also raises an important historiographical 
point. For Liverpool, closeness to Ireland not only facilitated a profitable trade, but 
also provided a relatively safe route that allowed Liverpool ships less chance to be 
captured by French privateers in times of war. 258 This safer route arguably allowed 
Liverpool to enter into trades despite turbulent times. Indeed, the less exposed route 
provided for the expansion of Liverpool's trade during the war years between 1689- 
1713 and 1739-1748.259 As mentioned in the last chapter, in the 120 years between 
1660 and 1800, Britain was engaged in five international wars, meaning Britain was 
involved in war for fifty-five of those years. 260 Protecting trade was thus of vital 
importance to merchants and navies, particularly in relation to the North American 
and West India trades in which competing Europeans powers were involved. 261 While 
Liverpool was certainly not immune to privateering, it has been argued that Bristol's 
participation in it, coupled with a corresponding decrease in normal trading voyages 
during war years, meant that Bristol lost vital ground to other outports, such as 
Liverpool and Glasgow. 262 Indeed, Bristol emerged as the leading mainland port of 
privateering during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) in which they had eighty-one 
condemnations versus Liverpool's fourteen. 263 At the height of their involvement in 
privateering during the War of American Independence, 157 Bristol vessels carried 
letters of marque, certainly indicative of a break in normal trading activity. 264 How 
258 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 20. 259 Jacob M. Price and Paul G. E. Clemens, "A Revolution of Scale in Overseas Trade: British Firms in the 
Chesapeake Trade, 1675-1775", Journal of Economic History, 47 (1987), pp. 1-43. 
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the diversion from privateering specifically affected the slave trade of Bristol and 
Liverpool is discussed in Chapter Four. 
Both Bristol and Liverpool's Atlantic trade, however, made up an increasingly 
significant branch of their commerce in the eighteenth century. In the period 1700- 
1701, North America and the West Indies received eleven per cent of English 
exports; this figure rose to sixteen per cent in 1750-1751, thirty-eight per cent in 
1772-1773 and fifty-seven per cent in 1797-1798.265 Bristol ships engaged in a wide 
variety of commodity trades with the Americas, the most important being the export 
trade in manufactured wares, textiles and enslaved laborers, and the import trade of 
colonial bulk staples, including tobacco and sugar. 266 Overall, the volume of 
transatlantic shipping arriving at Bristol more than doubled between 1700 and 
1800.267 Broken down regionally, 36.8 per cent of the import tonnage came from 
Jamaica, while 22.3 per cent came from the other West Indian islands; 11.7 per cent 
came from the colonies in the mainland Upper South, while 10.7 per cent, 8 per 
cent, 5.3 and 5.2 per cent came from the Middle Colonies, the Lower South, New 
England and Canada respectively. 268 The higher percentages from the Upper South, 
Jamaica, and other West Indian islands reinforce the importance of tobacco and 
sugar as staple imports brought to Bristol in the period. 
Benefitting from early established trading connections, Bristol, along with 
London, secured dominant places in the Chesapeake tobacco trade by the mid- 
seventeenth century. They were also the primary suppliers of European 
manufactures and indentured servants in the region until the 1680s. 269 The tobacco 
trade fluctuated through four phases, beginning in the 1630s when rapid settlement 
in the Chesapeake was accompanied by a boom in tobacco production and ending 
165 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 89. 266 Minchinton, Port of Bristol, pp. 1-4. 
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during the War of American Independence when the trade finally collapsed. 270 
Throughout this period, the leading ports in the trade changed. London led the trade 
up until the decade before the War of American Independence, when Glasgow 
overtook the capital in tobacco importation to become the overall leader; Glasgow 
also surpassed Bristol in imports by the 1720s, while Liverpool overtook Bristol 
though not Glasgow in 1738.271 Liverpool's tobacco trade was at its height by 1750, 
just when the port secured its dominance in the slave trade, indicating the port's 
growing success in commercial endeavors. 272 Bristol and Liverpool tobacco 
merchants catered to different markets in the Chesapeake region. Bristol merchants 
concentrated their efforts in Virginia, on the banks of the James, York, 
Rappahannock and Potomac rivers whereas Liverpool merchants, like those in 
London and Glasgow, concentrated in Maryland and the backcountry areas of 
Virginia. 273 Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchants also concentrated their 
efforts in similar regions to where they participated in the tobacco trade, as will be 
shown in Chapter Three. The majority of the crop Liverpool imported was, like 
London and Glasgow's imported tobacco, mainly re-exported to European markets. 
In contrast, Bristol was the only significant port where more than fifty per cent of the 
crop was consumed in the home market. 274 
Another staple colonial crop, sugar, was a significant import for both ports 
and was indeed the most valuable commodity imported to Britain from anywhere in 
270 Jacob M. Price, "The Imperial Economy, 1700-1776", in P. J. Marshall (ed. ), The Oxford History of the 
British Empire Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 78-104. 271 Jacob M. Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707-1775", William and Mary Quarterly, 11 (1954), pp. 179-199. 172 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 154. 273 Lorena Walsh, "The Chesapeake Slave Trade: Regional Patterns, African Origins and some Interpretations", William and Mary Quarterly, 58 (2001), pp. 139-177; Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 169. 
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the world between 1670 and 1820.275 The Introduction outlined the economic and 
political importance of sugar to eighteenth-century Britain. Surpassing linen by mid- 
century as the most valuable British import, sugar retained this position until raw 
cotton took over in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. 276 British sugar 
imports rose steadily throughout this period, with an importation of 8,176 tons in 
1663, over 25,000 tons in 1710 and over 97,000 tons in 1775. Britons at this time 
experienced an increase in real wages and improvements in internal infrastructures 
which made possible the consumption of new goods such as tea, cocoa, and, indeed, 
sugar. The increase in the importation of tea in particular certainly helped sustain the 
demand for sugar as much of the tea was consumed in the home market. Overall, 
the increase in consumption of these goods, known collectively as groceries, is 
statistically striking. In 1700, groceries accounted for 16.9 per cent of all imports, 
whereby this figure had risen to 34.9 per cent by 1800.277 
For Bristol, there is a strong link between the wealth of the city and its West 
India interest. As mentioned above, the city had twenty sugar refineries by 1750, 
which was more than other British outport. 278 By 1650, Bristol merchants stood at 
the hub of the plantation economy, as many sugar importers had also lived in the 
Caribbean at some point in their career or owned sugar estates as absentee 
landlords, thus reinforcing the early web of connections Bristol merchants forged 
with the Americas. 279 An immediate link was also established with the slave trade 
because many Bristol West India merchants had knowledge of slave regimes as they 
owned plantations themselves. Moreover, the wealth and commercial standing of 
these merchants were "complemented by their prominent role in local social, 
'`75 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 184. 276 Price, "Imperial Economy, 1700-1776", p. 81. 277 See Shammas, "Pre-Industrial Consumer", pp. 77-78; Shammas, "Revolutionary Impact", p. 170. 278 See above, p. 57. 279 See Dresser, Slavery Obscured, pp. 15-23; Morgan, "Bristol West India", pp. 191-195. 
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business and political life". 280 Bristol's concentration in the West India trade, 
however, is also linked to its declining importance in the slave trade, further 
discussed in Chapter Four. The sugar trade, like the tobacco and slave trades, also 
experienced fluctuations, largely due to war and competition, and particularly from 
competition with the French. 281 The British had been the leading sugar makers from 
1680 to 1735, until the flood of sugar produced on the French island of Saint 
Domingue undersold that of the British. By the 1780s, Saint Domingue was the 
"plantation powerhouse of the Caribbean" with 655 listed sugar plantations. 282 
Despite the French having an advantage in the trade, sugar imports increased in 
both ports throughout the century. The annual average of Bristol's sugar imports 
rose from 13,604 hogsheads in 1728-1732 to 21,094 in the years between 1798- 
1801.283 Liverpool merchants also engaged in the sugar trade, but not to the same 
degree for much of the eighteenth century. Jacob M. Price and Paul Clemens note 
that in 1706, Liverpool had thirty-one sugar importers, while just four years earlier, 
Bristol had 313.284 In terms of hogsheads, Liverpool imported 16,042 in 1773, 
compared to Bristol's 20,896.285 While Liverpool did not engage in the sugar trade as 
widely as Bristol, they traded with a greater degree of independence than Bristol. 
The sugar market fluctuated in the different ports and Bristol in particular was 
influenced by the price trends set in Liverpool and London. For example, Liverpool 
offered lower prices, which engrossed the domestic market normally served by 
Bristol. Bristol's market could then only recover once the Liverpool market was 
drained or the prices in other markets fell. Bristol was also dependent on the prices 
`80 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 186. 
281 Ryden, West Indian Slavery, pp. 116-131,179. 
282 Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. 395. 
-83 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 191. 
294 Price and Clemens, "Revolution of Scale", p. 36. 
285 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 196. 
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set in London, as they "broke" after the opening of the London market. 286 Writing to 
William Wells in St. Kitts, Richard Meyler observed "'the Liverpole and Scotch vessells 
that saile cheap and pay out little commissions & no more other charges that are 
actually needfull" can "by that means dispose of their sugar in London or in Bristoll 
on lower terms than we can gett"; likewise, "some proffitt by degrees takes that 
trade from our city". 287 Liverpool's independent practice thus served as a competitive 
advantage, and is indicative of Liverpool's "spirit of enterprise" which benefitted its 
trade, and especially its slave trade, throughout the period. 
The tobacco and sugar trades were therefore significant branches of both 
ports' Atlantic commerce, but they also have implications for their involvement in the 
slave trade, particularly due to the argument put forth by Price and Clemens on 
specialisation in trade, or a "revolution of scale". 288 As noted above, this argument 
asserts that major commodity trades, such as that in tobacco and sugar, became 
increasingly specialised as the eighteenth century progressed, with both trades in the 
hands of fewer and fewer firms. Similar patterns may be observed to a degree in the 
slave trade, however, it is important to consider that Price and Clemens' thesis has 
not been empirically tested across trades. 289 The trend towards specialisation 
occurred to a greater degree in Bristol, which is reflective of the fact that the Bristol 
tobacco and sugar trades were conducted by discrete groups of merchants, and little 
overlap in personnel existed between the two. 290 Conversely, Liverpool's flexibility in 
commerce arguably allowed her to prosper. 291 The implications of commercial 
specialisation in contrast with commercial flexibility as it relates to both human 
capital and performance in the slave trade will be discussed further in the next two 
286 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 209; Butel, Atlantic World, p. 144. 287 Richard Meyler II to William Wells, Dec 1732, in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 156. 288 Price and Clemens, "Revolution of Scale". 
289 Nash, "Organization of Trade", p. 114. 290 Clemens, "Rise of Liverpool", p. 219. 291 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 19. 
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chapters. The slave trade will now be anaylsed in its general context, with a focus 
on the importance of entrepreneurial qualities in voyage management. 
The Slave Trade 
Like trade above, the following discussion of the slave trade from the ports of 
Bristol and Liverpool is conducted in a comparative framework, often espousing the 
particular advantages Liverpool had over Bristol which ultimately made the port more 
successful in the trade. 
While slaves laboured to produce the colonies' most profitable commodities, 
they too, were in fact profitable commodities as human cargo themselves. The 
Atlantic slave trade began with the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch in the early 
seventeenth century; however, Spain and Portugal had engaged in trade, exploration 
and slaving activity on the West African Coast since the late fifteenth century. 292 
England was keen to follow in the footsteps of Spain and Portugal in their trade with 
Africa, but initially, their interest was only in acquiring other goods such as gold. As 
early as the latter part of the sixteenth century, both London and Bristol were 
actively seeking to develop commercial links with Western Africa and between 1618 
and 1660, several trading companies were chartered to pursue trade with Africa 
along those lines. 293 Therefore, although London did not enter the slave trade until 
the 1660s, knowledge of the African coast and the use of slave labour in Spanish and 
Portuguese colonies had spread to merchant communities in port cities throughout 
Europe. 294 Table 2.1 shows the clearances of slave ships by the five major national 
carriers over a three hundred year period. It is clear the Spanish and Portuguese 
292 Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440-1870 (London: Picador, 
1997), p. 76. 193 Morgan, British Transatlantic Slave Trade Vol. 1, p. xii. 294 April Lee Hatfield, "A `Very Wary People in their Bargaining' or `Very Good Merchandise': English 
Traders' View of Free and Enslaved Africans, 1550-1650", Slavery and Abolition, 25 (2004), pp. 1-17. 
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dominated the trade early on, as well as in the latter period after Britain abolished 
the trade in 1807. In the intervening years, however, the English controlled the 
trade. The numbers carried by the French and Dutch traders seem to pale in 
comparison with the English; this is interesting when it is considered that many 
British merchants perceived the French to be Britain's major rivals throughout the 
period, which is further explored in Chapters Four and Six. 
Table 2.1: Clearances of slave ships by national carrier 
England France Netherlands Spain Portugal 
1550- 19 14 70 68 
1600 
1601- 28 2 26 315 231 
1650 
1651- 
1700 
1701- 
645 76 431 
3,179 1,126 332 
46 12 
o 110 
1750 
1751- 
1800 
1801- 
5,515 2,168 549 
1,057 451 10 82 238 
12 436 
1850 
Total 10,443 3,824 1,352 525 1,095 
Source: Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
It was only with the rise of tobacco and sugar plantations that British traders 
first began to seek slaves, or "black gold". As Table 2.1 demonstrates, Britain's 
participation in the trade greatly increased in the second half of the seventeenth 
century and the beginning of the eighteenth, coinciding with the increase in these 
commodity trades. As mentioned in the Introduction, European powers' early efforts 
to organise the slave trade were conducted through the establishment of trading 
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companies; modelled on previous joint-stock companies, the establishment of the 
Royal African Company was an early attempt by England to control and manage the 
trade. Davies' comprehensive study on the Royal African Company ascertains four 
phases in the organisation's history. Its history was marred by inefficiency, 
complaints of high costs, and arguments against its monopoly organisation, which 
characterise changes made in the different phases. The first phase, from 1672-1689 
comprises the period when the royal charter granting the rights of the Company was 
intact and a monopoly on the trade was enforced. In the second phase, from 1689- 
1698, the charter was seen as defective but nothing was achieved to re-organise the 
trade. An Act of Parliament granted in the beginning of the third phase from 1698- 
1712 permitted private persons to engage in the trade after a nominal payment was 
made for the upkeep of Company forts on the African coast. In the last phase, after 
1712, the trade was open to all without restriction. 295 Free traders from Bristol 
therefore entered the trade from the 1690s while Liverpool joined early in the 
eighteenth century. Based on the noted problems of the Royal African Company, a 
new Company was organised, known as the "Company of Merchants Trading to 
Africa" under the African Trade Act of 1750. Bristol and Liverpool merchants are 
largely credited for proposing a bill for the reorganisation of the trade in which 
admission to this new Company was open to all British subjects on the payment of 
forty shillings. Representative groups were established in London, Bristol and 
Liverpool and three men from each city were annually elected to sit on a committee 
which was now responsible for the management of the African forts previously under 
the purview of the Royal African Company. 296 Bristol and Liverpool merchants' 
relationships with the Royal African Company and the established Company in 1750 
295 Davies, Royal African Company, pp. 100-101. For the decline of the Royal African Company, see also Ann M. Carlos and Jamie Brown Kruse, "The Decline of the Royal African Company: Fringe Firms and 
the Role of the Charter", Economic History Review, 49 (1996), pp. 291-313. 296 Morgan, British Transatlantic Slave Trade Vol. 2, p. xxxi. 
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are further explored in Chapter Six. Throughout its history, the British slave trade at 
large was also characterised by phases, experiencing peaks and troughs throughout 
the period. Richardson has noted three major expansionary phases; 1650-1683, 
1705-1725 and the year 1746. These phases were accompanied by shorter periods 
of expansion that occurred during 1690-1701,1734-1738 and 1780-1792.297 War 
was the most disruptive factor, but market fluctuations in sugar prices also affected 
trading activity. Expansion and decline in the slave trade is discussed in the next 
chapter when the specific clearance patterns are addressed as they relate to both 
ports' organisation of the trade. 
As highlighted in earlier sections, there is a strong link between the slave 
trade and the staple commodity trades of sugar and tobacco. 298 Local manufactures 
in both ports and their surrounding hinterlands boomed throughout the eighteenth 
century, and their products made up the majority of the cargoes, both to be bartered 
on the African coast for slaves as well as traded on the North American mainland and 
the West Indian islands for colonial products. Thus, those engaged in the trade from 
both ports usually were those who gained from providing goods and services to 
slaving ventures or those who locally profited from dealing with the products of slave 
labour. In this way, the trade in slaves was interwoven in the wider commercial 
fabric. 299 The prospects for profit in slave trading ventures were enticing. While 
Bristol merchant James Jones famously described the "precarious trade" where 
"sometimes profits good, sometimes not so good", a profit of around ten per cent 
297 David Richardson, "The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade", in Louis, Oxford History, pp. 
440-465. See also David Eltis, "The Volume and Structure of the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment", 
William and Mary Quarterly, 58 (2001), pp. 17-46; Stephen D. Behrendt, "The Annual Volume and 
Regional Distribution of the Atlantic of the British Slave Trade, 1780-1807", Journal of African Study, 38 (1997), pp. 187-211. 
298 The close relationship of the slave trade with these commodity trades was highlighted as a primary 
argument against the proposed abolition of the slave trade by Bristol and Liverpool merchants, as further 
explored in Chapter Six. 
299 David Richardson, "Slavery and Bristol's 'Golden Age"', Slavery and Abolition, 26 (2005), pp. 35-54; 
Dresser, Slavery Obscured, pp. 7-53. 
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was considered acceptable for the risk involved. 300 Dresser has argued that for 
Bristol, its urban development and the wealth merchants generated were inextricably 
linked to the slave trade and slave produced goods. 301 Likewise, Jane Longmore 
makes a similar argument when she assesses the validity of the contemporary 
assertion (albeit a drunken one) made on stage at the opening of the Theatre Royal 
in Liverpool in 1772 that "there is not a brick in your dirty town but what it is 
cemented by the blood of a negro". 302 Additionally, Wallace asserted that, in 
Liverpool, "almost every order of people is interested in a Guinea cargo" and that it 
is "well known that many of the small vessels that import about a hundred slaves are 
fitted out by attornies, drapers, ropers, grocers, tallow-chandlers, barbers, tailors, 
etc". 303 This contemporary observation demonstrates that many Liverpudlians who 
invested in the slave trade were not necessarily specialists in it, thus reinforcing the 
argument above that, unlike Bristol, more Liverpool merchants had diverse 
commercial interests. Cargo lists for both Bristol and Liverpool ventures that indicate 
beef, vinegar, tobacco, beer, cider, manillas, beads, powder and Manchester goods 
among other items certainly attest to the wide variety of products that needed to be 
obtained either locally or from the hinterland to supply a slaving venture. 304 
As noted in the Introduction, Richardson has conducted an in-depth analysis 
for Bristol's slave trading activity throughout its participation. In his analysis, 
300 Examination of James Jones 16 Jun 1788, in Sheila Lambert (ed. ), House of Commons Sessional Papers 
of the Eighteenth Century Vol. 68 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1975); See Hyde, Parkinson and 
Marriner, "Nature and Profitability"; Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade". Trade in sugar 
and tobacco was conducted on a commission basis, usually with a 2.5 per cent charge on sugar and tobacco 
imports and exports. Richardson, "Slavery and Bristol's `Golden Age"', p. 48. 
301 See Dresser, Slavery Obscured, pp. 96-129; Madge Dresser, "Squares of Distinction, Webs of Interest: 
Gentility, Urban Development and the Slave Trade in Bristol, c. 1673-1820", Slavery and Abolition, 21 
Q000), pp. 21-47. 
2 See Jane Longmore, "`Cemented by the Blood of a Negro? ' The Impact of the Slave Trade on 
Eighteenth Century Liverpool", in Richardson, Schwarz and Tibbles, Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, 
227-252. 
33 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 229. 
304 Jeremiah Meyler to Richard Meyler, 21 Sep 1752, in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 264; shipping account 
book of the snow, Fanny Apr 1777-May 1791,12162 BRO. See also David Richardson, "West African 
Consumption Patterns and the English Slave Trade", in Gemery and Hogendorn, Uncommon Market, pp. 
303-333. 
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Richardson noted that it grew from small beginnings to substantial levels in the 
period between 1725-1740, with the following thirty-five years being a period of 
contraction and stabilisation. Finally, following a partial revival after the War of 
American Independence, the trade in Bristol almost completely ended in the decade 
before British abolition in 1807.305 In terms of percentage share in the trade, Bristol 
peaked in the 1740s with a forty-five per cent share of Britain's trade, while it 
decreased to around twenty-five per cent in the 1750s. By the 1790s, Bristol's share 
had shrunk to just two per cent. 306 However, despite the fact that slave trade 
clearances from the port accounted for only four to nine per cent of all the ships 
leaving the port in the eighteenth century, the trade was more important than these 
percentages suggest when the amount of capital invested in the trade is 
considered. 307 It is estimated that Bristol slave merchants invested at least 
£100,000 per year in slaving voyages in peace time and £150,000 when Bristol 
slaving activity was at its peak, reflecting the large amount of financial capital 
required. 308 While a substantial sum, it has been estimated that in the 1780s, Bristol 
merchants invested £400,000-£500,000 in the sugar trade, demonstrating that the 
sugar interest was indeed the port's primary transatlantic commercial enterprise. 309 
While such a comprehensive analytical coverage of Liverpool's slave trade has not 
been conducted, Liverpool came to dominate the trade. In the period between 1750- 
1807, Liverpool merchants financed fifty-five per cent of all British slaving voyages 
and no less than seventy-five per cent between 1780-1807.310 Liverpool annually 
invested £264,000 in the trade in the period between 1748-1784, significantly more 
30' Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 3. 
306 Ibid., p. 3. 
307 Morgan, Bristol and Atlantic Trade, p. 131. 308 Ibid., p. 131. 
309 Richardson, "Slavery and Bristol's `Golden Age"', p. 47. 310 Richardson, "British Empire", p. 447. 
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than Bristol's annual share, signifying Liverpool's greater participation in the trade. 311 
Tellingly, in the final decade of the eighteenth century, over 960 ships cleared the 
port of Liverpool for Africa while only 135 left Bristol, further indicating the 
prominence of the slave trade in Liverpool's larger commercial profile. 312 Table 2.2 
lists the clearances of slaving vessels from both ports. While this is anaylsed more 
comprehensively in the next chapter, Liverpool's tremendous growth in participation 
in the trade in the mid-eighteenth century is readily observed, in contrast with 
Bristol's decreasing participation from that point. 
Table 2.2: Clearances of slave ships from Bristol and Liverpool 
Bristol Liverpool 
1740-1749 250 
1750-1759 220 
1760-1769 248 
1770-1779 169 
1780-1789 94 
1790-1799 135 
1800-1807 20 
Total 2,082 
58 
48 
192 
267 
496 
711 
558 
969 
930 
4,941 
Source: Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
31 Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade", p. 65. 312 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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A slaving voyage necessitated an "Atlantic-wide" perspective in its planning 
and coordination and its operation is well known in the historiography. This 
perspective revolved around a cyclical supply and demand of commodities, trading 
goods, and people in order to minimise risks and maximise their potential for 
profits. 313 Some of the considerations in a slaving venture included procuring slaving 
vessels, which were usually purchased from other trades, recruiting a "seasoned" 
labour force, including carpenters to outfit the slaving vessels, produce and foodstuff 
supplies in regional African markets, and the harvest periods in the Americas when 
slaves would be most desired for purchase. 314 By keeping this Atlantic-wide 
perspective and organising voyages around the most auspicious timing, the 
organisation of the slave trade required merchants to coordinate with several 
different parties and have knowledge of goods and people at various stages of the 
venture and around the Atlantic. Because a slaving voyage typically took a year to 
eighteen months to complete, timing was especially important in its successful 
completion. Most slaving voyages were fitted out between June and September and 
quick turn-around times were necessary both on the African coast and in the 
Americas. 315 Contemporary opinion stressed conducting quick purchases along the 
coast. As Liverpool merchant William Earle wrote to agents Kenyon and Southworth, 
"long purchases make sickly ships" and "unless one would expect slaves to spring 
and grow like mushrooms it is not to be expected from the great number of ships 
imployed in the African trade that it should be otherwise". 316 Mortality rates indeed 
varied, and more time spent on certain places along the coast, particularly Old 
313 See Stephen D. Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles and Profits: Merchant Decision Making in the 
Slave Trade", William and Mary Quarterly, 58 (2001), pp. 171-205. 
"a Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles and Profits", p. 173. 315 Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles and Profits", p. 180; B. K. Drake, "The Liverpool-African 
Voyage, c. 1790-1807: Commercial Problems", in Anstey and Hair, Liverpool, the African Slave Trade and 
Abolition, pp. 126-157; Klein and Engerman, "Slave Mortality", p. 116. 
316 William Earle to Kenyon and Southworth, 22 Apr 1761, Earle Collection, Liverpool Public Records 
Office (hereafter LivPRO). 
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Calabar and Bonny, experienced much greater mortality. 317 The nature of the slave 
supply in the various regions arguably influenced mortality, thus it becomes further 
apparent that venturing during the most auspicious trade cycle was imperative for 
the success of the voyage. 318 Other factors beyond the merchants' control could also 
affect the timing of a voyage and thus its success. For example, Earle also 
mentioned that, owing to bad winds, the voyage of the Calypso from Jamaica was 
prolonged and thus "throws us behind for next season". 319 Poor harvests, 
competition from other traders, and planters defaulting on payments were other 
such factors that affected the profitability of the trade. A slaving voyage thus 
involved risk on all three legs of its "triangular" journey and the success of a slaving 
voyage depended largely on the merchant's knowledge of these risks and his ability 
to problem solve. 320 
The management of slaving voyages required particular entrepreneurial skill 
because of the decision-making that was needed, the necessary coordination of 
resources and financial capital, and the risk inherent in each slaving venture that 
merchants had to respond to. Haggerty argues that Liverpool merchants were 
acutely aware of the unique risks of the slave trade, such as those surrounding the 
purchase of slaves on the coast, slave mortality, market fluctuations and receiving 
remittances, and were largely able to manage these risks. 321 The ability to 
successfully manage risks was consequently linked to having knowledge of what 
goods were desired in different areas along the African coast and being able assort 
317 Sheryllynne Haggerty, "Risk and Risk Management in the Liverpool Slave Trade", Business History, 5 (2009), pp. 817-834; Klein and Engerman, "Slave Mortality", pp. 117-119; Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson, "`This Horrid Hole': Royal Authority, Commerce and Credit at Bonny, 1690-1840", Journal 
of African History, 45 (2004), pp. 363-392. 318 Drake, "Liverpool-African Voyage", pp. 130-135; Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles and Profits", 173. 
32 
William Earle to John Darbyshire, 14 Mar 1761, Earle Collection, LivPRO. '0 Drake, "Liverpool-African Voyage", p. 126. 321 Haggerty, "Risk and Risk Management", pp. 819,823-828. 
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the appropriate cargoes to barter for slaves in these different markets. 322 African 
coastal dealers from the different parts of the coast were particular in, and had their 
own preferences for, specific quantities and qualities of European, Asian, and 
American textiles, manufacturers, firearms, gunpowder and alcohol and thus, agents 
had to assort specific cargoes for each port they visited. 323 For example, merchants 
had to make sure that they had manillas, or small brass bracelets, in the eastern 
Niger Delta, cowrie shells on the Slave Coast, and guinea cloth on the River Senegal 
to barter for slaves in conjunction with other merchandise. 324 These preferences 
likewise changed over time and merchants needed to be kept abreast of these 
changes. Speaking of bugles in particular, Richard Camplin from the African Office in 
London wrote to Bristol's Society of Merchant Venturers stating that "that article is 
subject to many changes of fashions 
... 
what the Negroes like one year they dislike 
the next year". 325 Indeed, merchants such as Liverpudlian Robert Bostock regularly 
implored their captains to "be very particular [in their correspondence] in mentioning 
... 
what goods is most in demand on the coast" to ensure they were well informed of 
the specific types of cargo needed for individual markets. 326 
The trading goods exchanged with the African coastal dealers usually fell into 
the categories of cloth, beads, metals and hardware (including iron bars, brass rods 
and brass bowls), alcohol and tobacco, and firearms and gunpowder. Knowing the 
precise assortments of cargoes for different regions and being able to procure them 
thus required merchants to have developed strong connections in the trading world, 
which in turn required an honest reputation. Timing was also important in obtaining 
these goods; orders were often requested "as early as possible" because items were 
322 Richardson, "West African Consumption", p. 304. 
323 ]bid., p. 304; Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles and Profits", p. 126. 324 Marion Johnson, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and the Economy of West Africa", in Anstey and Hair, 
Liverpool, the African Trade Slave Trade, and Abolition, pp. 14-3 9. 325 Richard Camplin to Society of Merchant Venturers, 21 Apr 1773, SMV 7/2/1/11, BRO. 
326 Robert Bostock to Captain Peter Bums, 10 Jun 1788, Robert Bostock Letterbook, LivPRO. 
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"not to be got for many unless ordered sometime" in advance. 327 Additionally, some 
of the preferred trading goods, particularly bar iron, beads and certain textiles, were 
manufactured by foreign markets and re-exported by British merchants. British 
manufactures could not imitate these goods to the satisfaction of the African 
merchants, indicating that British merchant networks for trading goods were indeed 
widespread in order to meet their trading demands. 328 
Knowledgeable merchants attuned to the wants of various African ports were 
important for success in the slave trade, but English merchants also had to take into 
account the different political structures along the West African coast. These different 
coastal polities further shaped the nature of the trade in that region. The seven 
primary regions to which British merchants traded were Senegambia, Sierra Leone, 
the Windward Coast, Gold Coast, Bight of Benin, Bight of Biafra and West-Central 
Africa. 329 These regions had multiple ethnic groups, languages, and social systems; 
moreover the social, political and economic networks of these African cultures were 
also embedded in a larger framework of slavery, of which the Atlantic slave trade 
was only a part 
. 
330 The Gold Coast, Bights of Benin and Biafra as well as West- 
Central Africa were the principal sites for much of the slave trade generally in the 
eighteenth century. For the British trade in particular, the Bight of Biafra became an 
increasingly important site towards the end of the period, and British shipments from 
that region accounted for eighty-five per cent of the total slave shipments from the 
Bight 
. 
331 The Gold Coast was also a vitally important region. With the largest 
European presence on the West African coast, the Royal African Company occupied 
ten castles on the Gold Coast, including their headquarters at Cape Coast Castle. 
327 William Earle to Sparling and Bolden, 20 Feb 1760, Earle Collection, LivPRO. 
328 Richardson, "West African Consumption", p. 308. 
329 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
33° As will be discussed in Chapter Three and Four, preferences changed throughout the period for slaves from different ethnic groups. 
331 Paul Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 50,59. 
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Britain's early involvement in the trade was shaped by the patterns established by 
the Royal African Company to this region. 332 
Throughout the period, changes occurred in market preferences, with 
expansion in exports taking place in West Central Africa and particularly the Loango 
Coast. As Paul Lovejoy and Richardson argue, the changes that took place 
throughout the eighteenth century, but especially after 1725, were dependent upon 
"the negotiation of new Afro-European working relationships". 333 This highlights the 
importance for English merchants in building and maintaining solid network 
relationships with both African leaders and merchants. How the Bristol and Liverpool 
slave traders utilised these various markets is reflective of aspects of 
entrepreneurship and is discussed further in Chapters Three and Four. Generally 
speaking, however, small guineamen were sent to politically decentralised coastal 
markets while larger ships slaved at more politically centralised ports with the 
commercial infrastructure to provide large-scale slave shipments. 334 The Kingdom of 
Dahomey as well as Old Calabar and Bonny, located on the Bights of Benin and of 
Biafra respectively, are prime examples of trading sites with different political 
organisations that influenced the trade with English merchants. Dahomey operated 
as a large, politically-organised military state that acquired slaves as tribute 
payments and through warfare and kidnapping. The political elites of these large- 
scale states controlled the supply of slaves by levying tribute payments, establishing 
commercial towns and trading centres, as well as collecting turnpike fees along 
major trading routes. 335 In contrast, the slave trade at Old Calabar operated on an 
332 Benjamin, Atlantic World, p. 338. 333 Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson, "African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade", in Richardson, Schwarz and Tibbles, Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, pp. 43-66. 334 Behrendt, "Markets, Transaction Cycles and Profits", p. 188. 335 Paul Lovejoy and Jan Hogendorn, "Slave Marketing in West Africa", in Gemery and Hogendorn, Uncommon Market, pp. 213-239. 
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adapted form of the local institution of debt bondage, or "pawnship". 336 Thus, 
English merchants needed to be aware of the different local practices for securing 
slaves in order to effectively conduct business. 337 The sound relationships English 
merchants had to cultivate with their counterparts on the African coast is emphasised 
in correspondence. Letters of instruction to captains often advised "prudent 
management with the Natives"; writing of the Africans in Old Calabar in particular, 
William Earle wrote that he "carefully avoid[s] having disputes with them". 338 Earle 
also wrote in very friendly terms to Duke Abashy of Old Calabar regarding the 
accidental capture of the Duke's sons as slaves. Writing that the Duke "know[s] very 
well I love all Calabar", Earle pledged to find and return Duke Abashy's sons safely, 
and mentioned his own wife and sons to intimate their common family ties. 
Additionally, written to perhaps "save face", Earle asked the Duke to "tell everybody 
you know that knows me I remain Duke Abashy's friend". 339 Furthermore, speaking 
in Parliament, John Tarleton discussed how the children of principal African elites and 
tradesmen were sent to England to be educated. This practice was encouraged 
because it "not only concilitates [sic] their friendship and softens their manners, but 
adds greatly to the security of the trader, which answers the purposes of interest and 
humanity". 34° These examples attest to the importance of fostering strong 
336 See Lovejoy and Richardson, "Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History", pp. 349-355. 337 Different African polities and ethnic groups were often at war with each other, which in turn affected British trading activity along the coast. In a letter from Cape Coast Castle regarding trading conditions, the 
committee noted an impending conflict between the Ashantees (Ashante) and the Fantees (Fante). They 
observed: "... that as most of our Forts are situated in the Fantee Country, and that Nation having always lived in friendship with us, we will grant them every assistance in our power consistent with reason should 
their adversaries the Ashantees attack them, this Council being clearly of opinion that the Fantees (a people long used to the manner of the Europeans and pretty much civilised) are as neighbours, far preferable to the Ashantees who are a rude unpolished set of Men". This highlights the nature of developing sound 
relationships with the Africans as well as the idea that ethnic groups were considered by Europeans' as discrete groups, with both desirable and undesirable qualities. This further relates to market preferences 
merchants and planters had among the different ethnic groups. Cape Coast Castle, 11 Aug 1772, Conditions 
in the Forts and in trade, SMV 7/2/1/11, BRO. 
338 Owners of the Chesterfield to William Earle, 22 May 1751, Earle Collection, LivPRO; William Earle to Anne Winstanley, 30 Aug 1751, Earle Collection, LivPRO. 
339 William Earle to Duke Abashy, Feb 1761, Earle Collection, LivPRO. 340 Examination of John Tarleton, 16 Apr 1788, in Lambert, House Vol. 69. 
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relationships among the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchants' wider networks. How 
strongly these relationships were cemented impacted upon the respective ports' 
entrepreneurial activity and is further discussed in the next chapter. 
Core issues embody the transatlantic commercial world and the organisation 
and operation of the slave trade exemplifies these issues, particularly in regards to 
risk awareness and management, as well as the consequent importance of trust and 
reputation. A contemporary noted that the slave trade was "a commerce of 
enterprise and risque", encapsulating both the notion of enterprise as well as risk as 
a noted facet of trade. 341 The proper management of slaving ventures was crucial in 
determining the success of a voyage and it is in the management of the voyages 
where entrepreneurial qualities are expressed by leading owners and the impact of 
human and social capital is observed. This will be more specifically analysed in 
Chapters Three and Four when the trends in the organisation of the trade for both 
port cities are discussed. Generally, however, within slave voyage partnerships, it 
seems that most of the responsibility was usually delegated to one of the partners, 
who was referred to as "ship's husband", "purser" or "agent", and it was this person 
who represented the particular merchants` firm or network group. This person was 
responsible for supervising the outfit of the ship, preparing the cargoes, 
corresponding with captains at sea and with commission houses in the Americas as 
well as the general bookkeeping for the voyage. 342 Usually these partners owned the 
slave ships as well, which was not necessarily the case in other trades. 343 There 
were obvious benefits for this type of organisation, both in terms of spreading risk 
and earning profits. Outfitting a vessel for a slaving venture was expensive; at the 
34' Edgar Come to Baron Hawkesbury, 27 Feb 1788, Liverpool Papers (hereafter LP), Vol. CCXXVII, 
Papers relating to the Slave Trade, 1787-1823, British Library (hereafter BL). 
342 Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade", pp. 68,69. 343 Slave ships were specifically designed and constructed for the trade, and were used on a fairly regular basis. For instance, in the year and a half before abolition, 114 of the 155 slaving vessels in Liverpool had been regularly engaged in the trade. Cameron, Liverpool, p. 12. See also Rediker, Slave Ship, pp. 50-56. 
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beginning of the eighteenth century, it cost around £3,000 to prepare a ship for the 
voyage and by the end of the century, this figure had risen to £8,000 or more. 344 It 
thus follows that it would be more advantageous for agents if the voyages were 
backed by a number of investors. Leading agents relied on the virtue of their 
reputation to attract investors, or "sleeping partners" to help spread the costs of the 
voyage; the attraction for the investors was the potential to make profits from the 
voyage without necessarily having an in-depth knowledge of the trade or too much 
responsibility in its overall management. 345 Interestingly, around the mid-eighteenth 
century, changes in those involved in slave trading voyages occurred in both port 
cities, most likely affecting the course of the slave trade in Bristol and Liverpool. By 
the 1740s an "infusion of new men" entered the Liverpool slave trade from the West 
Indian trade. Likewise, by 1750, there was a noted change in the key investors in 
the Bristol slave trade from "old" to "new" wealth or from "insiders" to "outsiders". 346 
This change had implications for the access slave trade merchants had to both 
human and social capital, discussed further in Chapters Four and Five. Moreover, the 
timing of this process is notable, considering this is around the time when Liverpool 
came to dominate the slave trade. This issue of timing, also noted by Clemens is 
thus important to consider when analysing factors for relative success and failure in 
the slave trade. 347 
344 Richardson, "British Empire", p. 447. 345 Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade", pp. 68,69. 346 Richardson, "Slavery and Bristol's `Golden Age"', p. 40. 347 Clemens, "Rise of Liverpool", pp. 211-225. This is further discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has established the commercial context of the ports of Bristol 
and Liverpool, demonstrating the interwoven relationship among the hinterland, local 
manufacture and the staple commodity trades including tobacco, sugar and slaves. 
While both ports were well placed to benefit from the "Americanisation" of trade that 
occurred in Britain in the eighteenth century, Liverpool's commercial prosperity far 
out-stripped that of Bristol. Leading abolitionist Thomas Clarkson asserted that it was 
a mistake to attribute Liverpool's wealth to its participation in the slave trade alone. 
Instead, he posited the following reasons: admission of strangers to Liverpool's 
trade, the salt trade, the increase in Lancashire's population, manufacturing in 
Manchester as well as canals. 348 As outlined above, multiple reasons have been put 
forth by historians for Liverpool's success that include Clarkson's observations, such 
as the mutually-beneficial relationship Liverpool forged with Manchester, the 
improvements made in transportation and communications throughout the century 
and the human capital that existed in Liverpool's mariner community. What was 
intimated in this chapter and what will be elaborated upon and further developed in 
the following chapters is that Liverpool's success can also be attributed to the 
entrepreneurship of its merchants accessed within associational networks, 
encapsulated by the contemporary notion of "spirit". Writing in 1773, Lowbridge 
Bright of Bristol commented, "the Liverpoole people go on with such spirit. I wish we 
could get more into that track, as they keep their business more to themselves". 349 
Not only did Bright recognise a certain "spirit" of the Liverpool merchants, but also a 
348 Clarkson's observations are included as a footnote in the "Petition of Liverpool to the House of Commons", 14 Feb 1788, in Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to 
America Vol. 2 (Washington D. C.: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1931), p. 575. 349 That is, Liverpool merchants engrossed trade. Lowbridge Bright to Henry Bright, 5 Nov 1773, in 
Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 450. 
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certain manner of business practice to emulate for success. By saying the Liverpool 
people "keep their business more to themselves", Bright also distinguished a 
particular business practice the Liverpool merchants possessed that enabled their 
success. As will be seen, Liverpool's slave trade was organised in such a way that 
utilised and benefitted from a greater access to local knowledge, skills and resources 
which offered more competitive advantages to their trade. Because of this, Liverpool 
merchants, as entrepreneurs, were able to surpass their counterparts in Bristol to 
become the leaders in the slave trade. 
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Chapter Three: Trends in the Organisation of the Bristol and 
Liverpool Slave Trade 
Chapter Two outlined the development of Bristol and Liverpool as important 
commercial centres, discussing the interplay between their geography, manufactures 
and industry, and trade. Specifically, their commerce was analysed in its Atlantic 
context, with a discussion of the slave trade. This chapter examines the organisation 
of the slave trade in both port cities more specifically, and includes an examination of 
the twelve merchant case studies and their business networks as they relate to the 
overall patterns analysed. These patterns and the relationships of the merchants 
operating within their networks are explained graphically using social network 
analysis, which by visually representing these merchant networks, provides a more 
nuanced and comprehensive comparison between the two ports. In addition, the 
changes in the organisation of the trade in terms of the major traders and their 
associated networks, as well as changes in market preference both on the African 
coast and in the Americas, are described, demonstrating a change in practice over 
time in both ports. By demonstrating trends and patterns, both on a macro-scale 
(the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities) and micro-scale (the 
merchant case studies), conclusions can be made as to how entrepreneurship and 
social capital were utilised through merchant networks and contributed to the overall 
success of the trade for both ports. This chapter details the trends, while the 
following chapter explains and analyses these trends using the established 
framework of entrepreneurship and the notions of various forms of capital. 
Clear trends are revealed by the analysis in this chapter. The Liverpool slave 
merchant community was much larger and more inter-connected whilst Bristol slave 
merchants were more atomised and their community smaller. It thus follows that the 
Liverpool case study merchants generally invested in slave voyages as part of larger 
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networks, which themselves were also more connected. Therefore, through these 
larger and more connected networks, Liverpool merchants had access to more 
knowledge, skills and capital which facilitated their entrepreneurial position as 
leaders in the trade. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
provides a general analysis of the slave trade from both Bristol and Liverpool. The 
number of slaves taken to the Americas by Bristol and Liverpool ships is given, 
including a breakdown of the major embarkation and disembarkation regions. 
Change over time is also demonstrated, in terms of peak periods in the trade as well 
as the changes in market preference. The second section presents trends in voyage 
management and investment. The slave merchant communities in both ports are 
graphically represented over time, and trends in primary and secondary ownership 
among investors are discussed. The third section analyses the case study merchants 
and shows how they do or do not conform to the patterns outlined in the first two 
sections. This is shown through an analysis of their own particular patterns of 
ownership and associational networks. 
General Analysis"' 
In the period between 1725 and 1807, a total of 494 Bristol merchants 
participated in 1,691 voyages and delivered approximately 483,259 slaves to the 
Americas. By comparison, Liverpool engaged in significantly more voyages, sending 
out 4,604 ships and delivering 1,313,865 slaves. Likewise, a much higher number of 
merchants were involved in Liverpool, with a total number of 2,025 participating in 
these voyages. As demonstrated below, these voyages largely conformed to national 
350 All of the tables and figures in this chapter have been produced based on data found in Eltis et al., Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. How the data has been specifically derived, particularly for the social network 
analysis, may be found in the Technical Appendix. 
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patterns. The following tables provide a summary of the seven primary embarkation 
regions for voyages leaving from both Bristol and Liverpool in the given time period. 
Chapter Two discussed that these different African regions had multiple ethnic 
groups, languages, different political systems and desires for specific trading goods 
which the British merchants had to be aware of when trading; their knowledge of 
these various factors thus facilitated and drove their trade. Market preference and 
slave supplies on the African coast, and the availability of the preferred goods for 
trade, such as textiles, firearms, cowries and manillas were particular considerations 
which contributed to the operation of the trade. The Bristol and Liverpool merchants' 
management of these factors thus contributed to their success. Voyage 
management, in terms of the decision-making on the part of the merchant, is 
particularly linked with notions of entrepreneurship when an entrepreneur is viewed 
as someone who specialises in making judgmental decisions. 35' Decision-making 
implies a leadership role, which has been argued to have a function only when 
something new needs to be carried out. For example, seeking new markets on the 
African coast or in the Americas that have not yet been exploited, and thus which 
had not been established through previous experience and routine. 352 These 
entrepreneurial considerations, and the particular managerial decisions made by 
Bristol and Liverpool merchants are considered in the following chapter. 
351 Casson, Entrepreneurship, p. 80. 
352 Schumpeter, "Entrepreneur", p. 248. 
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Table 3.1: Major embarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool slavers, 1725-1807 
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Table 3.1 underscores Liverpool's larger presence and supremacy in the trade 
throughout the period. Bristol's early predominance, however is evident. In the five 
years between 1725-1730, seventy-nine Bristol ships arrived on the coast compared 
with only fourteen vessels from Liverpool. In the following twenty years Bristol sent 
284 vessels and while Liverpool still sent out less at 217 ships, it is clear the port's 
presence in the trade was growing. Liverpool finally and significantly overtook Bristol 
by mid-century in the decade between 1750-1759. During this period, 470 Liverpool 
voyages were recorded on the African coast, surpassing Bristol by over 300 ships. 
This also exceeded the number of Liverpool ships in the previous decade by over 
200, indicative of Liverpool's increased interest and participation in the slave trade. 
As noted above, trade along the African coast was highly specialised and merchants 
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had to be aware of the specific local conditions in order to be able to successfully 
conduct business; merchants would thus instruct captains to venture to the same 
regions consecutively to trade with African merchants with whom they had developed 
relationships and where they had gained experience of the local practices and 
conditions. 353 As also mentioned in the Introduction, Liverpool mariners and captains 
in particular had a wealth of human capital based on accumulated experience in the 
slave trade which served as a competitive advantage. Behrendt cites that the 
availability of well-trained "Guinea mariners" in Liverpool throughout the year 
allowed for faster turn-around times and more market options in Africa because 
these mariners also had more experience in the different regions from which to draw. 
Thus, Liverpool merchants had the manpower to participate in more voyages and 
were able to access more varied markets than London and Bristol merchants. 354 
Captains, who had a "knowledge of the wants of the coast and possess an influence 
with the Black Traders" were thus important members of merchant networks, which 
is further discussed in the next chapter. 355 As demonstrated in Table 3.1, Bristol and 
Liverpool slavers had preferences for certain markets, indicative not only of these 
established connections, but also of their knowledge of the desired trading goods in 
different regions of the coast and their ability to meet these demands. Similar 
patterns are also found with the case study merchants, discussed below. 
As Eltis argues, the coastal regions of Africa all experienced a rise in numbers 
of Africans taken in the trade followed by a plateau; this was largely influenced by 
"pushing regions across a threshold of supply". 356 Early patterns of embarkation, 
particularly for Bristol, were shaped by the patterns established by the Royal African 
Company, while Liverpool merchants were more enterprising in exploiting new 
353 Eltis, "Volume and Structure", p. 32. 354 Behrendt, "Human Capital", p. 67. 355 Edgar Corrie to Baron Hawkesbury, 27 Feb 1788, LP, Vol. CCXXVII, BL. 356 Eltis, "Volume and Structure", pp. 33,34. 
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markets along the African coast later in the period. 357 This is discussed further in the 
next chapter. Generally speaking, in terms of specific embarkation regions, the 
Bight of Biafra was the principal location for both ports; however, Liverpool ventured 
there on almost three times as many occasions as Bristol. The region's popularity 
with Bristol and Liverpool's slavers mirrors the larger trend of British merchants at 
large, who by 1740 also preferred to trade in this area. 358 Indeed, the Bight of Biafra 
accounted for thirty-six per cent of Liverpool's activity on the African coast, while 
Bristol merchants sent almost fifty per cent of their ships to that region. Richardson 
notes Bristol merchants had a competitive advantage in the Bight of Biafra, as 
Bristol's local copper and brass industry could more readily satisfy the demands of 
that region which sought kettles, basins and copper wires and rods. 359 Other major 
locales for both ports included the Gold Coast and West Central Africa, while 
Liverpool also traded significantly along the Windward Coast. By the mid-century, 
Liverpool secured and never relinquished its position in five of seven regions: the 
Bights of Benin and Biafra, Sierra Leone, the Windward Coast and West Central 
Africa. 360 This corresponds with Richardson's characterisation that Bristol merchants 
were seemingly more conservative in their approach on the African coast by this time 
and may have "lacked the enterprise" of some contemporary Liverpool traders. 36' 
This notion is further developed in the next chapter. 
As expected, however, decline in slaving activity for both ports can be seen 
during war years, as war accounted for the most detrimental aspect of the trade. As 
with the slave trade for Britain at large, the trade for both ports slumped particularly 
during the War of American Independence in the 1770s and conflicts with the French 
in 1780-1782 and 1793. These latter conflicts saw a reduction in the British slave 
357 Richardson, Bristol Vol. 1, p. xxiii. 
358 Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance", p. 27. See also Lovejoy, Transformations, pp. 59-60. 359 Richardson, "Slavery and Bristol's `Golden Age"', p. 44. 360 Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance", p. 26. 361 Richardson, Bristol Vol. 3, p. xxi. 
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trade by more than fifty per cent. 362 This trend is reflected for Bristol and Liverpool in 
the table. Both ports' trading activity along the African coast decreased in the decade 
1770-1779, coinciding with the War of American Independence and on the eve of 
war with France. The trade to the Windward Coast in particular declined, supporting 
the general trend that decline started to occur in that region by 1780 due to French 
squadrons threatening British shipping. 363 The trade recovered somewhat in the next 
decade, but while Bristol slavers never returned to the coast in similar numbers as 
the first part of the century, during the period between 1780-1789, Liverpool slavers 
actually surpassed their peak of the previous twenty years. Additionally, the last 
seven years of the trade clearly demonstrate Bristol's relatively inconsequential 
presence in Africa, with only thirteen recorded ventures compared to Liverpool's still 
sizable 585. Thus, Liverpool merchants not only recovered more effectively from the 
effects of war than their counterparts in Bristol, but they were also able to further 
expand their own trade. How both ports responded during times of war, such as 
engaging in privateering, ultimately affected their success in the trade, and as these 
numbers hint, Liverpool's response demonstrates a spirit of entrepreneurship. 
Turning from the primary regions of embarkation, Table 3.2 shows the 
principal areas where Bristol and Liverpool disembarked their slave ships. 
362 Behrendt, "Annual Volume", pp. 197-199. 363 Eltis, "Volume and Structure", p. 35; Behrendt, "Annual Volume", p. 191. 
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Table 3.2: Major disembarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool slavers, 1725-1807 
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As with the major embarkation regions, the places of landing for Bristol and 
Liverpool ships conform to the established national patterns, with Jamaica receiving 
significantly more ships than any other region. For Bristol, the decade between 1730- 
1739 comprised the highest number of voyages sent to Jamaica, coinciding with the 
peak of Bristol's involvement in the trade. Conversely, Liverpool sent the highest 
number of ships to Jamaica in the last full decade before the abolition of the trade, 
well into period when Liverpool's prime position in the trade was secure. 
Significantly, Liverpool delivered more slaves to that island than Bristol and London 
combined, as well as twice as many slaves than those ports combined to Barbados. 364 
As Table 3.2 shows, however, the trade to Barbados declined. As with patterns of 
'°" Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance", p. 28. 
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embarkation, the effects of war and local conditions impacted upon the popularity of 
the region. A general decline in the sugar colonies was noted during the War of 
American Independence when West Indian planters were cut off from the supplies 
from the American mainland. Additionally, a financial crisis in the period between 
1780-1787 led to famine, in which Barbados particularly suffered. It was in this 
context that David Beck Ryden asserts, "planter interest in slavery waned". 365 
Liverpool's commercial exploitation of Jamaica, however, has already been 
established. Morgan calculated that twelve of the leading fifty Liverpool merchants 
disembarked over half of their slaves there, thus bolstering the numbers 
significantly. 366 On mainland North America, most Bristol voyages went to Virginia, 
followed closely by South Carolina. Again, the decade between 1730-1739 was when 
most of these voyages occurred, indicating not only Bristol's strength at this time as 
a major slaver, but corresponding with Bristol's involvement in both the Chesapeake 
tobacco interest and the servant trade, having forged trading connections there in 
the late seventeenth century. Like Bristol, most of Liverpool's ships were sent to 
Virginia in the decade between 1730-1739, while no ships were sent there in the last 
twenty years of the trade. Liverpool's slave trade to the Chesapeake region, 
however, was only marginal at best. Just over half of the merchants who sent a 
slaving vessel to the region by 1748 only invested in one slaving venture to the 
Chesapeake, and Liverpool's interest in the trade had diminished completely by 
1772.367 This decline was linked to a slump in overall trade to the region at the close 
of the Seven Years' War, as well as a decrease in demand for imported slaves due to 
the natural increase of the slave population. 368 The South Carolina market, however, 
365 David Beck Ryden, "Does Decline Make Sense? The West Indian Economy and the Abolition of the Slave Trade", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 31 (2001), pp. 347-374. 366 Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance", p. 29. 
367 Walsh, "Liverpool's Slave Trade", pp. 102,105. 368 Walsh, "Liverpool's Slave Trade", p. 115. 
99 
still relied on imported slaves and Liverpool sent the most shipments out of all the 
slave ports in the final seven years of the trade, with forty-six voyages. 
Perhaps what is more revealing is the percentage breakdown of these regions. 
In the period, Liverpool sent ninety-two per cent of its vessels to the Caribbean, 
while just under seven per cent went to the North American mainland; in contrast, 
eighty-one per cent of Bristol ships went to the Caribbean while about eighteen per 
cent were sent to North America. In the context of a declining North American 
market, it is clear that the bulk of slave ships went to the Caribbean (which had a 
greater need for enslaved labour due to the aforementioned fertility deficit among 
slaves), yet Bristol's share in the North American market was more than twice that of 
Liverpool's. This may be indicative of Bristol's early trading connections with the 
North American mainland, and particularly those in the Chesapeake, which accounted 
for Bristol's larger interest in this region. As highlighted in Chapter Two, Bristol's 
transition to the "Americanisation" of its trade was facilitated by the trading 
connections cemented between Bristolian and American merchants, in part due to 
the number of Bristol merchants who were born or trained in British North American 
cities or in the West Indies. 369 Bristol dominated this market early in the period, 
particularly concentrating on the York River where they had well-established 
business contacts. In the years between 1718-1727, over eighty per cent of Bristol 
slave imports went to this region. 370 Bristol later shifted to the expanding tobacco 
area of the upper James River Valley. Having entered the market relatively late, 
however, Liverpool focused on the Rhappahannock River region for its entire 
involvement in the Chesapeake trade. Bristol's activity in the slave trade declined 
coinciding with the time the trade declined to the Southern colonies, indicating that 
Bristol merchants perhaps were not prepared to diversify their markets. As little 
369 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, p. 10. 370 Walter E. Minchinton, "The Slave Trade of Bristol with the British Mainland Colonies in North 
America, 1699-1770", in Anstey and Hair, Liverpool, the African Slave Trade and Abolition, pp. 39-60. 
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overlap existed in personnel across trades, the switch to other markets (such as 
where Bristol merchants had connections in the sugar trade) may not have been 
easily facilitated given the discrete nature of the groups who managed these 
different trades. Furthermore, Morgan asserts that Bristol slave traders did not take 
advantage of "shifts in the centre of gravity" of the trade over time, which further 
supports the notion that Bristol slave merchants were more conservative in 
exploiting markets. 371 In this way, Bristol merchants could not compete with 
Liverpool or even London traders in expanding markets such as Jamaica and South 
Carolina between 1730-1770. 
Liverpool merchants, however, also showed more enterprise than their Bristol 
and London competitors by supplying slaves to both foreign and conquered colonies 
in larger numbers. Despite war with the Spanish and French hindering their general 
trade, Liverpool merchants benefitted from supplying their markets and proved to be 
more entrepreneurial in this regard. Liverpudlian merchants sent more slaves to 
markets such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, St. Lucia, San Domingo and Cuba than 
their Bristol and London counterparts. 372 For instance, while Bristol disembarked 
seventeen voyages at Martinique, Liverpool disembarked ninety-four. Additionally, in 
terms of supplying the Spanish market, Liverpool engaged in 126 voyages, 
disembarking at the Spanish American mainland, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico; 
108 vessels were sent to Cuba alone. On the other hand, Bristol engaged in just 
twenty voyages to the Spanish market. Exploiting new market opportunities 
demonstrates both entrepreneurial initiative, and the ability to make judgmental 
decisions in a trade fraught with risk. Later in the chapter, an analysis of the case 
study merchants demonstrates whether or not they conform to the overall patterns 
established here. 
371 Morgan, "Bristol and the Atlantic Trade", p. 640. 372 Morgan, "Liverpool's Dominance", p. 28. 
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Ownership and Investment 
Before discussing the patterns of voyage management, or ownership, and 
investment in slaving ventures in both Bristol and Liverpool, it is necessary to define 
a few terms. Merchant denotes any actor from Bristol or Liverpool involved in any 
slaving voyage, whether he was a primary or secondary owner. The Trans Atlantic 
Slave Trade Database lists a primary owner as "Owner A" while secondary owners 
are listed as Owner B, C, D etc. 373 Investors are defined by their secondary 
ownership only, or the total number of owners in a voyage that they were not the 
primary owner, or "Owner A". Lastly, Relationships identify when two merchants 
worked together on a voyage, for example, one is the primary owner and the other is 
an investor, or they are both investors. These relationships are analysed in the 
following figures and demonstrate notable differences in the organisation of the trade 
in both ports. 
373 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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Figure 3.1: Breakdown in the ownership of Bristol slaving voyages, 1725-1807 
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Figure 3.2: Breakdown in ownership of Liverpool slaving voyages, 1725-1807 
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As mentioned above, during this period 494 Bristol merchants participated in 
just under 1,700 voyages. Of the number of merchants, fifty-seven, or twelve per 
cent were primary owners only, labelled in the graph as "solo primary owner"; sixty- 
five were primary owners who accepted investment from other merchants on at least 
one voyage, or "non solo primary owners"; ninety-three were both primary and 
secondary owners throughout their career, while the majority, 279, were only 
investors, or secondary owners. It should be noted that many primary owners from 
Bristol are listed in the Slave Trade Database with an * listed after their name, which 
indicates "and Company" of the primary owner. In most cases, it cannot be 
determined who else is a member of the Company, so it is impossible to know the 
size of the investment group. This is not taken as a significant problem as the trends 
are still clear. 374 For example, when the partnerships are listed in full for the Bristol 
voyages, they are still generally smaller than those in Liverpool. Out of all the 
voyages that cleared from Bristol between 1725 and 1807, there are only nine 
voyages listed with eight owners; however case study Liverpool merchant Thomas 
Earle alone was the primary owner in seventeen groups of eight, indicative of the 
sheer spread of investment and the wealth of resources from which merchants had 
to draw in the Liverpool trade that was just not present in Bristol. This is discussed 
further below. 
The differences in terms of Liverpool's ownership and investment are quite 
striking. Again, Liverpool participated in substantially more voyages, and 
correspondingly, a much higher number of merchants were involved, with just over 
2,000 merchants participating in these voyages. Out of this much larger pool, just 
thirty-five, or two per cent were solely primary owners; 220 were non-solo primary 
owners who also accepted investment from others on at least one voyage; 428 were 
374 The Technical Appendix discusses the nature of the database further. See also Katie McDade, 
"Liverpool Slave Merchant Entrepreneurial Networks, 1725-1807", Business History [forthcoming]. 
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both primary and secondary owners throughout their career, while, similarly to 
Bristol, the clear majority of 1,342 were only investors. The differences between the 
two ports are most apparent in regards to primary ownership. Twelve per cent of 
Bristol merchants did not accept investment from others, compared to just two per 
cent of Liverpool merchants. It follows that more Liverpool merchants had investors, 
and more of them, in their voyages, making a slaving venture far more of a group 
enterprise. Thus, the Liverpool slave merchant community had a larger, sought after 
and shared pool of knowledge, skills and capital. These core competencies provided 
Liverpool slave merchants with a strong competitive advantage. 375 This is explored 
further in this chapter and in the next, in terms of the nature of these networks and 
how they facilitated access to skills and capital as well as opportunity. 
The next few figures support the established argument that a higher number 
of Liverpool merchants accepted investment from other merchants over the period. 
Figure 3.3 shows the average number of investors for slaving voyages in the two 
ports, demonstrating that Liverpool voyages were managed by a higher number of 
investors per voyage throughout much of the period. Likewise, the figure shows that 
changes in these investment patterns, in terms of the number of owners, occurred 
over the course of the period for both port cities. The changes in Bristol's investment 
patterns, however, were more erratic, with more peaks and troughs in the number of 
owners throughout the period. These peaks and troughs generally correspond with 
changes in Bristol's operation of the slave trade, such as demographic changes in the 
merchants who participated in the slave trade by mid-century, in response to war 
time conditions, and the proposed abolition to the slave trade in the latter part of the 
period. These factors are explored further in the next two chapters. 
375 See Introduction, p. 36. 
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Figure 3.3: Mean number of owners per voyage in Bristol and Liverpool, 1725-1807 
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Source: Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
Noticeably, the period of highest investment in Liverpool, in terms of the 
number of investors involved in slaving voyages, occurs when Liverpool began to 
dominate the trade by mid-century. An argument can be made that this spread of 
secondary investment contributed to Liverpool edging past the competition. These 
larger investment groups may also signify that Liverpool merchants were in a better 
position to alleviate risk because it was spread among more people. This changes by 
the end of the period; Bristol's investment groups became larger while Liverpool's 
groups became smaller. As argued more in depth in the following chapters, this 
change in investment groups is largely due to the varying degrees of access to social 
capital in both merchant communities, and the different purposes this access served. 
This will also be explored further below when the merchant case studies are 
examined, along with consequent implications for the operation of the merchant 
networks in the two ports. 
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The next two figures compare the trends in voyages managed by a solo 
owner versus voyages managed by more than one owner, or a primary owner with 
investors. The differences between Bristol's ownership patterns and that of Liverpool 
are extraordinary when represented in visual form. 
Figure 3.4: Bristol solo versus non-solo managed voyages 
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Figure 3.5: Liverpool solo versus non-solo managed voyages 
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While Figure 3.3 demonstrated that Liverpool voyages had a higher number of 
investors on average per voyage, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that Liverpool also had 
far less voyages managed by just one primary owner when compared with Bristol. 
This typifies the notion that Liverpool voyages were more of a group enterprise, both 
spreading risk as well as sharing knowledge, skills and capital. The trends in the size 
of investment groups, as well as in voyage management offer further insight into the 
nature of network behaviour when the mean number of voyages per year is 
considered. Taken from Table 2.2 in the previous chapter, it is noted that in the 
decade between 1750-1759, Liverpool finally surpassed Bristol in terms of 
clearances, sending out 496 vessels compared to Bristol's 220. As mentioned above, 
this occurred when Liverpool's slaving ventures had on average, the most number of 
investors compared to any other point in the period. This is also when Liverpool 
voyages managed by just a single owner were at its lowest. After experiencing a 
decline in the numbers of investors per voyage during the 1760s, Liverpool's 
108 
investment groups grew again during the decade between 1770-1779. In this 
decade, 711 slave ships sailed from Liverpool for Africa, in contrast to Bristol's 169. 
Thus, high numbers of voyages coincided with larger investment groups. However, 
this changed in Liverpool by the end of the period. Between 1790-1799, the port 
cleared 969 ships for Africa, but the size of Liverpool's investment groups dropped 
dramatically. Thus, far less investors participated, but in far more voyages. 
Additionally, this is also when the number of voyages managed by just one person 
was at highest point. This pattern is different in Bristol. Richardson has argued for a 
sharp decline in resource pooling by leading Bristol merchants in the 1780s, coupled 
with a decrease in the number of investors in voyages after 1790, leaving the 
primary owners with more of an assumed risk. 376 However, Figure 3.4 demonstrates 
a divergence from Richardson's assertion. The number of investors per voyage in the 
Bristol trade increased, even though the port only cleared 135 slaving vessels 
between 1790-1799 and just twenty in the last seven years. For Bristol, then, the 
reverse of Liverpool's case occurs: more investors participated in less voyages. 
Likewise, this period also coincided with the first time Bristol's voyages managed by 
more than one person surpassed the voyages made by a sole owner, again in 
contrast with Richardson's assertion. Further analysis on this feature of Bristol and 
Liverpool's slave merchant networks is presented in Chapters Five and Six, where it 
is argued that access to social capital impacted on the structure of merchant 
networks. 
The next figure describes the relationships between the Bristol and Liverpool 
slave merchants further, specifically in terms of how close-knit the merchant 
communities were. 
376 Richardson, Bristol Vol. 4. 
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Figure 3.6: Association of merchants, investors and relationships in Bristol and 
Liverpool, 1725-1807 
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Figure 3.6 shows the association among merchants, investors and 
relationships in Bristol and Liverpool, and it is again evident that Liverpool had 
significantly higher numbers in each of these categories. Liverpool had three times as 
many primary owners as Bristol, but five times as many secondary owners. Tellingly, 
Liverpool's secondary owners made fifteen times the number of investments as the 
Bristol owners. in Bristol there were a total of 1,888 relationships between its 
merchants, meaning merchants investing in one another or working together to 
invest in someone else. In Liverpool, however, there were 35,839 relationships 
between its merchants. "' This is an incredibly significant result; with only about four 
37 These relationships are scalar in that the relationship is only counted once and the direction is ignored. 
Merchant A and Merchant B are said to have had a relationship when they have both invested in the same 
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times the number of individuals investing in the trade, Liverpool investors had 
twenty times the number of connections with each other. While the average Bristol 
merchant invested with around four other people in his career, a Liverpool merchant 
worked with, or invested with about eighteen others. This cannot be explained simply 
by the increased number of individuals in the merchant community-Liverpool 
merchants sought more investors to work with. As Liverpool overtook Bristol in this 
period, this further highlights the importance of larger groups for the better provision 
of information, opportunity, skills and capital. The strength of weak ties argument 
put forth by Granovetter and discussed in the Introduction seems to be relevant in 
the case of the Liverpool merchant community based on the number of relationships. 
The fact that Liverpool merchants had significantly more relationships throughout 
their career suggests the presence of both strong and weak ties that facilitated 
access to information about the trade, impacting on their participation and success in 
slaving voyages. Simply put, because Liverpool merchants had more relationships, 
they also had more opportunity, skills, capital and knowledge from which to draw. 
It is obvious that the Liverpool slave merchant community was both larger 
and more connected than that of Bristol. Being able to trace the development of and 
the fluctuations within the two communities as a whole and over time provides 
insight into the organisation of the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade that has not 
been produced before. The next section analyses the structure of the Bristol and 
Liverpool merchant community using social network analysis. Graphing the slave 
merchant communities using social network analysis illuminates their structure and 
how connected the merchant investors were to one another. Seen over time, the 
changes in this structure and the relationships among the merchants are exhibited. 
As asserted by John Wilson and Andrew Popp, networks have an organising logic, 
voyage on one or more occasions. Therefore, "Merchant A has a relationship with Merchant B" is 
synonymous with "Merchant B has a relationship with Merchant A". 
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governing the relationships among social actors; thus, as outlined by Wouter de 
Nooy, Andrej Mrvar and Vladimir Batagelj the primary purpose of social network 
analysis is detecting and interpreting these patterns of social ties among actors. "' 
While the theory behind networks and how they may be applied to business 
enterprise has been discussed in the Introduction, it is necessary to reiterate some of 
these key themes in the analysis of the Bristol and Liverpool networks. It is 
important to view the changes in the structure of these two communities because 
networks are as much a process as they are a system of organisation. They are 
grounded in their own temporal, social and cultural context and it is natural that they 
experience change. 379 This idea is in keeping with theoretical presuppositions about 
entrepreneurship and it is this interplay between entrepreneurship and networks that 
is the crux of the argument for the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant 
communities. Howard Aldrich and Catherine Zimmer argue for entrepreneurship 
through social networks, indicating that, like networks themselves, entrepreneurship 
is also a process that must be viewed in dynamic terms. In addition, 
entrepreneurship requires linkages or relations between components of the process; 
through these linkages, then, social capital can be accessed. 380 In the case of the 
Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant networks, this would include resources such as 
financial capital, human capital in the form of knowledge and skills, as well as 
information. As discussed in the Introduction, eighteenth-century business 
partnerships were fluid; this was also the case for merchant networks. For example, 
Laurel Smith-Doerr and Walter M. Powell argue that networks are created for 
project-based work and their formation stems from personal networks based on 
loyalties and friendships maintained over time. They argue that these forms of 
378 Wilson and Popp, Industrial Clusters, p. 9; Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar Vladimir Batagelj, 
Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 5. 379 Wilson and Popp, Industrial Clusters, p. 5. 
380 Aldrich and Zimmer, "Entrepreneurship", pp. 4,20. For more on economic dynamism, see Joseph 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Unwin, 1942). 
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repeated exchange amount to much more than a "series of bilateral relationships but 
are entangled with concerns of friendship, status and reputation". 381 It is clear that 
business and social contexts were far from being separate for Bristol and Liverpool 
merchants in the eighteenth century. 
The figures below show the connections between the merchants who 
invested in slaving voyages in Bristol and Liverpool. The circles (vertices) on the 
figures represent a merchant, or actor, while the lines between the circles represent 
a relationship (edge or arc) between the merchants. As defined above, the 
relationship is indicative of merchants working together on a slave trade voyage; for 
example, one is the primary owner and the other is an investor, or they were both 
investors. Social network theory espouses the assumption that social networks 
generally have dense pockets of people who "stick together" and likewise argues that 
the people involved in these cohesive subgroups are joined by more than just 
interaction. It is also assumed that these groups foster norms, identity and collective 
behaviour, or what Granovetter called embeddedness, in specific socio-historical 
context. 382 These types of networks have important implications for access to social 
capital in that they can serve both positive and negative purposes, discussed further 
in Chapter Five when the slave merchants in their urban and social context is 
considered. In this business context, however, as Figure 3.6 demonstrates in terms 
of relationships, large and connected groups provided a wealth of resources in the 
Liverpool merchant community, offering strong competitive advantages. An 
individual's position in a network is of vital importance for information transfer and 
the notion of centrality is crucial. The more a person can serve as a "go-between" or 
a bridge between networks, the more central he is in the network or networks; in 
this way, bridges can be thought of as Granovetter's "weak ties". 
381 Laurel Smith-Doerr and Walter M. Powell, "Networks and Economic Life", in Smelser and Swedberg, 
Handbook of Economic Sociology, pp. 379-403. 
382 De Nooy et al., Exploratory, p. 61; Granovetter, "Economic Action", pp. 481-482. 
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The figures below show the structure of the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
merchant communities in the decades of the 1730s, 1750s, 1770s and 1790s. In 
Bristol, case study merchant Isaac Hobhouse was a central merchant in 1730, while 
James Rogers held that position in 1790; tellingly, no one Bristol merchant was 
central in 1770. In Liverpool, each of the decades outlined had a central merchant in 
the overall merchant community. It is no surprise that William Davenport held this 
position in 1770 considering the number of people he invested with throughout his 
career. Additionally, bridges between groups have also been determined for each of 
these time periods, and the implications for this are even more striking. These 
bridges link one group to another, thus their removal would mean a complete 
separation between the two groups. Six bridges were established in Bristol in the 
decade between 1730-1739 when its slave trade was at its height, but only one, 
James Rogers, provided a bridge in 1790-1799. No-one, however, served as a bridge 
in 1750-1759 or 1770-1779.383 In contrast, no-one served as a bridge in Liverpool in 
1730-1739 when the trade was still in its relative infancy; however, in 1750-1759 
and 1770-1779, ten bridges were identified while in 1790-1799, there were eight. "' 
In terms of network behaviour, it seems logical that when Liverpool's participation in 
the trade increased rapidly, taking over London and Bristol's previous position of 
dominance, that this was accompanied by merchants within an already connected 
group acting as go-betweens among the networks. These merchants were not 
necessarily "big players" like Davenport. In fact, none of the Liverpool case study 
merchants served as bridges. However, investors participating in multiple groups 
383 In 1730, the Bristol bridges were Henry Fitzherbert, Isaac Hobhouse, Joseph Iles, Joseph Jefferies, and 
Edmund Saunders. 
384 In 1750, the Liverpool bridges were Joseph Brooks, Edward Forbes, Thomas Pennington, Richard 
Savage, Thomas Seel, William Haliday, James Gildart, Richard Golding, George Campbell Sr., and George 
Campbell Jr. In 1770, they were Thomas Moss, John Tarleton, John Knight, William Dennison, John 
White, William Woodville, John Roberts, Edward Mason, Robert Grimshaw and William Dingman. In 
1790 they were John Hind, Thomas Rodie, Jonathan Ratcliffe, Francis Ingram, John Bolton, Joseph Birch 
and Moses Benson. 
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simultaneously can naturally share information, skills and capital across these 
groups. Likewise, the Bristol merchant network not having these bridges reinforces 
the idea of a less connected group; without more opportunity and access to crucial 
resources, Bristol's trade lagged behind Liverpool, particularly by mid-century. 
Generated using the social networking software called Pajek, the figures 
below demonstrate all the investors with connections; however, only those 
merchants who worked with other merchants on slaving voyages are shown, while 
solely primary owners are not, purely by virtue of the fact that they are not 
connected to another investor. "' 
385 Pajek is free and available to download at: http: //vlado. finf. uni-lj. si/pub/networks/pajek. 
115 
rn 
M 
N 
1-4 
O 
n 
. --i 
Vi 
N 
C 
7 
E 
E 
0 
U 
C 
(U 
L 
U 
L- 
cu E 
G) 
> 
fD 
N 
O 
0 
CL L 
Q) 
J 
C 
(0 
O 
N 
co 
N 
M 
Q) 
2 
U- 
cl 
C 
a 
T 
41 
m 
I 
a) 
U) 
41 
W 
a) 
V 
I0^ V 
Figure 3.7 compares the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities in 
the decade between 1730-1739. In this decade, Bristol merchants participated in 
396 slaving ventures, while Liverpool cleared 192 slaving vessels. These numbers 
are reflective of the fact that Bristol was at the peak of its slave trading activity while 
Liverpool was just starting to make concerted efforts in its participation. Likewise, 
the Bristol slave merchants are at their most connected throughout this decade. This 
is indicative of the crucial link between connectivity among merchants that is 
conducive to the resource-sharing imperative for successful slaving ventures. Bristol 
merchants were organised in several different groups, yet many of these groups had 
three or more merchants in them; many of these groups were also connected 
through investment by merchants serving as bridges to the largest connected group. 
As established, this is the period when the Bristol slave merchant community had the 
most number of bridges, facilitating Bristol's position of dominance. On the other 
hand, Liverpool merchants were organised into six disparate groups, four of them 
consisting of only three members. With no merchant serving as a bridge in the 
Liverpool slave merchant community at this time, the link between connectivity 
within the slave merchant communities and degree of participation in the trade is 
made clear. 
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The Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities by mid-century are 
radically different from just two decades previously as shown in Figure 3.8. The 
Bristol merchant community is smaller in terms of connections, coinciding with 
Bristol's waning participation in the trade. During this period, Bristol cleared 220 
slaving vessels, a decrease of over one hundred ventures than twenty years 
previously. As Figure 3.3 demonstrated, Bristol slaving ventures during this period 
were managed in smaller investment groups, further demonstrative of the fact that 
connectivity and resource-sharing is linked to a higher participation and greater 
success in the trade. Conversely, the Liverpool community has grown significantly, 
with a much larger number of merchants involved in the trade. They were organised 
in a densely connected core of investment, with many merchants connected to one 
another through investment sharing. In contrast with the previous period highlighted 
when there were no merchants acting as bridges, there were now ten merchants 
acting as bridges. 386 Related to this vast increase in resource-sharing in this period, 
Liverpool cleared 496 slaving vessels and took the leading position in the trade. 
Likewise, Figure 3.3 showed Liverpool voyages were managed by the largest 
investment groups of the period. Judging by the dense web of connections in the 
Liverpool merchant community, and the lesser number of connections among 
merchants in Bristol, these graphs further demonstrate the established phenomenon 
that more Liverpool merchants accepted investment from others and participated in 
larger investment groups. Additionally, Chapter Five discusses demographic changes 
in both communities during this period that factor into these changes of the 
organisation in the merchant communities. 
386 See footnote 384. 
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The structure of Bristol's merchant community changed yet again during the 
1770s. Figure 3.9 shows that while there were a number of partnership groups in the 
early years, during this period there were only three. Likewise, no Bristol merchant 
served as a link between groups to facilitate the spread of information. This again 
corroborates the argument that Bristol merchants did not spread their investment in 
slaving voyages as did the Liverpool merchants. Bristol's participation in the trade 
was consistently declining throughout this period and Bristol merchants only 
participated in 169 voyages in this decade, a significant drop from the previous 
decade which cleared 248. Demographic changes, as well as the merchant networks' 
response to war accounted for the decrease in connectivity in the merchant 
community, as further explored in the next two chapters. Liverpool's slave merchant 
networks, however, retained their structure, including the densely packed core of 
connected merchants. While there were still some disparate groups, these separate 
groups had at least four other merchants, while twenty years previously they were 
made up of only pairs. Liverpool cleared 711 slaving vessels during this decade, its 
highest number of clearances to date. The fact that the structure of the Liverpool 
networks did not change also suggests a certain degree of continuity in organisation. 
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Figure 3.10 shows that the structure of the merchant networks in 1790- 
1799 is most interesting for Bristol. The graphs for 1750-1759 and 1770-1779 
indicated that the Bristol slave merchant community was becoming less 
connected, and the largest connected group became smaller. This changed 
toward the end of the period. The Bristol merchant community as a whole had 
two primary connected groups and these groups had more members. Bristol 
cleared 135 ships for Africa, an increase of forty-one from the previous decade; 
this change in structure also aligned with the increased number of non-solo 
voyages made by Bristol merchants in the latter part of the period. Thus, the 
phenomenon that greater connectivity allows for greater participation in the trade 
is further supported. The increased connectivity is linked to access to social 
capital as a response to the proposed abolition of the slave trade, as further 
argued in Chapters Five and Six. On the other hand, the structure of the 
Liverpool merchant community looks relatively maintained, with a few disparate 
groups on the periphery of a densely connected core group. Liverpool cleared 969 
ships in this decade, the highest number of clearances for the period. This 
however also corresponds with Liverpool merchants' organising slaving ventures 
in smaller investment groups, although as a community they are still well- 
connected. This is also argued to be a function of access to social capital, 
explained in Chapters Five and Six. 
The contrasting size and interconnectedness of these networks raise 
important questions which will be dealt with in the next chapter. The patterns in 
the management of slaving voyages of case study merchants will now be 
analysed to ascertain how they conform or do not conform to the above 
established patterns. 
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Case Studies 
Twelve case study merchants, six from Bristol and six from Liverpool, have 
been selected to help frame the analysis of the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
merchant communities. The merchants from Bristol are Michael Becher, Henry 
Bright, John Fowler, Isaac Hobhouse, James Laroche and James Rogers while the 
merchants representing Liverpool are Foster Cunliffe, William Davenport, Thomas 
Earle, Benjamin Heywood, William James and John Tarleton. James Laroche and 
William James were two of the most prolific primary owners in Bristol and 
Liverpool respectively. James Laroche participated in 127 voyages, and was sole 
owner of eighty-seven while William James participated in 140 voyages, in eighty- 
four of which he was listed as the sole owner. Thus, they both had experience in 
a vast number of voyages as well as in sole primary ownership. The other 
merchants participated in a significant number of voyages throughout the period 
and represented the trade in both cities at different points in time. The analysis 
of the case study merchants here allows for commentary on the merchant 
networks, network behaviour, and their operation within the trade, which 
previous studies do not. 
Case studies: General Analysis's' 
The first two tables in this chapter established the primary embarkation 
regions and disembarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool ships in the period. 
The following two tables will do the same for the Bristol and Liverpool case study 
merchants. The Bristol case study merchants follow the general pattern of the 
Bristol merchants as a whole, with slight variations. Table 3.3 demonstrates that, 
in accordance with the general trend of all British slave merchants, the Bight of 
387 As with the tables and graphs, all of the merchant data given in this section, i. e. the number of 
voyages they participated in, their investment partners, and ships and captains used were taken from Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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Biafra was the most popular embarkation region, accounting for fifty-seven per 
cent of the case studies' presence on the African coast. James Laroche made just 
over half of his slave purchases in that region. While Bristol merchants as a whole 
favoured the Gold Coast over West Central Africa, sending 116 more ships to the 
first region over the course of the period, the case study merchants ventured to 
West Central Africa just slightly more than the former. As mentioned in the last 
chapter, the Royal African Company established forts and castles along the Gold 
Coast and thus the early British slave trade was directed there; Richardson 
argues that Bristol merchants in the early years of the trade (1698-1729) 
demonstrated a willingness to innovate and promote changes in these established 
patterns. 388 The case study merchants, however, do not necessarily conform to 
this spirit of innovation. No single Bristol merchant ventured to all seven areas, 
although both James Laroche and James Rogers went to six, indicating they were 
perhaps more open to exploring market options. Given that they were more 
prolific traders in terms of the number of voyages they participated in, this 
openness could have contributed to their success. Michael Becher, Henry Bright 
and Isaac Hobhouse only voyaged to three places, and for Bright and Hobhouse, 
the Bight of Biafra was the region where they most frequented. Moreover, 
fluctuations in where these case study merchants ventured occurred over time. 
For both John Fowler and James Laroche, their ventures to the Bight of Biafra 
decreased throughout the period. John Fowler participated in fourteen voyages 
that were sent to that region between 1760-1769 and only five between 1770- 
1779. Likewise, Laroche participated in eleven voyages to that area between 
1740-1749 and only one between 1780-1789. This conforms to national patterns, 
as the decades in which Fowler and Laroche embarked on fewer voyages to the 
region coincides with times when Britain was at war. On the other hand, Rogers' 
trips to the region increased throughout his career, sending thirteen there 
between 1780-1789 and eighteen in the three years between 1791 and 1793. 
388 Richardson, Bristol vol. 1, p. xxiii. 
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As with the Bristol case study merchants, those for Liverpool also follow 
the general patterns established by the Liverpool merchants as a whole, but 
again, with certain distinctions. In line with the general trends, the Liverpool 
case study merchants participated in substantially more voyages than the Bristol 
merchants, sending out 612 vessels to the African coast, compared to Bristol's 
241. Likewise, the case study merchants frequented the Bight of Biafra the most, 
with that region accounting for about forty-eight per cent of their trade. This 
percentage of trade to the Bight of Biafra is lower than Bristol, reflecting the fact 
Liverpool merchants had a greater spread along the coast. For instance, the 
Liverpool case study merchants went to Senegambia and the Windward Coast on 
twenty-two and 123 voyages respectively, while the Bristol case study merchants 
only sailed to those regions four times each. This seems to support Richardson's 
above assertion that the Bristol merchants were relative conservative in 
exploiting market opportunities. The second most popular region for the Liverpool 
case study merchants was the Windward Coast, while for the Liverpool merchants 
as whole, West Central Africa held this position. What most likely accounts for 
this is that William James participated in seventy-one voyages to the Windward 
Coast, or just over half of his total voyages. This makes the total number of 
Bristol's voyages there of only twenty-three seem even more insignificant. 
Furthermore, unlike Bristol, three of the Liverpool case study merchants went to 
all seven parts of the coast. These included Foster Cunliffe, whose career was 
relatively early in the period, starting from 1729 and spanning until his last 
voyage In 1761. As mentioned above, his contemporaries, Michael Becher and 
Isaac Hobhouse, only ventured to three parts of the coast. The remaining three 
Liverpool case study merchants still visited six of the seven regions. The 
implication is that Liverpool merchants exploited more and varied market 
opportunities. William Davenport in particular is credited for developing new 
sources of slave supply on the coast, especially to the Cameroons, which did not 
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have a strong English presence until mid-century. 389 Like Bristol, however, 
fluctuations in preference also occurred over time. Seventy-four of the voyages 
William Davenport participated in went to the Bight of Biafra; while twenty-four 
were sent in the decade between 1760-1769 and fifty-three in the decade 
between 1770-1779, only sixteen were sent in the latter period between 1781- 
1786. This is in keeping with Fowler and Laroche from Bristol, whose voyages to 
that region decreased in the latter half of the period, conforming to the national 
trend. 
Table 3.3: Major embarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool case study 
merchants, 1725-1807 
160 
- 
140 
120 
100 
N 
W 
00 
A 
O 
80 
W 
E 
60 
2e. I. - 1--l III 
40 
20 
o 
Michael Henry John Isaac James James Foster William Thomas Benjamin William John 
Becher Bright Fowler Hobhouse Laroche Rogers Cunliffe Davenport Earle Heywood James Tarleton 
Bristol Liverpool 
Source: Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
389 Richardson, "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade", p. 65. 
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Table 3.4: Major disembarkation regions for Bristol and Liverpool case study 
merchants, 1725-1807 
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The data for the Bristol case study merchants in terms of major 
disembarkation regions does not fall as nicely in line with the general trends as 
they did for embarkation regions. The case study merchants favoured South 
Carolina slightly more than Virginia, whilst the opposite was true for the Bristol 
merchants as whole. Moreover, Barbados was not nearly as popular for the case 
study merchants as it was generally, as Michael Becher, Henry Bright and John 
Fowler did not go there at all. Jamaica, however, was still the most popular 
destination, with the case study merchants sending just about sixty per cent of 
their vessels there. Table 3.2 showed the most popular regions for Bristol 
merchants as a whole; however, different regions were more significant for the 
. Other 
  Virginia 
If South Carolina 
iki St. Kitts 
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Bristol case study merchants, as shown in Table 3.4.390 For instance, while 
Barbados was a significant region for Bristol merchants as a whole, the case 
study merchants ventured to Antigua more. The case study merchants made 
fourteen voyages to Antigua while disembarking at Barbados only thirteen times. 
James Laroche went to Antigua seven times alone. For the Bristol merchants as a 
whole, however, Antigua counted for thirty-four less voyages than Barbados. 
James Rogers also did not conform to the patterns established by Bristol 
merchants as a whole. While he did not participate in any voyages to the North 
American mainland, he sent twelve voyages to Grenada (or twenty-four per cent 
of Bristol's total voyages to the area), four to St. Vincent and three to Tortola. Of 
all the Bristol case study merchants, Rogers had the most varied disembarkation 
pattern. 
The disembarkation data for the Liverpool case study merchants aligns 
with the general trends more closely than that for Bristol. The voyages to 
Virginia and South Carolina are just about proportional to the general trend, while 
again, most of the voyages disembarked at Jamaica. This is in keeping with the 
noted decline in North American trade throughout the period and the higher 
demand for slaves in the Caribbean to augment the population. Similarly to the 
Bristol merchants, the Liverpool case study merchants also had more numerous 
destination points than the Liverpool merchants as a whole 
. 
391 Antigua, again, 
had the edge slightly over Barbados, with sixty-nine vessels sent there; William 
390 The "other" category for the Bristol case merchants in Table 3.4 includes the following: Cuba and 
"other British Caribbean" as is labelled in the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database for Henry Bright; 
Maryland, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Tobago and Martinique for John Fowler; Montserrat, Nevis and 
Barbados for Isaac Hobhouse; Puerto Rico, Tortola, Barbados, St. Vincent and Grenada for James 
Laroche; Tortola. Dominica, Barbados, St. Vincent and Grenada for James Rogers. Eltis et al., Trans 
Atlantic Slave Trade. 
391 The "other" category for the Liverpool case study merchants in Table 3.4 includes the following: 
Barbados and Spanish Central America for Foster Cunliffe; Cuba, Tortola, Nevis, Montserrat, 
Dominica, St. Lucia, Barbados, St. Vincent, Grenada, `other British Caribbean', Martinique, 
Guadaloupe, "other French Caribbean" and Danish West Indies for William Davenport; Cuba, Tortola, 
St. Lucia, Barbados, St. Vincent, Grenada, Martinique and Danish West Indies for Thomas Earle; St. 
Vincent, Dominica, St. Lucia, Barbados, Guadaloupe, Grenada, Maryland and North Carolina for 
Benjamin Heywood; Montserrat, St. Vincent, Grenada, Barbados, Guadaloupe, Cuba, Martinique, 
Dominica, and "other British Caribbean" for William James; Grenada, Dominica, St. Vincent, 
Barbados, Santo Domingo, St. Lucia, Martinique, Danish West Indies, and "other French Caribbean" 
for John Tarleton. Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database. 
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James alone participated in forty-six of these voyages. While the Liverpool 
merchants as a whole disembarked significantly more voyages at Barbados, 
Antigua was only one vessel behind St. Kitts in terms of popularity, with 202 
voyages disembarking at that island. Table 3.4 demonstrates that the Liverpool 
case study merchants had a more varied disembarkation pattern than not only 
their Bristol counterparts, but the Liverpool merchants as a group. John Tarleton 
participated in twenty-nine voyages to Grenada, ten to Dominica and nine to St. 
Vincent. William Davenport also sent twenty-three voyages to Dominica, which 
was five more than he sent to Jamaica. Thus, Liverpool case study merchants 
demonstrated remarkable enterprise in both regions of embarkation and 
disembarkation. 
Case Studies: Ownership and Investment 
The second section of this chapter outlined the trends in ownership and 
investment for the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities at large. It 
was demonstrated that the Liverpool slave merchants were a much larger group 
as a whole, and participated in substantially more voyages in larger investment 
groups than Bristol. Additionally, Bristol merchants tended to manage more 
voyages solely as opposed to with investment groups over much of the period. 
Social network analysis also established the structure of both communities over 
time, demonstrating change in both the size of the community and the 
connections within the slave merchants. This section will consider to what extent 
the established trends held true with the case study merchants. 
The following tables outline several ownership characteristics of the Bristol 
and Liverpool case study merchants. 
130 
Table 3.5: Ownership characteristics of the Bristol case study merchants 
From Bristol Number of Number of Number of Number of 
Voyages times listed times listed times listed 
as sole as primary as investor 
owner owner 
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Source: Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
Table 3.6: Ownership characteristics of the Liverpool case study merchants392 
From Number of Number of Number of Number of 
Liverpool Voyages times listed times listed times listed 
as sole as primary as investor 
owner owner 
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Cunliffe 
Source: Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
It is immediately apparent that these characteristics conform to the 
established patterns. The Liverpool case study merchants in general participated 
in more voyages, were investors a significant amount of times in their career and 
were not sole investors very often. To analyse the above data further, the 
merchants have been divided into comparison groups, each comprised of case 
study merchants from Bristol and Liverpool representing different points in time 
throughout the period between 1725-1807. While there is obvious overlap among 
the different time periods, the group representing the early part of the period is 
392 From the number of voyages these merchants participated in, Pope's categorisation of eighteen 
voyages as a requisite for "top" merchant seems rather low. See Introduction, p. 44. 
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Michael Becher, Henry Bright and Isaac Hobhouse from Bristol, and Foster 
Cunliffe from Liverpool. The second group from the middle part of the period is 
John Fowler from Bristol and William James and Benjamin Heywood from 
Liverpool. The third group from the latter part of the period consists of James 
Rogers from Bristol and Thomas Earle and John Tarleton from Liverpool while a 
fourth group consists of Bristolian James Laroche and Liverpudlian William 
Davenport. This group is used particularly for their uniqueness; Laroche's career 
spans the majority of the entire time period, which helps make him Bristol's most 
prolific slave trader while Davenport was a relative specialist in the trade. 
Group one: c. 1725-1766 
As the son of John Becher, another slave trader, Michael Becher was from 
an established Bristol commercial family who took over his father's slaving firm, 393 
Like his father, Michael Becher had interests in the West India trade, in which he 
was most active during the periods between 1728-1749 and 1754-1757.394 In the 
slave trade, he participated in nineteen voyages in the years between 1727-1753. 
He was the primary owner in all of these voyages and was listed as the sole 
owner in fourteen. He did not invest with any other primary owner in his career 
as a slave trader. He participated in four groups with one other person, his 
father, John Becher being the other investor in two of these voyages. Most of his 
voyages occurred in the period 1731-1740, and sixteen of them disembarked in 
Jamaica. Thus, even though Becher was participating in the slave trade at its 
height in Bristol, he was not participating in groups conducive to spreading risk 
and sharing a wide variety of resources, typical of the pattern of Bristol 
merchants established above. 
393 Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 23; Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 101. 394 Morgan, "Bristol West India", p. 207. 
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Henry Bright took part in twenty-one voyages in the period 1747-1766. At 
the age of sixteen, he was apprenticed to Richard Meyler, a hooper, and this 
forged a long period of business interactions between the Bright and Meyler 
families. In the late 1730s, the partnership established a business in the West 
India trade, where Henry Bright was sent to Jamaica to serve as a factor. 3' On 
his return to Bristol in the 1740s, Henry Bright became a prominent sugar 
importer, most active in the trade in the periods between 1746-1748,1754-1768 
and 1773-1777.396 Henry Bright was most active in the slave trade between 
1747-1766, and so his interests in the sugar trade were more lasting. 397 As a 
slave trader, he was the primary owner in all but three of his voyages, and 
similarly to Becher, he was listed as the sole owner in fifteen ventures. Unlike 
Becher, however, he invested with two other primary owners while eleven others 
invested with him. Contrary to the general trends already established, Bright 
participated in fairly large investment groups. He was the primary owner in 
voyages that had groups of five, six and seven other members while he was the 
secondary owner in voyages with six and eight other owners respectively. Most of 
his voyages occurred at the end of his slaving career, with ten trips made in the 
five years between 1761 and 1766. This is perhaps indicative of resources and 
connections Bright had established in the trade, particularly in conjunction with 
his sugar interests. Following the general trend, most of these voyages went to 
Jamaica. 
Isaac Hobhouse had a variety of commercial interests throughout his 
career. He participated in and entered into numerous commercial partnerships 
with those engaged the West India, Virginia, South Carolina and African trades 
and also held shares in a local sugar refinery 
. 
398 He was most active in the West 
395 Kenneth Morgan, "Henry Bright", Oxford Dictionary of National Biography available at: 
httQ//www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/50515? docPos=1. Accessed 1/1/10. 
396 Morgan, "Bristol West India", pp. 197-199,207. 
397 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
398 Walter E. Minchinton, The Hobhouse Papers, 1722-1755: Letters and Other Papers of Isaac 
Hobhouse & Co. Bristol Merchant (East Ardsley: Micro Methods Ltd, 1971), p. 1. 
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India trade in the period between 1728-1749 and 1754-1758, and in the slave 
trade from 1725-1744, coinciding with the height of Bristol's involvement in the 
slave trade. Like Henry Bright and Bristol in general, then, his Interest in sugar 
outlasted that in slaves. 399 As a slave trader, he participated in sixty-eight 
voyages, of which he was the primary owner for thirty-two, and was listed as the 
sole owner for twenty-three voyages. Seven others invested with him as a 
primary owner, while he invested with thirteen others among thirty-six separate 
voyages. The pattern of Hobhouse's investment, unlike Bright's, followed the 
general patterns established for Bristol slave merchants, in that, compared with 
Liverpool, investment groups were fairly small. As a primary owner, he 
participated in five groups of two and three groups of three; as a secondary 
owner, he participated in seven groups of two and seven groups of four. Most of 
the voyages he participated in took place between 1731-1740, late in his career 
as a slave trader and at the height of Bristol's slave trade. Just under half of his 
voyages disembarked in Virginia and South Carolina, reflective of the connections 
he forged with those engaged in the tobacco trade, and when trade with these 
regions was at its height. By 1740, however, his activity in the slave trade 
declined, coinciding with the time when Bristol also started to lose ground to 
Liverpool in the tobacco trade. This indicates that not only were Hobhouse's 
slaving and tobacco interests linked, but it also conforms to the trend that Bristol 
merchants as a whole failed to diversify their market options. 
Foster Cunliffe, along with his sons, Ellis and Robert, became some of 
Liverpool's leading slave traders, with Foster being active in the port's formative 
years. 40° Foster also had commercial interests in Virginia, and Ascott categorises 
him as "an Isle of Man specialist" early in his career, with most of his shipments 
being to and from that island. 40' As a slave trader, he took part in sixty-four 
voyages between 1726-1761. Of these, he was primary owner of fifteen, but was 
399 Morgan, "Bristol West India", p. 207. 
400 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
401 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 153. 
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listed as the sole owner of only ten voyages, less than the number of times that 
Becher, Bright and Hobhouse were sole owners. Only four other people invested 
with him as primary owner, and he participated in two groups of two and two 
groups of three as the primary owner. He, however, invested with thirteen 
others, and as a secondary owner, took part in larger groups. He was a 
secondary owner with ten groups of five, twelve groups of seven and nine groups 
of eight. The composition of these groups varied slightly, in keeping with a 
recognised feature of eighteenth-century business practice that partnerships were 
fluid. When investment groups were the same, though, more often than not they 
invested in the same ship, and even the same captain was used. For instance, 
Cunliffe invested in four voyages between 1756 and 1761 with the same five 
investors, where this was the case. Of these voyages, the Young Foster under the 
captaincy of Henry Hayston, went to the Windward Coast on three out of four 
occasions, and disembarked at Jamaica each time. This is reflective of the fact 
that merchants relied on trustworthy captains who became so by experience in 
the trade. 402 By voyaging to the same parts on the African coast, Hayston would 
also most likely have established crucial relationships with the African merchants 
there, thus facilitating the barter for slaves. Like Hobhouse, Cunliffe participated 
in the most voyages in the last decade of his career when he had built up capital, 
skills and resources. Cunliffe disembarked twelve voyages in Virginia, relating to 
his interest in tobacco as well. Lorena Walsh argues he sold most of his slaves in 
the labour-short Potomac Basin, the region where he also purchased tobacco. 403 
In an analysis of African region of origin for Chesapeake slaves, Walsh further 
argues that Bristol and London merchants were discriminate in their market 
choices. They sent slaves from Gambia and the Windward and Gold Coast to the 
Rappahannock River while Biafran slaves were sent to the York and Upper James. 
In contrast, Liverpool merchants were not as selective, sending ships from 
402 This is discussed further in Chapter Four. 
403 Walsh, "Liverpool's Slave Trade", p. 105. 
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different West African regions to all of the sites where they traded. 404 Cunliffe 
supports this trend as he slaved on all seven major regions of the West African 
coast. Additionally, Walsh argues he was typically able to complete the triangular 
journey in one year, allowing him to outfit the same ship for another voyage the 
following year. This is evidenced by the consistency in ships, captains and 
partners listed for many of Cunliffe's voyages, and is indicative of the trusted 
relationships he built with members of his network. Additionally, this reflects 
Cunliffe's expert managerial skills. By being able to complete a slaving voyage in 
one year, Cunliffe was able to coordinate goods and people through his networks 
in a timely and efficient manner. 
Group two: c. 1750-1782 
John Fowler was involved in the slave trade between 1751-1779, both as a 
captain and as an investor in slaving ventures. 405 This was a typical career path 
for successful merchants in that experience, knowledge and network relationships 
were built in their career early as captains. Richardson lists Fowler, along with 
John Anderson, Isaac Hobhouse, James Laroche, James Rogers and Noblet 
Ruddick as the elite of the eighteenth-century Bristol slave traders in terms of 
their managerial prowess, together managing over 400 voyages. 406 As a slave 
trader, Fowler participated in sixty-three voyages, serving as captain twice early 
in his career in 1751 and 1753. As one of Bristol's elite slave traders, he ventured 
to six of the seven regions of the African coast, although, like British slave traders 
at large, he frequented the Bight of Biafra the most. Additionally, about half of 
these voyages disembarked at Jamaica. Perhaps tellingly, his first recorded 
voyage as captain in 1751 embarked from the Bight of Biafra and disembarked at 
404 Walsh, "Chesapeake", p. 151. 
405 Eltis et al, Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
406 Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 14. 
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Jamaica, establishing the general pattern in his trade. 407 He was the primary 
owner in sixty of these voyages, and in forty-nine he is listed as the sole owner. 
Like Becher and Bright before him, participating in most voyages as the sole 
owner reinforces the established argument that Bristol traders did not accept 
much investment in slaving voyages. He invested with two other owners in three 
voyages, while ten people invested with him in the eleven voyages in which he 
was not the sole owner. Of these eleven voyages, he managed eight groups of 
two and three groups of four, also in keeping with the established trend that 
Bristol investment groups were generally small. He worked with six different 
merchants in these groups of two, thus no real consistency in partnerships could 
be established. This inconsistency in partnerships, however, could be suggestive 
of bridges in Fowler's network, thus allowing him more access to a wide variety of 
resources and enabling him to be one of Bristol's more successful slave traders. 
Furthermore, the majority of voyages he participated in took place between 
1761-1770, before Bristol's involvement in the trade dropped significantly with 
the War of American Independence. Similarly to Cunliffe, the groups in which he 
was investor were larger than the ones he managed as the primary owner. He 
was a secondary owner in one group of five, and two groups of seven. While a 
more in-depth analysis of a greater number of individual merchants would be 
required to establish a pattern, this tendency of investing in larger groups than 
the ones in which a merchant was the lead owner is interesting. It is logical to 
assume, however, that investing in larger groups was less risky for the merchant; 
given that principal merchants often participated in more than one slaving voyage 
in a given year, investing in a venture in which risk and cost was more widely 
spread in addition to one in which the merchant did not have primary ownership 
responsibility would represent a sound commercial decision. 
Born in Drogheda, Benjamin Heywood, along with his older brother, 
Arthur, not only participated in numerous slaving voyages, but owned a banking 
407 Voyage identification number 17296, Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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business in Liverpool, a sugar plantation in the West Indies, and a cloth 
manufacturing business in Wakefield. 408 Heywood was most active in the slave 
trade in the period between 1745-1782. During this time he participated in 
seventy-two voyages, was the primary owner of twenty-six and the sole owner of 
two. Contrary to Bristolian Fowler, however, he managed groups with a larger 
number of investors. He was the primary owner of fourteen groups of six, a group 
of seven and eight groups of eight. There was also consistency in the membership 
of these groups, and their higher numbers indicate a larger pool of resources 
from which to draw. Five voyages between 1748-1755 and five voyages between 
1750-1756 consisted of the same six people, indicating that this network was one 
of strong ties. 409 The larger size of investment groups also reinforces Figures 3.8, 
3.9 and 3.10 on the structure of the Liverpool slave merchant community and 
emphasises the greater connectivity of Liverpool's mercantile community. Out of 
the seventy-two voyages he participated in, he worked with his brother Arthur in 
sixty-one, also illustrative of family connections within business. As a secondary 
owner, he participated in forty-six voyages and invested with sixteen others. 
These groups were also fairly large; he took part in seven groups of five, seven, 
and eight and six groups of six. Between 1754-1765, however, he worked with 
John Penkett and Arthur Heywood eight times and invested in the same ship, the 
Marques of Rockingham, and used the same captain, George Evans, on seven of 
these voyages. Drawing on the skills from an experienced captain as well as 
trusted individuals during the time in which Liverpool overtook Bristol as the 
leading slaving port illuminates the importance of access to human and bonding 
social capital in the initial stages of Liverpool's participation in the trade. 
408 Cameron, Liverpool, p. 20; Hughes, Banks and Bankers. 
409 In the five voyages between 1748-1755, Benjamin Heywood invested with Arthur Heywood, 
Thomas Backhouse, Lev Unsworth, Thomas Ward and Thomas Darbyshire. Voyage identification 
numbers: 90168,90169,90170,90172,90173. In the five voyages between 1750-1756, Benjamin 
Heywood invested with Arthur Heywood, Thomas Leatherbow, Henry White, John Gorrell and John 
Park. Voyage identification numbers: 90258,90259,90260,90261,90262. Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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William James was Liverpool's leading slave trader, participating in 140 
voyages in a relatively short twenty-six year period between 1750-1776. He was 
the primary owner in 123 voyages, and was listed as the sole owner in eighty- 
four. In this way, he managed voyages more similarly to Bristol merchants, as 
he did not co-invest with a large number of other investors in his ventures. As 
primary owner, though, he managed groups with a wide range of sizes. He led 
groups of three, four, five and seven, but he most often participated in groups 
with just one other owner. Between 1768 and 1771 he and Henry Ross made five 
voyages together while between 1771-1776 he and George Evans made ten 
voyages. Evans thus established himself as an expert captain who worked with 
Liverpool's leading slave merchants. As a secondary owner, he participated in 
seventeen voyages managed by six other owners. Like Fowler, the investment 
groups in which he did not assume primary ownership were generally larger than 
the ones in which he did, representative of an investment strategy with less risk. 
He was a secondary owner with nine groups of five and one group of eight. The 
members of these groups, although slightly varied voyage to voyage, were also 
the same as those who invested in him. Alexander Nottingham, Gill Slater, 
Thomas Spencer Dunn, Edward Grayson and Charles Ford were just a few of the 
merchants in which James regularly invested, particularly late in his career, 
indicating that his networks were well established and solidified. 
Group three: c. 1775-1804 
James Rogers was an insurance broker and merchant, who most likely 
spent time in London before settling in Bristol. Rogers had a wide range of 
commercial interests, including the coasting trade, Newfoundland, Mediterranean 
and West Indian trades 
. 
4'0 The slave trade increasingly dominated his commercial 
410 David Richardson, "James Rogers", Oxford Dictionary of National Biography available at: http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/55689? docPos=3. Accessed 1/1/10. 
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interests over time, and he was a member of Bristol's slave trading elite, 
managing voyages in the period between 1775 and 1793. Richardson argues that 
Rogers, along with James and Thomas Jones, who came to Bristol from South 
Wales, were largely responsible for sustaining Bristol's interest in the trade after 
the War of American independence. "" Thus, Bristol's interest in the trade was 
invigorated with "new blood" into its merchant community. With interest waning 
in the Bristol slave trade, however, in the latter part of his career Rogers financed 
many voyages by himself and eventually went bankrupt. Morgan has conducted 
an analysis of Rogers' bankruptcy in the wider business context of the British 
slave trade late in the period. Morgan cites the credit crisis of 1793, competition 
along the African coast, particularly with the well-connected Liverpool merchants, 
an over-extension of Rogers' slave trading activities, and poor managerial skills 
as ultimately leading to the demise of his career. 412 These factors are considered 
more in depth in the next chapter. As a slave trader, he took part in sixty 
voyages, in which he was the primary owner of forty-three and listed as the sole 
owner in thirteen. Fifteen merchants invested with him and he led groups 
ranging in size from two to six. He primarily led groups of two others besides 
himself, as he managed groups of this size fifteen times. Like James and 
Heywood, the groups Rogers managed showed a consistency in partnership, as 
he acted as primary owner in a small group with James Laroche and Richard 
Fydell eleven times in the short time between 1790 and 1793. During the credit 
crisis at this time, Liverpool merchants arguably recovered more quickly than 
other parts of the country, indicative of Liverpool's "spirit" and further argued in 
Chapter Six. 41 Interestingly, Rogers, Laroche and Fydell embarked on a slaving 
voyage from Liverpool on a Liverpool-built ship in 1790, demonstrative of 
411 Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 24. 412 Morgan, "James Rogers", p. 186. 413 Francis Hyde, Bradley B. Parkinson and Sheila Marriner, "The Port of Liverpool and the Crisis of 
1793", Economica, 18 (1951), pp. 363-378. 
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Liverpool's dominance in the trade, even at a time of financial crisis. 414 This also 
indicates that Bristol's slave trading community was not in a position to facilitate 
the trade of its more enterprising merchants. Moreover, as a group of four, 
Rogers led voyages with Laroche, Fydell and Thomas Walker eight times between 
1789-1793. He managed these insular groups at the very end of his career, but 
coinciding with the time Bristol slave investment groups were larger than they 
were in previous periods. This also corresponds with the time when merchants in 
Bristol, Liverpool and London were rallying against the proposed abolition of the 
trade. Merchants coming together to support a cause, particularly in the case of 
Bristol merchants, served to solidify network connections through access to 
bonding social capital. This bonding capital is thus reflected in the consistency in 
Rogers' partnerships towards the end of his career. Contrary to John Fowler and 
Foster Cunliffe earlier in the period, the groups in which Rogers was a secondary 
owner were generally smaller than the ones in which he served as the primary 
owner. While he was in a group of nine and eight, he invested mostly with just 
one other person. Of the nine voyages in which he invested with someone else, 
he worked with Patrick Fitzhenry three times, and invested with six other people 
for the remaining voyages. In this sense, who he invested with was more varied 
than the relatively constant groups in which he managed. This may speak to the 
fact that, as the principal owner, and thus the person with the greatest control, 
he felt more comfortable Investing with people in which he had a great amount of 
trust. This is again representative of a less risky investment strategy. When he 
was investing with voyages in which he was not the primary owner, and thus had 
a smaller share of the risk, the issue of trust was not as paramount. Most of the 
voyages he was involved in occurred in the very latter part of his career between 
1791-1793, with nineteen out of twenty-eight voyages he participated in during 
this time disembarking at Jamaica, reinforcing the role of bonding capital in 
facilitating these investment partnerships. 
414 Voyage identification number 83366, Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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John Tarleton of the Tarleton family was among the elite of the Liverpool 
commercial families, and they were involved in slave trading and other 
commercial pursuits for three generations. 415 John Tarleton was a significant 
supplier of slaves to the West Indies and the American and Spanish colonies. 
Moreover, he was a principal defender of the slave trade, representing Liverpool 
interests in Parliament during the proposed abolition of the trade 
. 
416 Along with 
his brothers, Thomas and Clayton, John entered into a partnership with Daniel 
Backhouse, becoming one of the leading slave trading firms in the mid to latter 
part of the eighteenth century. "" In the period between 1770 and 1802, Tarleton 
participated in 113 voyages in which he was the primary owner in fifty-six 
voyages and the sole owner in only one. In both the voyages in which he was the 
primary owner and those in which he was a secondary owner, the groups mostly 
consisted of three or four members. As a primary owner, he managed twenty- 
two groups of three other members. These groups were the same for each 
voyage, and included Daniel Backhouse and his brothers, Thomas and Clayton. 
He similarly invested in voyages where the group members were the same, but 
one of the other members was listed as the primary owner instead. Like James 
Rogers, then, a more insular shift seems to have occurred by the end of the 
period but this could also be attributed to the fact that as an elite and wealthy 
trader, he did not need to have his investment spread so widely. Having said 
this, in the same period, Tarleton was also a secondary owner in twelve groups of 
five, seven groups of six, two groups of eight, three groups of nine and even a 
group of eleven. Thus, Tarleton did participate in several voyages with a greater 
mix of people. By participating in both insular as well as diverse investment 
groups, his networks were thus characterised by access to both strong and weak 
ties, contributing to his overall success in the trade. 
415 Cameron, Liverpool, p. 20. 
416 This is discussed more in depth in Chapter Six. 
417 Cameron, Liverpool, p. 20. 
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Thomas Earle likewise came from a prominent commercial family in 
Liverpool, and his brother and father also participated in the slave trade. His 
uncles served as mayors of Liverpool and had commercial interests in the Leghorn 
trade in wine, coffee, hides and marble. 418 He was most active in the period 
between 1782-1804. The Earles forged numerous commercial relationships with 
many of the important Liverpool merchants in various ventures. During his career 
as a slave trader, he participated in eighty-two voyages, in fifty of which he was 
the primary owner. He was never the sole owner of a voyage. Earle exemplifies 
the established argument that Liverpool slave merchants participated in larger 
groups. While he managed groups with a range of two to nine members, he was 
the primary owner of seventeen voyages in which there were seven other 
members. Likewise, the smallest group he invested in had five members while 
the largest had eleven. Of the groups in which he was the primary owner, he was 
with the same seven members in seven of these voyages. This occurred in the 
latter part of his career between 1790-1795, indicative of the strong ties he had 
built up in his slaving career. Of these seven voyages, the same ship and captain 
were used for four of them, demonstrating consistency and interconnectedness 
that marked the Liverpool merchant community as a whole. There was also a 
degree of consistency in the membership of the groups in which he was a 
secondary owner as well as the ships and captains used. As with Heywood, then, 
connectivity and access to both human and bonding capital characterise Earle's 
network. These leading Liverpool slave trade merchants managed voyages in 
trusted networks in which resources and capital had been built over time. On the 
other hand, this built up and established expertise was not present in the smaller 
and more atomised networks of the leading Bristol merchants. 
Group four: c. 1727-1793 
418 Introduction to the Earle Family Papers, LivPRO; Dawn Littler, "The Earle Collection: Records of a Liverpool Family of Merchants and Shipowners", Transactions of Historic Society ofLancashire and Cheshire, 146 (1997), pp. 93-106. 
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From a London gentry and Huguenot background, James Laroche was 
Bristol's most prolific slave trader in the period, managing 127 vessels spanning a 
period between 1727-1793.419 Although this is a significant number of voyages 
over a very long period of time, it is interesting to note that Liverpool's top slave 
trader, William James, participated in thirteen more voyages in a time span that 
was forty years less. Laroche was also involved in the West India trade across 
much of the same period. As a slave trader, however, he was the primary owner 
of 100 voyages and was listed as the sole owner of eighty-seven. Most of his 
voyages took place early in his career, coinciding with the time when Bristol's 
slave trade was at its height, with forty-two occurring between 1731-1740. This 
is in contrast with the other Bristol case study merchants, who participated in 
more voyages towards the end of their career after they had built up suitable 
connections and capital. Seventeen other merchants invested with him, and as a 
primary owner, he managed groups ranging in size from two to eight. He 
managed three groups of both two and eight, and again, this was early in his 
career, between 1729 and 1747. In contrast, he was a secondary owner in 
eleven groups of three and eight groups of four at the tail end of career, in the 
years between 1790-1793. As mentioned above, these eleven groups of three 
included Richard Fydell and James Rogers, with Rogers being credited as reviving 
Bristol's interest in the trade. Furthermore as also mentioned above, Bristol's 
slave trade experienced resurgence and investment groups were larger at this 
time in response to the proposed abolition of the trade, which is reflected in the 
changing patterns of Laroche's trade. That he participated in more voyages with 
Fydell and Rogers towards the end of his career is suggestive of the bonding 
capital leading Bristol merchants had access to towards the close of the 
eighteenth century which bolstered Bristol's activity in the trade. As leading 
merchants in the trade, Laroche, Fydell and Rogers would have had the most 
419 Eltis et al., Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade; Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 101. 
144 
expertise in and demonstrated the most enterprise of the Bristol merchant 
community, as evidenced by Laroche and Roger's exploitation of more varied 
market opportunities along the African coast and in the Americas. 
Born in London to a Cheshire gentry family, William Davenport became 
one of the leading Liverpool merchants of the period. In 1741, he was 
apprenticed to William Whaley, a slave trader who most likely initiated him into 
the trade. He was involved in the trades of beads, ivory, sugar and tobacco as 
well as the Mediterranean in which he was a partner in a wine firm. He entered 
into numerous commercial partnerships throughout his career with other 
prominent Liverpool merchants, including the Earles, Heywoods, as well as 
Thomas Hodgson and John Copeland. 420 Davenport, however, surpassed most 
other Liverpool slaving merchants in terms of experience and specialisation, 
investing in 147 voyages throughout the period between 1748-1786.42' At the 
start of his career between 1748 and 1753, Davenport invested with his master 
William Whaley eight times, indicating that Whaley indeed facilitated Davenport's 
entry into the trade. Of these 147 voyages, he was the primary owner of sixty- 
five, and was listed as the sole owner only twice. Sixty-one others invested with 
him, a staggering number compared to all of the other case study merchants and 
implying his investment groups had a wealth of knowledge, skills and experience 
from which to draw. His position as the central merchant in the Liverpool slave 
merchant community also made him well placed to benefit from this access to 
information and skills. There was some consistency in the people who invested 
with him. For instance, Ambrose Lace invested with him twenty-eight times while 
Peter Black and William Earle invested with him in twenty-seven and twenty-six 
voyages respectively. In particular, William Earle, who served as captain of eight 
voyages in his career, would have brought considerable human capital to the 
Davenport's investment groups. Davenport also managed relatively large groups. 
420 Richardson, Introduction to Davenport Papers, Merseyside Maritime Museum (hereafter MMM). 421 Cameron, Liverpool, p. 20; Eltis et al., Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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Although they ranged in size from four to eleven, he led twenty groups of seven 
and twenty groups of eight. The sheer number of voyages he participated in also 
means that he led and participated in multiple groups at the same time. 422 
Likewise, Davenport participated in a number of voyages with the same group; 
for instance, he led six voyages between 1770 and 1777 consisting of the same 
seven members, as well as the same ship, the Hector, and five voyages between 
1772 and 1777 with the same eight members and ship, the Swift. 423 In the 
eighty-two voyages in which he was a secondary owner, the groups ranged in 
size from three to ten. He was a secondary owner in fourteen voyages with ten 
members, the highest number on both counts for the case study merchants, 
however, he took part in a group of seven the most, on eighteen different 
voyages. Like the other case study merchants, these groups varied slightly, as 
he was in five different combinations of the seven members. Also like the other 
Liverpool case study merchants, Davenport's pattern of investment is 
representative of the interconnectedness of the Liverpool slave merchant 
community and the wealth of resources such interconnectedness facilitated. 
Conclusion 
The structure of the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchant 
communities, as well as an analysis of the case study merchant networks 
provides insight into the operation of the slave trade for both ports. As 
demonstrated, the Bristol slave merchant community was small and atomised and 
422 This, of course, is true for other merchants who participated in numerous voyages in any given year. 
However, in terms of the case study merchants, Davenport's participation in slave trade voyages was 
ouite remarkable. 
4Y3 In the six voyages between 1770-1777, William Davenport invested with Ambrose Lace, John 
Washington, Edward Chaffers, Henry Trafford, William Rowe and Nonus Parke. Voyage identification 
numbers: 91573,91574,91575,91576,91594,91595. In the five voyages between 1772-1777, William 
Davenport invested with Christopher Davenport, Patrick Black, Robert Jennings, William Jenkinson, 
John Parker, William Earle and Ambrose Lace. Voyage identification numbers: 91790,91791,91792, 91793,91794. Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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this was accompanied by less resource-sharing. Bristol merchants also 
demonstrated less enterprise in venturing to different regions along the African 
coast and in the Americas. In contrast, Liverpool had a much larger and well- 
connected slave merchant community over time and the networks operated in a 
manner that allowed for a greater spread of knowledge, skills and capital. 
Tellingly, Liverpool slaving ventures had the highest number of owners on 
average by mid-century, indicating that this spread of investment, as well as the 
consequent pooling together of resources, contributed to Liverpool surpassing 
Bristol as the leaders in the trade. Additionally, when compared with Bristol, 
Liverpool also had significantly fewer voyages managed by a single primary 
owner, further contributing to the notion that Liverpool slaving voyages were 
more of a group enterprise. Liverpool merchants also demonstrated 
entrepreneurial initiative by exploiting more varied market opportunities. The 
merchant case studies reinforced these established patterns, with the Bristol 
merchants typically participating in smaller investment groups than the Liverpool 
merchants. The next chapter will analyse the role of entrepreneurship and the 
various notions of capital further, particularly from merchant source material, and 
how this contributed to their overall success in the slave trade. 
147 
Chapter Four: An Analysis of the Trends in the Operation of 
the Bristol and Liverpool Slave Trade 
Writing in 1884, a Genuine "Dicky Sam" relayed the following scene in a 
Liverpool counting house, in which a partnership was formed to finance a slaving 
voyage: 
In the office of Thomas Clarke, three gentlemen were busily engaged in 
conversation. One says, 'Shall it be equal shares? ' 'Certainly! ' say the 
other two; 'and we shall deal fairly this time, ' to which the former replied- 
'Let there be no cheating of any kind; here is my hand on it, here is mine 
and here is mine. '424 
Having formed a partnership, these men would thus engage in a venture, which 
"Dicky Sam" described earlier in his narrative as follows: 
Ships were built and loaded; cruel sailors and a more cruel captain, with 
favourable winds, sped the good ship to the African shores. Here the ship 
was unloaded of her cargo, which consisted of trinkets, handkerchiefs, 
ribbons, pistols and cowries; these were bartered for men, women, and 
children, not too old nor yet too young, but only such as could work hard 
and toil long. 425 
While the above descriptions provide somewhat erroneous details regarding a 
slaving voyage, they do convey relevant issues in the operation of a slaving 
voyage that are analysed in this chapter. Based on extensive queries of the 
Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database, Chapter Three examined the organisation of 
the slave trade in both Bristol and Liverpool, and included an analysis of the 
structure of the slave trade communities as well as the case study merchants' 
associational networks as they related to trends in voyage management and 
investment. This chapter analyses these trends further, by, as the above quotes 
suggest, specifically addressing how merchant partnerships managed and 
conducted slaving voyages within their larger networks. Qualitative sources, 
particularly merchant correspondence, are examined to ascertain how aspects of 
entrepreneurship, as well as access to various types of capital within the Bristol 
424 
"Dicky Sam", Liverpool and Slavery: A Scouse Press Reprint of the 1884 Account by 'Dicky Sam' (Liverpool: Scouse Press, 1985), p. 18. 
425 Ibid., p. 14. 
148 
and Liverpool merchant networks shaped the particular operation of the trade in 
both ports. As highlighted in the previous chapters, the management of voyages 
required entrepreneurial skill to ensure success. 426 A slaving venture and how it 
was managed also raises issues much discussed in the historiography of 
eighteenth-century commerce, including risk, trust and reputation. How these 
merchants dealt with these issues within their networks is considered here in the 
context of entrepreneurship. 
As established in the Introduction, current entrepreneurial theory assesses 
the entrepreneur through both indicative and functional approaches, whereby the 
personal characteristics and roles of the entrepreneur are analysed in determining 
the degree of entrepreneurship. Characteristics such as initiative, willingness to 
take risks, courage and foresight are noted as being particularly entrepreneurial, 
while eighteenth-century merchants often recognised these qualities as a certain 
type of "spirit". Likewise, the role of the entrepreneur has been defined as, 
among others, an innovator, decision-maker, supplier of financial capital and 
coordinator of resources. 427 As discussed in this chapter, Liverpool slave 
merchants possessed these qualities and fulfilled these roles more successfully 
than their Bristol counterparts, contributing to their superior performance in the 
trade. The framework for this chapter is structured around merchant networks' 
response to events of the period established in Chapter Three. The early and 
established patterns In the trade, the impact of war, opening of new markets, the 
effect of the Dolben's Act and the lead-up to the abolition of the trade are 
analysed to ascertain the degree to which entrepreneurship contributed to their 
respective performance in the trade. 
426 See Introduction, p. 28; Chapter Two, p. 82. 
427 See Introduction, pp. 28-29. 
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Analysis of the Trends 
Free traders from Bristol entered the slave trade after the Royal African 
Company lost its monopoly in 1698. The port then dominated Britain's 
participation in the trade from the 1720s until the end of the 1740s when 
Liverpool overtook this position. 428 Bristol's early activity in the trade was 
influenced by the patterns established by the Royal African Company. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the British had ten fortifications along the Gold Coast; 
in the last two decades of its monopoly, about eighty-five per cent of the Royal 
African Company's coastal exports were divided among the Gold Coast, Windward 
Coast, Gambia and Sierra Leone. 429 Bristol's early activity along the African coast 
largely mirrored these established markets. Between 1698 and 1725, Bristol 
embarked on the Gold Coast the most, voyaging there forty-nine times. Bristol 
also made trips to the Windward Coast and Senegambia, although in smaller 
numbers with two and ten voyages there respectively. 430 Richardson, however, 
has argued that during this period Bristol's activity on the African coast was 
marked by a willingness to "Innovate and promote" changes in these established 
patterns, by voyaging further west to the Bight of Biafra and along the Angola 
coast where the Royal African Company's presence was minimal. As Table 3.1 in 
the previous chapter illustrated, by 1725 and continuing through the period when 
the Bristol trade was at its height, Bristol merchants indeed ventured in larger 
numbers to the Bight of Biafra than they did to the Gold Coast and most certainly 
the Windward Coast. 431 This is indicative of early innovation in the Bristol trade. 
Richardson also noted that a core group of nineteen merchants financed almost 
sixty per cent of Bristol's slaving ventures in the first three decades of its 
participation; in so doing, this group was instrumental in promoting these 
428 Minchinton, "Slave Trade of Bristol", p. 39. See Richardson, Bristol Vol. 2, p, xiv. 429 Richardson, Bristol Vol. 1, p. xxiii. 430 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
431 See Table 3.1, p. 94. 
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innovations in the patterns of trade. 432 However, Bristol's slave merchants failed 
to create lasting dynasties, as Morgan has argued that eighteen of the twenty-five 
leading slave merchants at the height of Bristol's slave trade either died as 
bachelors, married without leaving a direct male heir or had children die before 
they reached maturity. 433 While the failure to create trading dynasties has been 
cited as a factor in the demise of Bristol's slave trade, trading dynasties in 
Bristol's West India trade are credited for its success. Additionally, while Morgan 
comments that there was some overlap between the sugar and slave trades, 
twenty-one out of the fifty leading merchants who engaged in both dropped out 
of the slave trade by the time of the War of American Independence, leading to 
the argument that Bristol's trade became "dangerously concentrated in the West 
Indies". 434 Indeed, Wallace posited that Bristol was "so engrossed in her 
attentions to the supply of her [West Indian] plantations" that it ultimately 
"impoverished her African trade". 435 The last chapter noted case study merchants 
Henry Bright and Isaac Hobhouse conforming to this pattern. This trend 
corresponds with the relative specialisation and the discrete nature of those 
managing Bristol's major commodity trades, noted in Chapter Two, and is 
important to consider here as it impacts upon the human capital available to slave 
merchants in both ports. The specialisation that occurred in Bristol's sugar trade 
also occurred in its tobacco trade. For example, in 1672 there were 467 tobacco 
importers, but by 1789, the importers only numbered seventeen. 436 While a 
degree of specialisation also occurred in Liverpool's tobacco and sugar trades, 
Liverpool's flexibility in commerce allowed the port to prosper. 437 Clemens 
comments that Liverpool benefitted from "merchants who dealt as readily in 
sugar as tobacco" which enabled Liverpool merchants to "switch their main focus 
432 Richardson, Bristol Vol. 1, p. xxii. 433 Morgan, "Bristol West India", p. 203. 
434 Minchinton, Port of Bristol, p. 8. 
435 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 215. 436 Price, "Imperial Economy", p. 94. 
47 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 19. 
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in Atlantic trade more easily than at Bristol". 438 Liverpudlians were thus in a 
better position to adapt more easily and quickly to changes in the market. As 
discussed further below, Liverpool slave merchants were also adept at finding and 
exploiting new markets on the African coast and in the Americas, demonstrating 
the fulfillment of an entrepreneurial role. Additionally, Liverpool merchants were 
particularly good at exploiting price fluctuations; because many slave merchants 
dealt in both sugar and tobacco, if the sugar prices fell, than slave traders would 
sell slaves in the tobacco regions. Likewise, if the tobacco prices fell, slaves were 
sold for sugar in the West Indies. 439 Ultimately, Ascott attributes Liverpool's 
success to the fact that merchants engaged in all major commodity trades and 
did not specialise in any particular one. This is reinforced by the Liverpool 
Memorandum Book published in 1753, which noted that Liverpool merchants 
were indeed "universal merchants". 44° 
The relative inflexibility in commerce of Bristol merchants, coupled with 
Bristol slave merchants' failure to create dynasties has implications for the 
availability of human capital in Bristol's slave merchant community. 
Entrepreneurship is argued to be a continuing function, yet the Bristol slave 
merchant community would not have had the ability of fulfilling another 
entrepreneurial role, that of creating further innovation, because those with the 
most human capital in the trade failed to leave a legacy. 44' Arguably, then, this 
crucial and enterprising human capital was not passed on to succeeding 
generations. Those that shaped Bristol's early activity in the slave trade may 
indeed have been entrepreneurial in finding new markets, however expertise in 
the slave trade declined in the atomised Bristol community as merchants turned 
away from the slave trade to concentrate on the sugar trade and the leading 
438 Clemens, "Rise of Liverpool", p. 219. 
439 Cameron, Liverpool, p. 8. 
440 R. Williamson, The Liverpool Memorandum Book or, Gentleman's, Merchant's and Tradesman's Daily Pocket-Journal, For the Year M, DCC, LIII, 1753. Available at Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online, Gale, University of Nottingham, accessed 1/1/10. 
441 See Introduction, p. 31. 
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slave merchants did not pass on their human capital to the next generation. This 
occurred precisely at the time when Liverpool was gaining momentum in the 
trade. That the Bristol slave trade merchants later in the period were arguably 
conservative in their market choices also demonstrates a collective unwillingness 
to take risks, which stands in contrast with the entrepreneurial characteristic of 
having low risk aversion. 442 This is reinforced by the argument further explored 
in Chapter Six that Bristol merchants also became complacent in their trading 
performance. While this argument was made specifically for Bristol's West India 
merchants, it is demonstrative of a general "business caution" that characterised 
Bristol merchants as a whole. 443 
Not only did the Bristol slave merchant community lose crucial human 
capital in the trade by the mid-century, but they were also unable to successfully 
re-build it. This is most apparent in the case of James Rogers. As noted in the 
last chapter, Rogers was a central merchant in the Bristol community in 1790. As 
such, he had a higher degree of access to information, resources and capital. He 
is also cited as one of Bristol's slave trading elite and is credited with reviving 
Bristol's interest in the slave trade after the War of American Independence. "' 
The last chapter noted that Rogers ventured to six of the seven primary 
embarkation regions along the African coast, indicating that, unlike the noted 
conservatism In the Bristol merchants as a whole, he was more open to 
diversifying his market options. 445 Because of his central position in the Bristol 
slave merchant community and his diverse pattern of slaving ventures, it would 
seem likely that Rogers had the human capital to conduct successful voyages. 
Rogers' voyages to the African coast, however, were met with difficulty. Writing 
from Bonny in 1790, Captain John Goodrich related to James Rogers that he 
"found after my arrival here that my cargo was badly laid for Callabar" as he was 
442 See Baron, "Cognitive Perspective", pp. 224-226; Wadeson, "Cognitive Aspects", pp. 103-104. 443 Morgan, "Bristol West India", p. 206. 
444 See Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 24. 
445 See Table 3.3, p. 126. 
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"short of articles and iron bars"; additionally, the "great number of vessels both 
at this place and Callabar makes slaves of a most enormous price", 446 Two years 
later, and writing from the Gambian market, Captain Edward Taylor also 
remarked that Rogers needed to assort a better and more appropriate cargo for 
the voyage. 447 These examples demonstrate that both captains were not only 
lacking an appropriate cargo, but in the case of Goodrich, he was advised to sell 
at a glutted market. As owner of the venture, and the central merchant in the 
Bristol slaving community, Rogers should have had the knowledge of the desired 
cargoes for these different markets and have assorted the cargos appropriately. 
Rogers also should have kept the captains informed of market conditions. As 
discussed below, however, Rogers was often remiss in corresponding with his 
agents, and thus he was not as informed on market conditions as he otherwise 
would have been. Therefore, Rogers could not fulfil the entrepreneurial role of 
coordinating and distributing resources (including information) successfully 
through his networks. 448 It stands to reason that if Rogers communicated 
effectively through his networks to get the most up-to-date information, his 
captains would not have been sent to glutted markets. 
Additionally, Rogers proved to be ill-equipped to handle other matters of 
the trade. Although he diversified his market options along the African coast more 
than other Bristol merchants, Rogers still favoured the Bight of Biafra and Sierra 
Leone more than other British slave traders. However, he found considerable 
competition in these regions from French and Liverpool vessels. 449 As noted in 
the last chapter, Liverpool merchants were particularly skilled at diversifying their 
market options and cementing connections with African traders, thus those in 
Rogers' network noting Liverpool's significant presence along the African coast is 
not surprising. Writing from Sierra Leone, Captain William Roper expressed, "I 
446 Captain John Goodrich to James Rogers, 20 Jun 1790, James Rogers Papers, C 107/5, TNA. 
447 Captain Edward Taylor to James Rogers, 2 Jul 1792, James Rogers Papers, C 107/6, TNA. 
448 See Casson, Entrepreneurship, pp. 81,84; J. S. Metcalfe, "Entrepreneurship: An Evolutionary 
Perspective", in Casson, Yeung and Basu, The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship, pp. 59-91. 49 Morgan, "James Rogers", pp. 193,196. 
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am sorry to inform you that my beads are all charged eighty per cent dearer than 
any ships either from Liverpool or London" and that he "will have to bring some 
home". 45° This exemplifies that Bristol merchants found it difficult to compete 
with the well-established connections of their rivals, and particularly those from 
Liverpool, whose connections facilitated their competitive advantage in terms of 
pricing. As a leading Bristol slave merchant, James Rogers's experience in the 
trade demonstrates that Bristol merchants as a whole simply lacked the human 
capital throughout the period to successfully compete with Liverpool merchants. 
Although they participated in significantly fewer voyages early in the 
period, Liverpool's early presence along the African coast also mirrored the 
patterns established by the Royal African Company and emulated by Bristol. In 
the period between 1698 and 1725, Liverpool merchants participated in only 
eighty-six slaving voyages, compared with Bristol's 397 voyages. They also 
ventured to the Gold Coast, Senegambia and West Central Africa the most, 
embarking there seven, two and one time respectively. 45' Liverpool merchants, 
however, were more enterprising later in the period in establishing new markets 
along the coast. As Richardson and Lovejoy argue, seventy-five per cent of slaves 
carried by Liverpool ships came from areas where there was little or no 
permanent European presence in the formative period between 1701 and 1725. 
Thus, Liverpool merchants are credited for diversifying the regional patterns in 
slaving activity along the African coast for much of the eighteenth century, 
demonstrating their entrepreneurship in finding new markets. 452 The fluctuations 
caused by war, foreign competition and African supply conditions triggered 
Individual Liverpool merchants to exert more enterprise in exploiting new markets 
along the African coast, suggesting that Liverpool merchants responded to such 
events In a way that boosted rather than hindered their trade. For example, in 
response to the French levying a fee to access the Benin through the River 
450 Captain William Roper to James Rogers, 22 Jun 1789, James Rogers Papers, C107/5, TNA. 
451 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
452 Lovejoy and Richardson, "African Agency", p. 60. 
155 
Formosa, Francis Ingram established trade at Porto-Novo in the late 1780s. 
Additionally, the opening of the trade at Old Calabar and the Cameroons is 
attributed to William Davenport. 453 The opening of the trade at Old Calabar, 
located in the Bight of Biafra, is particularly important because, as has been 
previously established, the Bight was the region British slavers ventured to the 
most, underscoring Davenport's important entrepreneurial role as a trailblazer in 
the trade. 454 Chapter Two noted that growth in the slave trade necessitated 
negotiation between Africans and Europeans. Liverpool merchants were especially 
adept at solidifying links with African merchants from different political 
infrastructures, which particularly aided the extension and protection of credit in 
the Bight of Biafra and especially Bonny. 455 As observed by James Rogers above, 
this gave Liverpool merchants a competitive advantage along the African coast. 
Chapter Two also noted these linkages often transcended business relationships, 
as evidenced by William Earle's demonstration of friendship towards Duke Abashy 
as well as the fact that children of African elites were often sent to Liverpool to be 
educated. 456 By diversifying their market options and making voyages to 
different coastal outlets in larger numbers, as well as forging strong connections 
with the African merchants and leaders, Liverpool slave merchants demonstrated 
greater entrepreneurship by gaining great competitive advantages for their trade. 
Just as the early activity along the African coast was shaped by patterns 
established by the Royal African Company, the markets supplied in the Americas, 
particularly for Bristol, were also influenced by their early trading connections. 
Bristol had forged ties in the Chesapeake region due to its participation in the 
tobacco trade, and as the last chapter demonstrated, the port supplied that 
region in greater numbers than Liverpool. It was mentioned that case study 
merchant Isaac Hobhouse had partners with multiple commercial interests, many 
453 Behrendt, "Annual Volume", pp. 201-202; Richardson "Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade", p. 65. 454 See Casson's discussion of innovation in Entrepreneurship, pp. 88-86,105-107,259-260. 41' Richardson and Lovejoy, "African Agency", p. 60. 
456 See Chapter Two, p. 86. 
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of whom were in the Virginia and South Carolina trades. A principal agent with 
whom he corresponded in Virginia was Augustine Moore, who was born in 
England and later purchased land and entered into Virginia's tobacco trade, 
reflecting the transatlantic connections Bristol and American merchants created 
with one another. 457 Demonstrating this connection further, Table 3.2 in the last 
chapter showed that between 1730 and 1760, Bristol merchants disembarked in 
Virginia in larger numbers than Barbados, indicating Bristol's stronger presence in 
this market. 458 Conversely, Liverpool's embarkations in Virginia decreased 
throughout this period, and although the numbers fluctuated, Liverpool supplied 
the Caribbean in much higher numbers. On the whole, however, Liverpool 
participated in a wider range of markets, which is discussed further below and is 
indicative of the entrepreneurship of Liverpool's slave merchants, particularly in 
regards to risk-taking. It is important to note here, however, Liverpool's early 
performance in the trade was also shaped by an "infusion of new men" from 
Liverpool's West India trade, who brought their own particular expertise. These 
men are credited for establishing a market for Lancashire textiles with Spanish 
contraband traders in Jamaica; after this trade was prohibited, these merchants 
turned to the slave trade. 459 The infusion of new men coupled with Liverpool's 
early activity and enterprise in this Spanish market arguably served as a 
springboard for Liverpool's later success. 
For Britain as a whole, these early trading connections with the Spanish 
Islands were made by the Asiento contract, in effect from the Peace of Utrecht in 
1713 until the War of Jenkins' Ear began in 1739. Under the Asiento, Britain was 
granted the right to annually supply the Spanish colonies with 4,800 slaves. While 
this trade was officially conducted by the South Sea Company, whose factors 
resided in Kingston, clandestine trade certainly occurred. 460 Indeed, Wallace 
457 Minchinton, Hobhouse Papers. 
458 See Table 3.2, p. 98. 
459 Anderson, "Lancashire Bill System", p. 61. 
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posited Liverpool's successful entry into the slave trade to smuggling slaves to 
Spanish islands. From an entrepreneurial perspective, it may be argued that strict 
government regulation does not foster an environment for the entrepreneur to 
thrive. 461 Liverpool's early involvement in trade, albeit illegal at times, thus 
demonstrates further innovation in their market choices. This attitude is also 
demonstrated in Chapter Six, when it is argued that, in regards to Liverpool's 
defence of the slave trade, Liverpool merchants often argued both for keeping the 
trade open and encouraging diverse market options. By keeping the trade open 
(that is, less regulated) Liverpool's slave merchants could exert more enterprise 
in their market choices and in their trade. 
Importantly, smuggling slaves early in the period established their credit 
in the Asiento trade and created trading connections with the Spanish, "whereby 
an easy gradation was formed to the increase of that branch of the traffic in 
which Bristol had long been without a rival". 462 Wallace defined the period in 
which this occurred between 1722-1744, coinciding with the "infusion" of West 
Indian traders to Liverpool's slave trade and the time in which Bristol's 
participation In the trade began to decline. 463 Therefore, this "infusion" of new 
men further enriched the Liverpool slave merchant community with human 
capital. This also contrasts with the notion mentioned above that Bristol's major 
commodity trades were managed by discrete groups of traders and is reflective of 
the fact that Liverpool merchants, as "universal merchants", exhibited flexibility in 
commerce which contributed to their commercial success. 464 
While Bristol merchants benefitted from their established connections in 
the Virginia market, the previous chapter also noted Bristol merchants' failure to 
take advantage of shifts In the centre of gravity in the trade, particularly in 
Jamaica between 1730-1770. This could be attributed to early and unsuccessful 
461 Ricketts, "Theories of Entrepreneurship", p. 36. 
462 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 216. 
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ventures to that market. For instance, in 1729, the Bristol ship, Aurora, left 
Bonny with 337 slaves and arrived in Kingston with 270; the Jamaican agent 
partnership of Tyndall & Assheton recounted to Isaac Hobhouse of its arrival that 
it was the "worst cargo of Bonny slaves [that] have been seen this long time" and 
thus, the Bristol men will make a poor hand of it" by receiving a poor price in 
sales. 465 Because of this, they remarked in a later letter that "the people of 
Bristol seem doubtful of the Jamaican market for slaves". 466 As Hobhouse was a 
central merchant in the Bristol slave merchant community, word of this poor 
cargo would have certainly spread among the merchant networks in Bristol, thus 
affecting their decisions of where to venture. Additionally, Bristol merchants' 
failure to exploit different market opportunities early in the period may be 
attributed to the failure to heed the advice of factors and agents in the Americas. 
Hobhouse provides another prime example in that he seemed to ignore Tyndall & 
Assheton's advice in 1729 that Gold Coast and Angola slaves were preferred in 
the Spanish market. 467 This is discussed below when market exploitation is 
further considered, but is important to mention it here because it is reflective of 
the conservatism that hindered Bristol's performance in the slave trade. As 
mentioned in the last chapter, the markets Hobhouse supplied with slaves were 
those linked largely with the tobacco trade and he did not diversify his market 
options after the tobacco trade declined. 468 This, coupled with his failure to heed 
the advice of his agents who informed him of other market opportunities, 
indicates both conservatism and also complacency in his trading performance. 
Furthermore, as with Bristol merchants' conservatism that characterised their 
trade along the African coast, their neglect of market opportunities in the 
Americas is also linked to a deficiency in human capital. Again, James Rogers 
provides a telling example from the latter part of the period. In a letter from 
465 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade; Tyndall & Assheton to Isaac Hobhouse & Co., 6 Aug 1729, 
Jefferies Collection, Vol. 13, BRL. 
46' Tyndall & Assheton to Isaac Ilobhouse & Co., 7 Sept 1729, Jefferies Collection, Vol. 13, BRL. 
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agent Alexander Macleod in Spanish Town, Jamaica, Macleod expressed 
frustration with Rogers' seemingly shoddy management in 1791: 
in comparing the terms which I have engaged to sell negroes with those 
you have given my friend Mr. Francis Grant I perceive they are very 
different indeed 
... 
the fact is that I had not the most distant idea that I 
was not agreeing to do business on the same footing with him 
... 
you sent 
me a Windward Coast on Gold Coast terms. Was this our bargain? Was it 
not the express foundation of our agreement that I was to do business 
with you on the same terms that my friend did. I must request your 
immediate and explicit answer 
... 
that I may form another connection in 
case you do not choose my terms. 469 
Treating a cargo of slaves from the Windward Coast as if they were from the Gold 
Coast is indicative not only of Roger's lack of knowledge in the market, but also 
his poor behaviour in a business deal. Macleod clearly felt that Rogers was going 
against his word and changing the terms of the deal they had originally agreed 
upon. This would have hurt Rogers' reputation with his contacts in Spanish Town, 
limiting his opportunity to do business in Jamaica at a time when Bristol's 
presence there was comparatively minor. If Rogers, however, possessed the 
necessary qualities to more effectively fulfil the role of entrepreneur, he could 
have taken advantage of this market opportunity. 
As the above examples suggest, factors and agents were important 
members of slave merchants' networks as they were essential in providing 
merchants with information regarding the state of their markets, the going prices 
for slaves and other commodities, what goods were in most demand, who the 
appropriate people were to sell their goods to, and the arrival of ships into their 
ports. In effect, they facilitated the role of the entrepreneur by contributing to 
knowledge transfer, which in turn impacted upon the decision-making of the 
merchant. Thus, not taking their advice into account in the management of a 
slaving venture could be at a detriment to the success of the voyage. Likewise, 
the trends found in slaving voyages were influenced by captains, who were also 
integral members of slave merchants' networks. Their human capital has been 
469 Alexander Macleod to James Rogers, 15 Jul 1791, James Rogers Papers, C107/5, TNA. 
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previously noted to impact upon the success of the voyage, and Liverpool 
captains in particular were sought by Bristol and London merchants for their 
expertise in the trade. This underscores the critical role captains had in the 
operation of a slaving voyage and highlights a reason why Liverpool was more 
successful in the trade. Albeit an economic one rather than one relating to 
expertise, Wallace observed an additional competitive advantage Liverpool 
merchants had in regards to their captains. He commented that Liverpool 
merchants operated on a "more economic but less liberal plan" by paying their 
captains yearly rather than monthly salaries, as done in London and Bristol, by 
not allowing cabin privileges, and not granting any port allowances; this allowed 
Liverpool merchants to then "sell their slaves to the islanders for four and five 
pounds per head less than London and Bristol" while at the same time (affording] 
themselves equal profit". 470 Liverpool's more economic plan contrasts with the 
observation that Bristol merchants "treated their captains like young gentlemen 
on the Grand Tour", relating to contrasting practices of voyage management by 
Bristol and Liverpool merchant owners. 471 Particular considerations regarding 
voyage management are discussed further below. 
Successful captains became so by experience, and merchants often used 
the same captain on multiple voyages, reinforcing the trusting relationship that 
developed between merchant owners and captains over time. Highlighting this 
trend, the last chapter noted that Liverpool case study merchants Foster Cunliffe, 
Benjamin Heywood and Thomas Earle managed a number of voyages utilising the 
same ship and captain, which contributed to their success. 472 Further 
emphasising this, the Liverpool partnership of James Clemens & Co. relayed to 
Captain William Speers that although "misfortunes may to be sure happen that 
human prudence cannot forsee", many in fact can be prevented "by prudence and 
470 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 216. 
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a proper attention"; they had observed these qualities in Speers on previous 
occasions and therefore, "doubt not a continuance". 473 Speers served as a captain 
in six slaving voyages between 1766-1775, and he participated in nine voyages 
as an investor, six of which were managed by James Clemens. 474 Their working 
relationship illustrates the importance of repeated exchanges in fostering good 
business practice and building trust. The recurring exchanges between Speers 
and the Clemens partnership built trust and confidence in Speers that the slaving 
venture would be successful, which was particularly important as Speers 
conducted these voyages during the Seven Years' War and on the eve of the War 
of American Independence when trade was precarious. In contrast, a captain's 
inexperience could serve as a detriment to the trade, as evidenced by the case of 
Bristol captain, Japhet Bird. Although Bird served as a captain in fourteen slaving 
voyages from Bristol between 1722 and 1754, his first was not successful. On his 
first voyage to Montserrat in 1722, he buried seventy slaves. Writing back to the 
owners in Bristol, Bird stated that he was "most dissatisfied that it should happen 
to a young beginner but thank God it can't be said that it's owing to neglect for I 
can assure you that it has been the constant care and endeavour of me [to work] 
for the interest of these gentlemen that have employed me". 475 Bird's ill-fated 
voyage underscores the importance of a captain's human capital in the success of 
a voyage, particularly because he mentioned that he was a beginner. Additionally, 
it highlights that, as with the fate of the Aurora, the risk of slave mortality could 
plague any voyage. Mortality is discussed further below as it was a risk that 
merchants had to expertly manage in slaving voyages. 
This build-up of capital is also linked to the aforementioned idea of a life- 
cycle, or a typical career path of those in the merchant-mariner community. 476 In 
a study of Liverpool captains in the period between 1785-1807, it was found that 
473 James Clemens & Co. to Captain William Speers, 3 Jun 1768, David Tuohy Papers, LivPRO. 
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the majority came from a commercial background, with around eighty per cent of 
them having fathers from some commercial employment. 47 Moreover, most 
captains' fathers were indirectly connected to Liverpool shipping, as shipwrights, 
vintners, ironmongers and turners. 478 After earning capital and gaining 
experience, many captains settled as merchants and specialised in the markets in 
which they previously traded. 479 The human capital captains accrued was 
essential, especially because merchants left many considerations to the captain's 
discretion. Because trading conditions on the African coast or in the West Indian 
or American markets might have differed from the merchants' initial expectations, 
merchants therefore relied on the captains' human capital to conduct a successful 
voyage in a constantly changing environment. Indeed, William Earle wrote to 
Captain William Hindle stating that while you know our sentiments with respect 
to your destiny in the West Indies you will be the best judge whether it be to our 
advantage" to proceed where originally instructed or "going down to Jamaica". 48° 
Casson notes a misconception that "no-one who bears financial responsibility for 
a situation will voluntarily allow someone else to take a decision that affects the 
outcome". 481 Decision making, however, can indeed be delegated, allowing for 
the entrepreneurial role to be shared among group members. Importantly, in 
many cases the captain was also an investor, and as a provider of capital he 
conceivably had the right to impact on the outcome. Thus, quick decisions, such 
as where to purchase better quality slaves along the coast, were made by 
captains who were given authority to do so by their merchant owners. Decision 
making was therefore shared, highlighting the trust merchants had in their 
captains, as well as their factors and agents as noted above, and the delegation 
47 Stephen D. Behrendt, "The Captains in the British Slave Trade from 1785 to 1807", Transactions of 
the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 140 (1991), pp. 79-140. 478 Behrendt, "Captains", p. 106. 
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of responsibility that occurred in the conduct of slaving voyage. By relying on the 
human, as well as financial, capital of various people throughout the Atlantic 
world, slave trade merchants acted in "coalitions of entrepreneurs" when 
managing slaving ventures. 482 
The context of the slave trade in the early years of Bristol and Liverpool's 
involvement also raises other managerial issues that speak to the notion of 
entrepreneurship and impact upon success. Frequent correspondence through 
merchant networks was absolutely essential in the management of a slaving 
voyage. Some theorists espouse the idea of a "risk horizon", meaning that risk is 
embedded in time and includes both short and long term risk. 483 To manage 
these risks, entrepreneurs need access to information; thus, one role of the 
entrepreneur is "to collect the right information, in the right sequence, and in the 
right ways". 484 Likewise, slave trade merchants had particular risks to manage 
and regular communication served to reduce these risks. In this way, frequent 
correspondence among members of the network also helped reduce transaction 
costs. For both ports, letters back and forth continually expressed the need to be 
kept informed of opportunities or changes in the market, and frustration was 
expressed when letters were few and far between. This frustration was often 
articulated as a sense of unease. An agent in Barbados, Theodore Morris, wrote 
to Isaac Hobhouse in 1730, saying, "it's been a long time since there has been 
any news from Bristol, which makes most people with friends that way pretty 
uneasy". 485 Similarly, writing from St. Croix in 1782, Joseph Rogers expressed to 
James Rogers, "I am very uneasy on account of your silence not having the 
pleasure of a letter from you". 486 After months of no communication, Joseph 
wrote again stating, "I am truly sorry you put it in my power always to be 
reminding you of your remissness of your correspondence, [I] have not had any 
482 Casson, Entrepreneurship, p. 79. 
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of your esteemd favours since Christmas last 
... 
[this] certainly makes me very 
uneasy". 487 It was noted above that two of the voyages Rogers managed were 
unsuccessful largely because Rogers did not have the appropriate cargoes 
assorted in addition to advising his captains to sell at glutted markets. His poor 
managerial skills are particularly cited as a reason for the demise of his career 
and the fact that he failed to effectively communicate with his partners supports 
this claim. 488 Certainly, successful managers keep members in their networks 
well-informed. 
That Hobhouse and Rogers were often remiss in correspondence is 
especially telling considering they held central and bridging positions in the Bristol 
slave merchant community. This speaks to the crucial link between 
communication and commercial success in the slave trade as the leaders in 
Bristol's slave trade often neglected their duty to correspond while Bristol's 
success in the trade dwindled throughout the period. In contrast, correspondence 
shows that Liverpool merchants often pushed their agents to keep them regularly 
informed. Writing to the partnership of Lightfoot Hill & Co. in 1789, Robert 
Bostock asserted he had not "had the pleasure of advice" for some time and 
hoped "to have the pleasure of seeing your writing in a few days or else I shall 
think you have lost the use of your hands". 489 
Not only were Liverpool merchants proactive with urging correspondence 
and seeking knowledge, but so were Liverpool captains. An interesting case is 
provided by Liverpool captain, John Irving, who served as a surgeon in five 
slaving voyages between 1783 and 1789 and as a captain in two voyages in 1789 
and 1792. Coinciding with the time Liverpool captains were particularly sought for 
their expertise, his correspondence with his wife is revealing. He instructed her to 
impart precise information to his colleagues back home that would have an 
impact on slave trading ventures, such as the state of the market and when and 
487 Joseph Rogers to James Rogers, 14 Oct 1782, James Rogers Papers, C107/1, TNA. 
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where he planned on travelling. He also desired her to call on certain people who 
"will tell you all African news". 490 These examples illustrate that regular 
communication was imperative for the smooth operation of the slave trade, 
particularly in dealing with risk. They also speak to Liverpool's more effective 
practice of communication, in contrast with the poor communication that occurred 
through the networks of Bristolian merchants Rogers and Hobhouse. Liverpool's 
effectiveness was due to the nature of its networks within its slave merchant 
community. Chapter Three demonstrated that the Bristol slave merchant 
community became smaller and more atomised, and the case study merchants' 
networks by and large conformed to this trend. Conversely, the Liverpool slave 
merchant community was substantially larger and better connected by mid- 
century, with the case study merchants consequently part of much larger 
networks. It is therefore argued that Liverpool merchants surpassed Bristol as a 
primary slaving port because of their greater ability to gather and pass 
information through these densely interwoven mercantile networks. In other 
words, Liverpool merchants could more effectively fulfil the entrepreneurial role 
and "gather the right information, in the right sequence and in the right ways" 
because of the increased level of connectivity in their networks. 491 A prime 
example of Liverpool merchants' more effective communication is provided by the 
ardent correspondence of case study merchant, John Tarleton, discussed further 
below and in Chapter Six. As the examples of Hobhouse and Rogers 
demonstrate, Bristol merchants in contrast were relatively poor at this 
information transfer. It is also argued below that some Bristol slave merchants 
even sought knowledge from the more experienced Liverpool merchants, just as 
they sought the use of Liverpool's captains. These large networks, in which 
Liverpool merchants conducted business in "coalitions of entrepreneurs" thus 
490 Suzanne Schwarz (ed. ), Slave Captain: The Career of James Irving in the Liverpool Slave Trade (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), pp. 111,149. 
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fostered a practice of regular and effective communication, greatly enhancing 
Liverpool's performance in the slave trade. 
As noted above, mortality was one such risk in the slave trade and 
voyages with high mortality are generally indicative of poor management. 492 Of 
all voyages over the period, Bristol voyages had a slightly higher mortality rate, 
with an average of 13.3 per cent of embarked slaves who died on voyages 
compared with 10.9 per cent on Liverpool voyages. 493 Mortality rates varied for 
both ports by region as well as over time, but as the overall percentage of 
mortality suggests, these rates were not strikingly different. A notable exception, 
however, is found on voyages to Jamaica, in which the mortality rate to this 
region for Bristol slavers was significantly higher. In the period between 1725 
and 1807, an average percentage of 11.7 died on voyages to Jamaica; in 
contrast, just 7.7 per cent of slaves died en route to this region on Liverpool 
slavers. 494 Early in the period, coinciding with the ill-fated voyage of the Aurora, 
Bristol voyages to Jamaica had their highest mortality rates: 20.1 per cent 
between 1727-1730,28.3 per cent between 1731-1735 and 24.7 per cent 
between 1746 and 1750. In these early years, one way in which Bristol owners 
tried to manage the risk of mortality was to advise captains to remain watchful of 
their slave cargo. For instance, in 1725, Hobhouse & Co. instructed Captain Berry 
to "let your knetting be fix'd breast high fore 
... 
and keep `em shackled and hand 
Bolted fearing their rising or leaping overboard". 495 Remaining vigilant, especially 
at night, was crucial, as Hobhouse & Co. further cautioned Captain Berry that 
"sleeping in their Watch has often been fatall and many a good Voyage 
... 
entirely 
ruined". 496 Additionally, in 1747, Richard Meyler and Henry Bright gave precise 
instructions to Captain John Brown to make sure slaves ate well, which would 
492 Morgan, "James Rogers", p. 186. Management when it came to mortality, however, got better over 
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"prevent distempers" and ultimately "contribute very much to the success of the 
voyage" 497 These instructions indicate that merchants thus relied on their 
captains' ability to maintain the health and safety of the cargo to ensure low 
mortality. 
In contrast with Bristol's mortality rate, the highest recorded mortality rate 
for Liverpool voyages to Jamaica was 19.6 per cent, which occurred in the period 
between 1756 and 1760, coinciding with the Seven Years' War. 498 As Liverpool 
slavers made the most voyages to that region, Liverpool's slave merchant 
community would have had a wealth of experience in conducting voyages there, 
helping to manage and reduce such risks as mortality. As such, their advice to 
captains regarding the treatment of slaves in some instances differed than that 
offered by Bristol merchants. Robert Bostock's advice almost half a century later 
was to "take care to use your people with great humanity, not to beat or abuse 
them as you see many voyages overset by ill treatment". 499 This is, of course, not 
to suggest that Liverpool slaving ventures did not experience unrest or that 
merchant owners never advised their captains to exercise vigilance with the 
slaves on board. However, this further demonstrates that Bristol merchants' early 
experiences in the slave trade were shaped in a context in which crucial human 
capital was diminishing, and as such, they responded differently to the Liverpool 
merchants later in the period. This only reinforces the detriment to Bristol's slave 
trade that failure of the leading slave merchants to create dynasties would have 
caused. The human capital needed to adapt to a variety of trading conditions 
would not have been passed down and merchants would not have the benefit of 
learning from the experience of their peers. 
497 Meyler and Bright to Captain John Brown, Mar 1747, in Morgan, Bright Meyler, p. 194. 498 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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While there is no evidence to definitively link the length of time spent on 
the "middle passage" to an increase in mortality, the length of days spent in 
transit was also longer for Bristol voyages-500 This also comprises an issue which 
merchants and captains had to manage. On average, Bristol ships spent 66.4 
days along the "middle passage" while Liverpool ships spent 59.3.50, Merchants, 
however, were aware that ventures required quick turn-around times on the 
coast to ensure the health of the voyage. Writing from St. Vincent, Captain John 
Kennedy lamented to James Rogers that he had "a long tedious passage of 13 
weeks" in which he "never experienced such a disagreeable passage since I 
followed the sea". Kennedy "buried 28 on the passage" in which he largely 
blamed the doctor who "had not turned out to my expectations". 502 Unlike the 
case of Japhet Bird above, where his lack of human capital had plagued the 
voyage, in this case the voyage suffered in part due to the lack of expertise in the 
ship's doctor. 503 Quick turn-around times were likewise influenced by the 
tonnage of the ship, as smaller ships were faster to load and could thus quickly 
depart the coast. Furthermore, writing to Hobhouse regarding the voyage of the 
Cato which departed from the Bight of Biafra, Tyndall & Assheton expressed that 
we are well content with our concern in the Cato but wish she had proceeded for 
Angola" as they "are afraid she is too big for Old Callabar by reason she will be so 
long purchasing her cargo". Likewise, they also opined that if the vessel, the 
Swift were to venture to Africa, she "would do better at Angola" because she "is 
too big for Old Callabar". 504 This example is further reflective of Tyndall & 
Assheton's greater knowledge in the trade and Hobhouse's poor managerial 
performance in comparison. The Cato was 266 tons and indeed the average 
tonnage for Bristol slaving vessels in the period between 1725 and 1807 was 
500 See Chapter Two, p. 81. 
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much smaller at 113.8. The average tonnage for Liverpool vessels, at 155 tons, 
was also larger than the average tonnage for Bristol vessels. 505 
The issue of tonnage became especially important when the Dolben Bill 
imposing tonnage restrictions was debated in Parliament in 1788. While these 
debates are discussed more in depth in Chapter Six, merchants argued that ships 
by this later period of around two hundred tons were thought to be ideal and 
anything under that tonnage, specifically stipulating the proposed (and later 
passed) ratio of five slaves per three tons would not be profitable. -506 Such 
stipulations, as Bristol merchant James Jones expressed, would "check the ardour 
of trade and a great number of ships would be laid out instead of being fitted out 
again immediately as usual". 507 John Tarleton likewise agreed against these 
stipulations, asserting his hopes that "while limits are fixed to extent of tonnage 
[that] no restraint may be imposed upon discretion of trader in the vessels of 
smaller sizes". 508 These arguments regarding tonnage and profitability were 
made in conjunction with the health considerations described above. Indeed, 
Tarleton emphasised that the smaller ships "remain a shorter time on an 
unhealthy coast" and in fact arrive at their destination with "less loss and with a 
healthier cargo", noting the perceived link between quick turn-around times and 
the health of the voyage. 509 As Tyndall & Assheton relayed to Hobhouse, "you'll 
see the small vessels make the best voyages", indicating the link among small 
vessels, quick turn-around times and thus the health and profitability of the 
voyage. 510 
While issues of mortality and tonnage affected trade, war certainly had the 
most immediate impact. As mentioned in the Introduction, Britain was engaged in 
five international wars in the period between 1660 and 1800. Four of these wars 
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occurred in the formative period when the British slave trade was opened to 
private traders and was also when Liverpool surpassed Bristol as the premier 
slaving port. The danger and conflict slave merchants, particularly those from 
Bristol, experienced during the trade's formative years had obvious ramifications 
in the development of how the port organised its trade as it was based on the 
perceptions formed from these initial experiences. For instance, an account from 
Jamaica appeared in a Bristol newspaper in 1733 that the "Market for Negroes 
... 
is at a stand in that Island, by reason of the Trade being stopp'd at the Havvanna 
[sic] and other Places on the Main by the Spanish Governors" due to Spanish 
ships being taken as prizes. It was concluded that the stoppage of trade would 
"prove a great Detriment to some Merchants in this City" because "the Merchants 
of Jamaica, to whom the Cargoes of Negroes are consigned, not knowing what 
way to dispose of them". 511 The time at which this took place is notable. In the 
period between 1730-1739, Bristol cleared their highest number of slave ships, 
with 396 bound for the African coast. Likewise, between 1731-1735, their 
highest number of ships (102) disembarked at Jamaica, the most popular 
destination as established in the historiography and demonstrated in the last 
chapter. Between 1736-1740, this number dropped to eighty and throughout the 
rest of the period, Bristol never sent a higher number than that to the island. 512 
As noted above, this period also had the highest mortality rates for Bristol slavers 
in that region; thus, not only was Bristol trading in a context at this time shaped 
by uncertainty and war, but also high mortality. In contrast, while Bristol 
disembarked their highest number of slave ships at Jamaica in this period, 
Liverpool disembarked relatively few, and so Liverpool merchants might not have 
been as adversely affected by Spanish interference. Indeed, it has been posited 
that Britain's war with Spain in 1739 and its extension to France in 1743 was the 
"watershed moment" in the British slave trade when Liverpool surpassed Bristol in 
5 News Item Relating to Slave Trade, Bristol 14 Nov 1733, in Donnan, Documents, p. 451. 512 Eltis et at., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. This is for the period 1725-1807. 
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its control. 513 Relatively safer trade routes around Ireland, coupled with low 
trading activity in more dangerous areas such as Jamaica, would have made it 
possible for Liverpool's early trading activity to thrive. Likewise, mortality on 
vessels to this region was relatively low. 514 
An important entrepreneurial point may also be made in regards to this 
"watershed moment" in terms of the leadership in the Liverpool slave merchant 
community. As Joseph Schumpeter argues, leadership (and thus the 
entrepreneurship derived from leadership) has a function when something new 
must be carried out; as the economy is generally routine, entrepreneurship often 
occurs during times of disequilibrium, such as disruption caused by war. 515 That 
the Liverpool merchants entered into the trade in earnest in times of war and 
uncertainty, as well as supplied the Spanish islands through smuggling, 
demonstrates their entrepreneurship by their innovation and their willingness to 
capitalise on opportunities in the face of greater risk. Between 1731-1735, only 
eighteen Liverpool ships disembarked at Jamaica. This number increased to 
twenty-five between 1736-1740, and while the numbers fluctuated throughout 
the rest of the period, Liverpool disembarkations never dipped below twenty-five. 
In fact, Liverpool disembarked their highest number at Jamaica, 191, right at the 
end of the period corresponding to the time when they cleared the most slaving 
ships in general, between 1789-1799.516 Liverpool merchants' willingness to 
capitalise on new opportunities is further discussed below, when their exploitation 
of a variety of markets is explored. 
A dip in the Bristol slave trade, and the consequent rise of the Liverpool 
slave trade, is likely due to early privateering activity, both by Bristol ships as 
well as European powers, and particularly the Spanish and French. Beginning in 
513 Richardson, Bristol Vol. 2, p. xiv. 
514 There is no recorded mortality rate between 1738 and 1750 for Liverpool slavers to Jamaica. This is 
not to say that the percentage was zero, but that there are no records during this period to ascertain the 
mortality. Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
515 Schumpeter, "Entrepreneur", p. 248. 
516 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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1739 and concluding in 1748, the War of Jenkins' Ear was the first war Britain 
entered into in which the fighting was exclusively over colonial issues. As such, a 
major theatre of war was the Caribbean, with Britain, Spain and France trying to 
strengthen their colonial connections and vying for control of both their respective 
empires as well as the ocean highway. 517 This was closely followed by the War of 
Austrian Succession (1744-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), and as 
was established in the Introduction, the Treaty of Paris concluding the Seven 
Years' War solidified Britain's control of the North American mainland and 
established its naval superiority. -918 In 1744, Bristol's Society of Merchant 
Venturers drafted a petition stating that Spanish privateers were becoming so 
numerous in the Caribbean waters that "our trade is rendered daily more and 
more precarious". 519 This also coincided with the time that, after Britain declared 
war on France, convoys were introduced to protect British vessels to Jamaica. 520 
Accordingly, merchants advised their captains to be extra vigilant in transit, as 
did the Meyler-Bright partnership when they told Captain John Brown in 1747 to 
exercise "great care and watchfulness at sea to prevent your being surprised by 
the enemy". 521 
While British vessels came under attack by privateers, they also engaged 
in privateering activity. Arguably, Bristol was more active than Liverpool in this 
regard, and indeed this is posited as a reason for their slipping behind in the 
trade. During the Seven Years' War in particular, Bristol emerged as the leading 
mainland port for privateering, claiming eighty-one condemnations as opposed to 
London's seventy-three and Liverpool's fourteen. Bristol fitted out more 
privateering vessels and claimed more prizes than any other British outport, 
517 Benjamin, Atlantic, p. 491; Starkey, British Privateering, pp. 117-118. 
518 Introduction, p. 8. 
519 Petition by the Society of Merchant Venturers, Southwell Papers, Vol. 8,1741-1744, BRL. 520 Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 184. 
521 Richard Meyler and Henry Bright to Captain John Brown, Mar 1747, in Morgan, Bright- Meyler 
Papers, p. 193. 
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which was done at a detriment to their trade. 522 Indeed, in 1759, Jeremiah 
Meyler wrote from Kingston to Henry Bright in Bristol that he feared "the great 
attention to privateering out of your city has much hurted the trade of it, for 
there is ten times business carried on from Liverpool to this island from your 
city". 523 Thus, Liverpool gained a stronghold over Bristol in the Jamaican market, 
a market in which Bristol's presence had already been declining, while Bristol was 
otherwise engaged in privateering. Figure 3.3 in the last chapter also showed 
that during this time Liverpool voyages were owned by the highest number of 
investors. This is representative of a key strategy in spreading risk, as Liverpool 
slave merchants were spreading their investment in the trade at a time of war 
and uncertainty. In contrast, Bristol merchants, particularly during the lead up to 
the seven Years' War, participated in voyages with the smallest number of 
investors of the period, indicating that costs and risk were not as spread. This is 
further indicative of their diminishing human capital in the trade at this time. 
Once Liverpool had established dominance in the slave trade, however, by 
the War of American Independence (1777-1783) its privateering activity 
increased. This did not serve to hinder their trade, but rather it was an 
appropriate response to protect it. As the Americans closed their markets to 
British goods, ports with significant interests in the Atlantic staple trades faced 
rising pressure. In response to this pressure, David Starkey has noted an 
increase in national privateering activity, not only in the numbers of 
commissioned vessels, but also the spatial diversity in the ports that engaged in 
it. 524 Liverpool's licensed fleet of privateering vessels increased over fifty per cent 
during the Seven Years' War. In contrast, Bristol's fleet declined by fifty 
commissioned vessels from its previous number between 1756 and 1762, 
indicating the relative decline of the port in the face of competition from 
522 Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade, pp. 18-22. 
523 Jeremiah Meyler to Henry Bright, 29 Sept 1759, in Morgan, Bright- Meyler, pp. 358-359. 524 Starkey, British Privateering, p. 201. 
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Liverpool. 525 Thus, while Liverpool merchants were able to take advantage of 
Bristol's preoccupation with privateering early in the period and establish a 
stronger presence in markets, Liverpool merchants also engaged in privateering 
once established, but in a manner which served to protect its growing and 
thriving trade. Liverpool merchants were simply better able to adjust to the 
pressures placed on trade due to war by maximising and capitalising on their 
opportunities. 
While Liverpool merchants were better able to adjust, the impact of the 
War of American Independence, however, should be recognised as a serious blow 
to both ports' economies. As Parkinson observes, Britain was at war with our 
best customers and the whole inter-dependent trade system of the Atlantic trade 
threatened to collapse". 526 Despite Liverpool's protectionist practice of 
privateering, Gomer Williams further asserted that the "seven long disastrous 
years" of the war "put an entire stop to the commercial progress of the port". 527 
In line with the general commercial decline, both ports' participation in the slave 
trade also decreased. During the war, Bristol only engaged in twenty-five slaving 
ventures while Liverpool cleared 213 vessels. 528 As noted above, it was also 
during this time that many Bristol merchants who engaged in both the sugar and 
slave trades left the slave trade to concentrate on the sugar trade, further 
contributing to this decrease in slaving ventures. Figure 3.3 in the last chapter, 
however, noted an increase in Liverpool's pattern of investment, in that average 
number of owners per voyage was higher than it was in the previous decade and 
was at its highest point of investment since they achieved dominance in the 
trade. This is demonstrative of an additional entrepreneurial and protectionist 
strategy, spreading risk at a time of great commercial uncertainty, and contrasts 
with Bristol's dip in investment at this time. 
525 Liverpool's licensed fleet during the Seven Years' War was 390 vessels. Starkey, British Privateering, p. 201. 
526 Parkinson, Rise of the Port, p. 124. 
527 Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers, p. 301. 528 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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Liverpool's increasing expertise and their entrepreneurial ability to gain 
information was not lost on Bristol's slave merchants, as it was during this time 
that some of Bristol's prominent slaving merchants turned to their more 
connected, knowledgeable and successful Liverpool counterparts for information 
and expertise. For instance, in 1760, Isaac Elton wrote to William Earle that he 
would be glad to be of service to him "and in return shall trouble you for a list of 
your African ships". 529 Likewise, thirteen years later, Henry Bright wrote to 
Richard Bright, who was visiting the Heywoods in Liverpool, asking for a list of 
that port's African ships and to write "as usuall from Liverpool with as much news 
as you can collect or your leisure will permit you to write". . 530 Lowbridge Bright 
also wrote to Henry Bright while visiting in Liverpool, mentioning that he had 
delivered the letters given to him for Mr. Tarleton, the Heywoods and Mr. William 
James, "the most considerable African merchant in this place". 531 Lowbridge 
passed on information regarding the Liverpool merchants' latest and intended 
voyages and noted that their terms of nine, twelve, and fifteen months to remit 
bills "are much better than I could get in Bristol", reinforcing the historiographical 
argument that Liverpool did indeed receive better terms of credit than Bristol 
merchants. 532 Moreover, whilst there, Lowbridge intended to "get a personal 
acquaintance with the principal people here" so that when he required anything in 
the future "by being known to them I may negotiate by a letter without being 
obliged to make a personal application". 533 By becoming acquainted with the 
"principal people", Bright could extend his network to include more 
knowledgeable, and thus helpful people, which would facilitate his trade. 
Cohen and Prusak argue for a strong link between trust and openness 
within networks, which in turn facilitates knowledge transfer; such openness is 
529 Isaac Elton to William Earle, 3 Mar 1760, Earle Collection, LivPRO. 530 Henry Bright to Richard Bright, 23 Dec 1769, in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 428. 531 Lowbridge Bright to Henry Bright, 20 Aug 1773, in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, pp. 446-447. 532 Ibid., p. 447. 
533 Ibid. 
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another reason why trust serves as a binding property of networks. 534 Seen in 
this way, a trusting relationship developed between some Bristol and Liverpool 
merchants, such as the Brights and the Heywoods, which broadened their own 
networks and facilitated knowledge transfer. However, that Bristol merchants 
were keen to be informed of Liverpool's activity suggests not only that Liverpool 
merchants were more knowledgeable, as success and knowledge were linked, but 
that Bristol merchants could not necessarily rely on one another for information. 
Casson argues that a competitive threat to the entrepreneur "comes from the 
presence of people seeking to acquire knowledge of opportunities at second hand 
from the entrepreneur", thereby obtaining a "free ride" from the entrepreneur's 
judgement. It is thus important to distinguish among "follower-entrepreneurs" 
from "leader-entrepreneurs". 535 Bristol's atomised networks were not as 
conducive for information transfer as the larger and more connected networks of 
Liverpool; hence, Bristol merchants needed to become acquainted with the 
"principal people" in Liverpool. In a sense then, Bristol merchants were at best, 
"follower entrepreneurs" by seeking the expert, first-hand knowledge of Liverpool 
merchants. Written during the period between 1760 and 1773, these letters are 
indicative of the time when Bristol did not have central or bridging merchants in 
its overall slave merchant community, as well as when Liverpool had secured 
dominance in the trade. 536 It is conceivable, then, that the more atomised Bristol 
merchants would be more trusting of their Liverpool counterparts based on their 
success. 
While war with the Spanish and French certainly hindered and threatened 
their trade, the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchants also benefited from 
supplying their markets. With territories in the Americas frequently changing 
hands, merchants, particularly in the latter half of the century, operated in a 
trading context that included both sanctioned and illicit options for trade. 
534 Cohen and Prusak, In Good Company, p. 46. 
535 Casson, Entrepreneur, p. 43. 
536 See Chapter Three, p. 114. 
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Attempts were made throughout the period to check enterprise connected with 
illicit trade. For instance, a series of acts of Parliament were passed in the 1760s 
in the wake of the Seven Years' War which tried to curb smuggling; thus to 
eradicate the Spanish contraband trade, the Free Port Act of 1766 established 
trading parameters and ports in Dominica and Jamaica where legalised trade 
could occur. 537 This was then extended until 1780.538 Additionally, an act of 
Parliament passed in 1775 prohibited trade with the rebellious colonies, resulting 
in "an extensive illegal trade" with the rebel colonies. Alternative sources of 
supply for the West Indies were the established free ports and those held by 
Holland, Spain, France and Denmark. 539 While St. Croix-based agent Joseph 
Rogers confidently asserted "the British Merchant is never at a loss to supply a 
market", it was the Liverpool merchant that was the most enterprising in this 
regard. 54° In terms of supplying the Spanish market, between 1725 and 1807, 
Bristol engaged in eighteen voyages, with eight going to the Spanish American 
mainland and the remaining ten divided among Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and 
Cuba. 541 In contrast, Liverpool's early enterprise in the aforementioned Spanish 
market helped establish a trading presence, and the port engaged in 126 voyages 
in the period. Sixteen were dispatched to the Spanish American mainland and 
the remaining 110 went to Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Cuba; 108 vessels 
alone were sent to Cuba. 542 In the final two decades of eighteenth century, when 
Liverpool merchants did not send any vessels to Virginia or South Carolina, 
Liverpool disembarked fifty vessels at Cuba, indicative of their more diverse and 
constantly changing market patterns. 543 
537 Allan Christelow, "Contraband Trade between Jamaica and the Spanish Main and the Free Port Act 
of 1766", Hispanic American Historical Review, 22 (1942), pp. 309-343. 
- 538 Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 456. 
539 Richard B. Sheridan, "The Crisis of Slave Subsistence in the British West Indies Before and After 
the American Revolution", William and Mary Quarterly, 33 (1976), pp. 615-644. Sao Joseph Rogers to James Rogers, 14 Oct 1782, James Rogers Papers, C107/1, TNA. 541 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
sae lbid. 
543 Ibid. 
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While there is evidence to suggest that Liverpool slave merchants 
benefitted from supplying the Spanish market, there is also that which suggests 
that Bristol merchants neglected this market. With regards to the South Sea 
Company supplying the Spanish market, Tyndall & Assheton wrote to Isaac 
Hobhouse in a manner relieving him of any fears that the South Sea Company 
would engross the trade on the African coast, stating that agents "are more 
inclinable to contract with merchants to comply with their Asiento contract than to 
purchase negroes on the coast". 544 Characteristic of Hobhouse's noted neglect, 
he did not seem concerned with the activities of the Company, because in their 
next letter, the partnership remarked, "you say nothing of the South Sea 
Company, whether they set out for Africa" and they advised him that he "should 
be cautious and inquisitive". 545 As mentioned above, Tyndall & Assheton 
additionally relayed to Isaac Hobhouse the Spanish preferences, as well as those 
of the South Sea Company, for particular slaves, citing that Gold Coast slaves and 
slaves from Angola were in demand. 546 They also imparted the knowledge that 
the demand for slaves, particularly in Cuba, would continue. 547 Hobhouse, 
however, only made one voyage to the Gold Coast and he did not supply the 
Spanish market at all, indicating that yet again he did not heed his agents' 
advice. In contrast, Liverpudlian Thomas Leyland corresponded with his contacts 
in Cadiz regarding the slave trade to the Spanish islands and was keen to make 
an introduction to the Spanish minister in London in order to venture to 
Havana. 548 While he was ultimately unsuccessful, it appears he had no qualms in 
adopting any measure to ensure success. While discussing this opportunity with 
Moses Benson in London, he advised, "as you can no doubt get an introduction to 
this gentlemen I recommend an attempt in this business before you leave 
... 
544 Tyndall & Assheton to Isaac Hobhouse & Co., 26 Oct 1729, Jefferies Collection, Vol. 13, BRL. 545 Tyndall & Assheton to Isaac Hobhouse & Co., 26 Oct 1729 and Nov 1729, Jefferies Collection, 
Vol. 13, BRL. 
546 Tyndall & Assheton to Isaac Hobhouse & Co., 13 Mar 1729, Jefferies Collection, Vol. 13. BRL. sal Tyndall & Assheton to Isaac Hobhouse & Co., 13 Oct 1729, Jefferies Collection, Vol. 13. BRL. 548 Thomas Leyland to Eustace, Barron & Co., 21 May 1786, Thomas Leyland Letterbook, LivPRO. 
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bribery I believe is the sure line in succeeding in it". 549 Thus, while it appears 
Bristol merchants were not as interested in pursuing these foreign markets, 
Liverpool merchants were eager to initiate these opportunities. In contrast to 
Bristol's merchants' "business caution", noted above, Liverpool slave merchants 
took risks in their efforts to expand their market opportunities. 
Bristol was not as successful as Liverpool in supplying the French market 
either. Between 1725-1897, Bristol sent a total of thirty-three vessels to 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Dominique and the other French islands. 550 In 
contrast, Liverpool sent 219 to these islands, including thirteen to French Guiana. 
Liverpool merchants also demonstrated particular initiative in this pursuit. 
Writing to his brother Clayton in 1790, John Tarleton discussed his 
long conversation with W. H. Le Mesurier respecting his scheme for our 
future adventures to St. Domingo as a joint concern with the house of 
Havre, which from continuance of the French bounties, and an uncommon 
demand for Negroes would, I am persuaded turn out a most lucrative one 
and far superior in every respect to what we can possibly expect in any of 
the English islands. 55' 
Tarleton's mercantile network would thus extend to include some French traders, 
expanding his knowledge of the trade, and increasing his opportunity for profit. 
Opening up connections with the French and having a less insular business 
practice could be attributed to his particular entrepreneurial acumen. The 
parliamentary debates surrounding the proposed abolition of the trade revealed 
that many British merchants viewed the French as their primary competition. As 
such, if the British relinquished the trade altogether, France would most certainly 
prosper. 552 That Tarleton sought to work in concert with a "rival" demonstrates 
his commercial and entrepreneurial position. 
Again, the timing of this is notable. Two years after this proposal, Clayton 
wrote to John Tarleton exclaiming that while "everything in the shape of a ship 
sag Thomas Leyland to Moses Benson, 22 May 1786, Thomas Leyland Letterbook, LivPRO. 550 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
55! John Tarleton to Clayton Tarleton, 29 Apr 1790, Tarleton Papers, LivPRO. 552 Both Bristol and Liverpool merchants' attitudes as they are revealed in parliamentary debates are 
analysed further in Chapter Six. 
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that can be come 
... 
is fitting out for Africa" there is still "no certainty in the 
African trade". 553 This statement is reflective of the fact that, even in the context 
of uncertainty, Liverpool merchants were still keen to engage in and profit from 
the trade. Not only was the trading milieu one of uncertainty, but the trade in its 
final decades was operating in a context of war again with the French, with the 
resulting unrest in the French Caribbean in the early 1790s affecting trading 
patterns. 554 Furthermore, the active campaign of the trade's abolition threatened 
the livelihood of many of the ports' principal merchants. Abolitionist sentiment 
began to spread earnestly after the War of American Independence, as the states 
of Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia banned the 
importation of slaves. 555 As will be seen further in Chapter Six, the Society for 
Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade was established in London in 1787, and 
one year later the Dolben Bill was passed, regulating the trade and effectively 
acting as a precursor to the trade's eventual abolition. While there may not have 
been any certainty, especially at a time when the trade was under attack, both 
Bristol and Liverpool merchants sought to defend it, with Liverpool merchants 
taking the most active lead in the opposition to abolition. Case study merchant 
John Tarleton played an especially prominent role, as he, along with James 
Penny, Robert Norris, John Matthews and Archibald Dalzell represented Liverpool 
in Parliament in the fight against abolition. 556 Perhaps because of its uncertain 
future, Bristol and Liverpool merchants increased their slave trading activity. In 
the decade between 1790-1799, Bristol cleared 135 slaving vessels, which was up 
from ninety-four in the previous decade. In contrast, Liverpool sent 969 in the 
period between 1790-1799, up dramatically from 558 the previous decade. There 
was a corresponding change in the pattern of investment as well. As discussed in 
the last chapter, at the end of the period, the number of investors in Bristol 
553 Clayton Tarleton to John Tarleton, 4 May 1792, Tarleton Papers, LivPRO. 
554 Dale H. Porter, The Abolition of the Slave Trade in England, 1784-1807 (Hamden, CT: Archon 
Books, 1970), p. 110. 
555 Parkinson, Rise of the Port, p. 140. 
556 Porter, Abolition of the Slave Trade, p. 40. 
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voyages increased, along with the number of voyages managed by more than one 
owner. In contrast, the number of investors in Liverpool voyages decreased. 
This is in response to both ports' access to social capital, as discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter utilised qualitative sources to examine the trends that were 
established in the last chapter in the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade. Issues 
including risk, trust, reputation, knowledge acquisition and transfer, and the 
importance of human capital were woven into this analysis to demonstrate how 
the patterns can be explained using these notions from entrepreneurial theory, 
particularly in regards to both the characteristics and the role of the 
entrepreneur. Bristol's early patterns along the African coast and in the Americas 
were based on the patterns established and the connections cemented by the 
Royal African Company and Bristol's enterprising merchants. By mid-century, 
however, the human capital in Bristol's slave merchant community decreased, as 
its leading merchants failed to create dynasties. Likewise, principal merchants 
who held bridging positions in the Bristol slave merchant community such as 
Isaac Hobhouse early in the period and then James Rogers later in the period, 
were ineffective. They failed to heed the advice of their agents in the Americas 
and were remiss in correspondence, thereby hindering information transfer. 
Lacking in expertise, the requisite characteristics for entrepreneurial behaviour, 
as well as having poor managerial skills thus contributed to conservatism in their 
choice of markets and ultimately frustrated their success in the trade. 
In contrast, Liverpool merchants were far more enterprising. Their entry 
in the trade was facilitated by an "infusion" of new men whose expertise and 
connections in the Spanish market allowed Liverpool merchants the early 
opportunity to diversify their markets. It is also demonstrative of the "universal" 
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nature of Liverpool's merchant community and thus the availability of greater 
types of capital to its slave merchants. Utilising the human capital of their 
captains and factors, and effectively communicating through their networks 
reinforces the notion that Liverpool slave trade ventures were conducted in 
"coalitions of entrepreneurs" as the entrepreneurial role was shared. 
Entrepreneurial strategies such as risk-spreading in times of war and privateering 
after gaining commercial prosperity further ensured their success, and after mid- 
century, Bristol merchants turned to Liverpool for their superior knowledge and 
expertise. As argued here, Liverpool merchants had superior human capital in the 
slave trade; Chapter Five will examine the access to social capital in both 
merchant communities to see how this further impacted upon their trade. 
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Chapter Five: The Bristol and Liverpool Slave Merchants 
in their Urban Setting 
The last two chapters focused on the patterns and trends established by 
the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchants in an entrepreneurial context, or their 
business practice "Inside the Counting House". This chapter analyses these 
merchants in their wider urban and social setting, and thus their life "Outside the 
Counting House". Chapter Three noted that networks emerge for project-based 
work and often this formal collaboration stems from pre-existing informal 
relationships. These informal relationships are based on repeated interactions and 
exchanges that in turn build trust, reputation and feelings of loyalty. 557 These 
relationships also provided access to social capital. As discussed in the 
Introduction, social capital includes the resources gained through relationships 
and therefore, social networks have an intrinsic value. 558 Social capital can be 
accessed through various sources, as relationships are formed and maintained in 
different contexts. Accordingly, slave venture investment partnerships were 
based on trust and reputation in fellow merchants' business practice, but these 
relationships were further cemented by the social capital accessed through 
informal interactions in places such as coffeehouses, drinking and dinner clubs 
and political associations. Thus, life inside and outside the counting house 
merged in a merchant's career and cannot be seen as discrete entities. The 
urban setting also allows for a greater discussion of the utilisation of social 
capital, and the degree to which this impacted on the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
merchant networks, and thus their overall success in the trade. 
Because networks exist in, and are shaped by, historically-specific 
contexts, the context of the eighteenth-century urban and commercial world must 
also be understood. Over the course of the eighteenth century, both Bristol and 
557 Smith-Doerr and Powell, "Networks", p. 385. 
558 See Introduction, p. 34. 
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Liverpool experienced tremendous growth, with corresponding economic and 
social changes that are characteristic of the "urban renaissance". Using the 
notions of "space" and "place" also provides another way of thinking about how 
social capital is accessed. 559 Therefore, in addition to an examination of Bristol 
and Liverpool's urban development, the locations of the Bristol and Liverpool 
slave merchants' homes, businesses, and the social organisations in which they 
were involved are mapped to demonstrate how physical and social proximity can 
be used to comment on the creation and maintenance of networks. This in turn 
can be used to show how this access to social capital contributed to their business 
practice. These are considered as snapshots in time. For Bristol, the time periods 
represented are 1775 and 1794, while the periods for Liverpool are 1766 and 
1805. The earlier dates were chosen because they correspond with the timing of 
the first printed directories in both ports; likewise, the later dates were chosen as 
representative of the latter part of the period while both merchant communities 
were still sizable. The maps included in this analysis also correspond with these 
dates; however, it should be noted that although this analysis uses the trade 
directory of Liverpool from 1805, the map is from 1795. This is done for ease of 
comparison purposes, as the orientation of the map from the later period does 
not match that of the 1765 map and thus comparisons would not be readily seen. 
By examining both ports from two different time periods, comparison is 
facilitated, as is analysis of change over time. While the last chapter 
demonstrated how the particular characteristics and roles of the entrepreneurial 
merchant shaped Bristol and Liverpool's slave trade, this chapter focuses on the 
social relationships within the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant community to 
assess its impact on their trade. Thus, access to social capital and its meaning for 
Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant networks is interwoven into this analysis as 
it relates to their respective performances in the trade. 
559 Miles Ogborn and Charles W. J., Withers Georgian Geographies: Essays on Space, Place and Landscape in the Eighteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 1. 
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Part One: The Eighteenth Century Urban Renaissance 
The Introduction briefly outlined important aspects of the "urban 
renaissance", noting the significant population growth that occurred in provincial 
ports such as Bristol and Liverpool as well as the corresponding developments in 
commerce, services and industry. These developments in turn fostered notions of 
civic pride as well as of self-improvement and status attainment. The values of 
"polite society", emphasised progress, order and civility, and thus "transformed 
both the reality and perceptions of urban society, culture and landscapes", and 
improvements were made in Bristol and Liverpool in terms of transport, 
architecture and cultural institutions. 560 Some of the most notable improvements 
made during this period include developments in communications infrastructure 
connected with a growth in inland trade. Bridges, turnpike roads, wider, more 
uniform streets as well as street lighting and cleaning were built and implemented 
to both facilitate trade and cater to the increase in traffic. 561 In addition to 
transport, improvements also took place in the form of public building programs, 
in which these new buildings were more uniformly constructed in the classical 
style. By the mid-eighteenth century, towns were largely reconstructed in brick 
and tile, which contributed to public safety by reducing fire damage. Indeed, 
Walter Ison attributes the more uniform building of houses in Bristol's Queen 
Square, St. James' Square and Orchard Street in the early part of the eighteenth 
century as an adaption of the regulations imposed in London in 1667 after the 
Great Fire. 562 By the 1720s, both Bristol and Liverpool had "sizable pockets" of 
such new architecture, and by the middle of the century, both ports also had 
monumental Exchanges designed by the distinguished Bath architect, John Wood 
560 Jon Stobart, "Culture versus Commerce: Societies and Spaces for Elites in Eighteenth-Century 
Liverpool", Journal of Historical Geography, 30 (2004), pp. 471-485. $61 See Introduction, pp. 14-15. 
562 Jones and Falkus, "Urban Improvement", p. 120; Walter Ison, The Georgian Buildings of Bristol (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1952), p. 21. 
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the Elder. 563 These trends in architecture represented the creation of a new 
"urban aesthetic", which is also indicative of a growth in an urban or civic 
consciousness; not only did it indicate the development of a "common language 
of architecture" whereby buildings began to resemble one another but public 
buildings such as charity schools and hospitals were also being constructed. 564 
For instance, nearing the end of the eighteenth century in 1795, Bristol had over 
300 almshouses and around 960 children in charity schools while Liverpool had 
126 almshouses and 300 children in charity schools. 565 Building works also 
constituted new social spaces and, importantly, places to access social capital. For 
merchants in particular, the business conducted in the merchant Exchanges, 
coffeehouses and taverns were spaces "animated by new activities, encounters 
and experiences shaped by 
... 
the ideas and practices of polite sociability" that 
was characteristic of this new urban consciousness. 566 
In conjunction with communications and architectural improvements, the 
development of a particular urban consciousness meant that the "urban 
renaissance" was also characterised by personal improvement and status 
attainment. This is evidenced by the building of charity schools, and of new 
leisure facilities such as assembly rooms, pleasure gardens and public walks that 
served to promote personal display and interaction. The development of 
intellectual pursuits such as philosophical and literary societies as well as libraries 
and newsrooms also fostered a sense of personal improvement. 567 Stobart 
argues that investments in "such cultural capital" not only contributed to the 
status of the individual, but also shaped the reputation of the town. 568 These 
collective issues of status and identity were not only important for merchants, but 
563 Borsay, English Urban Renaissance, pp. 43,104. 
564 Borsay, "The English Urban Renaissance: The Development of Provincial Urban Culture c. 1680-c. 
1760", in Borsay, Eighteenth Century Town, pp. 159-188. 
565 Bryan Little, The City and County of Bristol: A Study in Atlantic Civilisation (London: Werner 
Laurie, 1954), p. 175. 
566 Ogborn and Withers, Georgian Geographies, p. 9. 
567 Borsay, English Urban Renaissance, pp. 117-150. 
568 Stobart, "Culture versus Commerce", p. 472. 
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for Bristol and Liverpool as commercial cities particularly because arguments have 
been made that commercial interests superseded more cultural and polite 
pursuits. As a city of business, Bristol merchants in the late-seventeenth century 
were characterised as "very proud, arrogant and pompous" and their commercial 
culture could not compete with the sophistication, luxury and leisure of Bath. 569 
Indeed, a contemporary noted of Bristol that, "people give themselves to trade so 
entirely that nothing of the politeness and gaiety of Bath is seen here". 570 
Similarly, a Liverpool merchant has been notoriously described as a "mercantilist, 
a materialist, and an empiricist" with an "indiscriminate rage for commerce", 
which was perceived to have hampered the cultural development of the port. 571 
The creation of charitable and cultural organisations was thus important for the 
propagation of a more favourable reputation for both ports. 
As individuals, Bristol and Liverpool slave merchants constructed their 
social reputation through, among other things, their residence, participation in 
these new civic activities, and their material possessions, which demonstrates the 
link among trade, consumption and urban growth that is typical of the period. 572 
This link is crucial in ascertaining the socio-political structure of Bristol and 
Liverpool at this time. The Introduction noted that merchants became increasingly 
involved in politics throughout the period, as they held positions in power to 
protect their trading interests. 573 Merchants in Bristol and Liverpool also held 
prominent roles in these new socio-cultural institutions, sitting on the boards of 
charities, subscribing to subscription libraries and joining social drinking clubs. 
Merchant involvement in these socio-cultural institutions is discussed more 
specifically for the Bristol and Liverpool merchants below, while their political 
569 Thomas Garrard, Edward Colston, the Philanthropist, His Life and Times (Bristol: J. Chilcott, 1852), p. 307; R. I. James, "Bristol Society in the Eighteenth Century", in C. M. Maclnnes and W. F. Whittard (eds. ), Bristol and its Adjoining Counties (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith Ltd, 1955), pp. 231-243. 570 Quoted in McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 99. 
571 S. G. Checkland, "Economic Attitudes in Liverpool, 1793-1807", Economic History Review, 6 (1952), pp. 58-75; W. Matthews, The New History, Survey and Description of the City and Suburbs of Bristol, or Complete Guide (Bristol, 1794). 
572 Joyce M. Ellis, The Georgian Town, 1680-1840 (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 34. 573 See Introduction, p. 5. 
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involvement is analysed in the next chapter. In analysing these links between 
urban development and the slave trade, Dresser states that the "urban 
renaissance" coincides precisely with the time Britain's involvement in the slave 
trade and slave-produced goods started to flourish. 574 Thus, notions of commerce 
and culture were inextricably linked, with Bristol and Liverpool slave merchants 
playing leading roles in the political, economic and cultural composition of the 
respective ports. Moreover, the link between trade and urban development 
reveals that, as members of "polite society", merchants could be perceived as 
having a high status based on wealth and behaviour and not necessarily by birth, 
contributing to the relative fluidity of social standing at this time. 575 
These types of status-attaining behaviours were captured by the Liverpool 
Memorandum Book of 1753 through its instructions regarding how a merchant 
should organise and schedule his day. On a sample page of "Engagements", 
examples included "At the Custom-house" and "At the Insurance Office" in the 
morning, while sample evening activities included At St. Nicholas' Lecture" and 
To go with Mr. H to the Concert". 576 It was clearly important for merchants to 
subscribe to several work and non-work related activities in the construction of 
their reputation. Importantly, these types of activities also constituted 
opportunities to access social capital, as having numerous and varied 
opportunities to network contributed to what Putnam et al. refer to as 
"multistrandedness" of interaction, in turn creating more access to social 
capital. 57 Merchant reputation as constructed through their residence and civic 
participation will be analysed further later in the chapter. 
Urban population growth is a well-known feature of the eighteenth 
century, and the role of migration is cited as the primary contributor. 578 Bristol 
and Liverpool's population growth was discussed in Chapter Two. As noted, at the 
574 Dresser, "Squares of Distinction", p. 22. 
575 Hancock, Citizens of the World, p. 280. 
576 Williamson, Liverpool Memorandum Book. 
577 See Introduction, p. 34. 
578 Peter Borsay, "Introduction", in Borsay, Eighteenth Century Town, pp. 1-39. 
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beginning of the eighteenth century, Bristol was the "second city" behind London 
with around 21,000 inhabitants; by 1800, Bristol's population had risen to around 
60,000 and the port was the sixth largest city. 579 Liverpool's growth, on the other 
hand, was quite remarkable. With only around 5,500 inhabitants in 1700, by 
1800, there were over 80,000.580 In-migration significantly contributed to 
Liverpool's growth. Argued to be one of the most mobile locales studied by 
historical demographers, eighty per cent of the port's population increase in the 
late-eighteenth century was due to in-migration. 181 Stobart's synthesis of 
historiographical debates in this regard demonstrates urbanisation in the late- 
eighteenth century was linked to the process of industrialisation. Using Liverpool 
as an example, Stobart demonstrates that urban growth occurred in the north 
and west of Britain in "previously peripheral" areas to the country's economic and 
social life. 582 The in-migration that occurred in Liverpool was thus typical of 
north-western, industrialising British cities. However, this influx of people also 
brought human capital to Liverpool's merchant networks that added competitive 
advantages to their trade, as it was accessed via social capital. 
Additionally, other demographic changes also occurred around this time 
that impacted upon the slave trade. Richardson notes that before 1750, 
merchants In Bristol mainly came from the city and the surrounding areas and 
associations by birth, marriage or apprenticeship largely accounted for the means 
of recruitment into slaving ventures. However, this changed after mid century. 
Defoe remarked in the 1778 edition of his Tour that people from Wales, Scotland, 
Ireland and America created a "heterogeneous mixture" in the port so much so 
that "any general characteristics of its inhabitants cannot be given". 583 
Furthermore, Richardson observes that after 1750, "men of somewhat obscure 
origins" managed more slaving ventures as associational ties of marriage and 
579 Wrigley, "Urban Growth", p. 42; Morgan, "Economic Development", p. 49. 580 Langton and Laxton, "Parish Registers", p. 75; Wrigley, "Urban Growth", p. 43. 581 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 2. 
582 Stobart, "In Search of Causality", p. 149. 
583 Defoe, Tour through the Whole Island, p. 239. 
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apprenticeship among agents declined, indicating a lack of human capital in the 
slave merchant community at this time. 584 After 1750, more apprenticeships 
were given through charities and they consequently lost appeal among the 
status-seeking wealthier classes as a way to enter business. Thus, while charity 
was seen to enhance the reputation of the town at large, it appears merchants in 
particular did not view apprenticeship through these means as a favourable 
career progression. 585 Additionally, it has been argued that Bristol slave 
merchants failed to create lasting dynasties in the trade, impacting upon both the 
human capital available to slave merchants as well as their access to social 
capital. 586 Therefore, outsiders coming into the Bristol merchant community, 
such as James Rogers and James and Thomas Jones who moved from South 
Wales before the War of American Independence are credited for reviving and 
sustaining Bristol's waning interest in the slave trade. 587 
A decline in apprenticeship and the failure to create lasting dynasties 
therefore impeded long-term network development at a time when Liverpool 
merchants surpassed Bristol as leaders in the slave trade. These demographic 
changes should not be ignored; as Coleman argues, having access to social 
capital in one generation can lead to human capital in the next. 588 As outlined in 
Chapter Four, the failure of Bristol slave trade merchants to create dynasties 
would mean that the crucial human capital of these leading merchants would not 
have been transmitted to the next generation. 589 Thus, by mid-century, the 
Bristol slave merchant community had a dearth of both human and social capital. 
The arrival of "new blood" such as James Rogers later in the period provided a 
much needed boost in slaving interests and was crucial in building new networks. 
While this "new blood" reinvigorated Bristol's participation in the slave trade, it 
584 Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 24. 
585 Jonathan Barry, "Bristol Pride: Civic Identity in Bristol c. 1640-1775", in Dresser and Ollerenshaw, Making of Modern Bristol, pp. 25-48. 
586 See Morgan, "Bristol West India", p. 203. 
587 Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 24. 
588 Coleman, "Social Capital ", p. 109. 
589 See Chapter Four, p. 151. 
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must be kept in mind that these outsiders did not necessarily bring with them 
expertise in the trade. As demonstrated in the last chapter, James Rogers was a 
relatively poor slaving manager. 
To a degree, the Liverpool merchant community also experienced such 
integration. Pope's analysis of the 201 leading slave merchants found that 41.8 
per cent were born in Liverpool or the surrounding parishes; thus, over half were 
from outside Liverpool. 590 In corroboration, Gauci argues that the proportion of 
immigrant merchants in Liverpool remained significant throughout the period, 
which was indicative of a lack of "home grown recruits with capital and 
connections" 
. 
591 Like Bristol, then, the Liverpool merchant community benefited 
from the arrival and incorporation of human capital in the slave trade from 
outside areas. Indeed, for the case study merchants in both ports, the majority 
were not from Bristol or Liverpool. James Rogers came from Wales, while James 
Laroche was from London; Henry Bright was born in Worcestershire and Isaac 
Hobhouse hailed from Somerset. For Liverpool merchants, only John Tarleton and 
Thomas Earle were born in Liverpool. Clearly, "outsiders" could be absorbed into 
the networks of the existing merchant community and many became prominent 
and well-established merchants. Integration, particularly that which occurred in 
Liverpool, provided not only crucial human capital for the development of 
commerce, but access to social capital as well in the relationships created 
between "insiders" and "outsiders". This in turn fostered important commercial 
and civic relationships. Hyde notes that an influx of "outsiders" in the first part of 
the eighteenth century brought both financial and human capital to boost 
manufacturing and early industry, including sugar refineries, copper and iron 
works. These people obviously had established contacts with others outside 
Liverpool and eventually "created powerful vested interests in both the 
590 Pope, "Wealth and Social Aspirations", pp. 194-207. 
391 Gauci, Politics of Trade, p. 56. 
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government and economic prosperity of the port". 592 The intermingling interest of 
politics and commercial expansion illustrates the impact of bonding, or negative 
social capital as outlined in the Introduction and further analysed in the next 
chapter. Mariner-merchants from surrounding areas also flocked to Liverpool, 
bringing human capital and helping to build its commercial community, which 
prompted a contemporary to observe that "no town in England had so many 
merchants in it who rose from sailors". 593 For the slave trade specifically, it is 
argued that merchants and captains from Lancaster moved to Liverpool and 
contributed substantially to its trade. 594 For instance, Lancaster native, Ambrose 
Lace, served as a captain in seven voyages from 1755-1768 for prominent 
Liverpool merchants such as Edward Chaffers, William Boats, and John and 
William Crosbie. His career spanned until 1785, in which he invested in fifty-five 
total voyages, contributing significantly to Liverpool's slaving activity and 
providing a contrasting example to the performance of James Rogers, an 
"outsider" to Bristol's trade. 595 By contributing to these established networks in 
Liverpool, not only did "outsiders" bring beneficial human capital, but also access 
to social capital was created in the commercial relationships that were developed. 
Clubs and societies additionally fostered a cosmopolitan spirit and provided 
access to social capital. Williamson's Liverpool Advertiser in 1793 publicised the 
Cymrydorion Society, in which its aim was to render "onto the Welsh residents of 
Liverpool those Christian advantages their situation in society necessarily 
require"; society trustees included prominent slave merchant and native 
Liverpudlian Clayton Tarleton while William Gregson was a treasurer. 596 The 
Cymrydorion Society is reflective not only of the "urban renaissance" ideal of 
clubs and associations fostering improvement and civic reputation, but suggests 
592 Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey, p. 16. 
593 Quoted in Arline Wilson, William Roscoe: Commerce and Culture (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 2008), p. 12. 
594 Melinda Elder, "The Liverpool Slave Trade, Lancaster and its Environs", in Richardson, Schwarz 
and Tibbles, Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery, pp. 118-138. 595 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
596 Williamsons Liverpool Advertiser, 3 Jan 1793. 
193 
the absorption of outsiders into the Liverpool community and the consequent 
increased access to social capital available to its mercantile community. 
Highlighting this notion further, the 1805 Directory praised the "liberal spirit of its 
Body Corporate, in holding out terms of invitation to commercial men to settle 
here instead of devising means to prevent them". 597 
However, while the Directory may have purported that the Liverpool 
Corporation valued or boasted about the migrant contribution to the port's 
commercial prosperity, contemporary opinion suggested Bristol's Corporation was 
not as amenable, despite a considerable number of merchants coming from 
outside the area. While it was claimed that the Society of Merchant Venturers 
"always act in conjunction with the corporation for promoting the commerce, 
trade and improvement of the city", Defoe criticised Bristol's "Corporation 
tyranny" for denying economic advancement to non-Bristolians. 598 Defoe also 
linked the "tyranny" of the Corporation to the stagnation in Bristol's population, 
as "were it not for this, the city of Bristol, would before now, have swell'd and 
encrease'd in buildings and inhabitants, perhaps to double the magnitude it was 
formerly of". 599 More specifically, arguments have been made that Jews were 
more unwelcome in Bristol than Liverpool, evidenced by the Society's petition to 
Parliament in 1753 for the repeal of the Act of Naturalisation of the Jews. 600 
Likewise, five years previously, the Society also opposed the Bill for the 
Naturalisation of Foreign Protestants. This further reinforces claims that Bristol's 
merchant community had an exclusive focus, and is one such negative effect of 
bonding, or negative social capital 
. 
601 Both Bristol and Liverpool merchants' 
relationship with their corporation, specifically as it relates to commerce is further 
597 John Gore (ed. ), Liverpool Trade Directory for 1805 (Liverpool: Printed by J. Gore, 1805). 598 Matthews, New History; Little, City and County, p. 154. 599 Defoe, Tour through the Whole Island, p. 37. 
600 David Cesarani, "The Jews of Bristol and Liverpool, 1750-1850: Port Jewish Communities in the 
Shadow of Slavery", in David Cesarani and Gemma Romaine (eds. ), Jews and Port Cities, 1590-1900: Commerce, Community and Cosmopolitanism (Edgware: Mitchell Vallentine and Company, 2005), pp. 141-156. 
601 Walter Minchinton (ed. ), Politics and the Port of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century: The Petitions of 
the Society of Merchant Venturers, 1698-1803 (Bristol: Bristol Record Society, 1963), p. 78. 
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developed in Chapter Six. It is important to note here, however, that as 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, the Liverpool merchant community was much 
larger than Bristol's, and thus arguably more diverse, granting access to more 
and varied types of capital to Liverpool merchants. 
Part Two: Bristol and Liverpool Slave Merchants in their 
Urban Environment 
Valuable insights into the considerable population growth and the 
corresponding link between commerce and urban development in Bristol and 
Liverpool are provided by trade directories, maps, merchant memorandum books 
and town guides. Penelope Corfield argues that trade directories in particular 
developed in order to make sense of such growth; for commercial communities, 
such as Bristol and Liverpool, directories further served as "business 
handbooks". 602 Sketchley's Bristol Directory in 1775 provided a separate list of 
101 principal merchants and bankers, while Gore's Liverpool Directory of 1766 
offered "An Alphabetical List of the Merchants, Tradesman and Principal 
Inhabitants". 603 Trade directories not only demonstrated both the growth in 
population as well as of the town itself, but also indicated its status and that of its 
residents. Consequently, there were social implications for inclusion in a town 
directory. While roughly twelve per cent of those listed in Sketchley's Directory 
were of the gentry and professional classes, Gore's Directory identified just over 
three per cent as Gentlemen and Esquires. As Corfield has asserted, it cannot be 
assumed that all "local bigwigs" were correctly identified, especially during a time 
when ideas of what constituted or defined a "gentleman" were in flux and social 
status was a more flexible concept, 604 However, in spite of the relatively low 
percentage of high-status residents, the fact that Liverpool had a directory before 
602 Quoted in Penelope Corfield, "'Giving Directions to the Town': The Early Town Directories", 
Urban History Yearbook (1984), pp. 22-34, p. 24. 603 Sketchley's 1775 Bristol Directory with and introduction by Bryan Little (Kingsmead reprints, 1975); John Gore (ed. ), Liverpool Trade Directory for 1766 (Liverpool: Printed by W. Nevett & Co. for J. Gore, 1766). 
604 Corfield, "'Giving Directions"', p. 26. 
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Bristol is indicative of its rapid growth both in population and in commercial 
importance. Langton even goes as far to attribute its early appearance to 
"demographic narcissism". 605 Clearly, Liverpool was proud of its increasing 
position as one of Britain's most prosperous ports. 
Growth in the commercial profile of cities is traced through various 
directory editions, which is far more perceptible in Liverpool. In fact, Bristol 
directories show an actual decrease in entries. Sketchley's Directory in 1775 had 
around 4,200 entries including the list of 101 separate merchants and bankers. 
Bristol's Directory in 1794, however, listed around 3,440 entries with 169 
recorded as merchants. The fact that there was only an increase of sixty-eight 
listed merchants supports the claim that the merchant community failed to grow 
and even dwindled over the course of the eighteenth century. Patrick McGrath 
argues that the Bristol merchant community did not have any more than 200 
merchants (or those categorised as such in directories) at any one time and that 
membership in the Society of Merchant Venturers actually decreased throughout 
the period as did attendance at Society meetings. 606 Significantly, the decline in 
membership began in the 1740s and 1750s, coinciding with the aforementioned 
demographic changes and Bristol's declining activity in the slave trade. 607 
However, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, the Bristol slave merchant 
community and the connections among them increased towards the end of the 
period. In fact, the connections among the merchants were the highest in the last 
decade of the century. It is argued further below that this increase in 
connections is due to an increase in access to social capital. The argument is 
additionally supported in the next chapter when it is argued that the increase in 
the connections among slave merchants also corresponds with Bristol merchants 
lobbying the Corporation to respond to the decline in commercial activity, pushing 
605 Langton and Laxton, "Parish Registers", p. 75. 
606 McGrath, Merchant venturers, p. 93. 
607 Ibid., p. 102. 
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for further port improvements and defending the slave trade against the proposed 
abolition. 
In contrast to the fluctuations in Bristol's growth, the growth in the 
Liverpool community demonstrated by the directories is consistent and profound. 
The 1766 edition of Gore's Liverpool Directory listed 1,134 names, 188 of which 
were merchants. Compiled nine years earlier than Sketchley's, Bristol had around 
four times the entries, yet Liverpool's merchant community was listed as larger. 
By 1805, the directory listed over 10,000 entries with over 1,000 merchants. To 
offer a perspective closer in time with Bristol's 1794 Directory, the 1790 Liverpool 
Directory included 7,000 names in which 619 were merchants; thus, it is evident 
that, in contrast to Bristol, both Liverpool's population and merchant class 
expanded considerably and consistently throughout the period, at least as they 
were entered into the directories. 608 The Introduction noted that by mid-century, 
the term "merchant" denoted a person who engaged in overseas trade. As such, 
the term was accompanied by a higher ascribed status. Haggerty has therefore 
concluded that the increase in those listed as "merchant" in Liverpool directories 
could be attributed to the perceived status that came with having this label. 609 
Thus, it is important to keep in mind the reasoning behind trade directory listings 
had much to do with a person's perception of their status and how they wanted to 
be labelled and thought of in the community. These expanding numbers, 
however, also indicate diversification within the merchant community and the 
access to both human and social capital available to merchants. Important for the 
slave trade is thus Williams' observation noted in Chapter Two that "almost every 
order of people is interested in a Guinea cargo" and that it is "well known that 
many of the small vessels that import about a hundred slaves are fitted out by 
attornies, drapers, ropers, grocers, tallow-chandlers, barbers, tailors, etc". 61o 
608 Wilson, William Roscoe, p. 12. 
609 Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community, p. 75. 610 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 229. 
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A growth in population was accompanied by a corresponding Increase in 
the number of streets, squares and alleyways entered in the directories and as 
shown in the maps and town plans of the period. The production of maps and 
prospects increased during the period, symbolising a growing public interest in 
townscapes and further demonstrating "urban renaissance" aesthetic ideals. 611 
Studies of Bristol and Liverpool have typically used maps to underscore growth. 
Dresser compares maps and prospects to show Bristol's transformation from a 
cross-shaped medieval town into a large, pre-industrial city, with smoking 
glasshouses dotting the horizon. 612 Likewise, in their study of Liverpool, Ascott et 
al. use maps to show its growth from a quiet village consisting of eleven medieval 
streets to a bustling port with numerous docks crowding the harbour later in the 
eighteenth century. The Bristol maps used in this chapter also reference public 
buildings, chapels and meeting houses, as well as schools, charities and 
almshouses that are reflective of the notions of civic values. Civic values were 
propagated to improve the reputation of the town, which was particularly 
important in commercial centres where it was thought commerce took precedence 
over other concerns. Despite some observations that Bristolians were arrogant 
and pompous, Jonathan Barry has argued that in Bristol, civic values and 
activities were seen as crucial elements to social and individual welfare; as a 
trading city, charity was very important, because it could demonstrate that 
wealth was honourably spent. 613 The most prestigious monetary donations were 
those which went towards education and employment, or those that trained "the 
poor into the ways of virtue and industry". 614 Many charities, including Colston's 
Hospital, Queen Elizabeth's Hospital and the Merchant's Hospital were under the 
direction of the Society of Merchant Venturers and many council members served 
611 Borsay, English Urban Renaissance, p. 85. 
612 Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 102. 
613 Barry, "Bristol Pride", p. 33. 
614 Ibid., p. 34. 
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as trustees, reinforcing the notion of status in being involved in such pursuits. 615 
So, just as the later directories praised its merchants for their "liberal and 
extensive benevolence" who "are generous" and "live well", Bristol cartographers 
may have also been trying to indicate this by including such buildings on the 
map. 616 This in turn, could have also contributed to its reputation as a "City of 
Churches and Charities" and may have been an especially important exercise 
when Bristol's negative comparisons to Bath are considered as well. 617 
While the Liverpool maps also label buildings characteristic of "urban 
renaissance" ideals, besides the Exchange, these buildings are not as obviously 
differentiated. This is not to argue that Liverpool was not as civically minded; 
indeed, arguments have been made to support Liverpool's cultural importance. 
Moss's Liverpool Guide of 1797 certainly highlighted charities, public concerts and 
the theatre in its description of the port, while newspapers listed many merchants 
as leading contributors and trustees of charities and charitable institutions. Moss 
also noted that to work for a charity and to sit on its board was a sign of status 
and success. In contrast with many of the Bristol charities, Liverpool charities 
were largely established by private initiative, such as the Blue Coat School set up 
by Bryan Blundell in 1708 and the Blind Asylum for which Matthew Gregson is 
largely credited for rousing public interest and funds. 618 So, while not necessarily 
referenced on maps, the information was communicated through other means. 
Cartographers may have chosen to highlight the Exchange and the docks instead 
of other civic pursuits to show pride in the port's commercial success, which is 
perhaps also reflective of this notion of "demographic narcissism". 
It is important to note that both Bristol and Liverpool slave trade 
merchants engaged in these activities which demonstrated their benevolence and 
615 An Account of the Hospitals, Alms-houses and Public Schools in Bristol (Bristol: printed by H. Farley for T. Mills, 1775). Available at Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale, University of Nottingham, accessed 1/1/10. 
616 Matthews, New History, p. 37. 
617 James, "Bristol Society", p. 293. 
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charity; they did not necessarily see these activities at odds with their 
involvement in the slave trade. Arguments, however, have been made that some 
slave trade merchants tried to distance themselves from their involvement 
towards the end of the period before abolition. Dresser notes that merchants 
such as Henry Bright increasingly preferred to identify their trading interests as 
American and West Indian rather than African. For Bright, however, this could be 
just as much due to the fact that his interest in the sugar trade outlasted that in 
the slave trade than it was to any ideological misgivings. 619 Interestingly, John 
Powell is the only person listed as a "Guinea merchant" in the Bristol 1775 
Directory. Therefore, it stands to argue that he, by participating in fifty-one 
voyages between 1755 and 1790, was one of the port's relative specialists in the 
trade and chose to be identified as such. 620 This conforms to the notion Haggerty 
observed that merchants increasingly moved towards listing themselves with a 
particular commodity towards the end of the period, indicating a greater degree 
of specialisation. 621 Additionally, "Dicky Sam's" account of Liverpool speaks 
disparagingly about the slave trade but he tried to contextualise Liverpool's 
involvement in it by claiming slavery was supported by the Bible. 622 His account 
is dedicated to leading Liverpool abolitionists including William Roscoe, who, 
along with William Rathbone, James Currie, Reverend William Shepherd, Edward 
Rushton and John Yates were radical non-conformists who often championed 
opposing Ideological, religious and political positions to those of the Liverpool 
Corporation. 623 Roscoe, a prominent banker and businessman, was also a 
botanist, artist, historian and poet and is credited for promoting the cultural life of 
Liverpool in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 624 As discussed in 
the next chapter, however, Roscoe's position, and that of his circle of allies, 
619 Dresser, "Squares of Distinction", p. 24. 
620 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
621 Haggerty, British-Atlantic Trading Community, p. 76. 622 
"Dicky Sam", Liverpool and Slavery, pp. 13-14. 
623 Stobart, "Culture versus Commerce", p. 479. 
624 Arline Wilson, "The Cultural Identity of Liverpool, 1790-1850: The Early Learned Societies", 
Transactions of the Historic Society Lancashire and Cheshire, 147 (1998), pp. 55-80. 
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against the slave trade was not taken up by the Liverpool merchant community at 
large during the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade. Thus, while Roscoe 
was important in the cultural life of Liverpool, his political opinions regarding the 
slave trade were not as influential in the port. 
Charitable organisations, theatres, libraries and coffeehouses that were 
increasingly featured in directories and maps throughout the period demonstrate 
the importance of these new social spaces of the "urban renaissance". These 
spaces became increasingly important for merchants to frequent in the 
construction of their civic reputation, and in turn provided access to social capital. 
Coffeehouses in particular underscore the link between commerce and culture. 
As argued by Brian Cowan, they represent the "primary site for newer, more 
public, more commercialised and urbanised modes of virtuoso sociability". 625 
While there were not as many in the provincial cities as there were in London, the 
coffeehouses that arose in the ports became key meeting places where merchants 
and gentlemen accessed social capital, by meeting and discussing the affairs of 
the day as well as exchanging information and gaining access to capital and 
credit. As a source of display, information and exchange, coffeehouses also 
catered to notions of improvement and were not just practical business spaces. 
Cowan argues that a particular "', coffeehouse culture" arose by the 1720s, 
precisely the time Borsay argues that new building projects were developed in 
Bristol and Liverpool. 626 Coffeehouses may have constituted new urban spaces 
which catered to the growing urban and commercial sensibility, but they were 
based on "similar templates" of inns and alehouses already established. 627 Bristol 
in particular had over 850 inns and alehouses in the short period between 1752- 
1764, or about one for every fifty inhabitants. 628 Large concentrations were 
found In certain streets close to the harbour, such as the Quay and Back, and 
625 Cowan, Social Life of Coffee, p. 112. 626 Ibid., p. 4. 
627 Ibid., p. 79. 
628 Patrick McGrath and Mary E. Williams (eds. ), Bristol Inns and Alehouses in Mid-Eighteenth Century (Bristol, 1979), p. vi. 
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were good locations for merchants and sailors to meet and exchange 
information. 629 Names of some of these public houses such as the Blackboy and 
Blackmoors indicate the influence of the African trade and justify the argument 
that coffeehouses developed which catered for certain trades. 630 In this way, 
business also became socialised 
. 
631 Dresser argues that Bristol slave merchants 
tended to meet more in coffeehouses rather than the Exchange to conduct 
business, while Liverpool social clubs which had a large mercantile membership 
such as the Ugly Face Club similarly held their meetings in coffeehouses. 632 For 
instance, the Ugly Face Club met at Exchange Coffee House while the Unanimous 
Society met at the Cross Keys. Liverpool newspapers also frequently featured 
advertisements by coffeehouse owners for "Gentlemen, Tradesmen and others" to 
patronise, while auctions and applications to ships' cargoes were advertised to 
take place at the Merchant's Coffeehouse and the Exchange during the "usual 
business hours". 633 Thus, at the heart of the Bristol and Liverpool mercantile 
sector and serving the function of information flow, coffeehouses were ideal 
locations to access social capital, and build and maintain important commercial 
networks. 
Part Three: The Bristol and Liverpool Slave Merchant 
Communities Mapped 
A comparative analysis of the Bristol slave merchant community in its 
particular urban context in 1775 and 1794 and that of Liverpool in 1766 and 1805 
further demonstrates the link between commerce, urban development and access 
to social capital. The merchants' homes and businesses were mapped by cross 
referencing the trade directories with the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database. 
Likewise, the database was cross-referenced with social and political club 
629 Ibid., p. Vii. 630 Ibid., p. xi. 
631 Cowan, Social Life of Coffee, p. 169. 
632 Madge Dresser, Slave Trade Trail Around Bristol (Bristol: Bristol Museums and Art Gallery, 1998); Edward Howell, Ye Ugly Face Clubb: Leverpoole, 1743-1753 (Liverpool, 1912), p. 30. 633 Liverpool Williamsons'Advertiser, 1756. 
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membership lists to ascertain which slave trade investors were members. By 
noting the physical proximity of the merchants' homes as well as their socio- 
political associations, comments can be made on the particular impact of this 
access to social capital on both ports' success in the trade. 
Figure 5.1 analyses the residential and social space of Bristol based on 
Sketchley's Directory of 1775. Sketchely's Bristol Directory in 1775 had around 
4,200 entries and included a list of 101 separate merchants. Of these entries, 
seventy-three invested in the slave trade. 634 Thus, in contrast with the point 
made above in regards to Liverpool merchants, a smaller number than those 
listed as merchants in Bristol invested in the trade. 635 These seventy-three 
investors lived among forty-two different streets, and only five separate offices 
were listed. The fact that there were only five separate offices listed at this time 
is somewhat surprising. This is because in the first part of the eighteenth 
century, "houses were for trade first and dwelling afterwards" and the notion of 
merchants moving away from the commercial centres into the countryside for 
instance, and keeping separate offices in the centre developed later in the 
century. 636 This separation from narrow cobbled streets, from the "numerous 
street stalls and markets for food and animals, the slaughter-houses and the 
awful by-products of such places as tanneries and dye-works" was thus another 
product of the "urban renaissance". 637 While the "urban renaissance" ideal of 
separate residences and offices is not confirmed, Figure 5.1 indicates that 
concentrations of investors lived in the fashionable Queen Square and on Orchard 
Street. Seven investors resided in each of these locations, making up about 
twenty per cent of the slave investors at this time. Queen Square residents 
included John Anderson and Henry Bright, while it was also home to a West 
634 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
635 It is important, however, to refer back to Corfield's argument for inclusion in the directories. In 
cross-referencing the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database with the directories for both Bristol and Liverpool, many participants in the trade were not listed in the directory. 636 James, "Bristol Society", p. 232. 637 Ibid. 
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Indian merchant as well as a tobacco firm; thus it was a popular spot for those 
involved in the "Americanisation" of Bristol's trade. 638 Throughout the period, 
other prominent slave merchants also inhabited the Square, including case study 
merchants Isaac Hobhouse and James Laroche, as well as Thomas Freke, John 
Becher and John Day, indicating that it was indeed a high status place to live. 639 
Its proximity to the docks, as well the Customs House (centrally located in the 
northern part of the Square), Merchants Hall (on King Street parallel to the 
Square) and the Back and Quay where numerous alehouses and coffeehouses 
were located further demonstrate that Queen Square was situated as such to 
facilitate multiple interactions that would foster network connections and increase 
access to social capital. 640 Orchard Street, home to James Rogers, was 
constructed around 1716 and is argued to be architecturally "a perfect example of 
the period". 641 Its location slightly to the west of Queen Square also signifies that 
its residents would have had the same access to key points of interaction as the 
residents of the Square. Other popular places for slave investors to live included 
High Street, Stokes Croft and Cumberland Street, the latter two of which were 
much further north than the popular Queen Square and Orchard Street. 
638 Sketchleys Bristol Directory; Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 106. Construction of Queen Square, 
located in an area formally known as the Marsh, began in 1702 after a proposal was brought to the Common Council in 1699 for such an enterprise. Named in commemoration of Queen Anne, it was finished in 1727. Ison, Georgian Buildings, pp. 140,144. 639 Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 110. 
640 Ison, Georgian Buildings, pp. 146-148. 
641 James, "Bristol Society", p. 236. 
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This notion of merchant residential space, however, becomes more 
meaningful in a comparative context over time. The map from Bristol in 1794 
demonstrates growth, particularly towards the north and west of the city as well 
as in the increase of streets, alleys and squares in the city proper. As McGrath 
notes, the westward expansion towards Clifton and Hotwells would have been 
looked upon favourably by the Society of Merchant Venturers due to the potential 
for land development. 643 Indeed, a Bristol newspaper in 1790 boasted that "the 
increase of buildings on the western side of Bristol and at the Hotwells and Clifton 
is so great that there is reason to expect a junction of these in a few years"; if 
this were to be the case, Bristol would become "one of the largest, as it will 
confessdly be one of the pleasantest cities in Europe". 644 
643 McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 91. 
644 Bristol Mercury and Universal Advertiser, 1 Mar 1790. 
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While Bristol experienced growth and development, the trade directory 
indicated the growth in its merchant community did not follow suit; in fact, it 
stagnated. The 1794 Directory had around 3,440 entries with 169 listed 
merchants. Of those listed, just forty-six invested in the slave trade. 646 It is 
important to keep in mind that this period coincides with the time when Bristol 
slave merchant networks were larger and more investors participated in more 
voyages than in any period previously. Thus, while there were twenty-seven less 
listed investors than in 1775, they worked in conjunction with one another more 
frequently. Arguments for this are made later in the chapter when the impact of 
social capital is discussed. These forty-six investors lived among twenty-seven 
streets, a smaller number than in the previous period. Again, five offices were 
listed while only two investors listed a separate home and office address. As in 
1775, a popular place to reside was Queen Square, with four investors living 
there. However, College Green, just west of the Square was the most popular 
residence with five investors. Prince's Street, Great George Street, and Park 
Street, were three other popular areas of residence, and as the map indicates, 
were all in close proximity to one another. Merchant Venturers Hall was located 
on Prince's Street, which "ensured the street's commercial tone" and most of the 
warehouses, residential homes and public buildings were directly or indirectly 
related to the slave trade. 647 
Unlike 1775, then, most of the investors lived close together, granting 
them more potential for interaction and access to social capital. The implications 
of this access are discussed further when compared to Liverpool. Because the 
time period between 1775 and 1794 only spans nineteen years, it is of no 
surprise that some of the investors in the earlier directory would also be found in 
the later edition. In fact, of the forty-six investors in this period, fifteen had also 
been included in the 1775 Directory. However, of this fifteen, ten investors moved 
646 Eltis, et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
647 Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 103. 
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residence. Often, this move was from one place of status and prime location to 
another. For instance, James McTaggart moved from orchard Street to College 
Green, while James Harvey moved from Cumberland Street to Park Street. 
Moving within high status and advantageously-located areas of the city, as 
opposed to moving out of the city entirely, would allow these merchants to stay 
"in the loop" as well as build new contacts. 
The patterns in Liverpool were markedly different. "Dicky Sam" described 
John Eyes' Plan of Liverpool, and thus Liverpool at this time, as consisting of 
"thirty-six principal streets, which, for the most part were very narrow, crooked 
and badly paved". 648 He commented that the houses "were small, the ceilings 
low, the rooms ill-arranged" and like Bristol, "the merchant's office and house 
were on the same premises". 649 Likewise, in his description of the principal 
streets in Liverpool between 1775 and 1799, Brooke noted "the streets, squares 
and places at present almost entirely occupied by shops, warehouses, 
manufactories, counting-houses or taverns, in the heart of the town, and in some 
instances, in what would now be considered most disagreeable situations for 
residences". 65° The impression is given, that, as in Bristol, although "urban 
renaissance" notions encouraged improvement and moving away from the city- 
centre, up-scale and fashionable residential areas in Bristol and Liverpool were 
still dominated by commercial concerns. Gore's Liverpool Directory of 1766 had 
1,134 entries and 188 people were listed as "Merchants"; however, the number of 
investors in slave trade voyages was actually 234, indicative of the diversity of 
investors in Liverpool's slave trade 
. 
651 As the Liverpool slave merchant community 
was much larger than that of Bristol, it is not surprising that the number of 
investors is larger. However, that the number of investors is greater than the 
number of listed merchants lends itself to an important comparison with Bristol. 
648 
"Dicky Sam", Liverpool and Slavery, p. 2. 649 Ibid., p. 3. 
650 Brooke, Liverpool as it was, p. 464. 651 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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The types of investors were more diverse and included gentlemen, ships' captains 
and coffeehouse owners. Cowan refers to the "social cachet" of a coffeehouse 
keeper because ties could be created with men of wealth and power who 
patronised his establishment. For slave merchants, the owners of coffeehouses 
they patronised constituted a source of social capital, as merchants often 
conducted business, as well as met socially, in coffeehouses. 652 Having a greater 
diversity in the types of investors in Liverpool slaving ventures, such as a 
coffeehouse owner or ships' captain, typifies the assertion noted in Chapters Two 
and Four that Liverpool traders were "'Universal Merchants". 
652 Cowan, Social Life of Coffee, p. 164. 
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While "Dicky Sam" commented that the principal streets numbered thirty- 
six, the 234 investors resided among sixty-five streets. The greatest 
concentrations were found on Paradise and Hanover Street, both centrally 
located, as well as Castle and Water Streets, located near the Exchange. 
Hanover Street had the most number of investors living there, with sixteen, and 
included merchants such as Arthur and Benjamin Heywood. Hanover and 
Paradise Streets, as well as Redcross Street and Pool Lane (together with fifteen 
investors residing there) were also near the Old Dock, which specifically dealt 
with ships engaged in the African trade. 654 Merchant's Coffeehouse, located on 
Water Street, was a popular meeting spot and, thus, like Bristol, the highest 
concentrations of investor residences were in logical places to facilitate both 
business and social interaction and thus access to social capital. These streets 
also had a number of other prominent merchants and bankers residing on them. 
Brooke noted Castle and Water streets were home to James Gildart, Virginia 
merchant and mayor in 1750, John Parr, Jonathan Blackburne, Jonathan Blundell 
and Thomas Parke; Hanover and Paradise streets also housed Nicholas Ashton, a 
major salt exporter to America, Joseph Brooks, and the bankers Charles Caldwell 
and Thomas Smythe among others. 655 Prominent slave traders lived in close 
proximity to merchants engaged in other trades and would have had opportunity 
to network and exchange information with those with wide commercial 
knowledge. It is also the case that other prominent merchants were members of 
the social and political clubs, further granting opportunities to network. Their 
access to social capital granted through residence and club participation is 
discussed further below. 
654 Parkinson, Rise of the Port, p. 102. 
655 Brooke, Liverpool as it was, pp. 464,465,472,473. 
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Like Bristol in 1794, the most striking feature of the Liverpool map in 1795 
is the marked growth in urban development, as the periphery has been extended 
to include substantially more roads and buildings. Growth, however, as it is 
discussed in the directories is still described in commercial terms and does not 
necessarily reference the push towards the suburbs. Indeed, the 1794 Directory 
remarked that "this town has so much increased in trade since the 
commencement of the present century". 657 However, the 1807 Directory 
revealed that "the commerce of Liverpool has grown too large for some of the 
Public Buildings 
... 
and although the tobacco warehouse is of a size truly 
astonishing, it is yet found at times too small". 658 As will be seen in the next 
chapter, the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, whose first recorded meeting was 
in 1784, often pushed for more space for both docks and warehouses, indicating 
the growth in trade necessitated more and improved facilities. 659 
The 1805 Directory had over 10,000 entries, of which 1,005 were 
"Merchants". Of this number, 331 were investors in the slave trade. 660 This 
again conforms to the rapid and substantial growth in population as well as the 
size of the slave merchant community as established in Chapter Three. Unlike 
what was found in the pattern of residence for the Bristol merchants, this pattern 
later in the period is noticeably different than that observed earlier. Locations of 
the investor residences were far more spread out, as there were just over 150 
different streets that these 331 slave investors lived on; in fact, many streets are 
not shown on the map and in some instances only one investor lived on a 
particular street. This is in marked contrast with the Bristol investors in 1794 that 
were located among just twenty-seven streets. Also contrary to the Liverpool 
patterns observed in 1766, larger concentrations of investor residences were 
found in the north eastern section of the city, outside of the city centre and away 
657 John Gore (ed. ), Liverpool Trade Directory for 1794 (Liverpool, 1794). 
658 Gore, Liverpool Trade Directory for 1805. 
659 Records of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, MMM. 
660 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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from the Exchange. Some merchant residences were located off this map as well, 
with three living in West Derby and eleven in Everton, conforming to the "urban 
renaissance" ideal of moving to estates in the "country". A useful comparison can 
also be made with Bristol in terms of having separate addresses, one for their 
residence and one for their counting house. By percentage, almost seven per 
cent of Bristol investors in 1775 had separate addresses; while numerically, the 
number of separate addresses was larger (thirteen) in Liverpool in 1766, it only 
accounted for five per cent. However, in 1794, ten per cent of Bristol investors 
listed separate addresses, but this figure jumped to twenty-five per cent for 
Liverpool investors in 1805. Thus, while more Bristol investors conformed to the 
"urban renaissance" notion of separate home and work addresses earlier in the 
period, Liverpool investors did so in much greater proportions later on. 
Additionally, a significant spatial difference between the location of residence and 
business was found in Liverpool. As already demonstrated, merchant residences 
in 1805 were largely concentrated in the north east and outside the city centre 
itself. In contrast, the merchant counting houses were more centrally located as 
well as around the docks, which resemble the pattern of residences in 1766. Like 
popular Bristol residences locations, this was also a logical pattern as the location 
of a counting house was integral for business-if it were near the Exchange or 
popular coffeehouses, a merchant would be in a better position to access social 
capital and obtain clients, through daily interaction, thus building and maintaining 
his network. 
Although the maps only showed the locations of investors' residences, this 
coupled with the location of their businesses were important avenues for 
accessing social capital, of which a few considerations can be made here. As 
discussed in the Introduction, social capital is built through a redundancy of 
contact, meaning multiple interactions, or "multistrandedness". 661 A well- 
connected individual in a well-connected society is more likely to derive the 
661 See Introduction, p. 34. 
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benefits social networks can provide. Because connectivity is crucial in both 
creating this contact and solidifying networks, access to social capital is greater in 
smaller settings and is in effect hampered by urban sprawl. 662 A loss of 
connectivity due to urban sprawl is reinforced by Bristol merchant John Sergeant 
declining the offer to stand as a representative for the African Company of Bristol, 
stating that "my residence in the country rendering it impossible for me to 
discharge the duties of that office". 663 By moving away from the city proper, 
Sergeant would not be in a position to physically fulfil the role as representative, 
nor would he be in a position to maintain important commercial and social 
relationships that occur in closer proximity. Smaller settings allow for the 
creation of relationships, as they provide "easier footholds for initial steps". 664 
Yet they also provide the opportunity to build and rebuild social capital over time, 
as it is an accumulative process. 665 
As demonstrated, popular residential areas for Bristol investors throughout 
the period remained centrally located, such as Queen Square. In contrast, many 
Liverpool investors moved away from the city centre or out of the city entirely. 
Located within a smaller radius, Bristol investors were thus in a better position 
later in the period to maintain this needed redundancy of contact and were not as 
affected by urban sprawl as the Liverpool investors. Because Bristol slave 
merchants had greater connectivity through their physical proximity, it could be 
argued that they built, or rather, re-built their access to social capital later in the 
period, as also evidenced by their greater connectivity in slave venture 
investment groups by the 1790s. This better accessing of social capital was of 
paramount interest because the demographic changes noted above indicate that 
Bristol investors in effect lost a significant amount of social capital when 
662 Putnam, Bowling Alone, pp. 275,272. 
663 John Sergeant to Master of Merchants Hall and Members of the African Committee of the City of 
Bristol, 17 Jun 1778, SMV 7/2/1/14, BRO. 
664 Putnam et al., Better Together, p. 275. 
66$ Ibid., p. 286. 
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recruitment into slaving ventures through apprenticeship ties declined and in the 
absence of established family dynasties. 
Access to social capital, however, was most certainly not limited to an 
investor's address. Participation in civic and social organisations would have 
greatly contributed to the multistrandedness and redundancy in contact needed 
to build and maintain network relationships. It is argued that network 
relationships are most obviously formalised through membership in associations 
and clubs; likewise, these associations can be seen as foci around which 
individuals organise their social lives and create their social context. 666 People can 
arguably have multiple foci and thus numerous opportunities to network. For 
merchant investors at this time, their social network and the activities they 
participated in would not only have benefitted their business practice, but 
contributed towards their status as well. 667 
As mentioned above, both Bristol and Liverpool merchants were members 
of many charitable organisations and institutions as part of an "urban 
renaissance" civic ideal. Membership in social and political clubs as well as in 
cultural institutions also helped foster a civic reputation and would have worked 
to maintain social networks. It is further argued that social capital accessed 
within this group setting also has an evolutionary nature; clubs can become more 
exclusionary over time, affecting access to social capital as it changes from 
bridging to bonding. 668 Indeed, a rule of the Steadfast Society in Bristol stated 
that "no stranger be admitted" while the Ugly Face Club in Liverpool did not allow 
apprentices, indicative of an exclusionary policy but also with implications of 
limited access to social capital for the merchant community at large. 669 Thus, 
when analysing the impact of social capital on the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
666 Mark Casson, "An Economic Approach to Regional Business Networks", in Wilson and Popp, 
Industrial Clusters, pp. 19-44; Feld, "Focused Organization", p. 1016. 667 Lin, Social Capital, p. 32. 
668 Casson, "Economic Approach", p. 28. 
669 Steadfast Society Book of Rules, Orders and Proceedings, 1737-1802, BRO; 367 ULG Ugly Face 
Club, LivPRO. 
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merchants, Casson's caution is important to keep in mind. That is, the type of 
networking that occurs is more important than whether it occurs at all. Social 
capital can indeed be negative, and bonding and bridging capital can serve both 
positive and negative purposes. 6'0 
Social capital was accessed within this urban setting, as political office and 
membership in social clubs or cultural societies represented opportunities for 
merchants to meet, enter into business partnerships, and share commercial 
knowledge. Bristol's elite Society of Merchant Venturers had 367 merchants 
admitted between 1701 and 1799 and provided a powerful commercial lobby to 
local MPs on political and economic issues. 671 Membership in the Society of 
Merchant Venturers was attained either by apprenticeship, by birth or by fine. Of 
the 367 new members between 1700 and 1801,210 obtained membership 
through apprenticeship, while seventy-five and eighty-two achieved it through 
birth and by fine respectively. 672 Minchinton notes that entry by fine in particular 
helped the Society of Merchant Venturers bring "new blood" into the merchant 
community without hampering the close-knit structure of its merchant members. 
This is in contrast with Defoe's observation noted above that Bristol's Corporation 
denied the inclusion of "outsiders". In the Society, however, many Huguenots 
and their descendents entered the Society, including James Laroche, while 
members also included fathers, sons, brothers and those connected by 
marriage. 673 For instance, thirteen members of the Elton family were members of 
the Society while seven of them were masters of it in the first three quarters of 
the century. 674 
All six Bristol case study merchants were members of the Society of 
Merchant Venturers. Michael Becher was the only member admitted by way of 
670 Casson, "Economic Approach", p. 23. 
671 McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 102. 
672 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. xii. 
673 Ibid. 
674 Ibid. Jacob Elton participated in three slaving ventures in 1711,1713 and 1715. Abraham Elton Jr 
also participated in three voyages, two in 1713 and one in 1717 while Isaac Elton participated in a 
voyage in 1718 and 1720. 
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apprenticeship in 1736, while Isaac Hobhouse, Henry Bright, James Laroche, John 
Fowler and James Rogers each paid a fine. The amount of the fines differed 
according to changes in policy throughout the century. Bright and Hobhouse each 
paid £50 when they became members in 1717 and 1724 respectively, while 
Laroche paid £100 in 1727, Fowler paid £150 in 1765 and Rogers paid £200 in 
1783.675 Likewise, members of Bristol's Corporation throughout the period 
included many from the mercantile class. Richardson's profile of the leading slave 
merchants throughout the eighteenth century noted that thirty-two were 
members of the Society, while sixteen were masters of it at one time. 
Additionally, seventeen were common councillors, sixteen of whom became 
sheriff, while eleven served as mayor. 676 Thus, Richardson concludes Bristol 
society was relatively closed and elitist, which is more in line with contemporary 
observations. 
For Liverpool, it is also well known that its Corporation was heavily 
represented by a merchant oligarchy which served to protect and promote 
commercial interests in the city, particularly in regards to the construction of dock 
works. Clemens even argues that the merchant oligarchy in Liverpool was more 
tightly knit than in Bristol. 67 As early as 1708, twenty-six of the forty-one 
council members were engaged in overseas trade, who likewise shared 
information, expertise and capital investments through similar business and social 
networks, as many had the same trading interests and residential patterns. 678 In 
the last two decades of the eighteenth century, fifty-seven of seventy-three 
council members were merchants. 679 It likewise follows, that as in the Bristol 
Corporation and Society of Merchant Venturers, councillors were also linked by 
friendship and family ties. The Norris, Johnson and Tarleton families were just a 
675 Ibid., pp. 209-216. 
676 Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 21. 
677 Clemens, "Rise of Liverpool", p. 217. 
679 Power, "Creating a Port", p. 64. 
679 Wilson, William Roscoe, p. 14. 
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few of the examples of the family connections in politics. 680 In terms of the case 
study merchants, only Foster Cunliffe, Thomas Earle and John Tarleton sat on the 
council, however, they held several offices throughout their political career. 681 
Cunliffe served as alderman between 1751-1755, but held the position of mayor 
three times earlier in the century, which was exceptional. Thomas Earle also 
served as alderman, bailiff and mayor while Tarleton held the positions of deputy 
recorder, alderman and mayor. While Liverpool's Corporation was praised in 
directories for having a welcoming ethos in the commercial community at large, 
the Corporation itself typified the bonding capital council members had access to. 
Other status-ascribing bodies included subscription libraries such as the 
Bristol Library Society founded in 1772-1773, and the Library (later named the 
Lyceum) established in Liverpool in 1758 and the Athenaeum in 1797.682 The 
Liverpool Library was the first gentlemen's subscription library in England and was 
later imitated widely in provincial cities. Likewise, the Athenaeum was one of the 
largest gentleman's libraries built at the time. Because the politically radical 
William Roscoe was crucial in its foundation, the Athenaeum is considered to be 
demonstrative of the merchant elite's willingness to eschew religious and political 
animosities in the cause of cultural redefinition". 683 Additionally, political and 
social drinking clubs also contributed to opportunities for both redundancy in 
contact as well as promoting civic reputation. Whilst they certainly had a social 
element, many of the clubs the Bristol merchants participated in were political or 
charitable in nature. For instance, many merchants were members of the popular 
Tory Steadfast Society or Whig Union Club, while societies such as the Colston, 
Dolphin, Anchor and Grateful regularly held dinners in support of charitable 
works. 684 In contrast, the clubs most popular in Liverpool were social drinking 
680 Power, "Creating a Port", p. 65. 
691 Database of Liverpool Town Council members compiled by Sheryllynne Haggerty. 682 Little, City and County, p. 204; Wilson, William Roscoe, p. 72. 683 Wilson, "Cultural Identity", p. 63. 
684 Garrard, Edward Colston, p. 307. 
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clubs, or those that revolved around "the pleasures of the table". 
685 The Ugly 
Face Club, the Unanimous Club and the Mock Corporation of Sefton met monthly 
or fortnightly in coffeehouses to drink and socialise. 
The timing of the establishment of these Liverpool organisations is 
notable. The Ugly Face Club, founded in 1743, and the Unanimous Club and 
Mock Corporation of Sefton, both founded in 1753, were created at the time when 
Bristol's participation in the slave trade was waning. The fact that three Liverpool 
clubs that catered to merchants were established at the time when Liverpool's 
participation in the trade increased, speaks to the importance of these clubs for 
the access to social capital in building and maintaining network relationships. 
Michael Woolcock argues that the absence of, or the weakness in, formal 
institutions often results in the creation of informal organisations. 686 Because the 
Bristol mercantile community was not only represented and supported by the 
Corporation but by the Society of Merchant Venturers as well, the need to create 
informal institutions to foster contacts may not have been as strong. On the other 
hand, although the Liverpool merchants were also largely represented by its 
Corporation and various commercial organisations, no such cohesive commercial 
body as the Society of Merchant Venturers existed throughout the entirety of the 
eighteenth century to further support Liverpool's merchant community. 687 These 
drinking clubs therefore could have developed in larger numbers as a substitute, 
and served as forums to establish and maintain commercial relationships. As 
organisations such as the Chamber of Commerce, and indeed, Liverpool's 
dominance in the slave trade were established later in the period, drinking clubs 
such as the Ugly Face Club and the Mock Corporation may no longer have been 
as essential in accessing social capital. 
bas Wilson, William Roscoe, p. 17. 
686 Woolcock, "The Place of Social Capital", p. 13. 
687 These organisations include the Chamber of Commerce (1774), the American Chamber of 
Commerce (1801) and associations of merchants including those engaged in African and West Indian 
trades. 
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Although these clubs were both political and social in nature, it is 
interesting to note some similarities between them and the earlier Reformation 
societies. Margaret Hunt describes the Reformation societies as concerned with 
morality, and members kept an eye on each other to ensure they behaved 
accordingly. If a member transgressed, a fine had to be paid. For example, if 
anyone was absent from a weekly meeting, a fine of sixpence was issued. 688 
While the rules and fines for the Reformation societies were certainly written and 
imposed in earnest to foster proper behaviour, an examination of the rule books 
for the Steadfast Society in Bristol and the Unanimous and Ugly Face clubs of 
Liverpool also show similar rules and fines. These, however, seem to be written 
in a spirit of jest as the primary purpose of these clubs was indeed social. This is 
particularly evident for the Ugly Face Club, which stipulates certain physical 
features members were to have, such as "a large Mouth, thin laws, Blubber Lips" 
and "little goggyling or squinting Eyes" that "shall be esteemed considerable 
qualifications in a candidate". 689 Furthermore, these descriptions often relayed 
stereotypical similarities with commodities or areas in which they traded. For 
instance, Captain Nicholas Southworth, who participated in seven slaving voyages 
between 1730 and 1758, was described as having "a fine yellow Guinea 
Complexion" with "Large Nostrils, Negro Nos'd". 690 Both Liverpool clubs also 
charged ten shillings and sixpence when a member got married, presumably to 
go towards paying for the alcohol for club suppers. Similar fines were also 
imposed if a member of the Steadfast Society in Bristol used foul or abusive 
language towards another. Another rule of the Steadfast Society stipulated that 
"if any member betrays any secret of the Society or otherwise misbehaves" he 
may be excluded from the society if a majority of members agree 
. 
691 These 
expectations established by rules that specified marital status or proper behaviour 
688 Margaret Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender and the Family in England (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996), p. 106. 689 367 UGL Ugly Face Club, LivPRO. 
690 Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade; 367 UGL Ugly Face Club, LivPRO. 
691 Steadfast Society, Book of Rules, BRO. 
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helped to create collective norms within the group, reflective of the access to the 
exclusionary bonding capital group members shared. 
A more in depth analysis of the associational membership of different 
clubs and organisations in the Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities 
provides insight into the associated access to social capital merchant members 
had. In Bristol, the organisations are the Society of Merchant Venturers, the 
Bristol Freeman Trading to Africa, the Steadfast Society and the Dolphin Society. 
As the representative mercantile body of the Bristol merchant community, the 
Society of Merchant Venturers was chosen to gauge slave investor membership. 
Likewise, the Bristol Freeman Trading to Africa underscores the slaving interest. 
The Steadfast and Dolphin societies were chosen as representative of status- 
ascribing bodies, as the former is linked with politics (Tory) while the latter is 
associated with charity. The organisations chosen for Liverpool are the Committee 
of Company of African Merchants Trading from Liverpool, the Ugly Face Club, 
Mock Corporation of Sefton, the Town Council, and the Athenaeum. The Ugly 
Face Club is not represented in the latter period because it existed only between 
1743-1753, while the Athenaeum was established in 1798 and so is only included 
in the latter period. 692 These organisations are included for similar reasons. The 
Town Council and the Committee of the Company of African Merchants Trading 
from Liverpool highlight the slaving interest in the local government as well as 
Liverpool's commercial community at large. Additionally, the Ugly Face Club, 
Mock Corporation of Sefton and the Athenaeum represent both informal clubs 
which catered to Liverpool's merchants as well as cultural pursuits which also 
brought a degree of status. Likewise, the records of these organisations have 
complete membership lists, which allowed for cross-referencing with the Trans 
Atlantic Slave Trade Database. 
692 The data for these organisations was compiled by Sheryllynne Haggerty. The membership of the 
Athenaeum was found in Laws and Regulations of the Athenaeum in Liverpool (Liverpool, 1799) 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale, University of Nottingham, accessed 1/1/10. 
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In 1775, there were seventy-three investors in the Bristol slave trade. 
Table 5.1 demonstrates the percentage of these seventy-three investors that 
participated in these organisations. Of the seventy-three investors, forty-one, or 
fifty-six per cent, participated in one or more of these organisations. In terms of 
numbers, twenty (48%) were in the Society of Merchant Venturers, nineteen 
(46%) in the Bristol Freeman, fifteen (37%) in the Steadfast Society and twelve 
(29%) in the Dolphin Society. 693 Additionally, of this group, three were alderman, 
two were former mayors and three had been sheriffs, demonstrating 
representation in Bristol's corporate body as well. Only two, Henry Bright and 
John Powell, participated in all four, although forty-one of the group participated 
in two or three organisations. Thus, those that participated in organisations 
would have had a degree of contact redundancy that would have contributed to 
an increased access to social capital and an opportunity to build and maintain 
network relationships. In 1794, however, only twenty of the forty-six investors, 
or forty-three per cent, participated in one or more of the organisations. This 
smaller percentage of investors participating in one or more of these 
organisations signifies that the investors at the end of the period would have had 
less access to social capital as their opportunity to have multiple interactions was 
lessened. The Society of Merchant Venturers, however, had 55% of the listed 
slave trade merchants, indicating their presence in the representative mercantile 
body was stronger than in the previous period. 694 This would be particularly 
important towards the end of period when the merchants lobbied to prevent the 
abolition of the trade, especially as the percentage of those in the Bristol Freeman 
Trading to Africa dropped. 
693 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, pp. 209-216. Bristol Freeman Trading to Africa, BRL. Steadfast 
Society, BRO. Dolphin Society List of members, 1749-1854, BRO. 
694 In 1775,46% of the Bristol Corporation (mayors and alderman) were slave trade investors; in 1794, 
this percentage decreased to 27%. Thus, by the latter half of the period, more slave trade investors 
were in the Society of Merchant Venturers than in Bristol's corporate body. Sketchleys Bristol 
Directory; Matthews, New History; Eltis et al., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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Table 5.1: Percentage of membership of slave trade investors in organisations in 
Bristol, 1775 and 1794 
Oraanisation 1775 1794 
erchant 
Bristol Freeman 46% 30% 
Trading to Africa 
ý7 LGi1Y ýPýý VV V"ýrry 
.. 
ry; n: JI IV 
.. 
JV IV 'ýI`, :; }: 
Dolphin Society 29% 31% 
Source: Minchinton, Politics and the Port, pp. 209-216. Bristol Freeman Trading 
to Africa, BRL. Steadfast Society, BRO. Dolphin Society List of members, 1749- 
1854, BRO. 
For Liverpool, in 1766, of the 234 investors in the slave trade, ninety- 
seven investors, or forty-one per cent, participated in any one of the 
organisations listed in Table 5.2. Table 5.2 shows the percentages of these 
ninety-seven investors that participated in the organisations. While numerically 
larger, this percentage is less than that of the Bristol investors who participated in 
organisations in either period. This has implications for access to social capital as 
explained further below. Numerically, fifty-six out of these ninety-seven investors 
that participated in an organisation (57%) were in the Committee of the 
Company of African Merchants trading from Liverpool, while thirteen (13%) were 
in Ugly Face Club, thirty-four (35%) in the Mock Corporation of Sefton and thirty 
(31%) in the Town Council. In terms of a more integrated participation thirty- 
three per cent participated in two or three organisations. 
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Table 5.2: Percentage of membership of slave trade investors in organisations in 
Liverpool, 1766 and 1805 
Organisation 1766 1805 
Committee of the 57% 55% 
Company of 
African Mercnants 
Ugly Face Club 13% N/A 
Mock Corporation 35% 37% 
of Sefton 
Town Council 31% 31% 
Source: Sheryllynne Haggerty. The membership of the Athenaeum was found in 
Laws and Regulations of the Athenaeum in Liverpool (Liverpool, 1799) Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online, Gale, University of Nottingham, accessed 1/1/10. 
In 1805, the percentages of participation are not entirely different; 
however, only ninety-one of the 331 investors, or twenty-seven per cent, 
participated in any organisation, a much smaller proportion than in the previous 
period. Of these ninety-one investors, fifty-three (55%) were in the African 
Committee, while twenty-nine (31%) were in the Town Council, thirty-four (37%) 
in the Mock Corporation of Sefton and twenty-nine (31%) in the Athenaeum. By 
specific organisation, the percentages throughout the period are almost identical, 
indicating that their proportional representation remained about the same. As 
demonstrated, the participation in Bristol organisations experienced greater 
fluctuation. Most interestingly, though, while thirty-three per cent participated in 
two or three organisations in Liverpool in 1766, in 1805, this percentage 
increased to fifty-one per cent. Thus, the level of participation in more than one 
organisation significantly increased in Liverpool throughout the period while it 
decreased in Bristol. That over half of the slave investors who participated in 
organisations were involved in more than one may say something about a certain 
level of exclusiveness that existed in the latter period. Indeed, as John Haggerty 
and Sheryllynne Haggerty argue, between 1750 and 1810, associational 
membership (which they refer to as "institutional membership") in the Liverpool 
merchant community as a whole coalesced towards bonding networks, indicative 
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that merchant networks experience a life-cycle. 695 It may be said that an elite 
group of slave merchant investors comprised part of the Liverpool slave merchant 
community at this time. In other words, social capital may have only been 
available to a limited number of investors, typical of bonding capital and its 
exclusionary nature. 
There are a few considerations to be made in both merchant communities' 
access to social capital. First of all, it should not be assumed that large group 
membership or participation in civic or cultural activities indicates greater success 
in the trade. Rather, it suggests the potential for access to resources that would 
enable it. Both merchant communities in general were argued to be elitist; it 
follows that group membership in organisations that catered to merchants as 
status-seeking individuals would most likely reflect this. The fact that the Bristol 
Society of Merchant Venturers, for example, only admitted 366 members in a one 
hundred year period certainly supports these claims. The size of the 
organisations that merchants participated in must also be considered to more 
clearly ascertain what this representation means in terms of social capital. As 
mentioned, the Society of Merchant Venturers had 366 admitted members 
throughout the century; the Bristol Freeman trading to Africa in 1759 lists 231 
members while membership lists of the Bristol Steadfast Society and Dolphin 
Society throughout the period had 161 and 462 members respectively. For 
Liverpool, there were 184 members of the Town Council in the period between 
1750-1807,280 in the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa from Liverpool, 
seventy-three in the Ugly Face Club in the ten year period of its existence and 
489 in the Mock Corporation of Sefton from 1753-1796. The total size of the 
groups given over these periods of time suggests that membership in them was 
also relatively exclusive. Additionally, not every member would be present at 
every meeting, while the membership numbers varied from year to year. Thus, it 
695 John Haggerty and Sheryllynne Haggerty, "The Life Cycle of a Metropolitan Business Network: Liverpool 1750-18 10", Explorations in Economic History, 48 (2011), pp. 189-206. 
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cannot be assumed that slave investors would be seeing every other group 
member at each meeting. While the membership of slave trade investors in some 
organisations might have been smaller than one might expect, other group 
members with their own knowledge, skills and resources as well as their own 
respective networks were also part of these organisations. This potential 
interaction with other group members, or "weak ties", is not represented by the 
percentages in the table, but these other group members would have 
complemented the slave trade investors' wider networks. Other members of 
these organisations included those indirectly involved in the slave trade. For 
example, grocers that supplied provisions for slaving ventures, and brass 
manufacturers that provided trade goods for barter. For example, in Liverpool, 
Charles Caldwell, a sugar baker, banker and ship owner was a member of the 
Mock Corporation of Sefton as well as the Lyceum; additionally, George Dunbar, a 
major insurance broker and cotton merchant who served both the European and 
American markets was also in the Mock Corporation of Sefton as well as the Town 
Council. 696 Furthermore, West India and American merchants with related 
concerns also comprised the group membership. Thus, slave trade investors 
would have the opportunity to network and exchange information with those that 
could contribute in slaving ventures in other ways besides directly investing in 
them. 
A discussion of group size and membership also lends itself to comment on 
the notions of structural holes and the impact of bonding and bridging capital. It 
is argued that redundancy in contact is crucial for establishing and maintaining 
network relationships. Those that participated in multiple organisations, such as 
the larger percentage in Liverpool in the latter period, would have had the 
opportunity to strengthen their network relationships and share and exchange 
696 Robert J. Bennett, The Voice of Liverpool Business: The First Chamber of Commerce and the 
Atlantic Economy (Liverpool: Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, 2010), pp. 149,150. 
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"real or potential" resources gained from these relationships. 697 On the other 
hand, non-redundancy also offers the benefits gained from structural holes or 
weak ties. As noted in the Introduction, Burt argues that people connected across 
various groups can access different ways of thinking and behaving; if their 
networks bridge the structural holes between groups then they have a broader 
diversity of information. 698 In the case of slave trade investors, the ability to 
bridge different groups would provide opportunities to benefit their business 
practice. Haggerty and Haggerty remark that networks in the eighteenth century 
"were constantly changing and reforming", lending itself to the idea that 
merchants had access to different combinations of bonding and bridging capital, 
which resulted in different outcomes. 699 Thus, lower group membership does not 
necessarily indicate poor performance in the trade, but it can indicate the 
presence of structural holes within networks. The type of networking, that which 
bridges groups, can also have positive results for slave trade networks as the 
chances of "identifying and optimising opportunities" are increased. 700 
Conclusion 
Redundancy and non-redundancy, and the utilisation of bridging and 
bonding social capital, were simultaneous processes in the Bristol and Liverpool 
slave merchant communities that contributed to their respective performances in 
the trade. The evolution in the uses of various forms of capital as it facilitated 
success in the trade is most ably demonstrated by the case of the Liverpool slave 
merchant community. By the end of the period, the Liverpool slave merchants 
were the leaders in the trade and had the benefit of the established patterns 
based on knowledge and expertise in its practice. With the support of a 
697 Lin, Social Capital, p. 23. 
698 Burt, "Structural Holes", pp. 349-350. 
699 Haggerty and Haggerty, "Life-Cycle", p. 190; Woolcock, "The Place of Social Capital", p. 10. 700 Thornton, "Sociology of Entrepreneurship", p. 21. 
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Corporation that fostered commerce and encouraged "outsiders", access to social 
capital was established through network relationships built and solidified over 
time through the establishment of informal organisations such as drinking clubs. 
The sheer size of the slave merchant community indicates that it was rich in 
human capital and the welcoming ethos of the migrant contribution allowed ship 
captains, mariners and merchants to be absorbed into the community and 
contribute to the commercial activity of the port. Those from outside Liverpool 
would have also served as key weak ties, bridging together those from various 
networks as well as bringing with them access to their own respective networks. 
The Liverpool merchant community thus had a wealth of knowledge, skills and 
capital from which to draw. The relative exclusiveness of the group membership 
at the end of the period was therefore not at a detriment to the trade, even 
though it served as bonding capital. This is because the elite in the community 
did not necessarily need to build these relationships because they were already 
well established and the community had enough capital of all kinds to draw from 
for slaving ventures. Social capital was thus no longer needed for entry into the 
trade, as success and expertise in the trade saturated their networks. This 
bonding capital at the end of the period merely strengthened relationships among 
the elite and perhaps served more to foster notions of status and civic identity 
promoted by the "urban renaissance" than anything else. Smaller investment 
groups at the end of the period are thus reflective of bonding capital. 
In contrast, the size of the Bristol community and its seemingly less 
accommodating nature to outsiders indicates that it was not as rich in human 
capital. The failure of Bristol's leading slave merchants to create dynasties early 
in the period left the Bristol slave merchant community with a dearth in human 
capital and necessitated an influx of "new blood" to reinvigorate Bristol's interest 
in the trade. The redundancy in contact established, especially in the later 
period, was thus required to rebuild social capital lost by the mid-century and not 
to maintain it. This was made easier by the fact that the slave investors lived 
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relatively close to one another and were not as affected by the urban sprawl 
characteristic of the period. Living in fashionable areas thus not only supported 
the "urban renaissance" ideal of status attainment but also worked to foster 
network relationships. The creation of network relationships would have been 
facilitated by the redundancy in contact in social and civic organisations, but also 
through a sense of common purpose established by the end of the period. As 
argued in Chapter Six, toward the beginning of the nineteenth century, Bristol 
merchants rallied for common purposes, including the push for port 
improvements and against the proposed abolition of the slave trade. Bringing 
merchants together for these purposes would have further stimulated redundancy 
in contact and aided network relationships. The larger investment groups at the 
end of the period therefore suggests a re-building of social capital existed in 
Bristol; however, as argued in Chapters Three and Four, the smaller size of the 
community coupled with the lack of other forms of capital would mean it still 
could not compete with the expertise and thus the success of the Liverpool slave 
merchant community. 
The utilisation of social capital, both bonding and bridging as evidenced by 
both communities throughout the entire period also demonstrates the reliance 
still placed on it. Contrary to the arguments made by Richardson and Pearson, 
formal institutions such as credit arrangements actually had little effect on the 
use of social capital in Bristol and Liverpool, as it was still used to foster and build 
important network relationships. 701 A product of the "urban renaissance" was 
status attainment; as such, merchants involved themselves in politics, social 
clubs and cultural institutions which not only ascribed status, but contributed to a 
redundancy in contact that would aid building and maintaining access to social 
capital. Thus, merchants still met one another and cultivated relationships which 
facilitated their business practice. The next chapter analyses how these merchant 
networks, cemented in part by access to social capital, mobilised to respond to 
701 Richardson and Pearson, "Social Capital", p. 766. 
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issues such as the need for port improvements as well as the proposed abolition 
of the slave trade. Thus, while this chapter analysed these merchants in their 
wider social and urban environment, the next chapter examines the Bristol and 
Liverpool slave trade merchants' relationship to the state. 
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Chapter Six: Mobilisation of Slave Trade Merchant 
Networks and their Relationship to the State and London 
Through an analysis of the structure of both slave merchant communities, 
trends in the management of slaving voyages, and the Bristol and Liverpool slave 
merchants in their wider urban environment, the previous chapters have noted a 
distinct cohesiveness within the Liverpool slave merchant community that 
contributed to its success in the trade. The Bristol slave merchant community 
was smaller and more atomised; slaving ventures were likewise managed by 
smaller networks of merchants, who did not have the social capital necessary to 
access skills, expertise and resources. In contrast, due to a much larger and more 
mobile mercantile population, Liverpool slave merchants generally operated 
within larger and more inter-connected networks, and had greater access to both 
human and social capital that facilitated their entrepreneurial position as leaders 
in the trade. This chapter further explores the notion of cohesiveness within the 
respective slave merchant communities, by analysing the relationship of the 
Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchants with the state. It has been argued 
that merchants increasingly took part in politics throughout the eighteenth 
century, which fostered a relationship between business success and civic 
reputation. Both Bristol and Liverpool's Corporations were well represented by 
the mercantile class throughout the period, and slave merchants participated in a 
number of political and social organisations. Thus, not only did their participation 
impact upon their access to social capital, but their political representation as 
well. Besides Its Corporation, Bristol also had the Society of Merchant Venturers, 
which worked In conjunction with the Corporation and acted as the most effective 
voice for merchant interests in the port. 702 Although Liverpool did not have a 
comparable organisation which represented the merchant community as a whole, 
both communities had other more specialised organisations which also catered to 
702 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. xv. 
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and represented merchant interests. 703 These specialised interest groups 
included the Bristol Freeman Trading to Africa and the Committee of Merchants 
Trading to Africa from Liverpool, highlighted in the last chapter. They also 
included associations for West India or American traders, and committees that 
were created for a certain purpose or to support a certain cause, such as those 
merchants who rallied against the proposed abolition of the slave trade. These 
groups included members of merchants' associational networks and overlap 
existed in the membership among these different organisations. 
By noting how the merchants' relationship with the state was shaped by a 
spirit of enterprise, this chapter also examines the slave trade merchants' 
mobilisation of their respective networks through two case studies. These case 
studies are the action taken by both ports in regards to dock building and port 
improvements and the Bristol and Liverpool merchants' defence of the slave trade 
throughout the period, particularly in response to the Dolben's Act (1788) and 
proposed abolition of the slave trade. As mercantile communities, effective 
representation was necessary to foster the development and extension of its 
commerce. A discussion of dock building and port improvement schemes in 
Bristol and Liverpool is particularly valuable because it provides insight into the 
nature of both of their Corporations, in terms of their commercial ethos and the 
spirit of collective initiative that would facilitate economic expansion. The 
merchants' defence of the slave trade also offers a gauge to demonstrate 
merchant action, and it is especially important to see how slave trade merchants 
defended their particular commercial interest when it was under serious threat. 
These case studies also facilitate analysis over time. Through this examination, it 
is demonstrated that Liverpool merchants better utilised the same collective 
initiative and expertise that allowed them to succeed in the slave trade to further 
their wider interests. This investigation does not attempt a comprehensive 
703 As noted in the last chapter, Liverpool's Chamber of Commerce, American Chamber of Commerce 
and its West India Association acted as representative bodies of both wider and more specialised 
merchant interests. Chapter Five, p. 221. 
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discussion of the issues surrounding both topics for they are equally rich in 
historiography and argument. Rather these issues are simply used as 
springboards to further comment on the relative cohesiveness of the Liverpool 
community in comparison with Bristol, and the action taken by merchant 
networks in particular. This analysis further reinforces the argument concerning 
the entrepreneurial spirit of Liverpool merchants. 
Part One: The Corporation, Dock Building and Port 
Improvements 
In this section, the Bristol and Liverpool Corporations will be discussed in 
turn, followed by an examination of their respective port development. Recent 
themes in entrepreneurship research suggest that entrepreneurs, acting within 
organisations, can both reproduce and challenge the existing social order; the 
degree to which these processes happen depends upon the diverse outlooks and 
skills founding members possess. 704 As both Corporations had members from the 
mercantile class generally, and from slave trade networks specifically, it is useful 
to think of these Corporations as organisations from which entrepreneurship may 
be derived. This is discussed further below. The Liverpool Corporation was 
heavily represented by a merchant oligarchy and was arguably more cohesive 
than In Bristol. This is illustrative of a more exclusive group with access to 
bonding capital. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the members of this 
exclusive group had similar commercial interests, which spearheaded the 
improvement of the port, facilitating its growth and prosperity. By putting 
merchant interest at the forefront of their concern, the Liverpool Corporation 
encouraged the trade and commercial development that was to characterise the 
port throughout the period. This ultimately helped drive Liverpool's commercial 
success while Bristol's relatively "lethargic" Corporation hindered its progress. 705 
704 Aldrich, "Entrepreneurship", p. 451. 
705 McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 160. 
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Arguments have been made for the merchant contribution to the 
development of the early-modern state, particularly because commercial 
expansion required merchants to look to the state for protection and 
encouragement of its interests. 706 The eighteenth century is also a turning point 
in the modern understanding of entrepreneurship, as it is argued that the role of 
the entrepreneur emerged at a time when the association between commercial 
success and political power was strong. 707 Barry places Bristol's commercial 
success within a "broader context of civic tradition" in which the merchant was 
the "central figure activating the energies and talents of the community"; in this 
context, political activity and commercial life were not separate. 708 A charter of 
1499, with amendments in 1581, in effect "tightened" an oligarchic government 
in which forty-three burgesses, twelve aldermen, a recorder and mayor 
comprised the mostly Whig Common Council. 709 As was the corporate 
membership throughout England at this time, members of the Bristol Corporation 
were Anglican. Wealthy and powerful slave-trading Dissenters, however, including 
Thomas Deane, John Anderson and Richard Bright often "circumvented the law" 
and became members of the Society of Merchant Venturers in order to have their 
interests represented. 71° The mayors and aldermen throughout the period were 
increasingly overseas merchants, indicating that the Corporation became largely 
dominated by, and identified with, the Society of Merchant Venturers. 711 Indeed, 
most members of the Society of Merchant Venturers were merchants engaged in 
the African and West India trades while those participating in trades with Ireland 
and Europe were relatively under-represented. 712 Forty-five of the 104 mayors 
and seventy-six of the 196 sheriffs throughout the century were Society 
706 Gauci, Politics of Trade, pp. 2,10. See also Bowen, Elites and Enterprise, p. 82. 707 See Introduction, p. 16. 
708 Barry, "Bristol Pride", pp. 25,26,27. 
709 Peter Fleming, "The Emergence of Modern Bristol", in Dresser and Ollerenshaw, Making of 
Modern Bristol, pp. 1-25. 
710 Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 140. 
711 Fleming, "Emergence", p. 14. 
712 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. xii. 
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members, indicative of the close relationship between the Corporation and the 
Society of Merchant Venturers as well as an overlap in membership. 713 As 
mentioned in the last chapter, Bristol's slave merchants were represented, 
although not dominant, in the Common Council as well as the Society of Merchant 
Venturers. 714 For the case study merchants in particular, James Laroche was a 
sheriff in 1734 and mayor in 1750, while Henry Bright served as mayor in 
177 1.715 Likewise, Michael Becher was master of the Society of Merchant 
Venturers in 1749, a position Laroche also held in 1757 and 1782.716 Although 
the Corporation became identified with the Society of Merchant Venturers, it 
would be incorrect to assume, however, that this overlap in membership meant 
that the Corporation and Society of Merchant Venturers always demonstrated 
unity in its actions. While Barry notes that "ceaseless lobbying by [the] 
Corporation and Merchant Venturers was needed to maintain and extend Bristol 
trade", these groups existed and acted independently from one another. It is 
argued below that indeed the disunity in Bristol's broader leadership caused 
delays in making these much needed port improvements to extend trade. 717 
The Society of Merchant Venturers, incorporated by letters of patent in 
1552, was granted complete control of overseas trade by a royal statute in 
1566.718 Although the port also had a number of guilds, as the most effective 
voice of Bristol's mercantile community, the Society of Merchant Venturers often 
worked closely with the Corporation to promote Bristol's commercial interests, 
primarily by lobbying Bristol MPs on commercial matters. 719 This was 
accomplished by issuing petitions, and in the period between 1698 and 1803, the 
73 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. xvii. 
714 See Chapter Five, pp. 217-218. 
715 John Latimer, The Annals of Bristol in the Eighteenth Century (Bath: Kingsmead Reprints, 1970), 
p'p. 535,536. 
b Ibid., p. 537. 
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Society of Merchant Venturers dispatched 154.720 These petitions were largely 
concerned with the slave trade and other issues concerning the American 
colonies, as discussed further below. 721 Additionally, the Corporation delegated 
power to the Society of Merchant Venturers that would usually have been in the 
local government's purview, such as collecting wharfage money to construct and 
maintain quays. 722 Thus, the responsibility for the construction of docks and port 
improvement schemes was that of the Society of Merchant Venturers as well as 
the Corporation. As an influential body working in concert with the Corporation, 
being a member of the Society of Merchant Venturers was also prestigious, an 
important factor for status-seeking merchants. 723 
It is important to also keep in mind that, whilst the Whig Corporation and 
the Society of Merchant Venturers provided the "official expression of civic 
feeling", Bristol merchants could also represent themselves in informal political 
clubs, such as the Tory Steadfast Society and the Whig Union Club. 724 While 
often "no business of consequence occurred" at club meetings besides the more 
social purpose of, for example, finding an "old bottle port wine for the use of [the] 
society", these societies are reflective of a politically-conscious and civically- 
minded merchant community. 725 Additionally, they were places to access social 
capital, as highlighted by the Steadfast Society in the last chapter. On the eve of 
elections, letters were exchanged among some of the clubs, for instance, between 
the Union Society and the Steadfast Society in which it was "mutually (agreed] 
not to oppose each other" in terms of the candidates they would support. 726 A 
number of different political organisations thus existed which not only 
720 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. xviii. 
721 Ibid., pp. xvii, xxx. 
722 McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 150. 
723 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. xi. 
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725 Steadfast Society Book of Rules, Orders and Proceedings, 1737-1802,16 Jan 1801,20 Mar 1793, 
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represented the varied interests of Bristol merchants, but also facilitated a 
redundancy in contact for merchants to access different types of capital. 
Barry strongly links the notions of civic pride with the activities of the 
Corporation. He states that the members of the Corporation "were seen by the 
citizens above all as magistrates, providing justice and thus allowing the social 
and commercial life of the city to continue". 727 This, along with the contemporary 
assertion that the Society of Merchant Venturers "always act in conjunction with 
the Corporation for promoting the commerce, trade and improvement of the city" 
paints a relatively positive and misleading picture of the Corporation and Society 
of Merchant Venturers' active involvement, encouragement and cooperation in 
commercial affairs. 728 However, as is demonstrated further below, Bristol's 
Corporation was largely lazy and ineffective, particularly when it came to port 
improvements. 729 Commercial decline throughout the eighteenth century 
prompted merchants in the 1790s to demand the Corporation's intervention to 
revive its commerce. The Corporation, represented by the "old mercantile elite" 
was further blamed for continued extravagant spending during a time of poor 
harvests in 1795-1796 and 1800, which contributed to it becoming increasingly 
unpopular in the latter part of the century for its failure to effectively promote 
merchant interests in the port. 730 
The commercial decline Bristol experienced in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century is reflective of the trends in declining membership of the 
Society of Merchant Venturers. These trends in membership coupled with the 
decline in the Bristol merchant community as a whole examined in the last 
chapter are important because they offer insight into the cohesiveness of the 
merchant community, and are suggestive of the different types of capital 
available to merchants. As the Corporation was argued to be an oligarchic, elite 
727 Barry, "Bristol Pride", p. 28. 
728 Matthews, New History. 
729 McGrath, Merchant venturers, pp. 160-161. 
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group, accused of laziness and lethargy in regards to implementing port 
improvements, the argument of Bristol merchants' complacence is given more 
credence. Morgan certainly suggests this in his study of Bristol West India 
merchants, as intimated in Chapter Four 
. 
731 As an exceptionally cohesive group 
with a large influence in the local government, the Bristol West India merchants 
were the richest sector among Bristolians, many of whom, like many members of 
the Corporation, also lived in the fashionable residential areas such as Queen 
Square. 732 Yet this core group also exhibited a "business caution" due to their 
large material success by the end of the eighteenth century that not only 
hindered Bristol's economic progress but "left a legacy of poor adaptability". 733 A 
very influential and cautious group representing one trade would have impacted 
upon the merchant community as a whole. This sense of "business caution" is 
aptly demonstrated in the hesitance to improve the port. 
Scholarly discussions of Liverpool's Corporation often centre around its 
active support of the development of the port and to Liverpool's commercial 
importance. 734 In contrast with Bristol, the perceived "liberal spirit of its body 
corporate" has already been noted regarding the port's commercial ethos. 735 
Unlike Bristol, with guilds and other regulatory institutions such as the Society of 
Merchant Venturers, the Corporation represented the merchant community at 
large. Likewise, contemporaries asserted the River Mersey "held the foremost 
rank amongst the Ports of this flourishing kingdom" and that the "superior 
conveniences of the docks and other local advantages" contributed to Liverpool's 
prosperity. 736 Like Bristol, however, Liverpool's Corporation was also arguably 
closed and elitist. Yet instead of exercising caution or demonstrating 
731 See Chapter Four, p. 151. 
732 Morgan, "Economic Development", pp. 48-76; Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 108. 733 Morgan, "Bristol West India", p. 206. 
734 See Power, "Creating a Port"; Michael Power, "Councillors and Commerce in Liverpool, 1650- 
1750", Urban History, 24 (1997), pp. 301-323; Ascott et at., Liverpool 1660-1750. 735 See Chapter Five, p. 194. 
736 Draft preamble of speech by Clayton Tarleton to Common Hall, 1792, Tarleton Papers LivPRO; 
Mar 1796 Liverpool Town Books, Vol. 13,1793-1804, LivPRO. 
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complacency, Liverpool's local government maintained a spirit of activism 
throughout the century, indicative of a distinct entrepreneurial character. 
Speaking about a typical Liverpool merchant of the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century, Stanley Checkland famously described him as a "mercantilist, a 
materialist, and an empiricist" while Liverpool merchants as a whole believed in a 
division between statesmen and businessmen, each keeping to their own 
separate sphere. 737 In local politics, however, this was certainly not the case. It 
is well known that merchants increasingly became involved in local politics and 
were well represented by town councils; Liverpool was no exception. 738 A letter 
from burgesses offering support for John Tarleton's candidature to Parliament in 
1767 showed their belief that Tarleton would offer proper representation because 
"of his knowledge of trade in general and more particularly what relates to the 
true interests and welfare of this town". 739 Likewise, upon accepting the 
mayoralty in 1792, Clayton Tarleton pledged `'to make it my business to promote 
in every thing the peace of commerce and by consequence, the happiness and 
prosperity of Liverpool". 740 These assertions make clear the link among 
commerce, political activity and the merchant's role within this as an activist. 
Additionally, the slave trade merchants became particularly vocal in their defence 
of the slave trade, further reinforcing the notion that the merchant was heavily 
involved in politics. This is discussed further below. 
A "harmonisation of political and commercial activities" of Liverpool's 
Corporation in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was 
responsible for establishing Liverpool as an important commercial centre. 74' 
Michael Power and others note the distinctive character in which merchants 
rapidly came to dominate local politics, in effect, causing the port to "come of 
age" in just two decades between 1695 and 1710. This "coming of age" in turn 
737 Checkland, "Economic Attitudes", p. 58. 
738 Gauci, Politics of Trade, p. 95. 739 Letter of burgesses offering support of candidature, 18 Jul 1767, Tarleton Papers LivPRO. 
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was facilitated by the spate of dock building financed by the Corporation. 742 A 
charter granted in 1695 put new men in charge, all of whom were townsmen, 
with a large proportion from the mercantile class, and specifically those engaged 
in overseas trade. 743 This was in contrast to the earlier Corporation in which a 
mixed group of outsiders, craftsmen, merchants and mariners with little cohesion 
"perhaps prohibited corporate will" as they did relatively little to improve the port 
at a time when Liverpool merchants were increasingly turning to Atlantic trade. 744 
The 1695 charter also confirmed the closed nature of the largely Whig 
Corporation, in which the council was then composed of forty-one members 
including a mayor and two bailiffs. 745 Most council members served for life, while 
the mayor and bailiffs were chosen from the existing council members. 746 As with 
Bristol, members of the Liverpool Corporation throughout the period were 
Anglican. However, Dissenters became members of the Chamber of Commerce, 
the Committee of Merchants Trading to Africa from Liverpool as well as other 
social clubs. Case study merchant Benjamin Heywood is a prominent example of 
a Dissenter who was active in socio-political life without serving a formal political 
role. Thus, religion did not serve as a major obstacle in civic involvement. 
It is argued that with Liverpool's explosive population growth throughout 
the period, burgesses became increasingly unrepresentative, creating a gap 
between the Corporation and the citizenry. 747 The oligarchic nature of the 
Corporation, like Bristol, characterised the access to bonding capital this exclusive 
group had. However, despite claims of becoming increasingly un-representative, 
particularly in the first part of the eighteenth century, this insular and elite group 
742 Power, "Councillors and Commerce"; Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 174. 
743 Power, "Creating a Port", p. 54. 
744 Ibid., p. 53. 
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actively promoted the interests of the port instead of becoming complacent. This 
continued throughout the period. Pertinent to the analysis of Liverpool's role in 
the defence of the slave trade discussed below, F. E. Sanderson notes that a 
distinct bias in favour of the African trade existed in Liverpool's Common Council. 
At the beginning of the parliamentary abolitionist campaign in 1787, thirty-seven 
of the forty-one councillors were slaveship owners, major investors, or suppliers 
in the trade. This led the Common Council to be united in its defence of the 748 
trade. Throughout the period, however, the Corporation exemplified the access 
to bonding capital that is typical of an exclusionary group, yet its active 
promotion of the port's interests negates the supposition that under- 
representation was somehow detrimental to Liverpool's commercial life. The 
access to bonding capital, seen to influence the inactivity in Bristol, worked in the 
opposite way for the Liverpool councillors. Furthermore, any claims of being 
increasingly unrepresentative, or any political, religious or personal differences 
that existed among members, were set aside by the Corporation as these were 
perceived to be "less significant than their shared challenges". 749 In the case of 
early port development, these challenges included port improvements, discussed 
further below. 
While Liverpool's success may be attributed largely to the improvements 
made in communications, and specifically the dock building programs, the decline 
in Bristol's commercial prosperity may likewise be linked with its failure to do so. 
In 1792, the Bristol Corporation noted that: 
The state of the harbour of Bristol is by nature so far inferior to the natural 
or improved of many others of the Ports of Great Britain that ships holders 
of Bristol are not on an equal footing with the ships holders of other ports, 
either with respect to their security of their ships 
... 
or to the ease and 
expedition which they can be discharged, landed and proceed again to 
sea. 750 
748 Ibid., p. 66. 
749 Power, "Creating a Port", p. 70. 
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Bristol's Corporation was well aware that Bristol shipping was lagging behind that 
of other ports to such an extent that it served as a detriment to its trade, yet as 
will be shown they were also hesitant to make these improvements. Besides 
docks, however, Bristol generally did not make the necessary improvements in 
communications, and they ultimately lost ground to Liverpool, whose superior 
canal and river improvement schemes diverted a lot of traffic that would have 
normally gone through Bristol 
. 
751 Bristol's failure to make improvements made 
the port and harbour at times difficult to navigate and was a constant threat to 
safety. Chapter Two noted complaints that the docks and quays were made 
unnavigable due to stones and mud, so much so that ships were sometimes run 
aground. 752 Indeed, in 1789, haven master John Shaw noted that the "danger of 
the river" made transportation on it "a greater risque than proceeding to the West 
Indies". 753 Liverpool merchants also recognised how the inferior situation of 
Bristol contributed to poor trading performance. In 1760, writing to Joseph 
Percival & Co. regarding an order of copper that needed to be sent, William Earle 
expressed that "the passages are so uncertain from Bristol that I doubt unless 
you send soon we may be disappointed". 754 
Contemporaries were thus well aware that the state of Bristol's inferior 
communications system was a detriment to its trade. Chapter Two also noted the 
situation Bristol and Liverpool had with their hinterlands and how Liverpool, 
through its communications systems, was better placed to capitalise on this 
situation. Writing in 1788, Richard Bright observed that the rate of freight from 
manufacturing counties such as Staffordshire, Shropshire and Warwickshire to 
Liverpool was greater than to Bristol; likewise "almost the whole of the goods 
which used to be sent to Bristol to be forwarded to the United States of America & 
other parts, now are conveyed to Liverpool by the canals, & from thence 
751 Morgan, "Economic Development", pp. 64-66. 752 See Chapter Two, p. 55. 
's' John Shaw to the Society of Merchant Venturers, 19 Jul 1789, SMV 7/1/3/11 BRO. 754 William Earle to Dodding & Co., 26 Feb 1760, Earle Collection, LivPRO; William Earle to Joseph 
Percival & Co., 10 Oct 1760, Earle Collection, LivPRO. 
244 
shipped". 755 By the late eighteenth century, then, when Liverpool's dock facilities 
and transport schemes facilitated the port to prosper, Bristol merchants were still 
hoping that a "spirit of improvement would prevail" and that the Corporation 
would make every effort to implement commercial improvements. 756 The success 
of Liverpool's communications systems was not lost on Bristol merchants. Indeed, 
a correspondence emerged between the two ports among merchants and 
engineers regarding the dimensions of Liverpool docks, rates of dockage, and 
plans of the "relative situation of the docks and how they communicate with each 
other". 757 Thus, as explored in Chapter Four, just as Bristol slave merchants 
turned to Liverpool slave merchants for their expertise, knowledge and 
connections in the slave trade, the Bristol mercantile community as a whole also 
turned to Liverpool to learn the particulars of their superior dock system. 758 
As Bristol looked to Liverpool to see how they financed their docks, the 
issue of dock dues is also an important consideration. Although not directly 
related to port improvements as such, it links to the commercial expansion of the 
port and raises another point of comparison with Liverpool. As Minchinton has 
noted, Bristol's system of port financing seemed to have become more 
"burdensome" in the eighteenth century and port charges were higher in Bristol 
than other ports, including Liverpool. This certainly aroused criticism. A "well- 
wisher" wrote at length against Bristol's dock dues in comparison with the better 
rates found in Liverpool. The "well-wisher" stated that, indeed, "It will probably 
be found and proved, in the first Place, that Town-Dues and other local Charges, 
are partly the Occasion of the Decline of the Trade". For the trade to be revived, 
it was believed that Bristol must follow the example of Liverpool: 
That of the heavy Town-Dues, should be principally attended to, let this, 
with the Wharfage, be reduced to what they are in Liverpool. Trade will 
iss Bright, "Draft of Particulars", p. 661. 
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then naturally flow to this Port and afford ample Means, nay even require, 
the immediate attention to and smooth the Way for removing other 
Difficulties; without this, if all the rest of Accommodation for Shipping, 
Regulation of Pilots, etc. were attended to, they would, most likely in the 
End, prove only Half Measures. It may be objected here, that Town- 
Revenues would be injured; it might be so at first; but this is not quite so 
certain, and with the Example of Liverpool before us, where, 
inconsiderable as the Town-Dues are, they amount to 12,0001. Annually, 
there is no Doubt but the temporary Defalcation, if any, would be amply 
re-paid in a few Years. 759 
As with its leading position in the slave trade, Liverpool was also exemplary for its 
superior port management, which Bristol needed to emulate if it was to boost its 
trade. 
In fact, port improvements in Bristol during the eighteenth century can be 
characterised by indecision, reluctance, hesitancy and a Corporation not united 
behind the common purpose of improvement. Chapter Two noted that the port 
needed man-made improvements to facilitate trade and shipping, particularly as 
the port became increasingly congested as trade increased. 760 The responsibility 
for many of these improvements was in the hands of the Society of Merchant 
Venturers and minor improvements were indeed made early in the eighteenth 
century. In 1712, the quay along the River Frome was extended, while in the 
1720s, a wharf was constructed on Welsh Back for the loading of goods and a 
separate quay was built on St. Augustine's Back for timber and naval stores. 761 In 
1717, the construction of a wet dock was completed, however the dock was 
ultimately of little use by merchants because it was too far from the city. 762 
Quays were also built and extended when the Society of Merchant Venturers's 
lease to run the port was renewed in 1764.763 However, much to the 
dissatisfaction of the merchants, none of these improvements were adequate to 
support the trade of the port. Many improvement schemes were brought forth in 
759 Printed Letter for Reduction of Town Dues and Dock Improvements from a Well Wisher to the City 
and Port of Bristol, 20 Aug 1800,28048/p4, BRO. 
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the last third of the eighteenth century, and it was during this period that the 
hesitancy of the Corporation is most noted. 
Alan F. Williams has comprehensively analysed the later port improvement 
schemes. In the period between 1765 and 1900, over fifty schemes were put 
forward, in which there were two distinct phases. 764 The first phase occurred 
between 1765 and 1812, in which the schemes were concerned with the quays 
within the city, and the construction of a "floating harbour". The second phase, 
terminating at the beginning of the twentieth century, called for the development 
of docks downstream or on the Bristol Channel shore. 765 The first phase had 
proposals introduced by engineers, but also by dock owners and merchants. 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to thoroughly analyse each proposal, 
it should be remarked that the improvements under this first scheme did not take 
place until forty-five years after the first proposal was introduced, underscoring 
the hesitancy and delay that characterised the Corporation's response to the 
needed improvements. 766 
To further illustrate this, Williams included in his study a chronological list 
of proposals, counter-proposals and leading objections from this first phase, 
beginning in July, 1764 and ending in December 1812, of which there were a 
staggering 102.767 Thus, while there were certainly ideas and plans regarding how 
best to improve the port, these ideas were not put into action. Highlighting this, 
engineer Robert Mylne remarked on a plan in 1767 that it was "so very desirable 
for men in your present situation that I am surprised this proposition has not 
been made in former times and before the trade of the port increased to what it 
is". 768 Williams and others attribute this indecision to a lack of united purpose 
among the merchants, Corporation and ratepayers who could not agree whether 
764 Williams, "Bristol Port Plans", p. 138. 
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the benefits of the proposed improvements outweighed the costs. This disunity 
regarding its financial risk is emphasised by a petition of 1803 from the "mayor, 
burgesses and commonalty of Bristol" urging the House of Commons to authorise 
improvements in the Bristol Harbour. This was accompanied by a second petition 
to the House of Lords by a number of prominent merchants petitioning against 
the scheme. 769 Thus, unlike the united Liverpool Corporation, those in charge in 
Bristol were unwilling to take risks, demonstrating a less collective 
entrepreneurial ethos. Caution was further demonstrated the next year when a 
draft address by "a Bristol Merchant" regarding problems involved in 
implementing these docks warned that: 
So important a work, in which the welfare of the city and neighborhoods 
are materially concerned may not be begun until the whole undertaking in 
all its various parts, bearings and probable consequences be fully 
ascertained from the most indisputable authority, lest from a precipitate 
commencement, you should get involved in endless difficulties and 
expences. 7° 
"A Bristol Merchant" goes on to emphasise that the main question of this scheme 
was whether the means of carrying the work into execution [are] adequate to 
the objects proposed ". 71 This hesitancy and caution is further reinforced by the 
assertion that port improvement plans throughout the latter part of the century 
were "shelved" during periods when "there were affairs of greater moment 
affecting the interests of the merchant" such as the trade embargo imposed 
during the War of American Independence. 772 Improvements were also set aside 
in between war years and periods of national financial crisis, including 1787 and 
1793, when as Morgan claims, the Corporation and Society of Merchant Venturers 
were reluctant to fund these projects and were opposed to change. 773 This is in 
contrast with the Liverpool Corporation's continued action throughout the period, 
discussed below. Expressing frustration of their hesitancy, before stepping down 
769 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. 189. 770 Draft address by "A Bristol Merchant", 25 Feb 1804,11168/1s, BRO. 771 Ibid. 
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as engineer of the project in 1792, John Smeaton lamented, "excuse me when I 
say that I think you Gentleman take too much consideration, if they mean to 
Act". 774 Smeaton stepping down as engineer coincided with the time Bristol's 
Corporation noted the inferiority of Bristol's harbour. Eleven years later, the 
Bristol Dock Act was passed, and, under the auspices of the Society of Merchant 
Venturers, the Bristol Dock Company was formed, in which many members also 
sat on the Council. 775 The established Bristol Dock Company, however, failed to 
call their first general meeting "within the time as directed by the Act", which led 
Serjeant Heywood to opine that the powers of the Act were rendered void. 776 
Therefore, the Society of Merchant Venturers and Bristol Corporation's role in the 
port improvement schemes was marked by a "spirit of unambitious caution". "' 
This hesitancy and caution combined with the complacency marked the Bristol 
slave trade community and, in many ways, describes the activity of Bristol's 
merchants as a whole. 
In contrast, as discussed in Chapter Two, an important factor in Liverpool's 
commercial success was its communication and transport networks, developed 
and improved upon throughout the eighteenth century. Undoubtedly, a 
sophisticated network of river, canal, road and later rail networks, coupled with 
ocean and coastal shipping routes not only connected the port with its industrial 
hinterland, but to the rest of Britain and the wider world. 778 In terms of inland 
navigation schemes, Harris notes that Liverpool's Common Council was 
"favourable not simply to local schemes, but also those of wider application" 
which would in turn extend Liverpool's economic hinterland 
. 
779 For example, the 
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to the surrounding coalfields. Before the act for the canal was passed in 1755, the 
"Merchants, Proprietors of Saltworks, Sugar Bakers, Glassmakers, Distillers, 
Maltsters and other Tradesmen and Inhabitants" of Liverpool petitioned for such a 
scheme stating that communication was necessary due to the "great increase and 
improvement of the commerce, trade and manufacturers" of Liverpool. 780 As 
such, the petitioners "occasioned a greater demand for and consumption of coal", 
reflecting the importance of the "coal-canal nexus" in the port's economic 
development. 781 This canal was petitioned for and constructed in conjunction with 
other dock and harbour improvements, discussed below, increasing Liverpool's 
trade by supplying markets previously supplied by Bristol. 
The site of the Liver Pool required man-made improvements to facilitate 
shipping, and a number of dock and river improvement schemes occurred 
throughout the eighteenth century. 782 The docks in particular were a source of 
great pride, boasted of in town guides, praised in town directories and cited by 
merchants and councillors when seeking protection from Parliament of their 
trading interests. In its defence of the slave trade, the Corporation stated 
previous acts of parliament that were passed at different times for constructing 
of convenient docks for its shipping and particularly for the African ships"; as 
such, these docks needed to be constantly afloat and consequently, "your 
petitioners have been emboldened to lay out very large sums to pledge their 
corporate seal to a still greater amount for affecting these laudable purposes". 783 
These docks, they argued, along with "the enterprising spirit of the people, the 
trade of Liverpool, and particularly the African trade, which forms the most active 
branch thereof" gives "strength and energy" to the port. 784 Boasting about the 
superiority of the docks and the "enterprising spirit of the people" certainly 
780 The Humble Petition of Merchants, Proprietors of Saltworks, Sugar Bakers, Glassmakers, Distillers, 
Maltsters and other Tradesmen and Inhabitants in and near the Borrough and Port of Liverpool in the County Palatine of Lancaster, 9 Mar 1752-28 Feb 1755, Harper Collection of Private Bills, 1695-1814. 781 Stobart, "In Search of Causality", p. 154. 782 See Chapter Two, pp. 60-61. 
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contrasts with Bristol's noted apathy, indifference and commercial decline in the 
face of the need for port improvements by this period. 
Wallace asserted the docks "may not improperly be called the principal of 
all the public buildings" as they not only contributed "to the splendor, 
convenience and safety of commerce, but to the profit of the corporation". 785 The 
construction of the Old Dock (as it was later known), first authorised in 1709 and 
in use by 1715, was the first commercial wet dock in Britain and greatly elevated 
Liverpool's commercial capabilities by providing the port with particular 
advantages. 786 The dock was constructed on the pool, in close proximity to the 
centre of town, near Paradise and Hanover streets. As demonstrated in the last 
chapter, these streets were popular places of residence for slave trade investors 
by the middle of the century, and thus places with access to various types of 
capital. The site was also advantageous as the land around the dock could be 
used to construct warehouses for the port's growing trades. 787 The council that 
decided to construct the dock in 1708 had twelve major traders, including case 
study merchant, Foster Cunliffe. Ramsey Muir gave most of the credit, however, 
to Sir Thomas Johnson, a tobacco merchant and MP, as the founder of the 
enterprise. 788 Johnson sought the expertise of engineer George Sorocold 
concerning building a wet dock, and Sorocold urged Johnson and fellow MP, 
Richard Norris to obtain an act of Parliament for its construction. 789 Sorocold died 
before parliamentary approval was granted, thus Thomas Steers of London 
ultimately engineered the scheme. 790 With an estimated cost of £6,000, the 
construction of the dock was a major financial gamble, but admission fines, 
revised leases and implemented dock dues covered the costs in the long run; as 
Power has asserted, this enterprise was ultimately a "revealing test of political 
785 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 99. 786 Power, "Creating a Port", p. 58. 
787 Power, "Councillors and Commerce", p. 302. 788 Ramsay Muir, A History of Liverpool (Liverpool: 1907), p. 176; Moss, Georgian Liverpool, p. 34. 789 Moss, Georgian Liverpool, p. 34. 
790 Ibid; Muir, History of Liverpool, p. 176. 
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unity and nerve of the council". 791 This "nerve" or concerted effort of active 
promotion, demonstrates the enterprising spirit of a cohesive corporate body. 
Moreover, while the Liverpool Corporation was improving the port to boost its 
trade early in the century, the Bristol Corporation was more actively involved in 
constructing fashionable places of residence, such as Queen's Square, as noted in 
the last chapter. 792 This may be reflective of the different priorities the two 
Corporations had, even if both invested in property. 793 
With the success of the first dock, other docks followed throughout the 
century. This spate of dock building was also indicative of the port's commerce 
becoming more diversified. In 1738, an Act of Parliament was granted for the 
construction of a second dock, known as the Salthouse Dock (due to its proximity 
to the salt works), which was completed by 1759.794 Ships using this dock mostly 
engaged in the Irish, French and Mediterranean trades. 795 St. George's Dock, 
authorised in 1762 was completed by 1771; Kings and Queens Docks were 
granted parliamentary authorisation in 1758 and were completed in 1788 and 
1796 respectively. St. George's dock catered to the West Indian trade as well as 
trade with the North American mainland. 796 Kings Dock facilitated the Baltic 
trades, but due to its proximity to the tobacco warehouses, also accommodated 
the American trades, and particularly the Virginia trade. 797 Queen's Dock also 
facilitated those ships engaged in the American trade. 798 Those ships employed 
in the African trade largely used the Old Dock. Even before the completion of 
Kings and Queens Docks, however, A Plan of Liverpool with the Docks, in 1766 
boasted that "ships of any burthern may come up with their full lading and ride 
before the town; and vessels of eighteen feet draught of water may go into the 
791 Power, "Creating a Port", p. 60. 
792 See Chapter Five, p. 186. 
793 Ascott et al., Liverpool 1660-1750, p. 155. 
794 Marriner, Economic and Social Development, pp. 30-31. 793 Ibid. 
796 Marriner, Economic and Social Development, pp. 30-31. 797 Wallace, General Descriptive History, p. 103. 
798 Parkinson, Rise of the Port, p. 109. 
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docks, which are not inferior to any in Great Britain". 799 By the end of the 
eighteenth century, the port thus had around twenty-eight acres of docks 
including five wet docks, five graving docks and three dry docks. 80° 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
was established "for transacting the business of the docks", the first meeting of 
which was in 1784. As a committee, its members included the mayor and bailiffs, 
as well as prominent merchants with slaving interests such as Thomas Earle, 
George Case, William Crosbie and John Shaw. 80' The committee meeting minutes 
indeed show that a concern throughout the latter period was the extension and 
improvement of docks to accommodate the increase in trade. Proposals were 
made for the Corporation to purchase timber yards for the extension of docks as 
well as for ground adjoining docks to be kept as lots for the purpose of 
shipbuilding yards. 802 The need for additional space around the docks for the 
extension of commerce contributes to the changing residential patterns observed 
in the last chapter; more merchants moved out of the city centre and away from 
commercial spaces at a time when the Corporation was parcelling off this land to 
cater to the growing trade. The minutes also revealed that measures were taken 
to ensure the cleanliness and safety of the docks. For instance, days were set 
aside for George's Dock and the Old Dock to be let dry and cleared of mud, that 
tunnels be constructed along the docks for the purposes of clearing mud, that 
cisterns be made for graving docks "and proper fire engines and buckets be 
provided" in the interest of safety. 803 This stands in contrast with the poor 
situation of the Bristol quays and harbour as noted above. Additionally, dock 
master Captain William Hutchinson, "a man of considerable talents and 
ingenuity", was instrumental in installing the first parabolic reflector for 
799 A Plan of Liverpool with the Docks, 1766. (Liverpool, 1766). Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online, Gale. University of Nottingham, accessed: 1/1/11. 80° Mariner, Economic and Social Development, p. 31. 801 19 Nov 1784, Minutes of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, MMM 802 19 Nov 1784; 2 Apr 1787, Minutes of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, MMM. 803 Brooke, Liverpool as it was, p. 102; 27 Jul 1789; 4 Mar 1786; 16 May 1785, Minutes of the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Board, MMM. 
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lighthouses, reinforcing the claim that Liverpool was at the "forefront of port 
management". 804 In 1788, a year before Bristol haven master John Shaw 
thought that local navigation was more dangerous than a transatlantic voyage to 
the West Indies, Hutchinson was ordering new lamps for a new brick lighthouse 
to be built, contributing to the ease of transport and safety in the port of 
Liverpool. 805 
The Corporation's active promotion and encouragement of the port's trade 
can thus be seen as a priority throughout the century, as "merchants of this town 
and port of Liverpool in general being materially interested" petitioned throughout 
the period for its "general welfare and prosperity". 806 Plans for dock construction 
and the implementation of these plans were carried out even in war years and 
times of national financial crises when trade in general lessened. Indeed, the 
initiative of the merchants and Corporation is also noted in their response to the 
financial crisis in 1793. As outlined by Hyde et al., mercantile communities 
throughout Britain suffered disproportionately from the crisis caused by a 
derangement of credit. Yet, the prompt action by leading merchants to petition 
the Corporation, resulting in the establishment of a Loan office, facilitated the 
port's relatively rapid recovery. 807 In 1793, the Corporation petitioned Parliament 
that the trade and commerce of the town of Liverpool and the various 
manufactures of the neighborhood have of late years greatly increased and have 
continued to do so till the stagnation of credit". 808 Clayton Tarleton, John 
Greenwood, William Crosbie, George Case, Thomas Earle, John Blackburne, 
Richard Statham and Thomas Naylor, many of whom also sat on the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Board, presented evidence in Parliament giving the valuation 
of the estates and revenue belonging to the Corporation, much of which was 
804 Richard Woodman, Neptune's Trident: Spices and Slaves, 1500-1807 (Gloucester: Stroud, 2008), p. 226. 
805 8 Aug 1788, Minutes of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, MMM. 806 Mar 1796, Liverpool Town Books, Vol 13,1793-1804, LivPRO. 
807 Hyde et al., "The Port of Liverpool", pp. 363,369. 808 24 Apr 1793, Liverpool Town Books, Vol. 13,1793-1804, LivPRO. 
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derived from dock and town dues. Some of the evidence given noted that land 
was purchased with the "intention for the Extension of the Docks", which is in line 
with minutes of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board mentioned above that 
stated land was purchased for such a purpose. 809 Responding to the petition by 
the Liverpool merchants, the Chancellor of the Exchequer praised the "liberality 
and spirit of the corporation", observing that "so laudable an example of liberal 
support might lead to consequences highly beneficial to the public". 810 This is in 
line with the contemporary assertion noted above that the "liberal spirit of its 
body corporate" contributed to Liverpool's success. 
The "liberal spirit" of the Liverpool Corporation contrasts with the response 
by Bristol merchants. As Marshall argues, that "unlike Liverpool, which rallied 
promptly and effectively to restore its trade and finances by civic action", Bristol 
conversely, "seems to have accepted the situ ation". 811 This acceptance mirrors 
the complacency already mentioned of Bristol's merchants, while Liverpool's 
action is indicative of an entrepreneurial spirit. As explored in Chapter Four, 
leadership, and the entrepreneurship derived from it, has a function when 
something new must be carried out and thus entrepreneurship often occurs 
during times of disequilibrium, such as disruption caused by war. 812 That the 
Liverpool Corporation carried out financially risky and ambitious projects during 
these times of relative upheaval indicates the entrepreneurial characteristic of 
limited risk aversion. 813 Liverpool's sense of "spirit" thus stands in stark contrast 
809 Report from the Committee to the petition of Clayton Tarleton, esquire, mayor, John Greenwood, 
bailiff, William Crosbie the Younger, George Case, Thomas Earle, and John Blackburne, Alderman, 
and Richard Statham, and Thomas Naylor, all members of the Common Council of the Town of 
Liverpool, in the County of Lancaster, on behalf of themselves and the rest of the Common Council of 
the said Town, was Referred, 15 Ap. 1793, Seventeenth Parliament of Great Britain, 13 Dec 1792-21 
June 1793. Available at: parlipapers. chadwyck. co. uk, accessed: 1/1/11. 
810 11 Apr 1793, Seventeenth Parliament of Great Britain, 13 Dec 1792-21 June 1793. Available at: 
earl ipapers. chadwyck. co. uk, accessed: 1/1/ 11. 
Peter Marshall, Anti-Slave Trade Movement in Bristol (Bristol: Bristol Branch of the Historical 
Association, 1968), p. 3. 
812 Schumpeter, "Entrepreneur", p. 248. 
813 Casson, Entrepreneurship, p. 95. 
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with Bristol's "business caution". Summarising this notion, a "well wisher" wrote 
at length in 1800 regarding the necessity of dock improvements citing: 
But whilst every liberal mind must rejoice in the prosperity of any part of 
the empire, no inhabitant of BRISTOL, that reflects and compares those 
exertions and the Indifference and Apathy that prevail in this City, [my 
emphasis] with respect to the state of its port and declining commerce, 
can forbear lamenting, that not the least attempt is made to improve the 
port or revive the trade of this City. 814 
Thus, contemporaries observed a sense of indifference and apathy on the part of 
the Bristol Corporation, which contributed to the decline in the commercial 
importance of the port. Liverpool's Corporation and principal merchants, however, 
exhibited a culture of action. They were also to play a more dominant, active role 
in response to the proposed abolition of the slave trade as well. 
Part Two: Bristol and Liverpool Merchants' Defence of the 
Slave Trade 
The collective response of Bristol and Liverpool merchants in the push for 
port improvements mirrors their defence of the slave trade. This in turn impacted 
on their networks. As noted in Chapter Five, a re-building of access to capital was 
observed in the Bristol slave merchant community. Bristol merchants recognised 
that the port was in decline, and with the slave trade inextricably linked with its 
West India trade, merchants argued in its defence. Through the establishment of 
committees and increased meetings among merchants to discuss these matters, 
a redundancy of contact was established among principal merchants, which 
helped bolster their networks. This is evidenced by the increased investments in 
slaving voyages by the end of the period. For Liverpool merchants (as well as the 
Corporation) banding together against abolition demonstrates the access to 
bonding capital which facilitated earlier port improvements, and the 
entrepreneurial spirit of coordinated action that was shown in the response to the 
814 Printed Letter for Reduction of Town Dues and Dock Improvements from a Well Wisher to the City 
and Port of Bristol, 20 Aug 1800,28048/p4, BRO. 
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financial crisis of 1793. Initiative and action by an elite group continued further in 
this campaign. 
While official campaigns for the abolition of the slave trade were conducted 
largely in the last two decades of the eighteenth century, the Bristol and Liverpool 
Corporations as well as the ports' merchants generally sought its protection and 
encouragement throughout the century, particularly against the monopoly of the 
Royal African Company. Particular grievances were made against the Royal 
African Company in regards to its monopoly organisation; in the period between 
1690 and 1713, around one hundred petitions were presented to Parliament in 
support of free trade whereas less than twenty supported the monopoly. 815 
Those in support of free trade represented a variety of interests, including 
colonists, private traders and manufacturers, indicative of the variety of interests 
linked to the slave trade. These similar and separate interests groups, including 
West India planters and Bristol and Liverpool's manufacturing sector, also voiced 
their opposition to the proposed abolition of the trade later in the period, which is 
discussed below. Earlier in the period, however, the petitions of Bristol's Society 
of Merchant Venturers attest to merchants seeking protection of their slave 
trading interests. For instance, a petition in March, 1726 claimed the African 
trade was the "principal) and most valuable trade of this city in which many 
thousands of familys In this city and places adjacent imployed and supported". 816 
As such, the trade "depends on a great measure on the free commerce" that 
occurs on the African coast to the plantations in the Americas. 817 While this may 
simply be rhetoric, the petition was presented at a time when Bristol was 
engaged In the most voyages to Africa to date, indicating that the trade was 
Indeed Important in Bristol's commercial profile. 
With the dissolution of the Royal African Company's monopoly in 1698, 
the slave trade was opened up to private traders. Moreover, in 1750, Parliament 
81 Davies, Royal African Company, pp. 129-130. 816 Mar 1726 petition on the African Trade in Minchinton, Politics of the Port, p. 21. 817 Ibid. 
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established the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, to ensure the 
maintenance of the coastal infrastructure which was previously the responsibility 
of the Royal African Company. The lobbying of Bristol and Liverpool merchants 
was instrumental in the proposal of the Bill which reorganised the trade under the 
Company. 818 Of the 475 members at its inception, 236 came from Bristol, 147 
from London and ninety-two from Liverpool, a perhaps surprising figure given 
Liverpool's increasing activity in the trade at this time. 819 Noting this discrepancy, 
Williamson's Liverpool Memorandum Book observed three years later that 
"whereas their Trade to Africa is not so extensive as the Merchants of Liverpool" 
the Company at this time had 135 merchants from London, 157 from Bristol and 
101 from Liverpool. 820 As late as 1772, John Arbuthnott MP, informed Bristol 
merchant Paul Farr of the potential "padding" of the Committee list by London 
merchants, expressing "that there are upwards of fourteen hundred for the port 
of London free of the African Company" whereas for Liverpool "there are but 
eighty-five free of the said Company". This was in spite of the fact that "Liverpool 
is near four times deeper concerned in the African trade than London". 821 
Contemporaries were thus well aware that the number of members in the 
Company was not necessarily reflective of the slave trading activity of the ports' 
respective merchants, especially if committee lists were fraudulent. 
Fraudulent lists or not, London merchants had a large presence in the 
Company of Merchants, and its establishment initiated a lot of clamour by Bristol 
and Liverpool merchants for the protection of the trade against the attempt by 
London merchants to monopolise it or organise it in the fashion of a joint-stock 
company. Both Bristol and Liverpool merchants argued for equal representation 
in the Company, in that three Committeemen each from London, Bristol and 
Liverpool should be selected, rather than the proposed four from London and two 
B1a Morgan, British Transatlantic Slave Trade Vol. 2, p. xxxi. 819 Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 36. 
820 Williamson, Liverpool Memorandum Book. 
821 John Arbuthnott to Paul Farr, 17 Apr 1772, SMV 7/2/1/10, BRO. 
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each from the outports. Bristol and Liverpool merchants, however, raised 
different concerns in the defence of their trade. For Bristol, primary concern was 
regarding the eligibility of Company members. Responding to the proposed 
motion that that those who were not free of the Company should not be allowed 
to trade on the African coast, Bristol merchants felt rather that those who were 
not members should not be allowed to vote for Committeemen, rather than be 
excluded from trade altogether. Their reasoning was that "many persons residing 
in America, and other places, could not, with Conveniency, make themselves free 
of the said Company". 822 The exclusion of such persons could in fact work to 
lessen the trade. It makes sense that Bristol merchants, with early and well- 
established connections in the Americas, as well as a relative concentration and 
specialisation in the American and West Indian trades would have this as a 
primary concern. 
In contrast, for Liverpool merchants, a primary concern was losing the 
trade to foreign powers, and most particularly the French. Liverpool merchants 
noted that our greatest Rivals 
... 
have not only laid it open to all subjects of 
France, but give very great Encouragement to it, above any other Branch of 
Commerce". 823 As such, Liverpool merchants deemed it necessary that London 
also keep the trade open to retain and encourage Britain's position as leaders in 
the trade. As noted in Chapter Four, keeping the trade open would also facilitate 
the role of the entrepreneur, as arguably, strict government or bureaucratic 
intervention, such as enforcing monopolies or licensing and taxation do not foster 
an environment for the entrepreneur to thrive. 824 Additionally, Liverpool 
merchants wanted the trade open as they felt "it is more proper to have a 
922 Copy of a Scheme from the Merchants of Bristol to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations for 
Securing, Improving and Extending trade to Africa, 1 Nov 1749, in Lambert, House Vol. 18, p. 438. 823 Copy of a Representation from the Merchants Trading to Africa from Leverpool to Commissioners 
for Trade and Plantations for Carrying on, Extending and Securing Trade to Africa, 24 Oct 1749, in 
Lambert, House Vol. 18, p. 444. 
824 See Chapter Four, p. 158; Ricketts, "Theories of Entrepreneurship", p. 36. 
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number of markets to go to than one". 825 Liverpool merchants also raised the 
issue of foreign competition later in the defence of the slave trade. In 1779, the 
president of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, Gill Slater wrote to Bristol's 
Society of Merchant Venturers asserting that Liverpool merchants were "ready to 
cooperate with you in whatever measures may appear necessary to preserve the 
freedom of this once valuable branch of commerce" so as not to strengthen the 
trade in "the hands of our opponents". 826 This demonstrates Liverpool merchants' 
attempt at coordinated action to ensure its interests were protected. The 
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce was established in 1774 to serve as a 
commercial voice for the port and lobby on its behalf; in the period 1774-1779, 
Bristol's Society of Merchant Venturers exchanged at least fifteen letters with 
Liverpool's Chamber, indicating that the Chamber had become "almost a national 
voice on some issues". 827 However, as is discussed below, the defence of the 
slave trade was largely in the hands of Liverpool's Corporation; interestingly, case 
study merchant John Tarleton, a leading opponent of the abolition of the slave 
trade was a member of both the Chamber and the Corporation, indicative of the 
bonding capital that characterised Liverpool's elite. 828 
Arguing for open markets for English merchants and protection from their 
foreign rivals is further reflective of Liverpool merchants' entrepreneurial attitude 
in more ably spreading risk by exploiting varied market opportunities, which had 
facilitated their entrance to the trade-829 As seen in Chapter Four, Liverpool 
merchants, in the context of both sanctioned and illicit trade, were more 
enterprising at exploiting and supplying markets than their Bristol counterparts, 
reinforcing the reasoning behind Liverpool merchants' emphasis on having more 
82S 13 Feb 1753 Committee Book of African Company of Merchants trading from Liverpool, 1750- 1820, LivPRO. 
826 Gill Slater to Michael Miller Jr, 12 Apr 1779, SMV, BRO. 827 Bennett, Voice of Liverpool, p. 9. 828 Ibid., p. 51. 829 Wallace, General Descriptive History, pp. 215-217. 
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market options. 830 Encouraging more market options along the African coast was 
important, particularly because those in London in support of a joint-stock 
company complained that Bristol cargoes in particular consisted chiefly of 
Windward negroes of little value ". 831 The truth of this statement is questionable, 
as Chapter Three demonstrated that Bristol did not venture to the Windward 
Coast nearly as often as the Bight of Biafra, the Gold Coast and West Central 
Africa. However, the sentiment corresponds with the argument established that 
Bristol merchants were relatively conservative in their exploitation of markets, 
while Liverpool merchants held a dominant position in five of the seven slaving 
regions along the coast. 832 That the Liverpool merchants warned against losing 
trade to the French is also significant, as this remained a concern towards the end 
of the eighteenth century, when the abolition of the trade was proposed. The 
threat of French competition was thus a central argument in the defence of the 
slave trade throughout the period. This is discussed further below. 
The concerted effort to abolish the slave trade was a twenty year 
campaign, beginning in 1787 and ending with the trade's abolition in 1807. The 
campaign is often divided in two phases by historians. For instance, Roger 
Anstey marks the division in the phases by the year 1796.833 A degree of 
regulation was achieved in the campaign's initial stages in 1788 with the passing 
of the Dolben Act, which specified legal tonnage ratios and required all slave ships 
to carry a doctor on board to improve conditions aboard the vessels. 834 Much 
debate surrounded this issue, and Chapter Four noted the perception slave trade 
merchants had in regards to the relationship among the size of the vessel, the 
30 See Chapter Four, p. 177. 
3 Minchinton, Politics and the Port, p. 78. 
832 See Chapter Three, p. 96. 
B33 Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760-1810 (Aldershot: Gregg 
Revivals, 1975), p. 256. In this year, a bill for abolition was defeated by only four votes (70 to 74). 
This was the closest the abolitionists came to defeating the slave trade until 1807. See also Thomas, Slave Trade, p. 538. 
834 F. E. Sanderson, "The Liverpool Delegates and Sir William Dolben's Bill", Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 124 (1972), pp. 57-84. 
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health of the voyage and profitability. 835 The reasons behind antislavery 
sentiment are richly debated in the historiography, with causes attributed to 
changes in religious, socio-political and economic attitudes in the period. 836 
Likewise, the reasons behind the length of time of the campaign are equally rich, 
as it was conducted in a milieu of war, upheaval in the West Indies and 
consequent falling sugar prices and was further dependent on the strengths and 
weaknesses of both its proponents and opponents. In 1787, the London-based 
Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade was formed, coinciding with 
the pronouncement by Yorkshire MP William Wilberforce that he would initiate a 
parliamentary campaign for the slave trade's abolition. 837 The London Society 
effectively spearheaded the campaign by mobilising the British public and 
government through a print propaganda and petitioning campaign, in which 
publisher James Phillips, for example, published no less than forty-five abolitionist 
tracts in the period up to 1798.838 
While antislavery sentiment increasingly spread throughout Britain, 
attacking the slave trade was easier than to attack the institution of slavery itself. 
Gathering empirical evidence on the "middle passage" was an easier task than 
that for the treatment of slaves in the Caribbean; additionally, by ending the 
trade rather than the institution, Parliament would not necessarily infringe on the 
property rights of planters or have to deal with issues of compensation. 839 As this 
was an issue directly affecting the West Indian planters, however, the link 
between the West India interest and that of the slave traders is further 
835 See Chapter Four, pp. 169-170. 
836 Ryden, West Indian Slavery, pp. 158-159. Ryden also offers a good discussion of the historiography 
on the West India economy and the abolition of the trade, West Indian Slavery, pp. 7-18. For more on 
the abolition of the trade, see Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade; Fogel, Without Consent or Contract; David 
Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987); Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era ofAbolition (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of 
Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975); Porter, Abolition of the Slave Trade. 837 Ryden, West Indian Slavery, p. 163. 
838 John Oldfield (ed. ), The British Transatlantic Slave Trade Vol. 3: The Abolitionists Struggle: 
Oponents of the Slave Trade (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2003), p. xx-xxi. 839 Ryden, West Indian Slavery, pp. 183,164. 
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reinforced. Indeed, the West India interest was arguably the slave trade's most 
powerful lobby and one of the reasons why the abolition campaign took as long as 
it did. M0 Ryden notes the apprehension of the West Indian planters caused by 
the attack on the trade, particularly because the Commons had traditionally 
supported the sugar interest by sanctioning Britain's slave traders. 841 
While the attack against the slave trade was largely conducted through 
London, Bristol and Liverpool merchants played a significant role in its defence. 
As the sugar interest dominated Bristol's commercial affairs, Bristol merchants 
certainly petitioned against the parliamentary campaign. Liverpool, however, 
took the most active lead in its opposition. This is not surprising, as in the 
decade between 1780-1789, Liverpool cleared 558 slaving vessels while Bristol 
only cleared ninety-four. 842 Likewise, Liverpool sent the most petitions, sending 
at least sixty-four to the Commons or the Lords, compared to just twelve from 
the Bristol merchants and Corporation and fourteen from London. 843 Moreover, 
throughout the period of parliamentary investigations, delegates from Liverpool 
remained in London at the Corporation's expense, reinforcing the commercial 
importance of the slave trade to the port and in the eyes of the Corporation. As 
mentioned above, the vast majority of Liverpool's Common Council in 1787 
invested in the slave trade. Thus, Liverpool's Corporation was strongly in favour 
of the slave trade and adamantly came to its defence. 
In spite of the strong bias towards the African interest, the abolitionist 
campaigning of William Roscoe and his circle, including James Currie and Edgar 
840 Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 286. This is certainly true for London. In Bristol and Liverpool, 
opposition was primarily led by the Society of Merchant Venturers and the Corporation rather than 
their respective West India Associations. It must also be taken into consideration the point raised in the 
Introduction that the extent of parliamentary influence the West Indian traders had in Parliament is also 
debated. It is, however, generally agreed that the major opponents, "West Indian" or not were "a large 
mixed group of businessmen-landowners who derived part or all of their income from growing or 
marketing colonial produce". Porter, Abolition of the Slave Trade, p. 29. 841 Ryden, West Indian Slavery, p. 157. 
842 See Table 2.2, p. 80. At this time, London cleared 119 vessels. Eltis et al., Trans-Atlantic Slave 
Trade. 
843 F. E. Sanderson, "The Liverpool Abolitionists", in Anstey and Hair, Liverpool, the Slave Trade and 
Abolition, pp. 196-239. 
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Corrie must not be ignored. However, that their correspondence with London had 
to be conducted anonymously speaks to the fact that the Liverpool abolitionists 
were a relatively quiet minority. 844 This is in contrast with Bristol, where a 
waning interest in the trade was more conducive to abolitionist sentiment. An 
active Quaker community promoted abolition throughout the century, and 
numerous articles appeared in the Felix Farley Bristol Journal from America 
regarding the horrors of the trade even before 1787.845 Letters printed in the 
papers urged "Sons of Commerce to withhold 
... 
their daily sacrifices to the idol 
INTEREST" and to consider, "as Englishmen, had you not rather be served by 
Freemen rather than by Slaves" [emphasis in original]. 846 Letters such as this are 
reflective of the historiographical argument that the rise of industrial capitalism 
prompted further consideration on the nature of worker-employer relationships. 
Additionally, consumers were becoming more market-aware and had misgivings 
as complicit and passive consumers of such slave-produced goods as sugar. 847 
Furthermore, meetings from abolition societies in other cities such as Manchester 
(an industrial centre) were published. Bristol readers were thus exposed to an 
abolitionist sentiment and this, coupled with a waning interest in the trade, may 
explain why fewer petitions against the proposed abolition were sent from 
Bristol. 848 
Nationally, in terms of the defence of the slave trade, the Company of 
Merchants Trading to Africa at large were not the trade's official spokesmen, and 
this, together with the fact that African interests were entangled with those of the 
West India, American and Mediterranean trades, as well as with banking, sugar 
refining and manufacturing, made an agreed upon policy on abolition difficult. 849 
844 Porter, Abolition of the Slave Trade, p. 52. 845 Dresser, Slavery Obscured, pp. 130-134; Marshall, Anti-Slave Trade Movement, p. 1. 846 Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 26 Jan 1788. 
847 Ryden, West Indian Slavery, pp. 158-159. 848 Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 12 Jan 1788; Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 6 Dec 1788. 849 Sanderson, "Liverpool Delegates", p. 60. 
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However, the Committee issued a statement in 1788 in defence of the trade that 
was reflective of these intermingling interests: 
This committee makes no scruple that the African trade is so blended with 
our commerce and so interwoven with our general interests that if at any 
time through Neglect, Mismanagement or Misfortune this nation should be 
deprived of its benefits it will suffer a very great and irreparable loss, a 
Main in its Commerce, Dignity and Power of which it is impossible to 
recover. 850 
This statement echoes the earlier defences of the trade in which different interest 
groups argued for the importance of the slave trade in the wider commercial 
fabric. As already highlighted, the West India interest, particularly that based in 
London, provided a powerful lobby, arguing that the invested capital in the sugar 
colonies, land and slaves amounted to seventy million pounds. 851 Defenders of 
the slave trade also championed other reasons in Parliament, namely that the 
West India and African trades provided a "nursery for seamen", and the threat of 
foreign competition deemed it necessary that Britain continued in this line of 
commerce for its continued prosperity. This threat of foreign competition 
demonstrates that ultimately, "the defence of the realm was fused with the 
defence of the slave trade". 852 While the statement above issued by the 
Committee was forceful, opposition against abolition was achieved largely through 
the localised efforts of merchant interests to make their own representations to 
Parliament. These localised efforts, however, reveal that, like the earlier petitions 
against the Royal African Company, group membership reflects the intermingling 
interests of the slave trade with other trades, such as that with the West Indies. 
The various groups that petitioned against the proposed abolition are discussed 
further below. It is argued here that, while opposition was indeed localised, 
Liverpool merchants took the initiative in this campaign to engage Bristol in a 
correspondence against the proposed abolition. Through these letters, as well as 
the resolutions made by various established committees, the leading position of 
850 Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, 19 Feb 1788, LP, Vol. CCXXVII, BL. 851 Porter, Abolition of the Slave Trade, p. 56. 852 ]bid., p. 69. 
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Liverpool merchants in the trade is clearly demonstrated, both in their knowledge 
of the trade and in their initiative to lead the fight in the proposed abolition of it. 
Early in 1788, John Tarleton, Robert Norris, James Penny and John 
Matthews were chosen to go to London to represent Liverpool's interests and 
work in consultation with the Company of Merchants to provide evidence in the 
parliamentary enquiries. 853 Demonstrating characteristic initiative, they sent a 
letter to the Bristol Society of Merchant Venturers on 11 July 1788 asking for 
Bristol to help with expenses in attending to the opposition of the proposed slave 
bill. This should not be a problem they argued, considering that "the town of 
Liverpool has been at a very considerable expence in a cause in which not only 
yourselves, but the West India Gentlemen and manufactures are deeply 
interested". 854 At this, the Society of Merchant Venturers responded that, because 
Bristol had also sent representatives to London, Liverpool should instead 
approach the Company of Merchants. 855 This hints at the insular, complacent 
outlook that ultimately had detrimental effects on their trade. Undeterred by this 
seemingly unhelpful response, the secretary of the Liverpool African Committee, 
Samuel Green, wrote to master of the Society of Merchant Venturers James Jones 
on 18 February 1789 enquiring about the "intentions of the merchants in your city 
as to opposing the abolition the trade". 856 Green was the centre of the lobbying 
activity in Liverpool, coordinating all of the correspondence and information on 
the proposed abolition. Green was the secretary for the Chamber of Commerce 
at this time, as well as the Liverpool African Committee. That he acted on behalf 
of the Liverpool African Committee (he used the African Committee's address in 
all of his correspondence) further demonstrates the less prominent role the 
953 Sanderson, "Liverpool Delegates", p. 62. 
854 Letter to Chairman of Committee of Merchants from John Tarleton, Robert Norris, James Penny and John Matthews, 11 Jul 1788, SMV, BRO. 
855 McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 136. 
856 Samuel Green to James Jones, 18 Feb 1789 SMV, BRO. 
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Chamber had in officially lobbying against the proposed abolition of the slave 
trade for Liverpool noted above. 857 In a passionate plea, Green stated: 
a correspondence upon the subject would be satisfactory to the gentlemen 
here, who are immediately interested in this important business and they 
are desirous and ready to adopt and support such measures as may be 
judged most likely to prevent a blow, so fatal to the naval strengths of 
Britain and so destructive of the liberty and welfare of the human species 
858 
as the abolition of the branch of commerce would certainly prove. 
Like the Committeeman's statement of defence, Green's plea for the defence of 
the trade highlights the fact that Bristol and Liverpool merchants often defended 
the slave trade largely by expressing what its abolition would mean for other 
branches of their own commerce, as well as for the welfare of Britain at large. A 
piece in Felix Farley's Bristol Journal asserted that the trade to Africa is the "first 
principle and foundation of all the rest; the main spring of the machine, which 
sets every wheel in motion". 859 Abolishing the trade would mean total destruction 
of not only Bristol, Liverpool and London, but manufacturing centres such as 
Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield. Furthermore, Britain would also lose the 
West India planters, who "can no longer look to the mother country for support, 
will look for it to Foreign powers" [emphasis in origina13.860 A 1789 petition by 
Bristol West India merchants also echoed the trade's importance, stating that the 
African and West India trades constituted three-fifths of the commerce of the port 
of Bristol; another petition by the same group asserted that, specifically, the 
"sugar-refining trade has for many years been a very considerable branch of 
manufacture in this city". 861 Additionally, petitions were also presented to 
Parliament from West India Planters, ship-builders and principle manufactures. 862 
In his examination in Parliament, Liverpool merchant Robert Norris specifically 
857 Bennett, Voice of Liverpool, pp. 52-53. 
858 Samuel Green to James Jones, 18 Feb 1789 SMV, BRO. 
859 Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 23 Feb 1788. 
860 Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 16 May 1789. 
861 1789 petition by West Indian merchants, Papers Against the Abolition of the Slave Trade SMV, 
BRO. 
862 1789 petition by Principle Manufacturers, Shipbuilders, Shipholders and Traders, Papers Against the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade, SMV, BRO. 
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defended the African trade by emphasising its impact on the West Indies. Norris 
asserted, "I could approve of no abolition of the slave trade that was not 
compatible with the West Indian Islands and when the necessities of the Planters 
no longer require the aid of labourers from Africa". 863 Likewise, in a letter to 
Clayton Tarleton regarding his interview with Prime Minister William Pitt, John 
Tarleton relayed that the African, West Indian and North American trades were 
the "principal branches of our foreign and colonial system of commerce" that 
were "now mutually blended and connected together". 864 Should there be 
"complete abolition" of the trade, "the consequences would be a rapid decline in 
the two latter and total ruin and impending destruction to the former which could 
not exist without due encouragement from the legislation". 865 Another Liverpool 
merchant even calculated that abolition of the trade would mean a financial loss 
of £7 million for Liverpool, and the resulting unemployment of shipbuilders, 
sailors and others, as well as the loss in revenue the port would receive from 
dock dues would cause the town to suffer. 866 
As the slave trade was an integral part of the larger commercial profile of 
both ports, committees were established to represent various interests to petition 
against abolition. These committees underscore that opposition efforts were 
indeed localised. In Bristol, meetings were called for and held in taverns and the 
Merchants Hall by West India merchants and planters to discuss petitions. The 
Society of Merchant Venturers, which played the role of coordinator among the 
various opponents of abolition, also organised three committees, one constituting 
African merchants, one of West India merchants and planters and one of 
manufacturers. 867 The group of manufacturers was the largest, with thirty-four 
members, followed by the West India group with twenty-one; the group of African 
merchants, however, only had ten, which included case study merchants James 
963 Examination of Robert Norris, 17 Mar 1790, in Lambert, House Vol. 82. 864 John Tarleton to Clayton Tarleton, 5 Feb 1788, Tarleton Papers, LivPRO. 
865 John Tarleton to Clayton Tarleton, 5 Feb 1788, Tarleton Papers, LivPRO. 
866 Holt and Gregson Papers, 942 HOL 10, LivPRO. 
867 McGrath, Merchant Venturers, p. 136. 
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Rogers and John Fowler. As Dresser has noted, it seems interesting that two 
Scotsman and two Welshman (Rogers, and Thomas Jones mentioned in the last 
chapter) were included in this group of ten, reinforcing the point that new blood 
was largely important in sustaining the latter interest in the Bristol slave trade, 
having obvious implications for merchant networks. 868 That the West India 
committee had twenty-one members, including Bristol's most prolific slave trader, 
James Laroche, is not surprising, considering the importance of the West India 
trade to Bristol. The number of manufacturers, however, may be rather 
unexpected but it has been argued that the Society of Merchant Venturers may 
have "padded out" the names on this committee to include friends, such as 
bankers, who were not necessarily manufacturers. 869 Even in the event of the list 
being "padded out", the list of manufacturers also included shipbuilders, 
gunpowder manufacturers, grocers, deal merchants and glass manufacturers that 
would have benefitted from the trade's survival. Therefore, in any case, 
members of each committee would certainly have had an interest in seeing the 
slave trade continue for the general prosperity of the port, as trading interests 
were inextricably linked. 
While Bristol merchants expressed opposition to abolition through 
established committees representing various interests, both the Corporation and 
the delegates representing Liverpool in London made the strongest arguments 
against proposals for Liverpool merchants. As noted above, because the 
Corporation was largely run by slave traders, they could speak for the Liverpool 
and African Interest perhaps more effectively than the disparate groups organised 
in Bristol. This is not to suggest that Liverpool was united both politically and 
commercially with no discord existing among merchants; indeed, one only has to 
refer to Checkland's study on American and West Indian traders to note factions 
and disagreements, particularly during the wars with France between 1793 and 
868 Dresser, Slavery Obscured, p. 148. 869 Ibid., p. 150. 
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1815.870 However, in terms of the defence of the slave trade, Liverpool's 
Corporation and merchants for the most part transcended any difference to 
protect its commerce at large 
. 
871 As noted above, in their defence of the slave 
trade the Corporation used the docks to make a link among previous actions of 
Parliament, Liverpool's trade and why the slave trade should not be abolished. By 
noting the effect the docks had in improving the prosperity of Liverpool and thus 
"the kingdom in general", the Corporation used similar arguments to Bristol's by 
stating the impact abolition would have on Britain as a whole. While the 
Corporation's defence was united and strong, the delegates in London also played 
a significant role in the opposition to the proposed abolition. As noted in Chapter 
Four, John Tarleton in particular was an avid defender of the trade and was a 
persistent correspondent on the matter; "knowledgeable and authoritative" with 
"painstaking" attention to detail, Tarleton wrote numerous letters to Baron 
Hawkesbury in London, both supplying him with requested information on the 
trade but also enquiring as to the actions of Parliament. 872 Replying to one such 
enquiry, Baron Hawkesbury expressed a degree of impatience with Tarleton's 
tenacious letter writing, saying "I can now say no more on the subject than what 
I have repeatedly written you in former letters". 873 As Tarleton also wrote letters 
to Bristol enquiring after their proposed actions and requesting their support eight 
years earlier, his persistent contact with Baron Hawkesbury demonstrates the 
active role he took in defending the interests of Liverpool merchants over a long 
period. 
870 See S. G Checkland, "American versus West Indian Traders in Liverpool 1793-1815", Journal of 
Economic history, 18 (1958), pp. 141-160. 
871 Yukihisa Kumagai also argues that in campaigns against the renewal of the East India Company's 
charter (1812-1813 and 1829-1833), Liverpool merchants also transcended their political and economic differences to take a leading role in these campaigns by coordinating efforts with other towns. The 
Activities of Provincial Mercantile and Manufacturing Interests Against the Renewal of the East India Company's Charter, 1812-1813 and 1829-1833. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 
2008. 
872 Sanderson, "Liverpool Delegates", p. 62. 
873 Baron Ilawkesbury to John Tarleton, 28 Nov 1794, LP, Vol. CXXI, BL. 
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The letters between Baron Hawkesbury and merchants from both Bristol 
and Liverpool are of particular value because they reveal insight into how the 
entrepreneurial considerations of knowledge, expertise and merchant networks 
were used in the defence of the slave trade. Baron Hawkesbury was interested in 
gaining as much information as he could from merchants in both ports regarding 
the trade, particularly with respect to how the French, Spanish and Portuguese 
were conducting it. When the Dolben Bill was under consideration, specific 
information was also exchanged about tonnage of the vessels, profitability, the 
behaviour of the captains and crew as well as the health of the slaves on board. 
This information was relayed in the House of Commons enquiries and is also 
found in the Sessional Papers. Again, while it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to detail each point raised in the correspondence as well as in the parliamentary 
debates, a few important examples regarding these entrepreneurial 
considerations and merchant networks will be mentioned here. An issue that was 
often raised was the importance of having knowledge and expertise in the trade. 
Bristol merchant James Jones stated that the slave trade was a "very uncertain 
and precarious trade, and if there is not a probable prospect of considerable 
profit, no man of considerable property who hath any knowledge of it would 
embark or continue in it". 874 Likewise, Jones noted that restrictions in trade 
regarding tonnage would render the prospect of profit "inadequate and not 
encourage the persons in the trade whose knowledge of it has been matured by 
long experience 
... 
other adventurers that know nothing of it might perhaps start 
up". 675 Thus, those with experience in the trade would know these restrictions 
would be detrimental to the trade and would not embark on voyages, while those 
who knew nothing of it would ultimately be unsuccessful. 
Knowledge and experience in the trade were particularly imperative for the 
slave trade because of the unique risks involved. Slave traders had to be aware 
87 James Jones to Baron Hawkesbury, 26 Jul 1788, LP, Vol. CCXXII, BL. 
875 James Jones to Baron Ilawkesbury, 27 Jun 1788, LP, Vol. CCXXII, BL. 
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of these risks and possess the skills to manage them effectively. The importance 
of such knowledge and experience is further enforced through these letters as a 
necessary requirement for success in the trade. Communication with Baron 
Hawkesbury also emphasised the knowledge and expertise of the captains; 
indeed, a Liverpool correspondent observed that "the masters of vessels 
employed in the African slave trade have a knowledge of the wants of that coast 
and possess an influence with the Black Traders which no new set of man can 
acquire". 876 Therefore, knowledge and experience in the trade were closely linked 
and the success of voyages was largely dependent on the captains' human 
capital, as well as that of the merchants. Reinforcing this notion, a proposition 
was introduced in the House of Lords that no one should be placed in command of 
a slave ship unless he has previously commanded a slave ship or served as chief 
mate on at least two voyages. 87 The expressed sentiments of knowledge being 
"matured by long experience", that new men without the requisite knowledge 
would be unsuccessful, and that captains must have previous experience to be 
employed seems to support the idea that an insular, elite bonding group 
characterised the Liverpool slave trade at this late point in time. Chapter Three 
demonstrated the average size of Liverpool investment groups decreased in the 
last twenty years of the trade, indicating that merchant networks were becoming 
smaller. 878 It was also argued in Chapters Four and Five that a reason for this 
was Liverpool's established success in the trade which itself was based on their 
merchant networks being saturated with knowledge and expertise. The defence of 
the trade thus acknowledged that the knowledge and expertise, as it existed most 
predominately in Liverpool, was paramount to its success. This is discussed 
further below. 
Encouragement provided by the government was another issue raised 
especially with regard to their foreign rivals. That the French, Spanish and 
K76 Edgar Corrie to Baron Hawkesbury, 24 Feb 1788, LP, Vol. CCXXII, BL. 
"" Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 5 Jul. 1788. 
873 See Table 3.3, p. 127. 
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Portuguese were not as active in the trade as Britain, but were perceived to be 
looking to increase their participation may also speak to why British merchants 
strongly argued for the importance of knowledge and experience in the trade's 
success. As noted in Chapter Four, the French were a considerable threat to 
Britain throughout the eighteenth century, particularly in the Caribbean, and this 
fact was a common argument in the defence of the slave trade. 879 French 
merchants' overall involvement in the slave trade was generally less than that of 
Liverpool's. However, France's highest number of recorded voyages took place in 
the decade between 1780 and 1789, precisely the time of these debates, and at 
619 voyages, the French conducted sixty-one more voyages than Liverpool 
alone. 880 Despite France's smaller share in the trade compared with Britain as a 
whole, Liverpool merchant William Walton noted that the French bounty was 
"considerably larger than in England" and for "eight years past, France has paid 
every attention possible to increase her number of slave ships, by removing all 
obstacles and difficulties to the fitting out and loading of vessels intended for the 
slave trade". 881 Speaking in Parliament, Liverpool merchant James Penny also 
testified that the slave trade "is at present languishing from opposition to the 
French" and that their "liberal bounties and superior prices for slaves in the West 
Indies" contributed to perceived decrease in trade. 882 Jones and Tarleton also 
noted the bounty provided by the French government, and thought it best if 
Britain would follow their example, thereby encouraging the enterprise of the 
British traders rather than abolishing it or making it more difficult. These 
sentiments were also found in newspapers. That the French offered bounties, the 
Felix Farley's Bristol Journal asserted it "ought to awaken our ministers as well as 
the people of Liverpool and Bristol; or by the encouragement of the French 
... 
the 
79 See Chapter Four, p. 179. 880 Eltis et at., Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. The next decade, however, the French engaged in 389 
voyages while Liverpool participated in its highest number of recorded voyages, 969. 
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commerce of Africa will be lost to England". 583 Furthermore, "if France has 
deemed the trade of such importance to her, it must be of much greater to us, 
who may be said to subsist only as a maritime power". 884 These arguments were 
very similar to those made by Liverpool merchants at the middle of the century 
during the debates surrounding the establishment of the Company of Merchants. 
In this sense, the defence of the slave trade throughout the period relied very 
much on the same concerns and reflects the competitive threat France was to 
British commerce throughout the century. 
Even though France embarked on less slaving voyages than Britain as a 
whole, concern that French encouragement would mean a loss of the African 
trade in Britain was a genuine concern, particularly because some British slave 
traders embarked on slaving voyages from France. John Tarleton testified in 
Parliament that if restrictions specified less than two slaves per ton, "the 
consequence would be the removal to Port of Havre in France". 885 Tarleton 
himself sought partnerships with French traders to increase his chances for profit, 
as demonstrated in Chapter Four. 886 James Jones further noted that connections 
were being formed in France that would "prove very injurious to the trade of this 
country", while ships from both Bristol and Liverpool were being fitted out for the 
French trade. 887 It was also observed that Liverpool captains were sought by the 
French to command their vessels, further supporting Liverpool captains' increased 
human capital and expertise in the trade. 888 Concerns over French competition in 
particular were most paramount in the first phase of the campaign against 
abolition; as mentioned above, the late campaign was carried out in a context of 
war, which was naturally accompanied by uncertainty. The above comments by 
Walton, Penny, Tarleton and Jones were made before when the French trade was 
883 Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 18 Dec 1784. 
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at its height and thus posed a more significant threat. The revolutions in the 
French colonies of St. Domingue and Guadeloupe in 1791 and 1794, however, not 
only changed the socio-political structures of those colonies but greatly 
diminished their sugar production as well, in effect lessening French impact in 
trade. 889 Indeed, in the decade between 1790-1799, France only engaged in 389 
voyages, while in the last seven years of the trade, the number of voyages was 
reduced to just twenty-three. 89° Still, that a threat was perceived remained an 
important part of Bristol and Liverpool's defence as it related to the commercial 
interests of Britain at large. 
Spanish interests were also deemed to threaten English interests. William 
Walton relayed to Lord Liverpool that Spain in 1788 was only making ""necessary 
preparations to begin trade" but had not yet "settled her plan of operations". 891 
He also communicated that five Spanish merchants looking to enter the trade had 
come to London. From there, they went to Manchester to enquire after their 
trading goods and their prices. They also visited Liverpool to "'view the town and 
ships employed in the slave trade" and gather information on the trade's 
profitability to the port. 892 Like some of the French traders, they also wondered 
whether 
captains and doctors experienced in the trade could be prevailed upon by 
proper encouragement to go out to Cadiz and undertake the purchasing of 
the cargoes, navigation of their vessels and management of their slaves 
whilst on board their vessels. 893 
By enquiring after the trade in Liverpool rather than Bristol or London 
demonstrates that Liverpool slave merchants were clearly seen by merchants at 
large as the clear leaders in the trade, not only at home, but abroad too. 
889 Porter, Abolition of the Slave Trade, p. 110. 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter has argued that the Bristol merchant community and its 
leadership were characterised by hesitancy, caution and atomisation that 
hindered port improvements and impacted upon its campaigns against the Royal 
African Company monopoly and, later, abolition. Conversely, the collective 
initiative, action and expertise that allowed Liverpool merchants to succeed in the 
slave trade was utilised in Liverpool's efforts to further their wider interests, 
including implementing port improvements and opposing the proposed abolition 
of the slave trade. The bonding capital that typified the Bristol Corporation, 
Society of Merchant Venturers and its merchants manifested itself in a relative 
complacency and conservatism, which caused perpetual delays in improvements 
made to the port and commercial decline. This conservatism also mirrored Bristol 
slave merchants' activity in the slave trade. Bristol's noted conservatism in 
exploiting new markets on the African coast and supplying foreign markets in the 
Americas for instance may emphasise a general business culture that fostered 
caution, or "sticking to what you know". The idea of a cautious general business 
culture is reinforced by the notion that Bristol's West India merchants also 
exhibited relative conservatism by the end of the period. The atomisation of 
merchants and their interests resulted in disparate groups fighting the proposed 
abolition and a Society of Merchant Venturers who shunned Liverpool's outreach 
of support. 
In contrast, Liverpool merchants demonstrated a collective spirit of 
enterprise throughout the period. They were represented by a more united, active 
and commercially-minded Corporation, which made necessary improvements that 
both facilitated the growth of trade and provided an environment for the port's 
trades to thrive. Thus, by the time the slave trade in particular was brought into 
question, Liverpool slave merchants were its recognised leaders, and they led the 
rally against the proposed abolition of the trade. Liverpool merchants by the end 
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of the period were sought out not only by Bristol merchants, but French and 
Spanish merchants for their superior knowledge and expertise, demonstrating 
Liverpool merchants' collective spirit of enterprise that characterised their 
performance in the trade. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
In the eighteenth century, the port cities of Bristol and Liverpool enjoyed a 
commercial prosperity that was inextricably linked with the Atlantic trade, and 
particularly that of the slave trade. Both claimed to be England's "second city" at 
different points in their history, but by the middle of the eighteenth century, 
Liverpool surpassed Bristol to become the leading British port in the slave trade. 
The reasons for Liverpool's dominance have been subject to much debate. 
Chapter Two noted leading abolitionist Thomas Clarkson's assertion that 
Liverpool's success was due to the admission of strangers to Liverpool's trade, the 
salt trade, the increase in Lancashire's population, manufacturing in Manchester 
as well as canal development. 894 This project discussed the primary 
historiographical arguments for Liverpool's success, many of which are in line 
with Clarkson's assertion. Importantly, this project also placed these 
historiographical arguments together under the umbrella framework of 
entrepreneurship and the various notions of capital, thus achieving a more 
comprehensive argument for Liverpool's success. 
The admission of outsiders was a noted feature of the Liverpool merchant 
community. Liverpool's commercial ethos was important in the context of its 
tremendous population growth, facilitating the integration of "outsiders" and 
granting Liverpool merchants much greater access to important human capital. 
In contrast, changes in Bristol's demographic commercial profile limited the 
availability of human capital to its merchants and affected the port's prosperity in 
the slave trade. At the same time as Liverpool was growing quickly and 
establishing itself commercially in the 1720s and 1730s, leading Bristol slave 
merchants failed to create dynasties in the trade. 895 Additionally, after 1750, 
Bristol "men of somewhat obscure origins" managed more slaving ventures as 
894 Donnan, Documents, p. 575. 895 Morgan, "Bristol West India", p. 203. 
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associational ties of marriage and apprenticeship among agents declined. 896 
Another noted advantage for Liverpool, and also in line with Clarkson's reasoning, 
was that port's relationship with its hinterland. Liverpool's proximity to Lancashire 
textile mills was certainly an advantage when assorting appropriate cargoes for 
slaving ventures and in receiving valuable credit terms. Furthermore, the coal 
and salt fields surrounding Liverpool were instrumental in its development, as 
they made possible the creation of industries and improvements in transport and 
communications infrastructure. 897 Marriner observes a boom in river 
improvement schemes in the eighteenth century, in addition to Liverpool's 
pioneering dock building. 898 Thus, as Clarkson has also noted, superior transport 
and dock facilities, including the communication provided by the canals, also 
provided a significant advantage to Liverpool's trade. In contrast, Bristol was slow 
to improve its docks and implement canal schemes, which proved to be a 
hindrance for commerce. Bristol's indecision and delays throughout the 
eighteenth century regarding port improvement ultimately deterred its expansion 
in trade generally by the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
The entrepreneurship framework established in this project weaves 
together these arguments noted above. This framework takes into account the 
relationships merchants had within their networks, including how they were 
established and maintained, as well as how merchants accessed and utilised 
various resources necessary for the successful operation of the trade. This is 
inclusive of what may be considered "natural" advantages or resources, such as 
their respective geography and hinterlands. Both ports had to make man-made 
improvements to accommodate an increase in trade, and as argued, Bristol 
merchants exhibited a spirit of "unambitious caution" while Liverpool merchants 
encouraged and actively sought these improvements. Likewise, the relationships 
Liverpool merchants forged with the hinterland industries benefitted their trade, 
896 Richardson, Bristol Slave Traders, p. 24. 897 Marriner, Economic and Social Development, p. 13. 898 Ibid., pp. 18,31. 
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while, in part due to better transport facilities, Bristol lost much of its hinterland 
trade to Liverpool. Liverpool merchants thus actively shaped their environment 
to cater to their trade, further enhancing their competitive advantages. 
Therefore, by using the theory of entrepreneurship and the various forms of 
capital accessed within merchants' associational networks, this project achieves 
the more convincing and satisfying explanation for Liverpool's success besides 
their often-argued but little-explained "business acumen". This "business 
acumen" can now essentially be attributed to the entrepreneurship of the 
Liverpool slave merchants as it was derived from their networks. 
The slave trade was one of risk and uncertainty, and as such, it was 
conducted by merchant networks that were created based on trust and reputation 
in order to manage these risks and uncertainty. In building that reputation, 
specific personal qualities such as industry, prudence, vigour and spirit were 
recognised as essential for success in eighteenth-century commerce. Likewise, 
the particular role of the entrepreneur as slave trade merchants was defined in 
this context. For example, as part of this role, slave trade merchants needed to 
coordinate various resources, correspond with captains, factors and agents and 
exploit a variety of markets to ensure the success of voyages. Liverpool 
merchants also demonstrated particular initiative and coordinated action 
regarding both port improvements and in their defence of the slave trade. This 
exemplifies Liverpool's "spirit", which drove its success in the slave trade and 
stands in contrast with Bristol's apathy, hesitation and complacency that 
contributed to its decline. The particular role of the entrepreneur was most aptly 
demonstrated through the management patterns of Bristol and Liverpool slave 
trade merchants. Bristol slave trade merchants managed slaving voyages within 
comparatively small investment groups; thus, the business network a Bristol 
merchant was part of was also smaller. Social network analysis also found that 
the Bristol slave merchant community was more atomised, which corresponded 
with historiographically noted trends in Bristol's stagnating population and 
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decreasing merchant community at large throughout the period. In contrast, 
Liverpool merchants participated in much larger investment groups and the slave 
merchant community was much larger and more connected. The merchant case 
studies for both Bristol and Liverpool largely conformed to these established 
trends. The ability to coordinate knowledge and resources, an entrepreneurial 
role, was one such reason for large investment groups in Liverpool that 
contributed to their success. As Liverpool merchant investment groups were 
larger, the responsibility was shared among more people and risk was spread. 
Not only was risk spread, but these larger networks facilitated greater information 
transfer, keeping Liverpool merchants current with information used to combat 
problems associated with the uncertainty in the trade. In Bristol, where more 
owners acted solely, not only did these individuals assume all of the risk and 
responsibility, but they arguably did not have as much access to information, 
credit and different types of capital as did the Liverpool merchants acting in larger 
investment groups. Liverpool merchants thus conducted business in "coalitions of 
entrepreneurs" while Bristol merchants, in many cases acting alone, did not 
necessarily have the benefit of new and up-to-date information. 
Indeed, evidence was provided to demonstrate that Bristol merchants 
often turned to Liverpool for their superior knowledge and expertise in the trade. 
In this way, Bristol slave merchants were "follower-entrepreneurs" rather than 
"leader-entrepreneurs". 899 Spanish and French merchants also recognised 
Liverpool's superiority in the trade. Additionally, Liverpool captains facilitated 
information transfer and demonstrated superior expertise based on experience. 
Their human capital was sought by London and Bristol merchants, as well and 
those from Spain and France. That the role of entrepreneur was not fulfilled as 
successfully in Bristol as it was in Liverpool is further evidenced by Liverpool 
merchants' exploitation of new market opportunities both on the African coast 
and in the Americas. This demonstrates not only Liverpool merchants' willingness 
899 Casson, Entrepreneur, p. 43. 
281 
to take risks, but that Liverpool merchant networks, due to their size, also had a 
greater ability to gather and pass information within them more successfully than 
their counterparts. Furthermore, these larger networks facilitated merchants' 
access to social capital in their particular urban setting. 
These noted patterns relating to the business of the trade, or "Inside the 
Counting House" were also reflected in the social relationships and political roles 
these merchants had outside of a slaving venture, or "Outside the Counting 
House". However, life inside and outside the counting house often merged in a 
merchant's career and cannot be seen as discrete entities. Indeed, it was 
established that networks emerge for project-based work, such as a slaving 
venture, and often this formal collaboration stemmed from pre-existing informal 
relationships. Slave venture investment partnerships were formed based on trust 
and reputation in fellow merchants' business practice, and these relationships 
were further cemented by informal interactions in coffeehouses, drinking and 
dinner clubs and political associations, for example. Social capital, or the 
potential or real resources to aid a merchant's business practice that existed in 
network relationships, was also accessed through the Bristol and Liverpool 
merchants' particular urban environments. Residential patterns, membership in 
certain clubs and associations as well as frequenting specific coffeehouses not 
only conformed to ideals of the "urban renaissance" but allowed for merchants to 
build or re-build relationships that would contribute to better business practice. 
This project also demonstrated that, contrary to earlier arguments, the 
importance of social capital did not lessen throughout the century, it only altered 
network dynamics. With a dearth in both human and social capital after their 
height in the slave trade, Bristol merchants re-built their access to social capital 
by the end of the period, contributing to larger investment groups. Conversely, 
Liverpool's slave merchant networks by the end of the period were saturated by 
the wealth of knowledge and expertise the community had and thus access to 
social capital was not as necessary as it was for gaining initial entry into the 
282 
trade. Therefore, different types of social capital served different purposes in the 
Bristol and Liverpool slave merchant communities. The case study examples of 
port improvements and the defence of the slave trade further commented on the 
nature of both communities in which the entrepreneurial qualities of action and 
leadership, coupled with ideas of access to capital and the relative cohesiveness 
of merchant networks shaped their particular responses to these issues. It was 
found that the entrepreneurial qualities which made the Liverpool merchants 
successful in the slave trade were applied to issues of port improvement and the 
fight against the proposed abolition of the trade. As such, Liverpool emerged as a 
leading port by the end of the century and its merchants actively led the defence 
of the slave trade. As Bristol merchants did not collectively possess these 
entrepreneurial qualities, their trade declined throughout the period. 
The limitations of this study were discussed in the Introduction, however, 
there is great scope for future research. Indeed, each chapter presented issues 
which could be expanded into larger projects. As mentioned above, the Trans 
Atlantic Slave Trade Database is a fantastic resource, which facilitated this 
research tremendously. Using it, the nature of investment groups in Bristol and 
Liverpool were ascertained and provided evidence for the argument that 
Liverpool's comparatively larger groups aided their success in the trade. 
Questions then emerge regarding the feasibility of such comprehensive analysis 
across different trades in both ports as well as other locales at this time without 
such a resource. While this project briefly mentioned them, it would be 
interesting to conduct a wider analysis using this framework of the West Indian 
traders, American traders or indeed those trading to other parts of the Empire to 
see if they too demonstrated these entrepreneurial characteristics. Additionally, 
Bristol and Liverpool merchants in their particular urban environment can be 
analysed further, examining their familial and religious ties more closely. 
Furthermore, a more gendered analysis, including the role of merchants' wives, 
sisters and mothers and how they may or may not have contributed to the 
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merchants' networks and business practice would be very useful. The example in 
Chapter Four of Captain Irving corresponding with his wife as a vital link in 
knowledge transfer attests to the further research that can be conducted in this 
vein. Additionally, other aspects which could be explored include the merchants' 
relationships with the state and their involvement in large political movements 
such as the proposed abolition of the slave trade. 
More fruitful and new avenues of research can also be derived from the 
frameworks of entrepreneurship and networks. Using the theory of 
entrepreneurship, various notions of capital as well as social network analysis 
allows for a much more nuanced and complete study of trade and merchant 
communities beyond the slave trade and the communities of Bristol and 
Liverpool. Contemporaries recognised a link between a spirit of enterprise and 
business success, so there is no danger of anachronism. Additionally, it is well 
known that eighteenth-century transatlantic merchants conducted trade within 
networks that were established based on trust and loyalty and maintained 
through repeated interactions. Furthermore, these networks facilitated trade 
through knowledge acquisition and transfer conducted both through 
correspondence and informal meetings at merchant Exchanges, the counting 
house and coffeehouses. Future research utilising the theory of entrepreneurship 
and social network analysis can therefore be explored in other merchant 
communities and across other trades. The Atlantic World has become almost 
universally recognised as its own conceptual unit; examining networks of, for 
instance, Caribbean planters, Nova Scotian timber merchants, or Glasgow tobacco 
merchants utilising this framework would offer a more comprehensive view of 
these trades and communities. In so doing, a greater understanding of the 
Atlantic World would also be achieved. 
A study of Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchants utilising this theory 
offers the most comprehensive conclusion for Liverpool's success. The project was 
an interdisciplinary endeavour, as it was informed not only by the historiography 
284 
of the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade in its larger mercantile and Atlantic 
context, but also by current literature on business, entrepreneurship, networks 
and capital. Additionally, visual analytics tools were applied, facilitating visual 
representations of the structure of, and connections within, both merchant 
communities over time that have not been produced before. This, coupled with a 
spatial analysis of the homes and businesses of merchants, as well as the 
associational clubs of which merchants were members, offers a more rounded 
examination of the interwoven mercantile and social context which helped shape 
the Bristol and Liverpool slave trade merchants' business practice. This project 
therefore provides an important contribution to the existing literature on the 
Bristol and Liverpool slave trade and offers further insight Into the nature of 
entrepreneurship and business networks by placing these concepts into an 
eighteenth-century commercial framework. Adopting these concepts can enrich 
the study of trade which operated within a network form of organisation that is 
characteristic of Atlantic trade at large. 
An oft-quoted sentiment in the lead up to the abolition of the slave trade 
was the dichotomy between a "Liverpool man" and a "humanity man"; the 
implication being that those who opposed the slave trade on humane grounds 
were humanity men while a Liverpool man was self-interested, willing to engage 
in any trade as long as there were profits to be had. 900 After this analysis, 
however, it seems more apt to argue that what constituted a Liverpool man was 
his entrepreneurship. This study has demonstrated that Liverpool slave trade 
merchants had the personal entrepreneurial qualities of initiative, risk-taking, 
action and leadership. They also fulfilled the role of the entrepreneur by utilising 
and accessing various resources gained through their associational networks to 
make them knowledgeable and expert leaders in the trade. In contrast, Bristol 
merchants simply were not as entrepreneurial. Their performance in the slave 
trade was marked by conservatism and an unwillingness to take risks, which 
900 David Samuell to Gregson, Oct 1788, Gregson Papers, LivPRO. 
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mirrors Bristol's Corporation at the time in its hesitancy to make necessary port 
improvements to bolster Bristol's lagging trade. Lacking entrepreneurial 
characteristics and failing to fulfil entrepreneurial roles in the trade thus prompted 
some Bristol merchants to turn to those in Liverpool for their expertise. 
Supporting this, it is worth revisiting the comment first discussed in Chapter Two 
by Lowbridge Bright of Bristol, when he asserted, "the Liverpoole people go on 
with such spirit. I wish we could get more into that track, as they keep their 
business more to themselves". 901 Not only did Bright recognise a certain "spirit" 
had by the Liverpool merchants, but also a certain manner of business practice to 
emulate for success. Thus, what further constituted a "Liverpool man" was his 
success in business. These notions of spirit, knowledge and resource pooling, 
group cohesiveness as well as initiative and action are entrepreneurial qualities 
that ensured Liverpool's commercial success and enabled Liverpool slave 
merchants to dominate the trade. In short, what made a Liverpool man was his 
"particular spirit of enterprise". 
901 Lowbridge Bright to Henry Bright, 5 Nov 1773, in Morgan, Bright-Meyler, p. 450. 
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Technical Appendix 
This appendix explains how this project gathered and utilised data from 
the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database (TASTD). The TASTD is an invaluable 
resource. Based on years of research, and existing now as the updated online 
version of the CD-ROM created in 1999, it contains records of 34,941 
transatlantic voyages, each supported on average by between five and six 
sources. These sources are often drawn from three or more national archives. 902 
The database is also organic. The online version contains more records than the 
CD-ROM, and with a function that allows users to contribute data to the site, the 
TASTD is often updated. Thus, it must be taken into consideration that the data 
from this project was gathered and analysed largely between 2008 and 2009 and 
so there will be variations in it in future explorations. The TASTD offers a wide 
variety of data; among others, users can find the owners of voyages, the 
captains, tonnage of vessels, place of the vessels' construction and registration, 
where voyages embarked on the African coast and disembarked in the Americas, 
the number of slaves taken on board and that which disembarked. Essentially, 
users can trace the fate of a particular voyage in a significant amount of detail. 
This is particularly useful when the details of voyages can be supported by 
merchant correspondence and other manuscript sources. Additionally, users can 
construct specific queries and create tables and graphs specifying certain pieces 
of information to cater to the specific interest of the researcher. This project 
primarily used the database to find both the individuals involved and the number 
of voyages clearing from the ports of Bristol and Liverpool over different time 
periods and where they embarked and disembarked. Likewise, this information 
was found for the twelve case study merchants. To ascertain slave merchant 
902 David Eltis and Paul F. Lachance, "Estimates of the Size and Direction of the Transatlantic Slave Trade", available at http: //slavevoyages. org/downloads/2010estimates-method. pdf. 
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networks and construct the social network analysis, explained further below, lists 
of the owners of all Bristol and Liverpool voyages were also downloaded. 
With such a vast amount of information at hand, corroborated among 
numerous sources from multiple archives, the construction of the database has its 
own complex methodology and this needs to be taken into account when using 
the database. The database offers both a forty-page instructional manual on how 
to use it as well as essays comprising detailed explanations of how the data was 
derived. 903 Data was taken from records from the three points of the voyage, 
including from its organisation, the purchase on the African coast and the sale in 
the Americas. The number of sources used to detail each voyage from these three 
points is indicative of the fact that few voyages contain complete information on 
the route taken and the number of captives taken. Discrepancies and gaps in data 
thus exist. For instance it is noted in that the number of voyages that embarked 
on the African coast does not match the number of voyages that disembark in the 
Americas. Thus, the authors of the database summarised the information and 
made inferences. The data in which inferences were made are labelled as 
imputed variables, and the explanations from their derivation are made clear in 
their methodological essays. 
Fortunately for this project, however, the records for the British slave 
trade are more complete than they are for the other national carriers, so the data 
was analysed with confidence. Because "a close to complete set" of port books 
exist in Bristol, the authors of the database even assert that the data from Bristol 
is taken as one hundred per cent complete. One issue that this project had to 
deal with, however, was how the owners, particularly for Bristol, were listed. 
From their methodological essay, the authors explain how they listed the owners: 
For most of the slave voyages in the data set, however, merchants owned 
fractional shares of the vessel and trading cargo. The listing of merchants 
in the set probably reflects the size of each shareholder, though this fact 
can be confirmed only for a few voyages. For some voyages we only know 
903 For the instructional guide, see htro: //www. slavevoya es. orgJtast/database/guide faces; for the essay 
on how the data was derived see bZ: //www. slavevoyajzes. orpJtast/database/ aide faces 
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the principal owner "and Company. " This is true particularly for many 
Bristol (England) voyages. To indicate the fact that the voyage was owned 
and/or organised by additional owners, we placed an asterisk, *, at the 
end of the last recorded merchant's name. 904 
From this explanation, this project had to assume that the first person mentioned 
in the list of owners was the primary owner. When the data is downloaded into 
Excel, the first person listed in the display is represented "Owner A" while those 
listed under him are "Owner B", "Owner C" and so on. Cross referencing 
merchant correspondence with this listing often reflected that the person listed 
first, the primary owner, wrote to the ship's captain as well as the agents in the 
Americas. Thus, in analysing the trends in ownership, those listed first were 
counted as primary owners, or "Owner A", while those under were counted as 
secondary owners. Their exact share in ownership in terms of financial capital was 
not an important consideration for the project; what was, however, was the 
implication that the more owners contributing to a voyage constituted an 
entrepreneurial strategy, as both risk and profits were spread and investors had a 
larger pool of resources from which to draw to ensure the voyage's success. 
After downloading a list of all the owners from Bristol and Liverpool 
voyages, a computer code was created to count the following: the number of 
times they were primary owners, the number of times they were solo primary 
owners, and the number of times they were investors. 905 The number of 
relationships between merchants was also deduced, in which investors worked 
together on a voyage, whether one was Owner A and the other was an investor 
or they were both investors. The figures provided the basis for the analysis in 
Chapter Three. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the software program used for visual 
analysis, Pajek, is free and available to download. 906 There are numerous 
904 http: //www. slavevoyages. orWtast/database/jzuide. faces 905 I am grateful for the assistance of Dr. Adam Brown in the creation of this code as well as with the 
Pajek diagrams. 
906 http: //vlado. fmf uni-Iisi/pub/networks/pajek/. 
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applications available to users and the book by de Nooy et al. offers a step by 
step guide in these applications. 907 For this project, Pajek was used as simply a 
visual tool in which the slave merchant networks were graphically represented. 
907 de Nooy et al., Exploratory. 
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